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ABSTRACT
Since the late 1980s, a significant number of studies of the work of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) in the developing world have been published, giving rise to a 
distinctive literature within the social sciences. This literature however focuses on the socio­
economic aspects of NGO action and is of limited use to political scientists in interpreting the 
"associational revolution" triggered by the proliferation of NGOs in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America in recent decades.
Michael Bratton has argued that it is in the political sphere rather than the economic 
that the contributions of NGOs to development should be mainly seen, yet political scientists 
have failed to contribute proportionately to the evolving NGO literature. Following Bratton, 
this dissertation examines the role of NGOs in Philippine politics, especially since the collapse 
of the Marcos dictatorship in February 1986. The dissertation examines the history of 
Philippine NGO participation in politics, relations between NGOs and the Philippine state 
since 1986, the institutional forces promoting the proliferation of NGOs, and the main 
mechanisms through which NGOs engage in politics. Case-studies of two of the Philippines’ 
leading NGOs elaborate on the general arguments from early chapters and reveal that NGO 
strategy is characterised by a complex blend of participation and protest shaped by the 
policies of a succession of regimes throughout the late twentieth century.
Between 1984 and 1993, the number of NGOs in the Philippines grew by 148%. This 
growth raises important questions about the nature of NGO action and its impact on 
Philippine politics, the state, and civil society. Does the NGO community strengthen civil 
society? Can it transform relations between the state and civil society? Can it help to 
empower the millions traditionally marginalised from political participation in the Philippines? 
On the first question, the dissertation argues that NGOs simultaneously weaken and strengthen 
civil society and that the NGO community is best seen as a new arena within which battles 
from society at large are internalized. On the-second, it argues that collaboration between 
NGOs and the state has strengthened the state in small yet significant ways, helping it to 
attack entrenched socio-economic elite interests and helping the state to attract broad-based 
popular support for far-reaching political and economic reforms. On the third question, the 
dissertation argues that expanding political participation has been one of the main 
achievements of the Philippine NGO community and that NGOs, by linking with grass-roots 
"people’s organisations", have filled an important institutional vacuum resulting from the 
inability of political parties, trade unions and peasant associations to promote sustained 
popular political participation.
The main significance of growth in the Philippine NGO community is political. As 
the dissertation argues throughout, the proliferation, regional distribution and organisational 
character of NGOs, as well as the tasks they perform and the posture they adopt vis-a-vis 
state agencies and the private sector, have all been determined by essentially political factors. 
Philippine NGOs and the people’s organisations with which they work closely are significant 
mainly for their broad organisational reach and their ability to organise and mobilise around 
ideologically-coherent interests, hence making them an important actor in Philippine politics.
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CHAPTER ONE: The Politics of NGO Action in the Developing World: 
Theoretical and Comparative Overview.
1. Introduction
Since the late 1980s, a significant number of studies on the work of Non- 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the developing world have been published, giving rise 
to a distinctive literature within the social sciences. In 1987, World Development brought out 
a special issue on NGOs and development,1 based on the proceedings of a major conference. 
Then followed a series of books2 including the Overseas Development Institute’s four-volume 
series on NGOs and the state in the developing world.3 These works are now complemented
-  1 World Development, special supplement to Volume 15, 1987.
2 These include A. G. Drabek (Ed.), Development Alternatives: The Challenge for 
NGOs, Pergamon Press7New York, 1987; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Voluntary Aid for Development: The Role o f Non-govemmental 
Organisations, Paris, 1988; Robin Poulton and Michael Harris (Eds.), Putting People 
First: Voluntary Organisations an(T Third World Development, Macmillan, London, 
1988; Richard Holloway (Ed.), Doing Development: Governments, NGOs and the Rural 
Poor in Asia, Earthscan/CUSO, London, 1989; David C. Korten, Getting to the 21st 
Century :-Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda, Kumarian Press, West Hartford CT, 
1990; John Clark, Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organisations, 
Earthscan, London, 1991; Thomas F. Carroll, Intermediary NGOs: The Supporting Links 
in Grassroots Development, Kumarian Press, West Hartford CT, 1992; Michael Edwards 
and David Hulme (Eds.), Making A Difference: NGOs and Development in aTChanging 
World, Earthscan, London, 1992; Julie Fisher, The Road From Rio: Sustainable 
Development and the Nongovernmental Movement in the Third World,- Praeger, 
Westport CT, 1993; Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich (Eds.) Non-Goyemmental 
Organisations and Governments: Stakeholders for Development, Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1993.
3 Anthony Bebbington & Graham Thiele (Eds.), Non-governmental Organisations and 
the State in Latin America: Rethinking Roles in Sustainable Agriculture, Routledge, 
London 1993; John Farrington & Anthony Bebbington (Eds.) Reluctant Partners: Non­
governmental Organisations, the State and Sustainable Agricultural Development, 
Routledge, London, 1993; John Farrington & David Lewis (Eds.), Non-governmental 
Organisations and the State in Asia: Rethinking Roles in Sustainable Agriculture, 
Routledge, London, 1993; Kate Wellard & James Copestake (Eds.), Non-govemmental 
Organisations and the State in Africa: Rethinking Roles in Sustainable Agriculture,
1
by studies of individual NGOs,4 as well as an expanding journal-based literature.
The new literature is a testament to the emergence of NGOs as important actors in the 
development process in Asia, Africa and Latin America. According to figures from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), NGOs transferred 
US$5.3bn. from industrial to developing countries in 1986,5 nearly US$lb more than 
assistance provided by the International Development Association.6 By 1990, the amount had 
reached $7.2bn., equivalent to 13% of net disbursements of official aid or 2.5%-of total 
resource flows to developing countries.7 Putting these figures into perspective however, a 
study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) notes that "Even if NGOs 
were to treble their spending by the year 2000 they would still account for less than 20% of 
official aid flows".8
NGOs have acquired this financial role in a relatively short period of time; from low 
levels in absolute terms, official development assistance (ODA) disbursed through NGOs 
grew by 1400% in the ten years to 1985.9 This relatively new financial role provides NGOs
Routledge, London, 1993.
4 For example, Maggie Black, A Cause for Our Times: Oxfam, the first 50 years, 
Oxfam and Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992; Kalima Rose, Where Women Are 
Leaders: The SEWA Movement in India, Zed Books, London, 1993; Catherine Lovell, 
Breaking the Cycle of Poverty: the BRAC Strategy, Kumarian Press, West Hartford, 
1992.
5 OECD, Voluntary Aid for Development , pg. 81. Figures only apply to the 18
members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC): Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United 
States.
6 World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development, World Bank 
and Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, pg. 136.
7 Human Development Report 1993, United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), New-York, and Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, pg. 93.
8 Ibid.
9 Hendrik Van der Heidjen, "The Reconciliation of NGO Autonomy, Program Integrity 
and Operational Effectiveness With Accountability to Donors", World Development, special
2
with significant organisational reach: according to one official estimate in 1985, the work of 
NGOs in the developing world benefited almost 100m people.10 The UNDP accepts that 
NGO organisational reach has expanded sharply since then and is now close to 250m 
people.11 The implications of this growth and expansion are profound. According to 
Salamon, "...we are in the midst of a global ’associational revolution’ that may prove to be 
as significant to the latter twentieth century as the rise of the nation-state was to the latter 
nineteenth”.12 This dissertation looks at the politics of this associational revolution in the 
Philippines and in this introductory chapter examines the political aspects of NGO activity 
in the developing world.
2. What is an NGO?
NGOs date to the middle of the nineteenth century and to a Europe strained by the 
industrial revolution and its by-products: nationalism, middle-class ascendency and the 
emergence of a stratified ’civil society’. Conservative forces and great power rivalry defeated 
the bourgeois rebellions of 1848, but by then the European state had developed "from 
absolutism to a system of countervailing powers”, and the "frustrated revolutions... resulted 
in an effervescence of contacts between the peoples which had taken part in them".13 Alexis
supplement to Volume 15, 1987, pg. 104.
10 According to the Club of Rome, "Southern" NGOs reach 60m people in Asia, 25m in 
Latin America and 12m in Africa. See Fisher, The Road From Rio , pg. 8
11 Human Development Report 1993, pg. 93.
12 Lester M. Salamon, "The Rise of the Non-Profit Sector", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73 
No. 4, July/August 1994, pg. 109.
13 J. J. Lador-Lederer, International Non-Governmental Organisations and Economic 
Entities, A. W. Sythoff, Leyden, 1963, pp. 17 & 61. Antonio Gramsci argued that the 
French Revolution played an important role in stimulating the proliferation of "clubs" or 
"loose organisations of the ’popular assembly’ type" that maintained the "interest of a 
particular clientele that had no fixed boundaries" (Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith 
(Eds), Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, Lawrence & Wishart 
Ltd., London 1971, pg. 259).
3
iII
De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, Volume 1 of which was published in French in 
1835, notes that Americans developed the right of association*first imported from England 
and that a vast array of political associations developed as a result of individual initiative 
unfettered by the state.14 The oldest "modem" NGO, the world alliance of Young Mens 
Christian Associations (YMCA) was established in 1855 while the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) was established in 1863.15 With the successive international crises 
of 1870, 1918 and 1945, the proliferation of such organisations quickened:16 one study, for 
instance, of 546 international NGOs formed between 1846 and 1931 found that 9 were 
established between 1846 and 1865; 29 from 1866 to 1885; 96 from 1886 to 1905; 289 from 
1906 to 1925 and 123 in the six years to 1931.17
Organisations associated with the international labour movement helped to establish 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1928, but were known as "Private 
International Organisations" rather than NGOs.18 Officially, the term "NGO" first appeared 
in the United Nations Charter of 1945. Organisations established independently of government 
were involved unofficially as consultants to some of the country delegations (especially the 
Unites States) at the San Francisco drafting convention, and the role of NGOs in the
14 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1947T
^ Japan’s first "modem" foundation or NGO, the Society of Gratitude, was established 
in 1829, well before the first European or North American philanthropic organisations 
(Salomon, "The Rise of...", pg. 121).
16 Lador-Lederer, International Non-Governmental Organisations..., pg. 61.
17 Lyman C. White, International Non-Governmental Organisations: Their Purposes, 
Methods, and Accomplishments, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1951, pg. 279 
n5.
18 cf. Lyman C. White, The Structure of Private International Organisations,
Philadelphia, 1933.
4
Vemerging United Nations system was explicitly recognised in Article 71 of the Charter.19
By 1951, 87 international NGOs had secured consultative status with the UN Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC).20 As humanitarian relief poured into Europe after World War
II, and gradually to the countries of the developing world from the early 1950s, and as
national NGOs proliferated in the developing world, the term "NGO” achieved wide currency
within the United .Nations. By the 1960s, it was firmly established. Studies from the 1950s
and 1960s were produced mainly by specialists in international law and as such concentrated
on international NGOs.21 Challenging the traditional view that international society was
solely a society of states, and concerned with the role of NGOs as a countervailing force,
*
they defined NGOs largely by distinguishing them from states. Lador-Lederer, for instance, 
describes them as non-govemmental, non-profit-making, non-sovereign and non- 
ecclesiastical,22 a broad definition which embraced trade unions, professional associations 
and youth groups etc. He cites a study of 1,937 NGOs published in 1954 which found NGOs 
mainly involved in: welfare (relief, education, youth and gender) (10.9%), medicine and 
health (9.7%), economics and finance (8.8%), commerce and industry (8%), pure sciences 
(6.8%), agriculture (5.52%), and labour (5.5%).23
In the 1980s, as development assistance flows to NGOs in the developing world began
19 Leland M. Goodrich and- Edward Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: 
Commentary and Documents, World Peace Foundation, Boston MA, 1946, pg. 224. 
Article 71 reads "The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-govemmental organisations which are concerned with matters within 
its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organisations and, where 
appropriate, with national organisations after consultation with the Member of the United 
Nations concerned".
20 White, International Non-Governmental Organisations..., pg. vii.
21 eg. White, International Non-Governmental Organisations..., 1951, or Lador- 
Lederer, International Non-Governmental Organisations..., 1963.
22 Lador-Lederer, International Non-Governmental Organisations..., pg. 60.
23Ibid, pg. 62. The remaining 45% were distributed among 12 other groups.
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to expand exponentially, the term "NGO" acquired a new meaning. As Landim notes, NGOs
began consciously to think of their role in promoting development, and in society at large
during the 1980s,24 in contrast to earlier decades when an insufficient appreciation of the
role of NGO action was largely due to NGOs themselves.25 Drawing on the work of Padron,
Landim defined NGOs as "...in general, private, non-profit organisations that are publicly
registered (ie. have a legal status) whose principal function is to implement development
projects favouring the popular sectors and which receive financial support".26 As this
definition implies, the new meaning referred to development NGOs, and specifically, to those
working to address the structural causes of poverty. Today however many organisations in
_ *
the developing world that describe themselves as NGOs are not engaged in socio-economic 
development, although they do describe their activities in terms of a development discourse 
eg. human rights organisations. Equally, many NGOs fail to address the structural causes of 
poverty, preferring to concentrate on more narrowly-defined objectives such as relief and 
rehabilitation. Therefore, NGOs are private, non-profit, professional organisations with a 
distinctive legal character, concerned with public welfare goals. As such, NGOs are:
1. Distinct from the state and other political institutions, in particular, political parties;
2. Non-profit making and readily distinguishable from private or public profit-making 
corporations;
3. Professional in character, with paid staff equipped with professional experience and/or 
training;
24 Leilah Landim, "Non-Governmental Organisations in Latin America", World 
Development, Special Supplement to Vol. 15, 1987, pg. 30.
25 A- point also made by Lador-Lederer, International Non-Governmental 
Organisations..., pg. 16.
26 Ibid, drawing on Mario Padron, "Los centros de promocion y la cooperacion 
intemacionale al desarrollo en America Latina", Mimeo, Buenos Aires, 1986.
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4. Legally distinctive and as such distinguisable from organisations such as trade unions, 
media enterprises or industrial/agricultural co-operatives.27
5. Committed to collective or public welfare goals, rather than goals that benefit a narrow 
membership or constituency.28
6. Often, though not necessarily, membership based. More typically, they consist of a paid 
staff with a management committee, and are accountable mainly to funders.
This definition is problematic. As development assistance flows to NGOs in the 
developing world have increased and as social structures in developing countries have become 
increasingly differentiated, so the number and type of NGOs has increased. Fisher, for
__ s
instance, suggests that there were at least 35,000 NGOs in the developing world in 1993,29 
though she also accepts that it is impossible at present to make an accurate assessment and 
numbers could well run into the hundreds of thousands.30 Fisher is probably correct given 
the estimated number of NGOs of all kinds in particular countries, eg. Bangladesh 
(10,000+),31 Brazil (110,000+),32 India (100,000+/-),33 Kenya (26,000),34 and the
27 As with Landim’s definition, this should usually mean that NGOs are registered with 
a state agency. However, the definition recognises that there will be circumstances in which 
NGOs will be unable^to register, eg. under conditions of authoritarian rule.
28 In the developing world public or collective welfare is synonymous with development 
or empowerment. Here however, public or collective welfare is used in a broader context to 
include humanitarian or charitable work.
29 Fisher, The Road From R io ..., pg. 91.
30 Ibid, pg. 23.
31 "Cooperation with NGOs in Agriculture and Rural Development", Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), Manila, Vol. 1, August 1989, pg. 4.
32 Fisher, The Road From R io ..., pg. 24.
33 Farrington and Lewis, Non-Governmental Organisations and the State in Asia, 
pp. 92-93.
34 Alan Fowler, "The Role of NGOs in Changing State-Society Relations: Perspectives 
From Eastern and Southern Africa", Development Policy Review, Vol. 9 No. 1, 1991, pg. 
55.
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Philippines (20,000).35
The complexity is reflected in a number of ways. First, in particular countries, 
alternative labels are employed in place of the generic "NGO”: eg. Private Voluntary 
Organisation (PVO) or Intermediate Organisation (10) in the United States; Voluntary 
Organisation, or registered Charity in the United Kingdom; or Voluntary Agency (Volag) in 
India.
Second, the mainstream NGO literature recognises that since the late 1970s and 1980s,
organisations such as trade unions, peasant associations, and water-users associations have
redefined their roles and restructured their relationships with funders, clients, and members.
In a number of countries in Asia, especially Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, as
well as in Africa, the term "People’s Organisation" is used as a generic label fo ra  diverse
range of organisations that are not part of the state structure, are not engaged in  normal
commercial activity, and which relate their activities to a vibrant development discourse.36
One definition of a People’s Organisation (PO) is set out in Brown and Korten:
self-reliant (its continued existence does not depend on outside initiative or 
funding) mutual benefit associations (it exists to serve its members) with a 
democratic structure and mode of operation (its members exercise the ultimate 
authority). Self-reliant co-operatives, landless associations, irrigation 
associations, credit clubs, trade associations and political interest groups with 
accountable leaderships are all examples...POs have a distinctive development 
~  role...they are both the training grounds and the institutional building blocks 
of a pluralistic democratic society.37 ^
35 Karina Constantino-David, "The Need for Greater Unity and the CODE-NGO", in 
Forging Unity Towards Development, Proceedings of the 1st National NGO Congress, 
University of the Philippines Film Centre, Diliman, Quezon City, 4 December 1991, pg.
9.
36 With respect to Asia, see for instance, Farrington and Lewis (Eds.), Non- 
Governmental Organisations and the State in A sia...; or "Cooperation with NGOs....", 
Volumes 1 & 2, ADB. With respect to Africa, see, for instance, Alan Fowler, "The Role of 
NGOs...", 1991.
37 David L. Brown and David C. Korten, "The Role of Voluntary Organisations in 
Development", Institute for Development Research, Boston MA, 1989, pg. 15.
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A more succinct definition however is that they are local, non-profit, membership-based 
associations which organise and mobilise in support o f collective welfare goals. In general, 
POs are:
1. Distinct from the state and from other political institutions, in particular, political parties;
2. Non-profit-making and readily distinguishable from private and public profit-making 
corporations;38
3. Reliant on voluntary effort rather than paid professional staff, especially at the local level;
4. Legally distinctive, though less so than NGOs. They may be registered with more than one 
state agency or may be unregistered;
5. Committed to securing benefits for their particularjnembership though they still articulate 
their aims and objectives within a development discourse. Others pursue public or collective 
welfare goals;
6. Primarily membership-based and democratically accountable.39
Although the NGO/PO distinction is now accepted in much of the NGO literature,40 
a number of alternative labels are often applied. Carroll distinguishes between Grassroots 
Support Organisations (GSOs) and Membership Support Organisations (MSOs) while Fisher 
distinguishes between Grass-roots Support Organisations (GRSOs) and Grass-roots 
Organisations (GROs)41 (See Figure 1). Although POs are normally traditional organisations, 
new types of structures dating from the early 1970s are also regarded as POs in the
38 POs often aim to realise a surplus but this is usually retained to build savings, rather 
than distributed to members.
39 An alternative list of the characteristics of NGOs and POs is set out in Erle-Frayne D. 
Argonza. "The Rise of People’s Organisations", Solidarity, No. 127, July-September 1990, 
pg. 98.
40 For example, Korten, Getting To the 21st Century..., pg. 2, or Karina Constantino- 
David, "The Philippine Experience in Scaling Up" in Edwards & Hulme (Eds.), Making a 
Difference..., pg. 137.
41 Carroll, Intermediary NGOs.. . , pp. 9-15; Fisher, The Road From Rio.. . , pp. 5-18.
mainstream literature, eg. Basic Christian Communities (known also as Base Communities 
or Basic Ecclesial Communities), Popular Economic Organisations (PEOs, a distinctively 
Latin American category) or Community-Based Organisations (CBOs).
Third, complex coalition-building strategies in many countries give rise to distinctions 
on the basis of NGO/PO geographical or sectoral focus: a primary NGO or PO engages in 
direct programme work; a secondary NGO/PO is a regional or sectoral (and in countries with 
small NGO/PO movements, national) network of primary NGOs/POs; a tertiary NGO or PO 
is a national-level federation of regional or sectoral NGO/PO networks.
Fourth, rigorous analyses of NGO action now categorise NGOs by origin or function. 
One of the-most sophisticated is set out in Carroll, based on an empirical study of Latin 
American NGOs. Carroll’s typology corresponds closely with Constantino-David’s typology 
of Philippine NGOs (see figure 2).42 Other typologies are set out in Korten43 (see figure 
2), Fisher44 and Friedmann.45 A number of vivid acronyms have also achieved wide 
currency, for instance: BINGO (Big NGO); BONGO (Business Oriented NGO); INGO 
(International NGO); LINGO (Little NGO); GRINGO (Government Run or Inspired NGO) 
(also known as GONGO (Government Organised NGO); and QUANGO (Quasi- or Quasi 
Autonomous NGO).
42 Carroll, ibid, pg. 14f Karina Constantino-David, "The Limits and Possibilities of 
Philippine NGOs in Development", paper presented to the LAMBATLAYA National 
Conference on "Networking in the ’90s: Affirming the Commitment to the Decade of 
Nationalism", University of the Philippines, 22-24 November 1990, pp. 1-3.
43 Korten, Getting to the 21st Century..., pg. 2.
44 Fisher, The Road From R io ..., pg. 99.
45 Jonathan Friedmann, Empowerment: The Politics o f Alternative Development,
Blackwell Press, Oxford, 1992, pg. 146.
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Figure 1. NGOs and POs: Alternative Labels
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Figure 2. NGO and PO Typologies.
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Organisational complexity and diversity raise questions concerning the global NGO
community’s coherence. One body of opinion from a neoliberal perspective and inspired by
organisational theory refers to a "third sector", operating between the public and private
sectors.46 The categorisation is flawed however. Firstly, it is based on the assertion that
service delivery represents the predominant component of NGO action. Secondly, such
assertions are often motivated by an explicitly normative interpretation of the significance of
NGO action. Korten for instance argues that
It is becoming evident that the hope for dealing with the global 
development crisis rests not with the development industry, but with the 
great social movements of contemporary society including the peace, 
environment, women and human rights movements. It rests with people 
who are driven by a strong social commitment rather than by the budgetary 
imperatives of huge global bureaucracies. It rests in particular with the 
more forward-looking non-govemmental organisations (NGOs) of the South 
that find themselves immersed in the political environment and economic 
struggles of the poor with whom they work and that lack the luxury of 
closing their eyes to the real nature of the problem47.
Along similar lines, Friedmann sees NGOs as the key to the politics of alternative
development, more than a set of technical prescriptions, but rather an ideology underpinned
by "a certain moral coherence".48 Both Korten and Friedmann take an exaggeratedly.
instrumentalist view of NGO action. In reality, the heterogeneity of the NGO movement, and
its flexible and dynamic character, make it easy for other political forces to establish,
infiltrate or co-opt NGOs. The global NGO movement and the NGO communities of
particular developing countries are far from united and as a result, NGO action is effectively
46 See, for instance, Norman Uphoff, "Grassroots Organisations and NGOs in Rural 
Development: Opportunities with Diminishing States and Expanding Markets", World 
Development, Vol. 21 No. 4, 1993, pg. 609. According to Fisher, The Road From R io ..., 
pg. 8, the term "third sector" was first suggested by Waldemar Nielsen in The Endangered 
Sector, Columbia University Press, New York, 1979. Fisher however prefers the term 
"Independent Sector" (see pp. 8-10).
47 Korten, Getting to the 21st Century..., pp. ix-x.
48 Friedmann, Empowerment..., pg. 8.
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an arena within which important political battles from society at large are internalized. Herein 
lies a conundrum that underscores the essentially political character of NGO action in the 
developing world. And herein also lies the primary justification for a study of the politics of 
NGO action in the developing world.
3. NGOs and Political Science
From a political science perspective, the mainstream NGO literature has a number 
of characteristics which undermine its utility in analyzing the politics of NGO action in the 
developing world.49 First, it is predominantly neo-liberal in its analysis of the failings of the 
state in undermining rural poverty and the consequent role of NGOs in delivering social 
services to the rural poor cheaply, efficiently and accurately. From this perspective, NGOs 
are seen primarily as a channel for promoting economic and social development and 
secondarily as agents of the political empowerment and the democratization of politics. To 
a large extent, this view reflects the interests of multi-lateral, governmental and non­
government agencies in funding research.
The NGO research agenda is largely donor-driven.50 Few donors are concerned
49 The mainstream NGO literature includes works listed in footnotes 2-3. Other prominent 
works include: Judith Tendler, "Turning Private Voluntary Organisations into Development 
Agencies: Questions for Evaluation", Program Evaluation Paper No. 12, United States 
Agency for international Development, Washington DC., 1982; Milton J. Esman and Norman 
T. Uphoff, Local Organisations: Intermediaries in Rural Development, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1984; Albert O. Hirschman, Getting Ahead Collectively: 
Grassroots Experiences in Latin America, Pergamon Press, New York, 1984; Norman T. 
Uphoff, Local Institutional Development: An Analytical Sourcebook With Cases, 
Kumarian Press, West Hartford CT., 1986.
50 For instance, the OECD’s Voluntary Aid for Development...; Clark, 
Democratizing Development... (research funded by Oxfam); Edwards and Hulme (Eds.), 
Making a Difference... (funded largely by the Save the Children Fund); Carroll, 
Intermediary NGOs... (funded largely by die Inter-American Foundation); Holloway (Ed.), 
Doing Development... (funded by CUSO (formerly the Canadian University Services 
Organisation)) and the 1993 four-volume series by Farrington, Bebbington et al, funded by
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with the political complexities of NGO action and in many cases are anxious to ignore them. 
NGOs in the developed world are frequently restricted from funding political activities such 
as advocacy, campaigning, and coalition building. Many donors are also reluctant to 
acknowledge that funding to NGOs in developing countries frequently aimed or aims to 
strengthen opposition to authoritarian regimes. Others are wary of reactions from domestic 
constituencies and are reluctant to acknowledge the explicitly political nature of contemporary 
NGO action. Other donors avoid openly discussing the relationship between foreign-funded 
NGOs and political parties, especially those which espouse armed opposition to the state.
The second characteristic is an emphasis on the "newness" of NGO action, and a 
corresponding failure to relate NGO origins to other organisational forms. As a result, there 
is little appreciation in the literature of the connection between the growth and proliferation 
of NGOs and the expansion of their roles, to changes in the structure of polities, economies 
and societies in the developing world.
Third, there is a strongly normative, De Tocquevillian, character to assumptions in 
the literature that NGO movements in the developing world strengthen civil society and 
consolidate the "return" to democratic rule. In reality, there is little concrete evidence that 
NGOs can or do strengthen civil society.51
~  Fourth, the focus on rural development in the mainstream NGO literature, especially 
at the grassroots level, diverts attention from NGOs that are not concerned with rural 
development, not based in rural areas, and which are not locally-focussed. Emphasising its
the Overseas Development Institute.
51 In one of the first detailed studies of NGO politics in a developing country, Fowler 
argues that Kenya’s NGO community is unable to hasten fundamental political change. One 
of the main reasons is its fragmentation, lack of cohesion, competitiveness, and 
unrepresentative structure. In general, Fowler argues, NGOs are more likely to maintain the 
status quo than to change it (Alan Fowler, "Non-Governmental Organisations and the 
Promotion of Democracy in Kenya", Ph.D. thesis, University of Sussex, December 1993).
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normative character, the NGO literature also focuses on the potential of NGO-state 
collaboration, at the expense of a proper appreciation of the. dilemmas facing NGOs in 
intervening in political debates.
By concentrating on the role of NGOs as social development agencies, the 
contemporary NGO literature has obscured the significant political character of NGOs 
(through their antecedent, the civic or political association) noted in political philosophy. 
Writing in the early years of nineteenth century, G.W.F. Hegel argued that the state was 
morally superior to civil society. Equating the state with de facto  power, Hegel argued that 
political parties and associations were inextricably bound to the state.52 De Tocqueville’s 
Democracy in America represented a major counterpoint. In 1835, de Tocqueville pointed to 
the relationship between political associations organised independently of the state and 
democratic govemence as a key characteristic of American democracy. "There are no 
countries in which associations are more needed to prevent the despotism of a faction or the 
arbitrary power of a prince", he wrote, "than those which are democratically constituted".53 
Imprisoned between 1929 and 1935, Antonio Gramsci revived Hegel’s view of political 
parties and associations as "the ’private’ woof of the state".54 Civic organisations, Gramsci 
wrote, were a central component in civil society, but they also helped to maintain the social 
"“hegemony of a dominant class.55 Gramsci was certainly aware of the spread of civic 
organisations in North America and Europe but had yet to grapple with its implications.56
52 George Sabine, A History of Political Theory, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 
1970, Chapter XXX.
53 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, pg. in .
54 Hoare and Nowell-Smith (Eds.), Selections from the Prison Notebooks..., pg. 259.
55 Ibid, pp. 264-265.
56 Gramsci for instance notes the activities of Rotary Clubs and the YMCA. Although he 
notes the arrival of the YMCA in Italy, he adds little beyond mention of its American roots 
(ibid, pg. 286).
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His critique of pragmatism extended to criticism of voluntary organisations, but overall his 
argument implied that civic organisations did little to alter class structure.57
White’s 1951 study distinguished NGOs from pressure groups. While many existed
to promote the interests of a particular group, White noted, most INGOs functioned as agents
of international understanding and as moulders of public opinion at a national and
international level.58 Similarly, Lador-Lederer’s 1963 study suggested that NGOs were more
accurately seen as non -state organisations, since they were intimately involved in
governmental and inter-governmental processes.59 Diverging slightly from White’s position
however, he argued that NGOs (broadly defined) constituted "the main social countervailing
*
power to the state", and that as such, functioned mainly as pressure groups.60 Lador-Lederer 
also noted that NGOs were not restricted by obligations that fall on the state, and as such 
"may feel they have more in common with movements fighting certain regimes or certain 
institutions than with certain governments".61
The blame for obscuring the political character of NGO action should not fall on the 
authors of the contemporary NGO literature alone. Political scientists have consistently and 
for decades ignored the political character and dynamics of NGO action.62 Greenstein and
57 Refering to the Rotary Clubs, he writes "...we are not dealing with a new type of 
civilization [here]. This is shown by the fact that nothing has changed in the character of and 
the relationships between fundamental groups" (ibid, pg. 3l8).
58 White, International Non-Governmental Organisations..., pg. 18.
59 Lador-Laderer, International Non-Governmental Organisations..., pg. 13.
60 Ibid, pg. 60.
61 Ibid, pg. 217.
62 Studies of international development NGOs represent an exception. See for instance, 
Brian H. Smith, More Than Altruism: The Politics o f Private Foreign Aid, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1990; or Peter J. Burnell, Charity, Politics and the Third 
World, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991. For a more recent exception, see Tom Princen 
and Matthias Finger, Environmental NGOs in World Politics: linking the global and the 
local, Routledge, London, 1994.
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Polsby’s 1975 8-volume encyclopedia of political science makes no reference to NGOs.63
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, amid the collapse of authoritarian regimes throughout the
developing world, catapulting NGOs into more prominent positions in political debates and
contests, the tradition of ignorance is continued in literature on third world politics.64 The
NGO literature identifies important questions however, and when related to significant
relevant concerns in political science literature, suggests a research agenda which is
complemented by country- or issue-specific NGO studies.
In the contemporary NGO literature, the emphasis on socio-economic roles has not
gone unquestioned. Bratton, for example, has suggested that it is in the political sphere rather
than the economic, that the contributions of NGOs to development should be mainly seen.65
Poverty, he argues, is a political as well as an economic condition:66
[It] arises because people do not have access to power; this is, the capacity 
to do what they want and win compliance from others. Poor people have 
little or no control over the material and institutional conditions under 
which they exist. They experience great difficulty in making decisions about 
their lives. In short, the poor lack the political ’clout’ to make their 
preferences ’stick’.67
Bratton’s position finds influential support in a 1993 UNDP study which argues that NGOs 
compliment state attempts to eradicate poverty and provide social services, but that advocacy
63 Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (Eds,), Handbook of Political Science, 8 
volumes, Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., Reading MA, 1975. —
64 An argument based on a cursory survey of some recent texts on third world politics 
published in Britain: Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: An Introduction, 
Routledge, 1988 edition; James Manor (Ed.), Rethinking Third World Politics, Longman, 
London, 1991; Paul Cammack, David Pool, and William Tordoff, Third World Politics: 
A Comparative Introduction, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2nd edition, 1993; Mehran 
Kamrava, Politics and Society in the Third World, Routledge, London, 1993; Robert 
Pinkney, Democracy in the Third World, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1993.
65 Michael Bratton, "The Politics of Goverament-NGO Relations in Africa", World 
Development, Vol. 17 No. 4, 1989, pg. 569.
66 A proposition argued at greater length in Friedmann, Empowerment..., Chapter 4.
67 Bratton, "The Politics of Govemment-NGO Relations...", pg. 569.
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is, and will continue to be, their greatest strength.68 The World Bank also points to the 
political potential of NGOs. "Non-governmental organisations", the Bank notes, "have 
become an important force in the development process, [mitigating] the costs of developing 
countries’ institutional weaknesses which often include administrative shortcomings, and an 
inability to carry out essential development tasks".69
Given the socio-economic thrust to the mainstream NGO literature, and the absence 
of analysis of NGO action in the mainstream literature on third world politics, these 
propositions remain largely untested. Esman and Uphoff s 1984 study of local organisations, 
for instance, revealed that 19% of their case-studies could be classified as local development 
associations, 46% as interest associations and 35% as co-operatives. The second of these 
classifications points to the explicitly political nature of NGO action.70 Furthermore, the 
UNDP argues that NGOs proliferated more rapidly in Chile than in any other Latin American 
country as a direct result of military repression under the Pinochet dictatorship.71 Yet, as 
Echeverri-Gent notes, the politics of development literature provides few clues as to why 
NGOs come into existence.72 The inevitable result is a proliferation of hesitant or heavily 
qualified assertions, such as Donnelly’s suggestion that human rights NGOs in Chile and 
Argentina "may have played a role in the failure to stabilise military rule" during the 1970s 
and ’80s (italics added).73 —
68 Human Development Report 1993, pg. 98.
69 World Development Report 1991..., pp. 135-136.
70 Esman and Uphoff, Local Organisations..., pg. 62.
71 Human Development Report 1993, pg. 92.
72 John Echeverri-Gent, The State and the Poor: Public Policy and Political 
Development in India and the United States, University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1993, pg. 189.
73 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights, Westview_Press, Boulder CO, 1993, pg. 
50. Hirschman, Getting Ahead Collectively..., pg. 98, in more outspoken terms, argues 
that it is impossible to prove a connection between the withering of the authoritarian state in 
Latin America and the rise of NGOs and grassroots social movements.
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Despite the socio-economic emphasis, the mainstream NGO literature illustrates 
certain political roles that NGOs play. Clark, for instance, notes that in India and Bangladesh, 
NGOs are forcing through reform-oriented legislation in areas such as minimum wages, 
feudalism and bonded labour.74 Furthermore, Viswanath suggests that NGOs have become 
an effective institutional vehicle for undermining the economic impoverishment of women, 
especially in rural areas, and are potentially a significant means of undermining their political 
disempowerment.75 Bebbington and Thiele note that in Chile during the 1970s, NGOs filled 
an institutional vacuum when political parties were banned and university funding was cut 
back. For many professionals, NGOs offered the only viable hope of pursuing political goals 
and securing employment.76
4. NGOs and the State
Elaborating the political roles identified in the NGO literature requires an 
examination of state-NGO relationships. In both authoritarian and post-authoritarian polities, 
three basic political postures are open to NGOs. The first is to enter into a strategic alliance 
with local or national government agencies with a view to confronting traditional power 
structures which have inhibited development and popular empowerment. This strategy will 
normally be pursued when NGOs feel government agencies have consolidated their immediate 
position, that there is a degree of unity of purpose between reform-oriented ministries and 
~ those concerned with security, and that they place a priority on establishing new institutional 
ties with the poor. NGOs will also pursue this approach where they sense opportunities to
74 Clark, Democratizing Development..., pg. 5.
75 Vanita Viswanath, NGOs and Women’s Development in Rural South India: A 
Comparative Analysis, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991.
76 Bebbington and Thiele, Nongovernmental Organisations and the State in Latin 
Am erica..., pg. 38.
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replace patronage-based with issue-based political agendas, especially in the electoral arena. 
The second is to remain at a distance from the state, avoid .co-optation, concentrate on 
effective service delivery, and defend the limited political space available. This strategy will 
normally be pursued when NGOs feel the government is intrinsically authoritarian or when 
reformers are opposed by conservatives, jeopardising regime stability. It assumes that politics 
remains patronage-based and that little opportunity exists for issue-based political contestation. 
The third is to aggressively exploit fissures in regime “cohesion in an attempt to expand the 
political space available for popular organising. Such a strategy may be pursued when NGOs 
fear an imminent crack-down, where a state is weak and vulnerable to capture by 
conservative authoritarian forces, or where NGOs attempt, as part of a larger political project, 
to create a base from which to challenge for state power. Often, the approach involves 
militant pressure politics supported by an electoral strategy. In reality, NGOs, collectively 
and individually, pursue aspects of more than one strategy.
5. The Politics of NGO-State Collaboration
In India, the state has long viewed NGOs as potential partners in developing the 
country’s economic and political structure, especially in rural areas. India’s struggle for 
independence resulted in a commitment from 1947 to a welfare and socialist state with a 
mixed economy. In 1952, the government involved NGOs in health and educational service 
provision in the first Five-Year Plan.77 The same year, it launched the Community 
Development Programme to institutionalize village-level political participation, and later 
launched a three-tier system of rural co-operatives (.Panchayati Raj). As Migdal notes
77 Achim Brosch, "The Discourse on Non-Governmental Organisations and the Political 
Economy of Development in India", M.A. dissertation, School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London, September 1990, pg. 15.
20
"[Jawaharal] Nehru [India’s first post-independence Prime Minister] and his planners hoped 
co-operative farming along with peasant-dominated panchayat institutions would link peasants 
directly to the state without the influence of intermediaries on the disposition of goods and 
services".78
Beyond the state, parallel attempts to encourage participation were also initiated. In
1952, Jawaharal Nehru founded the Bharat Sevak Samaj (Society of the Servants of India)
to mobilise communities and promote local development. Established as a non-governmental
initiative, the movement became dependent on state funding and evolved into a quasi-
govemmental structure that eventually floundered in the late 1960s. In another approach,
_ *
Mahatma Gandhi encouraged supporters to donate land title deeds to the village assembly, 
the Grama Sabha to encourage local participatory democracy.79
Governmental and non-governmental schemes however both failed. With the latter, 
the small relative scale eroded any hope of wide-ranging impact. With the former, the lack 
of a commitment or capacity to challenge the position of the dominant land-owning castes, 
a powerful force in the Indian National Congress,80 as well as the Congress’s sense of its 
own superiority over other forms of political association, eroded any sense of substance in 
the government’s strategy, reducing it to the level of rhetoric. Yet the initiatives did 
contribute to a climate which enabled later governments to involve NGOs in rural
78 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and 
State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988, pg. 
251.
79 A. P. Fernandez, "NGOs in South Asia: People’s Partnership and Participation", 
World Development, Special supplement to Vol. 15, 1987.
80 Migdal notes that "[the] Triangle of Accommodation forged by rich peasants, the 
state’s regional politicians and implementors and the Congress party personnel... .resulted not 
only in hefty voter turnouts for Nehru’s Congress but also in rules of the game at the local 
level that mocked the intent of the state’s cooperative agricultural policy and reinforced the 
strongmen inimical to Nehru’s purposes" (Strong Societies and Weak States..., pg. 251).
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development programmes.
By the late 1980s, one of the most significant examples of co-operation between state
and NGOs in the developing world was set out in the Indian government’s seventh Five-Year
Plan (1985-1990), in which the government planned to channel Rs2b (US$150m) through
NGOs.81 NGOs were given three main roles in promoting rural development: acting as
intermediaries between governmental development programmes and the people; mobilizing
local resources; and organising the poor to ensure the accountability of village-level
officials.82 The Asian Development Bank (ADB) notes that the government had clear
strategic objectives in assigning these roles:
The government, recognising on the one hand the positive reputation of 
NGOs and on the other, the problem of local vested interests and the 
limitations of its own bureaucracy, has called upon NGOs to help create a 
"countervailing force" amongst the poor via the organisation of beneficiary 
groups.83
The strategic nature of the objective is readily apparent in Migdal’s account of the dilemma
facing successive post-independence governments:
Even as the Congress party sought to develop as a parallel state in the 
colonial period, it lacked direct access to the mass of India’s population, the 
peasants. After independence, the party relied heavily on strongmen of one 
sort or another to deliver the vote. Of particular importance have been the 
rich peasants who have not only asserted their social control locally but also 
as a group have become effective lobbies at the federal level and key 
players in party politics. The nexus of relationship among the state, party = 
and strongmen, the Triangle of Accommodation, ultimately defined the 
character of India’s state agencies’ activities at the local and regional level.
Even when Indira Gandhi sought in the 1970s to free herself of her 
dependence on strongmen, particularly the rich peasants, and to appeal r  
directly to the electorate, the accommodation proved impossible to
81 "Cooperation with NGOs...", ADB, Vol. 1, pg. 57; Echeverri-Gent, The State and 
the Poor..., pg. 187.
82 Brosch, "The Discourse on Non-Governmental Organisations...in India", pg. 16.
83 "Co-operation with NGOs...", ADB, Vol. 2, pg. 30.
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overcome without suffering unacceptable costs in terms of political 
stability.84
i
By the early 1990s, NGOs had become significant allies of the government in eroding 
"Triangles of Accommodation". An estimated 15,000 to 20,000 NGOs were actively engaged 
in rural development,85 and annual NGO revenue from abroad at Rs9b (US$520m), was 
equivalent to approximately 25% of official development assistance flows into India. When 
contributions from government to NGOs were taken into account, the annual income of 
Indian NGOs, RslOb, was equivalent to 10% of the government’s anti-poverty 
expenditure.86 Echeverri-Gent notes that "Without a prior distribution of the bases of 
political power, the state is unlikely to provide poverty alleviation programs,with sufficient 
resources to improve their plight relative to other groups",87 but there is tentative evidence 
that such a redistribution is being facilitated by NGO action. In Andhra Pradesh, Action for 
Welfare and Awakening (AWARE) has had a profound impact on local politics. With tens 
of thousands of members, it has influenced state legislation in key areas including land 
reform.88 One of India’s largest NGOs, with a staff of approximately 1,500~complemented 
by a volunteer force of 25,000 including professionals, AWARE has formed almost 2000 
village organisations which have brought 23,320 acres of land under cultivation.89 By 1986, 
three quarters of a million people had benefitted from its social action program.90
In Bangladesh, one of the most densely populated countries in the world with one
84 Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States..., pg. 250.
85 Farrington and Lewis (Eds.), Non-Governmental Organisations and the State in 
A sia..., pg. 92.
86 Ibid, pg. 93.
87 Echeverri-Gent, The State and the Poor..., pg. 186.
88 See Clark, Democratizing Development..., pg. 113.
89 "Cooperation with NGOs...", Asian Development Bank, Vol. 1, pg. 84.
90 Ibid.
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of the lowest rates of urbanisation and of per capita GNP, the acute nature of the socio­
economic challenges facing the government puts an even higher premium on potential state- 
NGO strategic alliances. Rural development NGOs have been involved in successive five year 
plans since the first (1973-1978) and under the regime of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1971- 
1975), NGOs proliferated with the influx of foreign aid following the civil war and famine. 
Under the regimes of Presidents Zia (1975-1981) and Ershad (1982-1990) however, relations 
deteriorated as NGO action broadened beyond relief and rehabilitation to encompass popular 
organising and as the state became more authoritarian and corrupt. As a result, NGO-state 
collaboration was weaker than in India, and the NGO sector developed autonomously to 
become a virtual parallel state capable of reaching 10% to 20% of the poor91 (roughly 13m 
to 26m people). Although foreign aid to NGOs of US$100m amounted to only 5% of total 
ODA flows, to Bangladesh,92 resources mobilised nationally and locally increased their 
economic importance. Following elections in 1991, and-the widespread expectations which 
they generated, NGOs represented potentially strategic partners in government attempts to 
stimulate sustainable rural development and institutionalize popular participation capable of 
anchoring a democratic regime. The new regime gave important advisory positions to NGO 
leaders with rural development experience and, as a result, NGOs acquired significant 
influence over government rural development policy.93 Yet overall, NGO-state strategic 
alliances are inhibited by the fragmented and personalist nature of the political-party system 
and the use of patronage by the~govemment to maintain parliamentary support.94 In such 
circumstances, NGOs are disinclined to forge relationships with the state since they see little
91 Human Development Report 1993, pg. 92.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 See J.C. Johari et al, Governments and Politics o f South Asia, Link Press, New 
Delhi, 1991, pg. 409.
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opportunity for pro-reform issue-based debate.
In Chile, a tentative alliance between NGOs and the state was established after the 
election of President Alwyin in 1990. First, as Hojman notes, "NGOs played a central role 
in guaranteeing [the] successful transition [to democracy in 1990]...by supporting...the 
democratic opposition to the military regime and putting forward...policy proposals which 
would eventually constitute a fundamental component of the incoming democratic government 
programme".95 Second, many Chilean development NGOs were established in the 1970s by 
professionals dismissed from the state sector and development NGOs represented a reservoir 
of skills on which the government could draw.96 As a result, the Aylwin administration 
brought inJeaders and staff from NGOs and associated think-tanks to fill ministerial and 
administrative positions to purge the power of the Pinochet apparatchiks and give momentum 
to reform in agriculture-and other sectors. Third, because of budget constraints, the 
government subcontracted partial responsibility Tor agricultural development and support 
services to NGOs.97 A redistributive land reform programme was implemented in Chile in 
the 1960s and beneficiaries to this day rely on support services. In response, the 
governmental Institute of AgrariaaDevelopment (INDAP) planned to use NGOs to quadruple 
from 25,000 to 100,000 by the end of 1994 the number of peasant farmers receiving technical
95 David E. Hojmanr "Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the Chilean 
Transition to Democracy"^ European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 
54, June 1993, pg. 7. NGOs based in academe played a central role in this respect. See 
David E. Hojman, Chile: The Political Economy o f Development and Democracy in the 
1990s, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1993, pp. 44-48.
96 David E. Hojman, "Introduction" in David E. Hojman (Ed.), Neo-Liberal 
Agriculture in Rural Chile, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1990, pg. 3.
97 David E. Hojman, "Introduction" in David E. Hojman (Ed.), Change in the Chilean 
Countryside: From Pinochet to Aylwin and Beyond, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1993, pg. 
7
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and other assistance.98 Fourth, the government saw NGOs as important allies in its efforts
to decentralise and reduce the state apparatus. NGOs absorbed important service delivery
functions when the Pinochet regime implemented neo-liberal economic reforms which cut
government expenditure on social services. As a result, urban and rural NGOs were well
placed to act as sub-contractors. In addition, local elections were held in 1992 and
intermediary NGOs supported Popular Economic Organisations (PEOs, Organizaciones
Economicas Populares) and Self-help Organisations (SHOs, Organizaciones de Auto-Ayuda)
to participate in local government structures.
An explanation for the relatively advanced nature of NGO-state collaboration in
*
Chile is offered by Hojman:
A relatively higher degree of urbanisation, a stronger political culture and 
a larger and more influential middle-class were all both cause and 
consequence of the fact that before 1973, democracy survived for longer 
and civil society was more developed [than any other country in Latin 
^America]. This is a virtuous circle. A stronger civil society and middle 
sectors before 1973 meant that after the 1973 military coup the development 
of NGOs was more substantial which itself meant that after the democratic 
transition in 1990 civil society emerged more vigorously than elsewhere in 
Latin America.99
Major obstacles however undermine this strategic alliance. Given the fractious nature of 
Chilean political culture, the Chilean NGO sector is highly fragmented and politicised; 
government overtures to one NGO alienates others and ensures a relatively small number to 
whom the government can turn for support. Chilean NGOs also have a mixed record for 
effective service delivery. Berdegue, for instance, notes that development NGOs are highly 
concentrated (especially in Regions VIII and IX) and that most peasant families participating
98 Cristobal Kay, "The Agrarian Policy of the Aylwin Government: Continuity or 
Change?", in ibid, pg. 28.
99 Hojman, "...NGOs and the Chilean Transition to Democracy", pg. 21.
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in NGO programmes have not achieved production and living standards significantly different 
from their non-participant neighbours.100 Third, NGOs still have a limited reach, 
undermining the extent to which the state can view them as strategic partners with the ability 
to bring large groups within a social coalition: one estimate from the mid-1980s, for instance, 
suggests that PEOs reach only 120,000 people in the capital Santiago, 2% of the population 
of 5m.101
Overall, as the examples discussed above indicate, neither the NGO literature nor 
the political science literature examines the dynamics of strategic state-NGO alliances in any 
degree of depth. And yet a number of important questions are obvious: To what extent are 
the relationships being forged between NGOs and states "strategic", ie. to what extent do they 
undermine deep-rooted obstacles to the betterment and empowerment of the poor, including 
the patronage basis of politics?; to what extent are objectives achieved?; what are the 
mechanisms employed by states and NGOs to forge strategic alliances and to pursue stated 
objectives?; and finally, how important are NGO-state relationships in the context of a 
plethora of institutional relationships pursued both by state agencies and NGOs? This 
dissertation examines these questions.
6. The Politics o f Autonomy and Co-optation ~
100 Julio A. Berdegue, "Non-Governmental Development Programmes for the Peasant 
sector: A Critical Review" in Hojman (Ed.), Change in the Chilean Countryside..., pp. 
165-166.
101 See Charles Downs, Giorgio Solimano, Carlos Vergara and Luis Zuniga (Eds.), 
Social Policy From The Grassroots: Nongovernmental Organisations in Chile, 
Westview Press, Boulder, 1989, pg. 201. Lehmann however cites another study which 
estimates that 200,000 people in Santiago benefit from the work of organizaciones de 
sobrevivencia (survival organisations)(David Lehmann, Democracy and Development in 
Latin America: Economics, Politics and Religion in the Post-War Period, Polity Press, 
London, 1990, pg. 179).
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Samuel Huntington once wrote that "The problem [in modernising countries] is not 
to hold elections but to create organisations. In many, if not most..., elections serve only to 
enhance the power of disruptive and often reactionary social forces and to tear down the 
structure of public authority".102 The argument points to both a dilemma and a dynamic at 
the heart of politics. In Taiwan, the fortuitous combination of an American-enforced radical 
redistributive land reform programme and the legacy from the Japanese colonial period of 
strong farmer or producer associations^ organised by government officials enabled the state 
to co-opt land reform beneficiaries within a social coalition.103 As Haggard notes, the 
pursuit of industrialization accompanied a relative political weakening of elite agricultural 
interests and the redistribution of land' created rural support for the regime.104 What 
Haggard doesn’t say however was that the institutional character of that support, with direct 
links between the state and the rural organisations, and the relative absence of elite patronage 
spoiling of that character, were crucial to this strategy.
In South and South-East Asia, post-independence governments inherited less 
egalitarian land structures. They also encountered powerful rural elites that intervened in 
attempts by the state to seek support directly from the poor and disempowered. These elites 
penetrated state machinery directly through the electoral process and the perpetuation of 
patronage politics. Today, faced with the problem of what Migdal calls "fragmented social 
control";105 governments try to mediate and aggregate the interests of elite agricultural
102 Samuel Huntington, Political Order In Changing Societies, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1968, pg. 7.
103 On the farmer/producer associations and their roles, See Joseph A. Yager, 
Transforming Agriculture in Taiwan: The Experience of the Joint Commission on 
Rural Reconstruction, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988, especially Chapter 8.
104 Stephen Haggard, Pathways From The Periphery: The Politics o f Growth in the 
Newly Industrializing Countries, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990, pp. 35-36.
105 Migdal, Strong Societies, Weak States..., pg. 257.
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organisations and the less powerful organisations representing the poor.
As a result, Asian governments instinctively relate to NGOs by trying to control and 
co-opt them, wedding them to government positions on key development concerns, often 
successfully. In India for instance, the government established the Council for Rural 
Technology (CART) in 1986 to strengthen the technological capacity of rural development 
initiatives. In September 1986, as part of the Seventh Five Year Plan’s thrust of involving 
NGOs more closely in rural development projects, the government merged Peoples Action 
for Development India (PADI), a governmental organisation which funded rural development 
NGO programmes, and CART to form the Council for the Advancement of People’s Action 
and Rural Technology (CAPART). In theory CAPART had the twin aims of involving NGOs 
more closely in rural development and using them to promote technological innovation, but 
in practice it became a mechanism to coordinate government funding to rural development 
NGOs.106 The bulk of rural development NGOs remained wary of CAPART however. 
While formally asserting its independence from government, CAPART was administered as 
a functional wing of the Ministry of Rural Development, provoking distrust.107 CAP ART’s 
role in channelling funding has also provoked concern about its potential to control the rural 
development NGO sector, while NGOs also resent the government view of NGOs as sub­
contractors rather than partners. —
An even greater source of tension between NGOs and the Indian government was 
the establishment in 1986 of the Council of Voluntary Agencies. Included in the Council’s 
mandate was the preparation of a "Code of Conduct", which, when drafted, called for NGOs 
to be made financially accountable, and to be barred from promoting commercial or political
106 Farrington and Lewis (Eds), Non-Governmental Organisations and the State in 
A sia..., pg. 95.
107 See Fernandez, "NGOs in South Asia...", pg. 44.
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interests (precluding NGOs from joining political parties or holding elective office at local 
or national level). By the end of 1986 however, over 50 meetings had been held throughout 
India and as a result of the opposition, the government was unable to implement the code. 
Despite the backdown, many Indian NGOs remained worried by what Tandon describes as 
"... the growing role of the state and state-ism in India" over the last 30 to 40 years, and a 
corresponding "...shrinking role for voluntarism and voluntary action".108 In 1988, NGOs 
established their own co-ordinating body independently of the government, the Voluntary 
Action Network India (VANI), which took some sting out of state-NGO conflict. In a country 
where interest groups have traditionally found it difficult to remain autonomous from political 
parties as well as the state, VANI may prove an important landmark in consolidating the 
institutional integrity of India’s voluntary sector, yet the highly segmented nature of Indian 
society and politics will remain a significant obstacle to unity.
Indonesia represents a different problem to India, a genuinely dominant state not — 
threatened by elite agrarian interests, but rather a complex and heterogeneous country where 
the state places a premium on stability and unity, posing a different dilemma for NGOs. 
Migdal argues that strong states are rare;109 creating them requires a wrenching social 
dislocation leading to a tremendous concentration of social control, which in turn depends on 
exogenous factors creating catastrophic conditions that undermine existing survival strategies, 
the bases of social control.110 In Indonesia in 1965 a military coup wiped out the communist 
party, Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), in a slaughter which claimed die lives of up to half 
a million people. The coup was backed by an American government preoccupied with war
108 Rajesh Tandon, "The State and Voluntary Agencies in India", in Holloway (Ed)., 
Doing Development..., pp. 27-28.
109 Migdal, Strong Societies, Weak States..., pg. 269.
110 Ibid, pg. 262.
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in Vietnam, and fear of the spread of communism throughout South-East Asia. The 
subsequent state of terror and rural "pacification" to which it led facilitated the imposition of 
the Orde Baru (New Order) regime of General Suharto.
The Indonesian state exerts significant control over rural organisations that link the 
poor directly to the state apparatus and has been able to maintain effective social control. By 
inheriting the badan perjuangan, the local associations that represented the main institutional 
constituency in the nationalist pre-independence pemuda movement, the Sukarno regime 
created GOLKAR (from golongan karya, or "functional groups"), the ruling party under the
Suharto regime, with a presence in practically every village. Through its control of
* ~~
government patronage and its administration by officials of the bureaucracy down to the 
village level, supplemented by legislation banning political parties from organising in rural 
areas between election campaigns, GOLKAR has won every-national election since 1971.
After 1981 however, fluctuating balance of payments difficulties caused by oil 
revenue shortfalls111 led to reductions in spending on state development programmes. The 
government tried to compensate by liberalizing the economy and promoting greater 
community participation.112 As a result, it acknowledged the role of NGOs in maintaining 
welfare programmes in rural areas and allowed them greater autonomy to raise funds abroad 
and from coordinating with government agencies. In Indonesia, communism and socialism 
are regarded by the government as alien ideologies potentially capable of undermining the 
entire fabric of the Indonesian state however, and NGOs are~are seen as sympathetic to both
111 Traditionally Indonesia’s major export earner, oil revenues accounted for 80% of 
export earnings in 1981.
112 Mary Johnson, "Non-Government Organisations at the Crossroads in Indonesia", in 
Robert C. Rice (Ed.), Indonesian Economic Development: Approaches, Technology, 
Small-Scale Textiles, Urban Infrastructure and NGOs, Proceedings of the Centre for 
Southeast Asian Studies’ Winter Lecture Series 1988, Monash University, Clayton, 1990, pp. 
77-78.
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ideologies. As a result, the government does not allow NGOs to engage in political activity 
and the Indonesian NGO community is largely apolitical, concentrating on social development 
functions. As a result, Indonesia has some of the most effective and focused rural 
development agencies in South-East Asia.
In 1983, reflecting NGO sensitivities, the term "NGO" was largely abandoned 
because of its anti-government and oppositional connotation, in favour of the generic labels 
Lembaga Swadaya Masayarakat (LSM, Self-Help Organisation) and Lembaga Pengembangan 
Swadaya Masayarakat (Self-Help Promotion Organisation) and NGOs are loyal to the state 
ideology of Pancasila.113 Many NGOs are however opposed to state attempts to monopolise 
interpretations of Pancasila,114 and while not seeking Westem-style democracy, are 
nevertheless attempting to expand the limited "political space" available to them to challenge 
the hegemony of the state.115
As a result, Indonesian NGOs lack the independence needed to forge a strategic
113 Philip Eldridge, "NGOs and the State in Indonesia", in Arief Budiman, (Ed.), State 
and Civil Society in Indonesia, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia No. 22, Monash 
University, 1990, pg. 506;-Philip Eldridge, "NGOs in Indonesia: Popular Movement or Arm 
of Government", Working Paper No.55, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies—Monash 
University, Clayton, 1989, pp. 3-4. Pancasila stresses belief in a supreme being, 
humanitarianism, national unity, democracy by consensus, and social justice.
114 Eldridge, 1990, ibid, pg. 509 or 1989, ibid, pg. 5.
115 Islam plays=a key role in this respect. By exploiting the traditional Indonesian concept 
of ummat (community), religious leaders have forced the government to allow the 
establishment of relatively autonomous Islamic associations (See John Bresnan, Managing 
Indonesia: The Modem Political Economy, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993, 
pp. 236-239; Taufik Abdullah,"Zakat Collection and Distribution in Indonesia", in Mohamed 
Ariff (Ed.), The Islamic Voluntary Sector in Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore, 1991). A similiar situation exists in Vietnam where indigenous NGOs 
were legally sanctioned in 1991. Careful to echo the party line as obliged by law, NGOs are 
never-the-less increasing their autonomy from the state-controlled mass organisations to which 
they are loosely affiliated, emboldened by the state policy of Doi Moi (Renovation) (See Tran 
Thi Lanh, "The Role of Vietnamese NGOs in the Current Period", paper presented at the 
Vietnam Update Conference, "Doi Moi, the State and Civil Society", Australian National 
University, Canberra, 10-11 November 1994).
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alliance with government agencies to undermine the power of agrarian elites,116 and instead
are primarily concerned with defending and expanding their .limited autonomy from the
government, especially the security agencies, GOLKAR officials and local administrators.
Holloway describes the background to NGO strategy:
The government has been particularly worried about groups of village-level 
organisations whose development activities might mask political agitation.
This concern came to a head in 1972 when the various political parties were 
reduced to three...In the following year, a large number of fishermensV 
farmers’, and workers’ organisations were subsumed into... government- 
controlled [bodies]. Since then, there have been various attempts to replace 
NGO networks with those of their own, although this has been voluntary 
rather than by decree.117
As Eldridge notes however, these government-initiated structures including the "Village
Community Resilience Institutes" (LKMD) were empty structures with little appeal to local
communities.118 In the 1980s, cracks in the cohesion of the Indonesian regime became
apparent and NGOs were among the first to exploit them. Ministries such as Environment,
Public Works, Interior, and the Cabinet Secretariat came to view NGOs in positive
terms.119 In 1982, the government issued an Environmental Law explicitly recognising the
contribution of NGOs to environmental policy,120 while in 1986 the Ministry of the Interior
created, with NGO support, the "Working Committee on the Development of People’s
Participation in Regional Development".121 However, the influence of the state security
116 Although land disputes remain an integral part of rural politics in Indonesia. Invariably 
the resentment of farmers and NGOs who work with them is directed at the state apparatus, 
eg. the Kedung Ombo dam project in which the government planned to displace 30,000 
people in_Central Java.
117 Richard Holloway, "Partners in Development?: The Government and NGOs in 
Indonesia", in Holloway (Ed.), Doing Development..., pg. 148.
118 Eldridge, "NGOs and the State in Indonesia", pg. 517.
119 Andrew MacIntyre, Business and Politics in Indonesia, Asian Studies Association 
of Australia (ASAA) and Allen & Unwin, 1990, pg. 39.
120 "Cooperation with NGOs...", Asian Development Bank, Vol. 1, pg. 119.
121 Ibid, pg. 127.
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apparatus was brought to bear in the passage of the 1985 Laws on Social Organisations 
(Undang Undang Organisasi Kemasyakatatan), which makes *a state permit obligatory to 
establish an NGO and makes it more difficult for NGOs to attract foreign funding. The law 
came into effect in June 1987 but has not been applied systematically, illustrating an 
ambivalence in the Indonesian government’s position.122
In such circumstances, NGOs invariably attempt to broaden the cracks in the 
governments position and in most countries, human rights NGOs are the most militant and 
the best placed to broaden the political space available to NGOs. In Indonesia, the Legal Aid 
Institute, one of the country’s most active and controversial NGOs, has clashed openly with 
the government by representing defendants in politically sensitive trials,123 while others have 
supported the opposition Petisi Kelompok 50 (Group of 50 Petition). NGOs have also 
provided an important institutional base to students and intellectuals, traditionally the main 
opposition to the government. Most NGOs however expand their autonomy by collaborating 
with government, demonstrating their efficacy as development agencies and then attracting 
foreign funding,124 enabling them to maintain a professional distance from government 
through mechanisms such as sub-contracting or tripartite collaboration (with government and 
foreign funders).
Given the top-down nature of Indonesian development strategy^ and the authoritarian 
character of the regime, it is difficult for bottom-up initiatives to organise or threaten the
122 MacIntyre, Business Associations..., pg. 39. One illustration of this ambivalence 
is the Indonesian government’s continued reluctance to introduce tax concessions for private 
institutions including NGOs (See Bresnan, Managing Indonesia..., pg. 301).
123 MacIntyre, ibid; Daniel Lev, "Legal Aid in Indonesia", Working Paper No. 44, 
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Clayton, 1987.
124 Funding from international NGOs alone between 1977 and 1983 was worth 
US$25.5m. See "Cooperation with NGOs...", Asian Development Bank, pg. 124.
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government.125 The bottom-up organising strategies of large NGOs however, create a potential 
for autonomous mobilization. Indonesia’s largest NGO, for instance, Yayasan Bina Swadaya 
(Community Self-Reliance Development Agency), had by the late 1980s organised 17,000 
local groups directly or indirectly,126 and about 15 large NGOs, mainly Jakarta-based, 
engage in similar work. With the advent of large-scale multi-lateral funding from the World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank and UN agencies, Indonesian NGOs may find greater scope 
to engage in independent organising and policy advocacy in years to come, potentially 
eroding the hegemony of the Indonesian state.
NGOs in the developing world remain wary of co-optation by foreign funders as well 
as by the state and often attempt to steer a difficult path between the two. In Thailand for 
instance, according to Gohlert, NGOs prefer foreign NGO rather than government funding, 
and prefer European over American or Japanese funding.127 Frequently an important factor 
is the antagonism which foreign support for NGOs attracts from other actors. International 
development NGOs are often seen as vested interests wielding power without accountability. 
Arnold, for instance, describes them as "an insidious fifth column", "...with no intention of 
relinquishing their interests in the South".128 "Progressive" NGOs in the developing world 
in particular risk opposition from Communist parties on two fronts: first because NGOs 
threaten party legitimacy as defenders of the interests of the poor; and second, because they 
become embroiled in factional party splits. In India for instance, the Communist Party split
125 Although the New Order regime has had to contend with insurgency in Northern 
Sumatra and Irian Jaya, an independence movement in East Timor and frequent clashes with 
student groups.
126 "Cooperation with NGOs...", Asian Development Bank, pg. 131.
127 Ernst W. Gohlert, Power and Culture in Thailand: The Politics o f Development, 
White Lotus Co., Bangkok, 1990, pg. 40.
128 Guy Arnold, The End of the Third World, St. Martins Press/Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 1993, pp. 176-177.
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in 1969. A break-away revisionist faction committed itself to parliamentary struggle and by 
the early 1990s had strong pockets of support in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, eastern Uttar 
Pradesh, Kerala and West Bengal, areas where NGOs and POs were prominent in local 
politics. A more radical faction however, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) 
regarded all foreign-funded NGOs as agents of imperialism that weakened the workers’ and 
peasants’ movement, and called on the Indian government to further regulate such NGOs.129
Like indigenous hardline communist parties, Asian governments are wary of the 
divisive impact of foreign funding to indigenous NGOs. In Malaysia, the ethnic Malay-
dominated government feared the effect of a politically-vocal NGO community on stability,
✓ — 
and the country’s delicate ethnic compact during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In particular,
the government feared that foreign funding would encourage oppositional and politically-
assertive NGOs. The Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad criticized foreign manipulators
using a worldwide network of NGOs to promote popular causes in third world countries, and
described foreign-assisted NGOs such as the Environmental Protection Society Malaysia
(EPSM) or Aliran Kesedaran Negara (Aliran) as "thorns" in the government’s "flesh". This
euphemism was subsequently appropriated by Malaysian NGOs themselves.130
Environmental NGOs, for instance, by linking with foreign counterparts provided, significant
opposition to the- construction of hydro-electric dams, embarrassing the government
internationally.131 Many opposition activists, prosecuted under Malaysia’s 1960 Internal
129 Brosch, "The Discourse on Non-Governmental Organisations...in India", pg. 27. 7
130 See Gurmit Singh K.S., A Thom in the Flesh, Selangor, 1990.
131 See Michael Vatikiotis, "Malaysia’s War: Government Hits Back at its Critics", Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 4 June 1992. For a detailed study of Malaysian environmental 
NGOs, see Bernard Eccleston and David Potter, "NGOs and the Environmental Politics of 
Deforestation in Asia", paper presented to the annual conference of the Association of South- 
East Asian Studies in the United Kingdom (ASEASUK), London, 28-30 March 1994. The 
authors note that in September 1992, Dr. Mahatir sought a truce with environmental NGOs, 
declaring that they were no longer seen as the enemy.
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Security Act and related legislation, especially in the 1987 wave of arrests, came from 
foreign-assisted NGOs, and faced charges such as attending demonstrations or NGO training 
courses in the Philippines.132 The 1987 arrests stimulated the politicization of the NGO 
community by bringing NGO activists together in prison and by eroding fear of the Internal 
Security Act and led to the formation of SUARAM, Malaysia’s main human rights NGO.
The logic behind government behaviour was obvious; support for the dominant party 
in the ruling coalition, UMNO Baru (the New United Malay Nationalist Organisation), came 
mainly from rural Malays and the party maintained a tight grip over local associational life. 
In increasing their limited ability to reach the rural poor, rural development or environmental
j0
NGOs represented one of the few potential threats to UMNO Baruls power base.133 In 
addition to legislation which inhibits NGOs extending beyond their Kuala Lumpur and 
middle-class base, the government has also been able to exploit personality and organisational 
tensions within the NGO community to undermine its political impact. NGO leaders however 
hope that sections of the growing middle-class will become alienated from the existing 
political parties and will opt instead for political participation expressed through NGO 
action.134
132 The Malaysian government’s White Paper No. 14 of 1988, "Towards Preserving 
National Security", for instance, contains, in Appendix F, a photograph of two named 
Malaysian NGO activists labeled "photographs showing involvement of Marxist individuals 
from Malaysia in demonstration [sic] in the Philippines".
133 On the lack of rural development NGOs in Malaysia,and the predominantly middle- 
class character of the NGO community, see Andrew Harding, "Public Interest Groups, Public 
Interest Law and Development in Malaysia", Paper presented to the conference on "Lawand 
Development for the 1990s: Towards new Dimensions of Accountability", School of Oriental 
and African Studies, University of London, 30 May-1 June 1990. In contrast to other 
countries where rural development NGOs represent a large section of the NGO community 
as a whole, Harding argues that Malaysian NGOs cover 7 main sectors as follows: consumer 
rights; environment; religious rights; social reform; women; culture and education; and 
human rights.
134 See for instance, Chandra Muzaffar, Freedom in Fetters: An Analysis of the state 
of democracy in Malaysia, Aliran Kesedaran Negara, Penang, 1988 edition, pp. 66-67.
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Dr. Mahathir’s criticisms also raise the question of whether foreign funding, 
motivated by a desire to expand and strengthen civil society, leads to the establishment of 
NGOs that are unable to develop effective links with other groups or institutions to ensure 
their viability and relevance. In Cambodia, NGOs outperformed the Vietnamese-sponsored 
regime of Hun Sen at rural relief and rehabilitation, and absorbed over US$10m per annum 
from foreign NGOs, an inflow which the government bureaucracy would have been unable 
to absorb, resulting in effective state-NGO partnerships.135 But during the reign of the 
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) established in March 1992 to 
oversee the May 1993 elections, the number of NGOs proliferated, stimulated in part by 
UNTAC’s US$2bn. budget. Many collapsed however following the departure of UNTAC 
while many of those that survived, including the^human rights organisations, are resented by 
the Sihanouk regime as foreign creations with little support among the Cambodian people.
The NGO literature fails to explain the full complexity of NGO attempts to maintain 
autonomy from the hegemonic campaigns of other institutions. While the threat of co-optation 
by the state, and to a much lesser extent, the threat of over reliance on foreign funding are 
covered,136 others are largely ignored. One important threat, for instance, comes from 
political parties who are wary of NGO attempts to agitate their geographical or sectoral 
constituencies or undermine the patronage basis of their appeal. Another problem largely 
ignored is that of working in territory controlled by insurgent groups. Similarly, the-threat 
to left-wing NGOs posed by the centralizing tendencies of Marxist-Leninist movements is also 
ignored, a complex problem for such NGOs since they must also avoid co-optation by the
135 Clark D. Neher, Southeast Asia in the New International Era, Westview Press, 
Boulder CO, 1991, pg. 188; Clark, Democratizing Development..., pg. 5.
136 See for instance Bishwapriya Sanyal, Cooperative Autonomy: The dialectic of 
State-NGOs relationship in developing countries [sic], Research Series 100, International 
Labour Organisation, Geneva, 1994, which provides a comprehensive literature review.
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state and foreign funders.
7. The Politics of Opposition and Protest
Throughout the developing world, NGOs and POs have become important 
institutional vehicles for mobilizing and articulating opposition to the state. Firstly, they fill 
an institutional vacuum by articulating issue-based platforms in countries where political 
parties are based on patronage and by mobilizing groups and individuals which the party 
system has proved unable to reach. Second, they have filled an institutional vacuum at a time 
when the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has 
undermined the popular legitimacy of radical social movements. Third, amid a profound 
differentiation of social structure in many developing countries, NGOs play important roles 
in complex and differentiated social movements. Overall however, while the NGO literature 
grapples in some detail with the potential and problems of NGO alliances with the state, it 
largely ignores important patterns of opposition and protest. The literature on social 
movements, however, concerned largely with Latin America, and hitherto distinct from the 
mainstream NGO Hterature, addresses some of these issues. Since NGOs engage in protest 
action largely through participation in broad social movements, the literature provides 
valuable insights, and needs to be wedded to the NGO literature for a proper appreciation of 
the dynamics of NGO protest. The broad historical context which characterises the social 
movements literature can also help develop a greater historical understanding of the causes 
of NGO proliferation and role expansion and bring a structural perspective to the subject 
which balances the concern with formal political processes characterising the NGO literature.
An important problem with social movements theory as applied to the developing
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world137 is its failure to adequately analyze the changing institutional character of such 
movements and more specifically to recognise the increasingly .important role of NGOs. For 
instance, in a review of the predominant literature on popular protest and contemporary social 
movements in Latin America, Susan Eckstein analyses forms of protest, the social basis of 
defiance and the impact of defiance, but not the institutional vehicles used to articulate it.138 
The failure leads to a number of problems. Eckstein argues, for instance, that "People learn 
repertoires of defiance partly in reaction to dominant group responses".139 Repertoires of 
defiance however also depend on the institutional vehicles employed by dominant and 
dominated groups alike. She also argues that "...the repertoire of collective action on which 
groups tend to draw tends to be limited and heavily influenced by social structural features 
and historic traditions",140 again missing the relationship between institutionalization and 
-mobilization,141 important given that NGOs differ in their strategic objectives and resultant 
tactics. —
David Lehmann is one of the few writers to attempt to reconcile the relatively new 
phenomenon of NGOs with the changing character of contemporary social movements.
137 See for instance Susan Eckstein (Ed.), Power and Popular Protest: Latin American 
Social Movements, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989; Marta Fuentes and 
Andre Gunder-Frank, "Ten Theses on Social Movements", World Development, Vol. 17 
No. 2, 1989; Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder-Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein 
(Eds.), Transforming the Revolution: Social Movements and the World System, 
Monthly Review Press, New York, 1990; James Petras and Morris Morley, US Hegemony 
Under Siege: Class, Politics and Development in Latin America, Verso, London, 1991.
~For a comprehensive review of Latin American social movements theory, see Joe Foweraker, 
=Theorizing Social Movements, Pluto Press, London, 1995. On new social movements in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America, see Ponna Wignaraja (Ed.), New Social Movements in the 
South: Empowering the People, Zed Books, London, 1993.
138 Susan Eckstein, "Power and Popular Protest in Latin America", in Eckstein (Ed.), 
Power and Popular Protest__
139 Ibid, pg. 10.
140 Ibid, pg. 9.
141 A relationship recognised as central in political science theory. See, for instance, 
Huntington, Political Order In Changing Societies, Chapter 1.
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Lehmann suggests a general relationship between economic change and the proliferation of 
NGOs, arguing that Latin America’s previously large-scale social movements are fragmenting 
into smaller ones amid a shift in the themes of social mobilization.142 In the 1960s, he 
argues, social movements were composed primarily of "large organisations calling upon a 
nationwide constituency and aiming to influence government policy or engage in broad-based 
conflict drawn up along the lines of social class" but that authoritarianism undermined 
them.143 In Chile, Lehmann notes, large peasant organisations were easily repressed and 
dismantled by the Pinochet dictatorship. In Peru, the land reform programme of the late
1960s, which broke up the large estates into co-operatives, resulted in the cooptation of
*
peasant organisations. In Brazil, the Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG) had 
a membership of 4.5m in 1978 but was only able to bargain effectively in the sugar cane 
industry "where a degree of uniformity in managerial and pricing arrangements makes the 
negotiation of collective agreements feasible".144 As a result, in the late 1970s and 1980s 
new forms of social mobilization developed partly in response to repression but also as a 
response to changes in economic structure and the role of the state in the economy. Today, 
-  Lehmann suggests, "In the place of large formal organisations, we find a myriad of small- 
scale dispersed movements engaged in an enormous variety of conflicts".145 Contemporary 
rural social conflict, Lehmann notes, "...takes multiple, decentralized, and localised forms 
and rarely follows a hegemonic political organisation".146 And in turn, the social base of 
these movements is heterogeneous, including smallholders, sharecroppers, artisans, and 
landless workers.
142 Lehmann, Democracy and Development , pp. 148-160.
143 Ibid, pg. 148.
144 Ibid pg. 157.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid, pg. 160.
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Within these diffuse movements, NGOs play an important role as intermediaries, and 
Lehmann underlines the role played by the Catholic church and by foreign funders in 
promoting NGOs as vehicles for popular protest.147 Lehmann also notes many of the pitfalls 
facing NGO protest and opposition. In the first place, he notes, NGOs and the diffuse social 
movements with which they work, risk "institutionalised marginality". Another problem he 
suggests is that when they acquire a national political profile, their leadership passes into the 
hands of political parties. Thirdly, NGOs have to contend with political elientelism in Brazil 
and party divisions bordering on sectarianism in Chile.148
Friedmann offers another of the more detailed studies of the basis of NGO protest,
__ *
through analysis of the political claims pressed by NGOs and the social movements of which 
they form a part. He identifies four main claims: 1. inclusive democracy, 2. appropriate 
economic growth, 3. gender equality, and 4. sustainability.149 The value of this analysis is 
its fairly accurate reflection of the contemporary appeals made by NGOs and social 
movements in their protest actions against the state. While some may quibble with finer 
points (many NGOs for instance would eschew the informal labour advocated by Friedmann), 
he successfully pinpoints four key areas of conflict, even if the practical mechanisms by 
which that conflict materialises are not addressed.
In Brazil, NGOs play an important oppositional role, especially since the transition 
from authoritarian rule in 1986. One of the most remarkable features of Brazilian politics 
since 1986 has been the rise of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers’ Party). In the 
Presidential elections of 1990, the PT leader Luis Inacio Lula da Silva won 31m votes against 
35m for the winner, Fernando Collor de Mello, an unprecedented parliamentary achievement
147 Ibid, pg. 159, for instance.
148 Ibid pp. 181-182.
149 Friedmann, Empowerment..., Chapters 5 & 6.
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for a progressive party in Brazilian politics.150 Although the PT is strongest in the industrial
heartlands of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, it attracted crucial rural support mobilized by
NGOs and POs, eg. CONTAG, an alliance of 3000 POs or unions with a combined
membership today of 10m united around a pro-land reform platform, or MST, (the Movement
of Rural Workers Without Land).151 In a country with an estimated 100,000 Base Christian
Communities,152 most of which espouse progressive politics, church-based NGOs and POs
also played an important role. Significantly, in the northeast, where rural inequality is highest
and where NGOs and POs are strong, Lula won almost half the vote.153 The experience of
NGO support for the PT questions Lehmann’s analysis on two particular points; firstly, that
*
NGOs and POs necessarily risk institutionalized marginalization and secondly, that Brazilian
NGOs are necessarily undermined by political clientelism.
Loveman describes progressive NGOs in Chile as "The Invisible Left", playing an
important role in restructuring opposition to the state. Emerging first in the mid 1970s under
the umbrella of the Catholic Church and the Vicaria de la Solidaridad (Vicarate of Solidarity,
one of Chile’s leading NGOs) NGOs,
novel in politics, contributed to the professionalization, technification and 
sophistication of opposition political elites at a time when political parties, 
the labor movement, student and community organisations were suppressed 
by the dictatorship. Staffed primarily by leftist (or, less frequently,
Christian Democratic) academics,- former government officials and 
professionals, they also allowed a reconsideration of the role of the state in 
Chile by intellectuals of the left and centre. The increasing emphasis on 
grassroots, local autonomous initiatives in the development process was a 
dramatic departure from the tradition of state-centred vision of the Chilean
150 See Emir Sader and Ken Silverstein, Without Fear of Being Happy: Lula, the 
Workers Party and Brazil, Verso, London, 1991, pg. 142.
151 Ibid, pg. 60.
152 Ibid, pg. 58.
153 Ibid, pg. 142.
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left.154
Progressive NGOs, Loveman argues, articulated a new political agenda on the left that 
included "a new emphasis on human rights, the basic needs of the poor, the role of women 
in society and politics, and...environmental destruction"155.
In South and South-East Asia, NGOs are also playing important roles in mobilizing 
opposition to the state. In Thailand for instance, NGOs, especially those concerned with 
human rights, played an important role in the demonstrations of May 1992 which led to the 
collapse of the National Peace-Keeping Council led by General Suchinda Kraprayoon, in 
contrast to the Wan Maha Wipayok, the "Great Tragedy" of October 1973, when 
demonstrations against military rule were led by students. Gohlert, for instance, argues that 
".. .there is no sector in Thai society.. .more closely identified with and committed to political 
democracy and economic development for all than the private voluntary organisations",156 
although the underlying significance of that commitment has yet to be established. Ostensibly 
the May 1992 demonstrations unleashed the anger of an uninstitutionalized middle-class, but 
Gohlert argues that the institutional character of the mobilization was disguised by individuals 
hiding their organisational affiliations to protect NGOs from an expected military 
backlash.157 Underlining the change in character of protest in Thailand between 1973 and 
1992, Gohlert notes that during the turbulent period of democratic politics between 1973 and 
1976, NGOs were largely distrusted by the student leadership. The 1973-1976 period
154 Brian Loveman, "The Political Left in Chile 1973-1990", in Barry Carr and Steve 
Ellner (Eds.), The Latin American Left: From the Fall o f Allende to Perostroika, 
Westview Press, Boulder and Latin America Bureau, London, 1993, pg. 32.
155 Ibid.
156 Ernst W. Gohlert, "Thai Democracy and the May 1992 Crisis: The Role of Private 
Non-Profit Organisations", Paper presented to the Western Conference of the Association for 
Asian Studies, University of Arizona, Tucson, 23-24 October 1992, pg. 2.
157 Ibid, pg. 5. Justified in light of estimates that over 150 protestors died during the 
demonstrations.
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however defined the NGO movement. Liberalization led to a growth in the number of NGOs 
while the repression of 1976 drove NGO leaders underground with other opposition and 
student figures, establishing a newly-political and left-wing orientation.158 In contrast to 
Malaysia, Thai environmental NGOs have successfully opposed government attempts to tap 
the country’s hydroelectric power potential and achieved, the cancellation of a hydroelectric 
scheme at Pak Moon in 1991.159
In general, the literature covers the dynamics of NGO protest and opposition to the 
state in scant detail. While there is some suggestion that human rights and environmental 
NGOs are significant initiators of protest actions against the state, there is little analysis of 
the qualitative impact of different types of NGOs andPOs. Similarly, there is little analysis 
of tactics, the calculations behind them, and their variation over time or with regime change, 
eg. participation in elections or support for political parties, advocacy of armed struggle, 
militant strikes and demonstrations, public campaigns for legislative change, establishing — 
personal links with government figures. Neither is there comparative analysis that enables an 
assessment of the efficacy of NGO/PO protest, vis-a-vis political parties or armed 
insurgencies. ___
8. Politics and NGO Organisation
Ultimately, the ability of NGOs to intervene in local or national political debates 
depends on how they fulfil their core service-delivery functions and how they organise 
themselves individually and collectively as a political force. The NGO literature discusses five 
particular issues: size; focus; funding & finance; inter-NGO/PO relations; and participation
158 Gohlert, Power and Culture..., pp. 101-102.
159 See Paul Handley and Susumu Awanohara, "Power Struggle: Thai Dam Scheme...", 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 October 1991,
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& decision-making processes.
Size represents an issue of controversy within the NGO literature with a general 
consensus that large intermediate NGOs are more effective than smaller, more numerous ones 
and a minority view that favours the latter. The controversy is important because the 
NGO/PO communities in many developing countries (eg. Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh, 
and Sri Lanka) consists of a small number of large, long-established and well-funded NGOs 
set against hundreds or thousands of small NGOs and POs. This disparity is largely due to 
the preferences of foreign funders who have created a virtual oligopoly but it also represents 
an intermediate stage in a complex process of institutionalization. Carroirs empirical study 
of Latin American GSOs (intermediary NGOs) and MSOs (POs), for instance, found that 
GSOs had a slight edge over MSOs in group capacity building and poverty reach but a big 
advantage when it came to policy influence and innovation and suggested that foreign funding 
was best directed to GSOs,160 a view supported by Lehmann.161 Given the current concern 
with "scaling-up",162 and the belief that "maximising impact is the paramount objective of 
NGOs",163 the literature deals at length with the disadvantages of smallness. To Farrington 
and Bebbington who summarise this view, "small-scale" usually means "insignificant" in the 
face of pervasive poverty; "politically independent" can mean "powerless" or "disconnected"; 
"low-cost" can mean "under-financed" or "poor-quality"; while "innovative" can simply mean 
"temporary" or "unsustainable".164 —
One of the main critics of this view, Constantino-David, however, notes that
160 Carroll, Intermediary NGOs..., pg. 36.
161 Lehmann, Democracy and Development..., pg. 201.
162 See for instance Edwards and Hulme, "Scaling Up The Development Impact of NGOs: 
concepts and experiences" in Edwards and Hulme (Eds), Making a Difference....
163 John Clark, "Policy influence, lobbying and advocacy" in ibid, pg. 191.
164 Farrington and Bebbington, Reluctant Partners..., pg. 23.
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"beyond a certain size, it becomes impossible to avoid setting up a bureaucratic/hierarchial
structure that is less flexible, creative and participatory than smaller organisations".165
Furthermore, she argues, the underlying ethos of development NGO work should remain
participatory, "including the ability to decentralise decision-making to autonomous regional
groups", whereas BINGOs "retard the development of autonomous development NGOs
because programmes are developed at the centre", and because they are favoured
disproportionately by donors166. Constantino-David’s view is credible; while all large NGOs
struggle to avoid being atrophied by bureaucracy, many are retreating from direct programme
work to become funding agencies in their own right. As a result, foreign funders are
*
increasingly bypassing intermediary NGOs to fund regional and local NGOs/POs.
Focus represents another area of controversy. On the one hand, a consensus exists 
within the literature-that "scaling-up" NGO impact necessitates a macro-view of NGO action. 
On the other hand however, an organisational and managerial thrust to the literature continues 
to emphasise the importance of professionalising service-delivery functions. Farrington and 
Bebbington illustrate an ambiguity in the literature: while arguing that a critical weakness of 
NGO action is that it is often conducted in isolation from wider policy issues, they also argue 
that NGOs pay too much attention "to qualitative aspects of development such as participation 
and not enough to the harder questions of income generation".167 Edwards and Hulme 
agree, arguing that_"with greater access to resources comes a preoccupation with growth, a 
tendency towards bureaucratization and an increasing danger of becoming ’contractors for the
165 Karina Constantino-David, "The Philippine Experience in Scaling Up", in Edwards 
and Hulme (Eds.), Making a Difference..., pg. 139.
166 Ibid.
167 Farrington and Bebbington, Reluctant Partners..., pg. 184.
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international system and its agenda’ "168. Certainly, political conditions also influence focus
to a large extent. The relatively ''liberal" environment NGOs face in India or Chile
encourages programme diversity while the restrictive environment faced by NGOs in
Indonesia enhances programme focus. Equally however, donor restrictions on political activity
and concern with empirically-verifiable results has inhibited indigenous NGO communities
from striking a balance between macro- and micro-concerns on the basis of local political
conditions. —
Ostensibly, finance and specifically the reliance of most NGOs in the developing
world on funding from abroad, has given rise to little controversy, especially in the core texts
*
on NGO action. This is largely due however to the donor-driven agenda which underpins 
these books but it obscures a fundamental imbalance which inevitably gives rise to disquiet. 
Lehmann is one of.the few authors to acknowledge the problem directly. His concern with 
the "institutionalised marginality" towards which NGOs and social movements may be 
moving is traced directly to NGOs and POs funded from Europe and America, which, he 
argues,
fit the ideological and even the budgetary requirements of these agencies 
very well: they are cheap, they are prepared to put up with short-term 
programmes requiring annual or biennial reapplications and they embody 
the philosophy of an ’alternative development’. They do not use high 
technology, they seek out self-sufficiency and Their members are perceived 
as constituting...the authentic poor, the salt of the earth.169
A number of specific tensions arise however which are not addressed in the literature: First,
large NGOs and POs are increasingly concerned about the short-term nature of funding
commitments, the recurring bureaucratic requirements associated with maintaining it, and the
168 Edwards and Hulme, "Making a Difference?: Concluding Comments", in Edwards and 
Hulme (Eds.), Making a Difference..., pg. 215.
169 Lehmann, Democracy and Development..., pp. 180-181. See also pg. 189.
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leverage over programme direction which it gives to the funders concerned, and are seeking 
new arrangements concerning in-country project approval, longer term funding and a more 
mutually supportive relationship. Second, smaller NGOs and POs in particular are becoming 
increasingly resentful of the ability of big NGOs to comer the lions share of foreign funding 
and are now forging direct links with donors to erode the oligopoly. Third, NGOs and POs 
of all hues and sizes, partly under pressure from donors but also through a process of 
institutionalization, are attempting to generate an increased proportion of their monetary and - 
non-monetary (eg. equipment or services) resources from indigenous sources. All three of
these processes give rise to interesting political dynamics which go unexplored in the NGO
*
literature.
The issue of inter-NGO relations is one which gives rise to near-unanimity within
the NGO literature: all writers note that ’peak’ NGO/PO bodies and multi-tiered federations
have been established in nearly all developing countries with NGO/PO communities and that
they constitute an important component of "scaling-up" strategies designed to increase the
impact of NGO action. As Uphoff argues,
while isolated instances of local institutional development can be 
impressive, their cumulative effect is negligible...what counts are systems 
of networks of organisations, both vertically and horizontally.170
A significant, if empirically weak, case can also be made that such national-level federations
have had a demonstrable political impact in overthrowing dictatorial regimes in Bangladesh
(Ershad), Chile (Pinochet), Haiti (Duvalier) and Thailand (Suchinda) and have become a
potent force in the politics of capital cities throughout the developing world. But other
interesting political aspects of inter-NGO relations are also apparent. First, peak bodies and
federations often become vehicles for advancing the interests of large NGOs or personalities
170 Uphoff, Local Institutional Development..., pg. 213.
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particularly in relatively sectarian political cultures such as Bangladesh or Chile. Second,
federations of small NGOs or POs can be even more atrophied by bureaucracy than the large
NGOs to which they are opposed, because of the need to achieve broad consensus before
undertaking programme work. Third, peak-body or federation politics often suggests deep
rivalry between an emphasis on sectoral-based organisation, usually characterized by control
from the capital, and local- or regional-based organisation which aims to preserve autonomy
from the centre and the regional distinctiveness of programme orientation. Fourth, NGO
federations and peak bodies are often beset by debate about political tactics and levels of
intervention in political arenas. None of these issues however is addressed in the NGO
*
literature.
The final issue, participation and decision-making processes, is among the most 
complex and controversial since its strikes to the heart of the nature of NGO action. Carroll 
found that MSOs, which by definition should be more participatory, were no more effective 
at ensuring participation than GSOs,171 and that they were "more prone to mismanagement, 
corruption, political cronyism or cooptation than GSOs whose leaders and staff do not depend 
on the type of reward system where formal accountability mechanisms can be circumvented 
more easily”.172 Government-organised structures at the local level often perpetuate a strong 
if empirically unsustainable rhetoric of popular participation and the literature has long 
acknowledged the comparative advantage organisations such as NGOs or POs enjoy over 
government in promoting political participation.173 But concern at the rhetorical aspect of 
NGO/PO commitment to participation is now being voiced. Jonathan Rigg, for instance,
171 Carroll, Intermediary NGOs..., pg. 3
172 Ibid, pp. 88-89.
173 For instance, Esman and Uphoff, Local Organisations..., or Uphoff, Local 
Institutional Development...
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critically appraises the community culture development perspective, watthanatham chumchon,
practised by a number of Thai NGOs, and notes that far from resulting from popular
participation of the intended beneficiaries, the approach is inherently elitist:
Selective notions of village self-reliance, co-operation and participation 
have been coopted by academics (and then by the state) and placed within 
an entirely new, alien, framework. The ideology masquerades as village- 
based and -oriented, yet it is little different in the manner in which it has 
been designed from the orthodox development strategies it aims to 
replace.174
Hewison, in a reply, argues that Rigg’s overall position demonstrates "a proclivity to reduce 
political activity to the level of individuals and their cliques, ignoring class- and system-level 
interaction".175 Hewison’s argument can also be interpreted more broadly since the NGO 
literature fails to adequately analyze the institutional or class, as distinct from the clientelistic, 
aspect of local-level NGO action. Yet Rigg is undeniably correct in suggesting a discrepancy 
between a rhetorical NGO commitment (often articulated in good faith) to participation and 
a practical capability to ensure it. The NGO literature is poorly placed to address the issue. 
Given its donor-driven agenda, the literature, inevitably perhaps, misses the role played by 
donors who traditionally encouraged NGO accountability to their own boards rather than to 
their own members and supporters.
9. Conclusion.
This chapter argues that the politics of NGO action is insuffiently analysed in 
academic literature. Rather, the mainstream NGO literature focuses on the socio-economic
174 Jonathan Rigg, "Grass-roots development in rural areas: A lost cause?", World 
Development, Vol. 19 No. 2/3, 1991, pg. 204.
175 Kevin Hewison, "Nongovernmental Organisations and the Cultural Development 
Perspective in Thailand: A Comment on Rigg (1991)", World Development, Vol. 21 No. 
10, 1993, pg. 1700.
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roles of NGOs, especially in promoting rural development, at the expense of their political 
roles. Political scientists have been slow to appreciate the significance of the "associational 
revolution", the proliferation of NGOs in the developing world since the early 1970s. They 
have thus failed to contribute to the rapidly emerging social science literature on NGOs. A 
seperate body of literature, focusing on new or contemporary social movements, examines 
issues that relate to NGO political roles. This literature however has yet to make an 
impression on the mainstream NGO literature. Moreover, the normative concern with 
development that underpins the mainstream NGO literature obscures the political character
of NGOs and their antecedents, civic and political associations, and pressure groups.
*  ~~
Nevertheless the NGO literature-does address political issues to an extent. When 
supplemented with region or country-specific NGOs studies and themes from mainstream 
political science or political economy, a tentative picture emerges of NGOs playing significant 
roles in local and national politics. Important questions, however, go substantially 
unanswered. Why or how, for instance, do NGOs come into existence? How or why do 
NGOs intervene in politics? Are NGOs simply pressure groups, or distinct political actors? 
How are NGOs affected by prevailing political culture? Why do-States forge relationships 
with NGOs? What obstacles undermine such relationships? How do NGOs relate to other 
political institutions such as political parties, trade unions, peasant associations or insurgent 
groups? This dissertation attempts to answer these questions with respective to the 
Philippines. ~
A major issue addressed throughout the study is the role of NGOs in promoting 
democracy. "Redemocrarization" and the politics of democratic consolidation have been 
among the most significant themes in political science theory since the mid-1980s. An 
important dimension of this concern involves accounting for new mechanisms created by
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changing institutional relationships. Competing institutional interests animate any process of 
democratization and clues to the character of a "redemocratization" project can be found in 
an examination of the nature and degree of competition between and within institutions of 
state and society. Since it is not certain that NGOs are the most effective means to 
institutionalize "popular empowerment", this study examines the contradictions as much as 
the potential of NGO action.
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CHAPTER TWO: NGOs and the Philippine State: From Spanish Rule To
The Fall of Marcos.
1. Introduction.
Though the contemporary NGO literature ignores or obscures the long tradition of
voluntary action throughout the developing world and its political character, many developing
countries such as the Philippines have voluntary sectors dating to the late nineteenth or early
twentieth centuries. In an important contribution to the NGO literature, David Korten
identifies four " generations"_of NGOs as follows:1
*
(1) First generation strategies: "Relief and welfare". Direct delivery of services to a 
beneficiary group or population such as food, health care and shelter.
(2) Second generation strategies: "Small-scale, Self-Reliant Local Development". Breaking 
the dependency resulting from charity or humanitarian assistance. Empowerment of local 
communities through "preventative health care measures, the-introduction of improved 
agricultural practices, the formation of community councils, digging wells, building feeder 
roads etc".
(3) Third generation strategies: "Sustainable Systems Development". Concerted efforts to 
replicate and multiply NGO successes at the micro-level. Creation of new and sizeable 
institutions, increased collaboration with governmental agencies and a change in NGO role 
from service provider to Catalyst, especially in mobilising local communities through 
autonomous Peoples Organisations (POs).
(4) Fourth generation strategies: Still evolving and relatively undefined but essentially the
1 David C. Korten, Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global 
Agenda, Kumarian Press, West Hartford, 1990, pp. 115-127.
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promotion of institutional and structural reform through increasingly complex NGO/PO 
coalitions, both nationally and internationally.
Korten’s typology, especially the first and second "generations", is based on a 
primarily socio-economic interpretation of NGO activity that reflects the focus of the broader 
literature. In practice however, as the case of the Philippines illustrates, NGOs and their 
antecedents, civic and political organisations, have a long record of participation in politics.
2. NGOs and State-NGO relationships in the Philippines from the 1880s to 1972.
"First generation" strategies in the Philippines date to the late nineteenth century and
*
to collaboration between elite philanthropists, the Catholic Church and the Spanish colonial 
administration. One of the first Philippine civic organisations, the Conferencia de San Vicente 
de Paul, was established in 1886 by Spanish priests, with Margarita Roxas de Ayala, founder 
of the Casa Ayala and scion of the Zobel de Ayala family, its first President.2 In the 1880s, 
the Spanish colonial administration established the General Inspection of Charities and Public 
Health to involve charities in upgrading medical skills and facilities, and to make up for the 
shortage of qualified personnel in the bureaucracy.3 According to Rizal’s Noli me Tangere, 
the administration gave awards to civic initiatives that promoted agricultural or commercial 
development, financed by taxes on cock fighting.4 Spanish policy however restricted the righr 
of association and political organisations were treated harshly.
Philanthropy was a prominent force in the establishment of civic organisations
2 Women of Distinction, Bukang Liwayway, Manila, 1967, pg. 26.
3 Eliodro G. Robles, The Philippines in the Nineteenth Century, Malaya Books Inc., 
Manila, 1969, pg. 230.
4 Jose Rizal, Noli me Tangere, translated by Leon Ma. Guerrero, Longman, London, 
1961, pg. 289. "Blessed the vice that produced such excellent results!", Rizal adds wryly in 
response.
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throughout the world in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. In the Philippines however, where 
family clans would long remain the primary unit of social organisation and a dominant force 
in politics, its role was accentuated. Philanthropy enabled prominent families to secure church 
approval of their wealth and to legitimate their social prestige; to secure and maintain political 
office and protect their economic interests; and to socially interact with the Spanish, and 
later, American, rulers. For the Catholic Church, the establishment of charitable organisations 
brought the support of prominent families in enforcing its own religious hegemony. Equally, 
the Spanish state relied on the Church and prominent philanthropists to help provide relief
and maintain social order during emergencies and natural disasters, including the 1878
*
famine.
During the Philippine-American War 1898-1901, both sides used civic organisations 
as adjuncts to their armies. Ilustrados (and women in particular) formed philanthropic 
organisations, such as the Philippine Red Cross, to raise funds for the Katipunan, and provide 
medical care for its wounded soldiers.5 American civic organisations, including the Salvation 
Army and the Young Mens Christian Association (YMCA) were mobilized to support the 
American war effort, especially to treat wounded soldiers.
With the imposition of American rule by 1901, charities began to multiply, stimulated 
by American colonial policy. William Howard Taft, the first American Governor General, 
and later, US President, believed that American-style De Tocquevillian democracy, centred 
on local government and vibrant civic organisations, could be transplanted to the 
Philippines.6 A legal framework governing the activities of civic organisations was outlined
5 Teodoro M. Kalaw, The Philippine Revolution, Jorge B. Vargas Filipiniana 
Foundation, Manila, 1969, pg. 152.
6 Stanley Kamow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines, Random 
House, New York, 1989, pg. 228
56
in the Philippine Corporation Law of 1906, and numerous American civic organisations had 
established offices in Manila by the late 1920s, including the Philippine Chapter of the 
American Red Cross, the Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the 
Philippine Islands Anti-Tuberculosis League and the Associated Charities of Manila.7
American rule consolidated the role of philanthropy in legitimating the social status
of Philippine elites. American philanthropic and missionary organisations established branches
in the Philippines and members of the Filipino social elite embraced their activities with
enthusiasm. Aluit’s history of the Philippine Red Cross, for instance, notes that membership
in the 1910s "was a veritible roster of all the great names of the Philippine scene at the time;
*
Juan Sumulong, Jose de Luzurriaga, Cayetano S. Arellano, Jaime de Veyra, Sergio Osmena, 
Vicente Singson Encamacion, Rafael Palma and Manuel L. Quezon all served on the 
board".8 However, few philanthropic organisations challenged the administration on the 
socio-economic consequences of colonial rule.9
The American colonial government had two main means of encouraging the 
proliferation of civic organisations. Firstly, senior politicians, judges and administrators 
developed personal relationships with prominent American and Filipino philanthropists to 
provide elite patronage and leadership. Taft organised the Gota de Leche, a campaign to 
provide milk for orphan babies, with the civic organisation La Protection de la Infantia,
7 See Rosenstock’s Manila City Directory 1927-1928, Volume XXXIII, pg. 182.
8 Alfonson J. Aluit, The Conscience of the Nation: A History of the Red Cross in 
the Philippines 1896-1972, Philippine National Red Cross, Manila, 1972, pp. 182-183.
9 See for instance Kenton J. Clymer, Protestant Missionaries in the Philippines: An 
Inquiry into the American Colonial Mentality, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 
1986, pg. 160, citing a YMCA official on the negative socio-economic consequences of 
colonial rule. The YMCA however refrained from openly challenging the colonial 
administration.
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headed by prominent Filipino philanthropist, Teodoro Yangco.10 Returning to the Philippines 
in 1905 as Secretary of War, Taft presided over the formal organisation of the Philippine 
Chapter of the American Red Cross.11 A later Governor General, W. Cameron Forbes, 
generated financial support for the YMCA (described by Gleeck as "The most successful 
American effort deliberately aimed at modifying Filipino values") and served as one of the 
first Presidents of the Philippine Amateur Athletic Association.12 The second method was 
to provide direct government funding. In 1921, the colonial government allotted $150,000, 
equivalent to 2.2% of its annual expenditure,13 to civic organisations engaged in health 
service provision, especially for a campaign against leprosy.14 Senior American officials 
were proud of the contribution civic organisations made to the provision of social services and 
the institutional innovation which they represented in a country where people traditionally 
relied on familial relationships to fulfil social needs.15 Yet, the socio-economic impact of 
civic organisations was a palliative to overall colonial strategy of resource extraction.16
Civic organisations played an important political role in American colonial strategy. 
First, they aided the proliferation of democratic values and support for the American strategy 
of local government. In 1922, for instance, Governor General Leonard Wood reported that:
10 Lewis E. Gleeck Jr., American Institutions in the Philippines 1898-1941, Historical 
Conservation Society Monograph No. XXVIII, Manila, 1976, pg. 85.
11 Ibid, pg. 89.
12 Ibid, pp. 71 & 74-75.
13 W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands, Volume II, Houghton Mifflin Co., 
Boston, 1928, pg. 244. The amount may be unrepresentative however, since allocations to 
charities were not made on a regular annual basis.
14 Ibid, Volume I, pg. 278.
15 See for instance, George A. Malcolm, The Commonwealth of the Philippines, D. 
Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1936, pg. 302. Malcolm was the Senior Justice of 
the Supreme Court.
16 Total insular expenditure in 1921 for example was $6.8m, while revenue from taxation 
was $22.7m, and total revenue, $55m (Forbes, The Philippine Islands, Volume II pg. 244).
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One of the strongest influences for building up interest in proper municipal 
government comes from the numerous womens clubs. They have done 
excellent work, especially on behalf of child welfare, .public health, public 
instruction, private and public morality and the stimulating of interest in local 
governments- municipal and provincial.17
Second, they helped persuade many Filipinos of the value of limited government and the role
of independent and self-reliant initiatives at a time when the colonial administration was
committed to resource extraction.18 Third, Protestant civic organisations acted as a
beachhead in establishing Protestant denominations in a country that was predominantly
Catholic.19 Officials of the YMCA led the first Protestant services on Philippine soil.20
American pastors, Clymer notes, "considered the Y[MCA] as an evangelical organisation and
maintained close ties with the mission”? 1 The_YMCA also played an important role in
muting conflict with the Catholic Church and among the various Protestant denominations22
while Protestant civic organisations supported the military _pacification campaign and
maintained close ties with military personnel.23 Fourth, civic organisations facilitated the
American strategy of maintaining political stability by perpetuating the position of the
oligarchy, establishing the position of prominent families who remain prominent in NGO
circles to this day, including the Benitezes and the Pardo de Taveras._Fifth, according to
17 Annual Report of the Governor General o f the Philippines, 1922, pg. 31, quoted 
in ibid, Volume I, pp. 18-19.
18 Writing in 1934, for instance, a Filipino political scientisf noted in a college textbook, 
"The Filipinos, like many other peoples of the modem world believe that progress and 
advancement can not be attained by the work of government alone. These must be supplanted 
by the direct assistance of the people, either individually or through civic organisations”. See 
Eufronio M. Alip, Political and Cultural History of the Philippines, Volume II, Alip & 
Sons Inc., Manila, 1934, pg. 409.
19 Gleeck, American Institutions..., pg. 60.
20 W. Cameroon Forbes, The Philippine Islands, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1928, 
Volume II, pg. 65.
21 Clymer, Protestant M issionaries..., pg. 5.
22 Ibid, pg. 103.
23 Ibid, pg. 158.
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Cullather, civic organisations and institutions sponsored by the colonial government helped 
to keep Manila’s restive Chinese minority "compliant and happy" and promoted their "retro- 
assimilation" into Filipino culture.24
During the 1910s however, political cleavages developed between the colonial 
administration and civic organisations, compounded by racial tensions between Americans 
who used them to legitimate their political power and social prestige,25 and Filipinos who 
used them to articulate their ambiguous and evolving sense of national identity. In 1905, the 
Philippine Chapter of the American Red Cross accepted that the colonial administration 
should assume responsibility for disaster relief and subsequently became inactive. But in the 
1910s, when Filipinos had become more prominent, Americans and Filipinos differed over 
the role of the colonial administration in the organisation’s affairs.26 In 1916, the Red 
Cross’s activities and its relations with the colonial administration became a major source of 
controversy when the Philippine legislature passed an act establishing a Philippine chapter 
independent of the American Red Cross. Directed against American dominance over most, 
and the exclusion of Filipinos from many, civic organisations, the act was declared void by 
the administration’s Attorney General.27 Tensions continued during the 1930s when the 
administration, now composed mainly of Filipino officials, and the Red Cross vied to claim 
credit for disaster relief activities, as President Quezon renewed demands for an independent 
Philippine Red Cross.28
Catholic civic organisations were equally engrossed in politics. During the 1930s, anti­
24 Nick Cullather, Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States- 
Philippine Relations, 1942-1960, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1994, pg. 15.
25 Filipinos were initially banned from membership of some American-established civic 
organisations, including the YMCA, where they only became members after 1910.
26 Gleeck, American Institutions..., pp. 87 & 89.
27 Ibid, pg. 88.
28 Ibid, pg. 92.
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communist and anti-socialist Catholic organisations such as the Catholic Womens League, the 
Bellermine Evidence League and the Chesterton Evidence League were established in reaction 
to the growth of trade unions and peasant associations.29 Tracing church involvement in 
socio-economic transformation to this period, Fabros argues that counter-propaganda was the 
main objective of the Church’s emerging concern with social action. This objective, he 
argues, was consolidated in the 1940s, as Catholic civic organisations began to organise 
peasants and workers. Following recognition of NGOs in the 1945 UN Charter, the Institute 
of Social Order, established in 1947, became one of the first church-inspired NGOs in the 
Philippines.
Overall, operating in the relatively rarefied atmosphere of elite Manila society, civic 
organisations were far removed from the mass movements that developed in response to 
American rule, and the increased political power of agrarian-based elites, and played a 
relatively minor role in the important political debates of the day. During the 1950s however, 
civic organisations became enmeshed in rural politics. Following World War II, the returning 
US military, with the aid of local landlords and the Philippine Constabulary, violently 
demobilized the peasant-based Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa Hapon (HBL, Anti-Japanese Peoples 
Army) because of its perceived communist orientation.30 The reimposition of oligarchic rule, 
and in particular the prohibition on the peasant-backed Democratic Alliance occupying the 
6 seats it won in 1946 legislative elections provoked remnants of the HBL, led by the Partido 
Komunista ng Pilipinas (Philippine Communist Party) to form the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng 
Bayan (HMB, The People’s Liberation Army). Before the Huk Rebellion, Central Luzon had
29 Wilfredo Fabros, The Church and its Social Involvement in the Philippines 1930- 
1972, Ateneo de Manila University Press, Quezon City, 1988, pp. 17-20.
30 See Benedict Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the 
Philippines, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1977, Chapter 4.
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"virtually no horizontal political organisation."31 At the height of the rebellion, 1949-1951, 
however, the HMB had roughly 15,000 armed guerillas, transforming Central Luzon through 
insurrection and the creation of large peasant unions.32 At the same time, elite philanthropic 
organisations became increasingly active in rural areas. As agriculture became increasingly 
dominated by capitalist-based relations of production, and in the absence of government 
efforts to provide housing, education or other social services to workers, corporate 
philanthropy supplemented traditional patronage as companies provided support to their 
workforces and made donations to civic organisations which catered to their workers.
A counter-insurgency campaign directed by the US quashed the rural revolt by the 
mid-1950s. In 1952, the Quirino administration overhauled legislation governing non-profit 
voluntary organisations in the Science Act (Republic Act 2067), stimulating an immediate 
response through the establishment of new civic organisations commited to rural development 
and these organisations played an important role in winning the support of the rural 
population of Central Luzon for the government. One of the most important was the 
Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), established in 1952 in direct imitation 
of the Taiwanese Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction,33 with help from the Social 
Welfare Administration (SWA). The SWA became a major funder of NGO activity during 
the 1950s. It’s public assistance budget, PI.9m a year on average between 1953 and 1957, 
was_ supplemented by relief supplies from-Catholic Relief Services of America, worth P4m 
in 1957 alone. This support enabled the SWA to approve grants totaling P200,000 in 1957,
31 Ibid, pp. 210 & 249.
32 Ibid.
33 James Putzel, A Captive Land: The Politics o f Agrarian Reform in the 
Philippines, Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, 1992, pg. 90; Jose 
Abueva, Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography, Solidaridad Publishing House, 
Manila, 1971, pg. 362.
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based on 226 applications from civic and charitable organisations.34
A retrospective account of military tactics used to crush the Huks observes that "civic
organisations [made] contributions to the counter-guerrilla effort that [were] nothing short of
awe-inspiring".35 Confirming that view, a Huk commander’s report explains declining
support from peasants:
Many have been influenced by deceitful government propaganda, the 
establishment of ’welfare- agencies’ (Agricultural Credit and Cooperative 
Financing Administration, Farmers Cooperative Associations, Philippine Rural 
Reconstruction Movement, Rural Improvement Club, Social Welfare 
Administration) and the promised land for the landless program administered 
by the Land Tenure Administration.36
Although few substantive concessions were made to the demands which had fuelled 
it, the Huk Rebellion prompted the government to forge direct institutional ties with the 
peasantry. In 1953, the Quirino administration, at US behest, established the Agricultural 
Credit and Co-operative Financing Administration (ACCFA) to organise Farmers Cooperative 
Marketing Associations (FACOMAS) and by 1959, 502 FACOMAS had been organised with 
a membership of 289,121 farmers.37 This first attempt at state-led popular mobilization was 
a failure; by 1969, only 250 remained, and by 1975, less than 30.38 Exploiting weaknesses 
in FACOMA strategy, elite agrarian interests dominated the new associations, undermining 
the intended direct links between state and peasants. As Po and Montiel explain:
the FACOMAs were meant to serve the interests of farmers and agricultural
34 Eight Annual Report of the Social Welfare Administration for the Fiscal Year 
1957-1958, Social Welfare Administration, Manila, 1960, pg. 4.
35 Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T. R. Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations: 
The Philippine Experience, Pall Mall Press, London, 1962, pg. 83.
36 Quoted in Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion..., pg. 240.
37 Frank H. Golay, The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic 
Development,, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1961, pg. 287.
38 Agenda for Action For the Philippine Rural Sector, Agricultural Policy and 
Strategy Team, University of Los Banos- Agricultural Policy Research Program and the 
Philippine Institute for Development Studies, October 1986, pg. 570.
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producers [and therefore] excluded... rural workers who comprisefd] a 
substantial portion of the rural populace. Sugar tenants were likewise left 
out...Furthermore,....capital was needed before a FACOMA could be 
organised..[0]nly those farmers with the resources to pay their share in the 
cooperative qualified for membership. The FACOMA structure replicated the 
inequality characterizing rural society. While the ACCFA aimed to help the 
small farmer primarily, any bona fide agricultural producer- landlord or tenant 
could become a member of the FACOMA... It was inevitable therefore that, 
more often than not, landed interests had the controlling power [within] the 
FACOMAS.39
In 1956, President Magsaysay, in an attempt to launch a government institution capable of 
promoting sustained rural development, and undercut potential support for a Huk resurgence, 
created the Presidential Arm on Community Development. The PACD was designed to 
replace the government’s hitherto fragmented approach to community organising.40 Although 
inspired by the success of PRRM, it effectively excluded civic organisations which Magsaysay 
viewed as potential rivals in his own plans to build popular rural support.41 Together, PACD
39 Blondie Po & Cristina Montiel, Rural Organisations in the Philippines, Institute of 
Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University, 1980, pp. 62-63. According to the World 
Bank however, FACOMAs failed because "Management was weak and sometimes dishonest, 
government supervision was inadequate, delinquencies on loans rose...and four-fifths of co­
operatives lost money". See The Philippines: Priorities and Prospects for Development, 
The World Bank, Washington D.C., 1976, Pg. 121.
40 In 1954,“an adviser warned Magsaysay that "people in the barrios are now confused 
with so many organizations ostensibly for their good. They are asked to organize themselves 
into ’barrio councils’ by the Bureau of Agricultural Extension, and before their second 
meeting they are asked again to organize a ’rural council’ according to the administrative 
code. [Then] they are herded by school teachers into a purok (neighbourhood self-help 
association)...[and] their wives...[are herded] into ’Rural Improvement Clubs’ by the Bureau 
of Agricultural Extension. The children do not escape; they are herded into 4-H clubs. After 
this, the PRRM [Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement], the PRUCIS [Philippine Rural 
Improvement Society], the NAMFREL [National Movement for Freedom of Elections] and 
other organizations join the melee with their own barrio teams. Net result- confusion, 
duplication, waste and jealousies" (quoted in Jose V. Abueva, Ramon Magsaysay: A 
Political Biography, Solidaridad Publishing House, Manila, 1971, pg. 359).
41 Civic organisations were to be actively involved in the PACD strategy. A 1957 report 
noted-that the PACD would play "A subordinate role in which it provides certain essential 
services to peoples organisations (communities) necessary for the achievement of goals and 
objectives which they have set themselves" (Ramon P. Binamira, The Philippine 
Community Development Program, Office of the Presidential Assistant for Community
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and American officials drafted proposals to improve local government, which resulted in the 
Barrio Charter of 1955. At the same time, the Bureau of Agricultural Extension established 
functional community organisations such as "4-H" clubs, farmers’ associations, cooperatives 
and womens’ rural improvement clubs.42 Some, the 4-H clubs especially, later forged ties 
with independently-organised NGOs. Effective local government depended on the viability 
of these various institutions which in turn were dependent on funding mainly from the PACD. 
Most proved of short duration however since the PACD hoarded funding for distribution at 
election time to barrios that supported particular provincial or national politicians.43 Another 
factor in the 1960s was that President Macapagal, in contrast to Magsaysay, felt that the 
PACD played a marginal role in promoting economic growth in rural areas/4 and as a result 
it was marginalised from policy-making.
In addition to counter-insurgency, the government promoted civic organisations as an 
alternative to increased state intervention in the economy. Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice-President 
during the Macapagal administration, for instance, emphasised the need for self-reliance and
Development, Manila, 1957, pg. 1). The PACD worked with the Jaycees, Rotary, the Ramon 
Magsaysay Foundation and a number of other voluntary organisations in its community 
development work (Annual Report on Foreign Aid Programs in the Philippines FY 
1966, National Economic Council, Office of Foreign Aid Coordination, Manila, pg. 91) but 
cooperation was confined to groups that supported the Magsaysay government. PACD tight 
control estranged many civic organisations. Thus, while a 1959 PACD report notes that 
private organisations such as PRRM and the Philippine Rural Community Improvement 
Society (PRUCIS) were being "rallied and their efforts coordinated", (Community 
Development: The War Against Want, Hunger, Illiteracy and Disease, PACD, Manila, 
1959, pg. 38) collaboration with the PACD was a relatively minor aspect of their work and 
a 1960s report acknowledged "ten years of silent misunderstanding" between PRRM and the 
PACD (Annual Report on Foreign...FY 1966, National Economic Council, Office of 
Foreign Aid Coordination, Manila, pg. 91).
42 Po and Montiel, Rural Organisations..., pg. 31.
43 The Philippines: Priorities and Prospects..., pg. 119; Po and Montiel, Rural 
Organisations..., pg. 35.
44 See Diosdado Macapagal, A Stone for the Edifice: Memoirs o f a President, MAC
Publishing House, Manila, 1968, pg. 284.
65
civic responsibility, echoing positions adopted by successive post-war governments:
the sooner we realize that progress lies in our initiating action to help 
ourselves within the framework of basic laws that protect our substantial 
rights, the sooner we wake up to the fact that progress lies not in government 
regulation and regimentation but in the least interference by the government 
in our lives, consistent with the common good, that much sooner will we 
achieve the progress and prosperity that we all dream of for our country and 
people.45
The government had little cause however to argue that Filipinos had become too dependent 
on the state. By 1964, a year after Pelaez stepped down from the Vice-Presidency, general 
government expenditure stood at only 13.4% of GNP, and government revenue was 12.7%
of GNP, figures which had declined respectively to 13% and 12.2% by 1972.46 Rather,
> — 
government positions reflected agrarian elite antipathy to increased state intervention and
attempts at undermining the regressive nature of the tax system.47
In another approach to coopting NGOs, the Americans, through the. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) helped to establish the National Movement For Free Elections
(NAMFREL) in 1951 to create indirect support for a Presidential bid by the Defence
Secretary Ramon Magsaysay and channeled funding through American civic organisations.48
Ostensibly a non-partisan civic organisation, NAMFREL’s campaign was directed largely a t
corruption and electoral fraud within the incumbent Liberal Party,49 and provided important
45 Emmanuel Pelaez, Government By The People: My Beliefs and Ideas X)n Our 
Public Affairs and National Development, Quezon City, 1964, pg. 24.
46 Amando Doronila, The State, Economic Transformation and Political Change in 
the Philippines, 1946-1972, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1992, pg. 143—
47 Doronila notes that "during the 1960s and 1970s, 70-75% of tax revenues were derived 
from indirect taxation. In addition, the tax base during the 1960s was eroded by a series of 
legislation granting tax concessions intended to promote industrial growth". See Ibid.
48 See Raymond Bonner, Waltzing With A Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making 
of American Policy, Times Books, New York, 1987, pg. 40; Cullather, Illusions of 
Influence..., pp. 112-113.
49 The Americans felt that the incumbent and Liberal Party candidate Quirino lacked the 
resolve to fight the Huks and that corruption within his administration provided an important 
rallying point for the Huks.
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support to Nacionalista candidate Magsaysay in the 1953 Presidential elections.50 Doronila 
argues that by campaigning intensively in rural areas, a break with traditional election 
campaigns which led to a 30% increase in turnout, "Magsaysay... [by-passed] the local 
political middlemen who formed the synapses of the patron-client framework of the two-party 
system".51 Magsaysay won the presidency over traditional elite opposition, but those same 
elites dominated Congress, providing effective opposition to the new President’s programme. 
To bypass Congressional opposition, Magsaysay needed to generate institutional and 
organised, rather than individual and spontaneous, support from the rural peasantry but in this 
he was largely unsuccessful.52 Following his election, Magsaysay introduced a redistributive 
land reform program but his administration lacked effective autonomy from Congress where 
his Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1955 was emasculated.53 Consolidating a pattern of 
perpetual tension between the executive and Congress for financial control over government 
programmes, Congress also refused to fund Magsaysay’s social welfare programmes, and his 
successor, Carlos Garcia was forced to abandon them entirely.54
President Macapagal (1961-1965) also cooperated closely with American advisers and 
and, like Magsaysay, used civic organisations to fight communism and maintain rural 
stability. In 1962, the government embarked on an economic and social rehabilitation 
programme in parts of Central Luzon where Huk elements remained active, with support
50 See Jorge R. Coquia, The Philippine Presidential Election of 1953, University 
Publishing Co., Manila, 1955, pp. 282-292.
51 Doronila, The State..., pg. 96.
52 Magsaysay attracted support from business-inspired civic organisations such as the 
Jaycees, Lions and Elks (Cullather, Illusions of Influence..., pp. I l l  & 151) but more 
popular-based institutional support proved elusive.
53 See Putzel, A Captive Land..., pp. 83-96.
54 Carlos P. Romulo and Beth Day Romulo, The Philippine Presidents: Memoirs o f 
Carlos P. Romulo, New Day, Quezon City, 1988. pg. 112.
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from PRRM and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).55 
During the mid-1960s, US governments used the CIA and USAID (which channelled funds 
through the Ford, Rockfeller and Asia foundations), to promote civic organisations in the 
Philippines.56 The main objective was to erode support for mass agrarian movements seen 
as communist.
Despite attempts by post-war governments to mobilize popular-based and organised 
support, the prevailing regime was relatively unaffected. Writing in 1968, Gunnar Myrdal 
argued that policy-making was shaped predominantly by "personalities and landlord controlled 
lobbies" and "producer associations built around commercial agricultural products". In turn, 
Myrdal argued, the scope for government action was determined primarily by shifting 
coalitions among these interests groups.57 Landlords were the main source of funding for 
both political parties, the-Liberals and the Nacionalistas. As a result, there was little 
ideological competition between the two, minimal intra-party solidarity, endemic inter-party 
switching and membership was effectively confined to politicians.58 Along similar lines to 
Doronila, Grossholtz argued in 1964 that interest groups with a newly political orientation 
were articulating increasingly explicit demands, leading to a "breakdown of the old 
hierarchial relationships and gross economic inequality".59 These included business groups 
such as the Chamber of Commerce, Veterans groups, church groups, and labour unions. In 
reality however, successive governments dissipated non-elite political demands through a
55 Macapagal, A Stone for the Edifice..., pg. 165.
56 Funding to civic organisations dispersed through the CIA reputedly ended in the late 
1960s.
57 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into The Poverty Of Nations, Penguin 
Books, Harmondsworth, 1968, Vol. 1, pg. 389.
58 Carl Lande, Leaders, Followers and Factions: The Structure of Philippine 
Politics, Monograph Series No. 6, Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University, 1964, pg. 1.
59 Jean Grossholtz, Politics in the Philippines, Little, Brown and Co., 1964, Chapter 
XI, especially pg. 235.
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combination of repression and co-optation.
Thus, when Ferdinand Marcos became President in 1965, civic organisations were a 
weak, albeit tangible, threat. Marcos responded by coopting or displacing civic organisations 
engaged in relief and welfare activity, largely by expanding the socio-economic and 
community development role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In the 
government's Four Year Economic Program 1967-1970, co-ordination with NGOs in 
promoting community development is only briefly mentioned, while a whole chapter is given 
over to the Civic Action Program of the AFP.60 Marcos proved adept at using civic 
organisations for his own ends. In 1967, for instance, he persuaded PRRM’s President 
Gregorio Feliciano to become Head of the Social Welfare Administration, a move that led 
to consternation within PRRM’s board (See Chapter 5). To Marcos, as to Magsaysay and 
Macapagal before him, NGOs were useful vehicles in undermining potential communist 
threats, and in 1969, he appointed PRRM Chairman Manuel Manahan to chair the Central 
Luzon Study Commission, a body charged with creating a bipartisan consensus on renewed 
rural unrest in the region.61
Overall, despite limited funding, civic organisations proliferated during the late 1960s. 
From 1967 to 1971 (inclusive), 750 non-stock entities (NSEs)62 on average registered with
60 The program notes "...an extensive community development program ...is expected 
to reach about two thousand barrios a year over a period of four years. Community 
development activities will range from the utilization of out-of-school youth to the 
construction of self-help projects such as school buildings and communal irrigation systems. 
These activities will be undertaken in co-ordination with government and private volunteer 
organisations engaged in related services”. See Four Year Economic Program for the 
Philippines, Fiscal Years 1967-1970, Manila, September 1966, pg. 30. Chapter 6 deals 
with the Civic Action Program of the AFP, and among other things calls for Philippine Army 
and Philippine Constabulary participation with the PACD and the National Land Reform 
Agency in promoting community self-help projects. See pg. 71.
61 Eduardo Lachica, Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt, Solidaridad 
Publishing House, Manila, 1971, pg. 251.
62 See Chapter 3 for further details of NSEs.
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the Securities and Exchange Commission each year, compared to 3,200 stock entities.63 
Martial law however led to a dramatic restructuring in relationships between the non-profit 
and business sectors; registrations of NSEs fell to 559 in 1972 and 607 in 1973 while stock 
entity registrations rose to 4145 and 6156 respectively. Yet by 1975, NGOs began to 
proliferate again.
3. NGOs and the Marcos Dictatorship.
On 21 September 1972, Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law. Congress was closed,
key opposition leaders were arrested, existing political parties were banned, newspapers and
*
radio/television stations were closed or nationalized' and a brutal counter-insurgency 
campaign was unleashed against rural and urban communities alike. All institutions that 
existed independently of the state and that could potentially mobilize opposition to it, were 
Tepressed, driven underground or shut down. The Catholic hierarchy and officials of the main 
Protestant churches, supported the regime, yet Marcos clamped down on local social action 
programmes, jailing priests and nuns, raiding church establishments,64 and disrupting the 
work of church-based development NGOs.65 When martial law was declared, the Philippine 
NGO community was relatively small. During the 1950s and ’60s, the Philippines was seen 
internationally as an oasis of economic well-being and democratic stability, and was not an
63 Paid Up Equity Investment Report Series, Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Manila.
64 Robert L. Youngblood, Marcos Against The Church: Economic Development and 
Political Repression in the Philippines, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990, pp. 172- 
173.
65 A telex from the World Council of Churches in Geneva to affiliated European funding 
agencies, dated 8 November 1972, notes that the declaration of martial law had significantly 
restricted the operation of church development programmes in the Philippines, necessitating 
a reassessment of programme activities (Christian Aid archives, SOAS, University of 
London).
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important recipient of Official Development Assistance (ODA),66 a major stimulant to NGO 
proliferation and growth in Africa and South Asia at this time. In the absence of major ODA 
inflows, NGOs possessed little financial capacity to counter the patronage-based appeal of the 
martial law regime. The small number that existed were primarily involved in relief and 
welfare rather than political activity and were largely controlled by prominent businessmen 
and philanthropists who were willing to acquiesce to the dictats of the martial law regime.
Nevertheless, Marcos tried to ensure that elite NGOs would not become a threat by
curbing their financial autonomy, though the strategy was only partially successful. First, the
government excluded civic organisations from participating in government-initiated socio-
*
economic programmes. The Four Year Development Plan 1974-1977 excluded collaboration 
with NGOs, and opted instead for a process of state-directed institution building centred on 
barrio councils, citizens assemblies, barrio associations and cooperatives.67 Second, shares 
of the proceeds of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes allocated to prominent NGOs were cut 
on the orders of Marcos, as happened to the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement in 
1979. Third, in 1976, the government unsuccessfully attempted to impose a 1% tax on 
business profits to establish a government-controlled Community Fund, a move which would 
have curbed private sector funding of business-organised or -oriented NGOs (BONGOs) such 
as Philippine Business for Social Progress.68
While largely ignoring the limited threat which NGOs posed, especially in the 1970s,
66 The annual average of ODA receipts between 1967 and 1971, for instance, was 
equivalent to only 1 % of GNP (Development Assistance 1972, Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1973, pg. 245).
67 Four Year Development Plan, Fiscal Years 1974-1977, Manila, 1973. See 
especially Chapter 20.
68 Ruth Callanta, "Philippine Business for Social Progress" in NGO Strategic 
Management in Asia: Focus on Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines, Asian NGO 
Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, Manila 1988, pg. 126.
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Marcos concentrated on deploying state patronage in an attempt to coopt support from the 
urban and rural population and neutralise the armed opposition of the New Peoples Army. 
In 1973, in Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, Marcos (himself one the country’s largest 
landowners69) launched a limited land reform programme. Confined to rice and comlands, 
the programme was limited to 34% of tenant farmers and barely 8% of an estimated 5.28m 
landless farmers.70 To become beneficiaries however, farmers had to join Samahang Nayon 
(SN, Barrio or Pre-cooperative Associations), and the government planned to establish 16,000 
SNs with a combined membership of lm.71 SNs were supposed to provide revenue to the 
government,72 and to undermine the hundreds of independent rural cooperatives excluded 
from the land reform programme.3 According to government figures, 15,451 SNs were 
established within a year and a half of the enactment of PD 27, with a membership of 
663,489 farmers,74 yet Kerkvliet argues that only a fraction of the planned target was 
reached by 1979.75 Between 1979 and 1985, 459 independent rural co-operatives registered 
with the Bureau of Rural Workers,76 suggesting that the Marcos strategy had failed. Yet, 
in parts of Central Luzon where the land reform program was successful,77 SNs, Kilusang
69 Marcos reportedly owned over 30,000 hectares in Cagayan, Isabela and Negros. See 
Benedict Kerkvliet, "Land Reform: Emancipation or Counterinsurgency" in David A. 
Rosenberg (Ed.), Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1979, pg. 121.
70 Ibid, pp. 129 & 131.
71 Agenda for Action..., pg. 570.
72 Would-be farmer-beneficiaries were supposed to pay a membership fee of P25 and 
annual dues of P I00. See Benedict Kerkvliet, Everyday Politics in the Philippines: Class 
and Status Relations in a Central Luzon Village, University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1990, pg. 187.
73 Kerkvliet, "Land Reform: Emancipation or Counter-insurgency", pg. 127.
74 See Agenda For Action..., pg. 570.
75 Kerkvliet, "Land Reform: Emancipation or Counter-insurgency", pg. 127.
76 Agenda For Action, pg. 569.
77 Although only 138,300 farmers had or were about to become landowners by 1986, the 
beneficiaries were highly concentrated, especially in Nueva Ecija. See Kerkvliet, Everyday
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Bayan (government-controlled cooperatives) and other government-controlled rural 
organisations,78 provided important support to the Marcos regime until its collapse in 1986.
Marcos also tried to create patronage networks that linked local communities directly 
to the state through a new system of village-based local government. Reviving the precolonial 
barangay (village) structure because of its nationalist overtones, in place of barrios, the 
government renamed existing structures at the local, municipal, and provincial level and 
established a host of new structures: the Katipunan ng mga Barangay (League of Barangay 
Councils), the Kabataang Barangay Pampook (League of Barangay Youth Organisations), the
Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian (League of Provincial and City Councils) and the Kabataang
* ~~
Pambarangay (Barangay Youth Organisation)^ As a result, by the mid-1970s, few other 
significant social organisations existed apart from those of the church79 and, as Hollnsteiner 
notes, "Spontaneous expressions of mass interests [were] -either coopted by elites or 
suppressed as subversive threats to the state".80 —
During the late 1970s however, the number of NGOs grew significantly (see Chapter 
4) and the government was forced to make overtures to them for two important reasons.
Politics..., pp. 31-32. As a result, Marcos enjoyed the support of the peasantry of Nueva 
Ecija, even in the 1986 Presidential elections. See Benedict Kerkvliet, "Understanding Politics 
in a Nueva Ecija Rural Community" in Benedict Kerkvliet & Resil Mojares (Eds.), From 
Marcos To Aquino: Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines, 
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1991, pp. 226-231.
78 These included the National Congress of Farmers Organisations (NCFO) and other 
"company unions" which "lent legitimacy to the regime.. .[helped] divide organised peasants, 
and participated in the military’s persecution of militant peasant leaders" (See Francisco Lara 
Jr., and Horacio R. Morales Jr., "The Peasant Movement-and the Challenge of Rural 
Democratization in the Philippines", Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 26 No. 4, 
1990, pp. 147-148), as well as the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (ARBA), 
organised and controlled by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (See Agenda for Action..., 
pg. 570).
79 Wurfel, Filipino Politics...,pg. 119.
80 Mary Racelis Hollnsteiner, "Mobilizing the Poor Through Community Organisation", 
Philippine Studies, 27 (1979), pg. 391.
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First, from the late 1970s onwards, the government attempted to normalise its rule. In 1978, 
elections were held to a new National Assembly after political parties had been relegalized 
and in 1981, martial law was lifted. Tentative collaboration between NGOs and state agencies 
became part of a process of normalisation. Second, as the martial law regime’s 
industrialization strategy floundered following global oil price rises in 1979, poverty levels 
increased,81 and the country was gripped by economic crisis. As a result, the government 
became progressively more dependent on ODA (see Table 1). As ODA increased however, 
the bureaucracy, as the difference between commitments and actual flows in Table 1 
illustrates, had difficulty in absorbing it,82 and it was forced to involve NGOs in project 
implementation.
The government was also unable to control the disbursement of large amounts of 
development assistance, and aid from European funding NGOs especially went directly to 
Philippine counterparts. In addition, the way in which development was conceived by multi­
lateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
changed. Locally-based popular participation and "basic needs" were increasingly
81 According to World Bank figures, Philippine GDP grew by 5.9% per annum between 
1965 and 1980 but a mere 0.7% per annum between 1980 and 1989 (World Development 
Report 1991, World Bank and Oxford University Press, 1991, pg. 206). Yet, as Boyce 
notes, this growth was accompanied by significant impoverishment. Between 1961 and 1985“  
he estimates, real incomes of the poorest 30% fell by 23%, while the number of families 
living below the poverty line rose from 41% in 1965Tb 59% in 1985 (James K. Boyce, The 
Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, Macmillan, 
London, 1993, pp. 43 and 47).
82 ODA absorbtion rates between 1973 and 1983, for instance, varied widely between 
government departments and agencies, from a low of 19.5% to a high of 92% (Romeo A. 
Reyes, Official Development Assistance to the Philippines: A Study of Administrative 
Capacity and Performance, National Economic and Development Authority, Manila, 1985, 
pg. 215). Overall reasons for low absorbtion rates in the period to 1985 included a) the 
inadequacy of medium-term financial plans; b) the lack of co-ordination among ministries 
dealing with ODA donors; c) an inability to raise necessary counter-part funding.
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emphasised.83 An International Labour Organisation (ILO) mission to the Philippines in 
1974 argued that the country’s growth potential lay largely, in the rural sector and that 
development needed to be based on popular participation, especially at the barrio level.84 
As a result, the Marcos
Table 1
ODA Flows to the Philippines 1978-1990 (US$m)
Year (1) (2)
1978 514.7 249.3
1979 399.4 267.4
1980 450.2 299.8
1981 475.0 376.1
1982 495.5 333.4
1983 534.9 429.0
1984 458.9 381.8
1985 365.9 460.4
1986 1103.1 955.8
1987 1074.7 770.2
1988 1870.7 854.3
1989 1611.2 844.5
1990 2176.2 1276.7
(1) ODA Commitments from all sources
(2) ODA Flows from all sources
Source: Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 1992, Asian 
Development Bank, Manila, pp. 71 & 73.
government came under pressure to involve NGOs and other forms of community-based 
organisations-in its socio-economic development programmes. Bowing to this pressure, 
government agencies promoted programmes that fostered local participation and initiative. In 
1976, for instance, the National Irrigation Authority (NLA) tried to launch autonomous
83 H. W. Arndt, Economic Development: The History of an Idea, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987, pp. 97-98.
84 See Gustav Rainis et al., Sharing in Development: A Programme of employment, 
equity, and growth for the Philippines, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1974, pg. 
64.
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irrigation associations in Central and Northern Luzon.85 In 1981, an NGO called 
SARILAKAS (from sariling lakas, or "own strength") was launched by the Bureau of Rural 
Workers, with funds from the Dutch government and the International Labour Organisation’s 
Programme on Organisations of the Rural Poor (PORP).86 SARILAKAS was designed to 
establish autonomous People’s Organisations (POs) and in 1983 the Bureau of Rural Workers 
established another NGO, PROCESS (Participatory Research Organisation of Communities 
and Education in the Struggle for Self-Reliance), to replicate SARILAKAS’s success in 
community organising.87 These initiatives were reflected in overall government policy. The 
government’s Five Year Development Plan 1978-1982 called for closer coordination with 
NGOs in promoting community development and in social service provision.88 The Updated 
Philippine Development Plan 1984-1987, went further, encouraging links with NGOs to 
strengthen the delivery of social services.89 More specifically, the government noted the role 
of state-NGO links in attempts to curb population growth,90 echoing developments in 
Indonesia where, under prodding from USAID, the government worked with NGOs to 
implement family planning programmes.
85 Boyce, The Political Economy o f Growth and Impoverishment..., pg. 86. The
NLA programme achieved mixed results. In some cases, organisations were successfully 
established. In others, irrigation associations fell under the control of local politicians, 
alienating small farmers. -
^Charlotte Harland, "SARILAKAS: Grassroots participation in the Philippines" in Peter 
Oakley et al, Projects with People: The Practice o f Participation in Rural Development, 
International Labour Organisation, Geneva, 1991.
87 For details of PROCESS, see "Cooperation with NGOs in Agriculture and Rural 
Development", Asian Development Bank, Manila, August 1989, Volume 1, pp. 335-338.
88-In Chapter 12, Social Services and Community Development (SSCD), the Plan calls 
for "Closer interagency coordination among SSCD (public and private) bodies to expand 
clientele outreach and maximise the efficient use of resources". See Five Year Philippine 
Development Plan 1978-1982, Including the Ten Year Development Plan 1978-1987, 
Manila, September 1977, pg. 234.
89 Updated Philippine Development Plan 1984-1987, National Economic and 
Development Authority, Manila, September 1984, pg. 225.
90 Ibid, pg. 223.
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Despite these overtures however, the government maintained its leading role in
implementing community development projects. This control .facilitated the direct flow of
state patronage into barrios and barangays, and provided the financial resources to mobilize
grassroots support as regime legitimacy came under increased threat. Large scale community
development initiatives supported by official development assistance donors also provided
substantial opportunities to enrich the first couple. Imelda Marcos enriched herself by
plundering ODA grants to community development projects*1-through her control of-the
Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS), a "super-ministry" created in 1981 which displaced
the work of many civic organisations. In 1981, the MHS launched Kilusang Kabuhayan at
*
Kaunlaran (KKK, Movement for Livelihood and Progress), with an initial budget of $lbn.. 
Ostensibly, KKK aimed to give interest-free loans to support livelihood projects, but, under 
Imelda’s control, was used in practice to buy the support of local officials*2 and to acquire 
land for herself and her husband.93 The government also established ostensibly independent 
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Associations (ARBAs), but the strategy failed since the 
ARBAs were widely seen as creations of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.94 A host of other 
community organisations were also established: Kilusang Sariling Sikap (KSS, Self-Help 
Movement) (which came under the auspices of the KKK); Samabang Kabubaycm 
(Countrymen’s Organisation); Bagong Lipunan Community Associations (linked to Kilusang 
Bagong Lipunan, (KBL, the New Society Movement), the ruling party established in 1978), 
and KABISIG (Linking Arms) Service Brigades. The latter initiative illustrated the Marcoses
91 See Belinda A. Aquino, The Politics of Plunder: The Philippines Under Marcos, 
Great Books Trading, Quezon City, 1987, pp. 63-69.
92 Within six months of the launch of KKK, Imelda ordered the release of P10,000 paid 
to barangay captains in Metro Manila, PI00,000 to each mayor in the country and P500,000 
to each governor. See Wurfel, Filipino Politics..., pg. 257.
93 See Aquino, The Politics of Plunder..., pp. 66-67.
94 Agenda for A ction..., pg. 570.
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desperate and ultimately unsuccessful attempts to stem the erosion of support for their regime, 
and in December 1985, the idea was expanded when Marcos launched Kabisig sa Diwang 
Pilipino (Comrades in Filipino Minds), rhetorically aimed at encouraging popular 
participation in government and propagating a spiritual, humanist, and nationalist ideology. 
Riven by corruption, dominated by KBL henchmen and blatantly designed to mobilize support 
for the first couple, these initiatives alienated the more socially-committed NGOs that 
grappled with rising poverty and landlessness, ineffective government service delivery 
programmes, and the violent control of associational life, and by 1986 relations between the 
state and NGOs were more polarised than at any time in the post-independence period.
4. Conclusion.
The Philippines has a long tradition of voluntary activity, dating to the 1880s and 
Spanish colonial rule. Promoted by the Philippine Corporation Law of 1906, civic and 
political organisations proliferated in Manila during the years of American colonial rule 
(1898-1946). After World War II, post-independence regimes promoted their continued 
proliferation, through legislation such as the Science Act of 1952, and through government 
funding channelled through agencies such as the Social Welfare Administration (SWA) and 
the Presidential Assistant on Community Development (PACD).
Philippine NGOs, and their antecedents, civic and political organisations have long 
been used in the pursuit of political objectives. The proliferation of relief and welfare 
organisations, Korten’s "first generation" NGOs, in the early twentieth century was 
inextricably bound up with American colonial policy of transplanting American democracy 
and its institutions in the Philippines. These organisations also helped American officials and 
businessmen to maintain their social status in Manila and to enable the Filipino middle-class
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to interact with them.
After World War II, new civic organisations focused on rural development. The state, 
the Catholic Church and elite philanthropic interests all promoted civic organisations in an 
attempt to undermine communist insurgency and to preserve existing democratic, and 
inherently elite, institutions by maintaining rural stability. Thus, in the Philippines, "second 
generation" NGOs were established primarily to fight rural insurgency and only secondarily 
to fight rural poverty or remedy faults in  first generation strategies.
The policy of post-independence governments towards NGOs has been complex and
multifaceted. Rural development NGOs, for instance, proliferated during the early and mid
*
1950s, stimulated in large part by government legislation and financial support. The 
Magsaysay administration (1954-1958) ostensibly supported civic organisations, yet Ramon 
Magsaysay regarded NGOs as a threat to his own plans to develop direct institutional ties 
between the government and the rural peasantry and PACD collaboration with NGOs was 
undermined by the resultant ambivalence. Similarly, during Ferdinand Marcos’s two elected 
terms as President (1965-1969 and 1969-1972), NGOs continued to proliferate yet Marcos 
marginalized them, mainly by expanding the community development functions of the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines.
The years of The Marcos dictatorship (1972-1986) redefined the Philippine NGO 
community in many respects (see Chapter 4). NGO proliferation slowed initially as a result 
of the declaration of martial law, but after 1975 a new generation of NGOs emerged, 
stimulated by rising rural poverty and political marginalization. Until 1972, NGOs worked 
in close collaboration with the Philippine state, and, elitist in nature, had weak ties to their 
beneficaries. Under the authoritarian regime however, new NGOs worked closely with grass­
roots "peoples organisations" and eschewed collaboration with the state to varying degrees.
79
Implementation of development projects in local communities provided the means to mobilize 
opposition to the state and NGOs developed significant capability, both in delivering social 
services and in organising beneficaries. After 1979, the government was forced by foreign 
funders and economic circumstances to involve many NGOs in the implementation of 
development projects. To secure its own position and to maintain political stability however, 
the government promoted state institutions that mobilized people at the barrio or barangay 
level, bringing NGOs and the state into direct competition for the support of specific 
constituencies.
By 1986, NGO proliferation had made the NGO community an important political 
actor. Most NGOs, however, were bitterly opposed to the Marcos regime and NGO strategy 
aimed primarily to build an infrastructure of political power and a socio-economic capacity 
that was autonomous from the government and had the potential to undermine it. In 1986, 
therefore, the Philippine state, traditionally undermined by a variegated range of autonomous 
and often powerful social forces, faced a new political force, complicating the regime 
consolidation dilemmas of the Aquino government.
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CHAPTER THREE: NGOs and the Philippine State: 1986-1993.
1. Introduction.
After the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986, Philippine NGOs continued to 
proliferate and by the early 1990s, the Philippine NGO community had become one of the 
largest and best organised in the developing world. NGOs were major beneficiaries of the 
political liberalization that followed Corazon Aquino’s accession to power. Aquino quickly 
forged ties with NGOs, a policy continued by her successor in 1992, Gen. Fidel Ramos, and 
over the intervening years, left-of-centre NGOs began to reassess their stance towards the 
Philippine state. In a relatively short 'period of time, NGOs became central political 
institutions, potential partners-in a strategic alliance that could enhance the Philippine state’s 
autonomy from the economic^ predominantly agrarian, elites who had traditionally acted as 
a restraint on the development of state autonomy andxapacity. But what would be the basis 
of such an alliance and how would it develop between 1986 and 1993?1
In one theoretical case for collaboration between states and NGOs, Evans argues that 
the "developmental states" of East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore) are characterised by "an autonomy embedded in a concrete set of social ties which 
bind the state to society and provide institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation 
and renegotiation of goals and policies".2 In certain middle-income-countries such as Brazil 
however, "embedded autonomy is a partial rather than a global attribute", largely because the
1 This dissertation is based on fieldwork carried out in the Philippines during 1993 and 
focuses on events upto the end of that year.
2 Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and 
Structural Change", in Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman (Eds.), The Politics of 
Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts and the State, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992, pg. 164.
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"persistence of clientelistic and patrimonial characteristics has prevented the construction of 
Weberian corporate coherence" within the state apparatus.3 In India especially, Evans notes, 
the state "lacks the ties that might enable it to mount a shared project with social groups 
interested in transformation".4
Evans’ partial embedded autonomy concept is particularly useful in analyzing 
development dilemmas in the Philippines. The Philippine state has been variously described 
as "soft",5 "weak",6 or "captive",7 and Rivera notes that it has failed significantly "to 
construct or oversee a social coalition" capable of sustaining industrial growth.8 This 
argument raises the question of how the Philippine state might mount a shared project with 
groups interested in transformation. Steven Rood argues that a strong community of Non- 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) could help provide the state with some insulation from 
socio-economic elites.9 This correlates with Evans’ suggestion that embedded autonomy 
stems from the development of "a project shared by a highly developed bureaucratic apparatus 
and a relatively organised set of private actors who could provide useful intelligence and
3 Ibid, pg. 172. "[RJather than being able to focus on its relationship with industrial 
capital", Evans argues, the Brazilian state "has always had to simultaneously contend with 
traditional elites threatened by the conflictual transformation of rural class relations" (pg. 
170).
4 Ibid, pg. 176.
5 David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1988, pg. 327, drawing on Gunnar Myrdal. _
6 Stephan Haggard, "The Political Economy of the Philippine Debt Crisis", in Joan 
Nelson (Ed.), Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics o f Adjustment in the 
Third World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990, pg. 216.
7 James Putzel, A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines, 
Catholic Institute for International Relations, London, 1992, pg. xx.
8 Temario Rivera, "Class, The State and Capital: The Politics of Philippine 
Industrialization, 1950-1986", Ph.D. thesis, Graduate School, University of Wisconsin- 
Madison, 1991, pg. 220.
9 Steven Rood, "The State and Non-Government Organisations", paper presented at the 
Fourth International Philippine Studies Conference, 1-3 July 1992, Australian National 
University, Canberra, Australia.
82
decentralized implementation",10 and with Haggard’s argument that the power of the 
Philippine bureaucracy has been circumscribed by a lack of qualified personnel and by the 
marginalization of reform-oriented technocrats within the policy-making process.11
Through an analysis of state policy towards NGOs as articulated by the executive, 
the military and the bureaucracy, this chapter tests the hypothesis, based on Evans’ and 
Rood’s analysis, that formal or informal relationships with NGOs can improve state capacity 
by:
(1) creating "pockets of efficiency"12 within government ministries that undermine 
corruption and patronage-based decision-making processes;
(2) providing a degree of strategic partnership that enables government ministries and other 
state agencies to attack entrenched socio-economic elites, including landlords, mining 
corporations, and logging concessionaires;
(3) filling voids in the government’s social service provision role;
(4) providing intermediate institutional ties that link the government to traditionally 
disempowered strata of society, thus mobilising popular support for a government committed 
to structural reform.
2. The Background to State Policy.
The environment for NGO action in the Philippines is liberal in comparison to other 
countries in South and South-East Asia, especially in the period since 1986. State permission
10 Evans, "The State as Problem^..", pg. 165.
11 Haggard, "The Political Economy of...”, pg. 217.
12 The term comes from Evans, "The State as Problem... ”, pp. 166-172, and his analysis 
of the Brazilian bureaucracy.
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is not required to establish an NGO and few controls existed on foreign funding to NGOs.13 
Under the 1980 Corporation Code of the Philippines, NGOs ‘acquire a legal personality by 
registering with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).14 Registration in itself 
however does not confer NGO status,15 and the SEC estimates that NGOs account for 
roughly 75% of registered non-stock entities.16 Table 2 sets out the total number of non­
stock entities registered with the SEC between 1984 and 1993, and the number of NGOs as 
per the SEC estimate.17 The figures show an 88% increase in the number of NGOs 
registered between January 1986 and March 1992, the years of the Aquino presidency. This 
increase is partly explained by anti-Marcos and development NGOs registering in the more 
liberal atmosphere post-1986. Another factor triggering the growth, however, was 
establishment of "elite" NGOs. One category was made up of NGOs which aimed to channel
13 One of the few restrictions is that agencies wishing to place foreign personnel with 
Philippine NGOs must receive permission in advance from the Philippine National Volunteer 
Service Coordinating Agency, a device used under Marcos to keep out or expel foreigners 
perceived as sympathetic to the NDF-CPP-NPA. Foreign funders such as the Ford 
Foundation have to submit annually and retrospectively a list of projects funded, and 
experience little formal opposition although informal warnings are sometimes issued about 
support for particular NGOs (Terence George, Program Officer, Ford Foundation, interview 
with author,-Manila, 12 July 1993).
14 NGO Handbook: A Legal Guide, Structural Alternative Legal Assistance Group 
(SALAG), Manila, undated, pg. 3. Registration with the SEC is needed to secure a Tax 
Identity Number and employ staff and, increasingly, to sign contracts with foreign funders.
15 According to the SEC, "...SEC registration of non-stock corporations...does not 
automatically confer [on] these registered companies the status of Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO). They partake an NGO personality only upon accreditation with the 
appropriate Government Agency/Institution. The Commission has no record, of duly 
accredited NGOs". (Letter from the SEC Chairman to the Chairman of the Housing and 
Urban Development Coordinating Council, 28 September 1993).
16 Letter from the Director of the Investments and Research Department, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, to an Assistant Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, 10 
February 1993. This rough estimate includes POs, civic organisations, clubs, foundations and 
business associations (hence defining the NGO community very broadly) but excludes 
religious, medical and educational establishments.
17 The figures are illustrative at best. They underestimate true numbers since many NGOs 
and POs, especially in remote rural areas, are not registered, while they overstate the 
numbers since NGOs and POs that cease to exist are not deregistered.
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financial and managerial resources on a profit-making basis to socio-economic development
projects, capitalising on the dramatic growth in ODA, both in absolute (See Table 1, Chapter
2) and relative terms,18 and government funding to NGOs.19 Most ODA donors insisted
on NGO involvement as a condition of most programme loans, and as the government sought
NGO partners, many were established specifically to avail of ODA support, often with the
connivance of local government officials. A second category was made up of NGOs
established by politicians, members of local government units, and the military. The motives
were invariably political: first, a new means to the old end of maintaining control over the
allocation of resources dispersed to the local or national level by national or international
*
sources; and second, recourse to a traditional elite strategy of coopting popular institutional 
initiatives that threaten the status quo. The third category consists of phantom NGOs set up 
to avail of tax shelters.20
After registering with the SEC, stock and non-stock entities are required to submit 
annual accounts. This is the sole means by which the SEC can monitor the profit/non-profit 
status of a registered entity.21 The SEC however lacks the resources to follow up 
corporations that do not file and even reputable development NGOs fail to submit annual 
returns. Non-stock entity status is therefore widely abused. Many NGOs welcome this loose
18 During the years of the Aquino presidency, ODA flows as a percentage of GNP 
reached record levels; 2.8% in 1986-87, 2.5% in 1987-88, 2.3% in 1988-89, 3.3% in 1989- 
90 and 3.0% in 1990-91. By 1991-92 however, it had fallen to 1.6%, equivalent to the rate 
of dependence in the late 1960s. (Source: Development Cooperation Annual Series, 1988- 
1993, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris).
19 See below for details of government funding to NGOs.
20 NGOs generally do not have to pay corporation or property taxes. Donations can also 
be made to NGOs on a tax-free basis which means that NGO can be used as a device to own 
property without paying tax. See "Taxation for NGOs" in NGO Handbook: A Legal Guide, 
pp. 27-41.
21 Teresita Saplala, Chief, Investment and Research Department, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, interview with author, Manila, 14 October 1993.
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regulatory environment, equating it with the opportunity to create a rival institutional power- 
base to a state that could reassume its authoritarian character. One 1992 survey, however, 
estimated that only 10% of registered NGOs could be considered as "genuine development 
NGOs".22
The laxity and uncertainty which characterises SEC oversight of the NGO community 
is mirrored by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and the 
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). NEDA is responsible for monitoring 
official and unofficial development assistance from abroad channelled to Philippine NGOs, 
yet has no procedures for monitoring funding that goes directly to NGOs and only limited 
procedures for monitoring funding coursed through government bodies.23 By 1993, NEDA’s 
Social Development Staff (SDS) had still not established adequate mechanisms to monitor the 
development NGO community or foreign funding channelled to it, and was instead relying 
on its regular liaison with the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) for 
information about ODA inflows and the overall size of the development NGO community.24
These problems were exacerbated by the passage of the 1991 Local Government Code, 
(Republic Act No. 7160). The Code entitles NGOs and POs to:
22 Mindanao Interfaith Peoples Conference (MIPC), Davao, 1992. The MIPC survey 
estimated that of more than 50,000 NGOs registered with the SEC in May 1992, only 3,000, 
or about 6-10% are "genuine development NGOs". (Source: "NGOing: The Latest Scam", 
INFO-Davao e-mail bulletin, 23 March 1993.
23 NEDA is responsible for monitoring funding under three modes set out in NEDA 
Board Resolution No. 2 (Series of 1989), "Guidelines for Government Organisation and Non- 
Government Organisation (GO-NGO) Collaboration", yet monitors only Mode 1 inflows 
(covering agreements signed by the Philippine government and donors with funding going to 
government-accredited NGOs). According to NEDA figures, Mode 1 commitments to NGOs 
between 1986 and 1992 amounted to US$30.5m. (Josefina U. Esguerra, Director, Public 
Investment Staff, National Economic and Development Authority, letter to author, 15 
November 1993.)
24 Thelma Cruz, Supervising Development Specialist, Social Development Staff, National 
Economic and Development Authority, interview with author, Manila, 19 October 1993.
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Table 2
Non-Stock Entities (NSEs)25 and NGOs: 1984-1993.
Date NSEs NGOs
June 1993 77,697 58,200
April 1993 76,369 57,200
September 1992 70,673 53,000
March 1992 67,748 50,800
March 1991 59,199 44,400
August 1990 54,925 41,100
February 1989 45,444 34,000
August 1988 43,528 32,600
January 1988 41,863 31,300
July 1987 39,912 29,900
January 1987 38,353 28,700
July 1986 37,191 27,900
January 1986 36,179 27,100
December 1985 35,937 __ 26,900
June 1985 34,877 26,100
December 1984 33,787- 25,300
January 1984 31,719 23,800
Source: Monthly Paid-Up. Equity Investment Report Series, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Manila.
(1) representation on elective bodies at the municipal, provincial and regional level,26 
including 25% of Development Council seats at each level;
(2) sectoral representation in the local legislative assemblies (the sanggunian panlalawigan 
or provincial assembly, the sanggunian panlungsod or city assembly, and the sanggunian
25 Under Section 87 of the 1980 Corporation Code, a nonstock entity "is one where no 
part of its income is distributable as dividends to its members^ trustees, or officers subject to 
the provisions of this code...[A]ny profit which a non-stock-corporation may obtain as an 
incident to its operations shall...be used for the furtherance of the ... purposes for which the 
corporation was organised".
26 Local School Boards must include an elected representative of the local Teachers, and 
Parent-Teachers organisations, (Section 98). Local Health Boards must have one 
representative from the private sector or from an NGO concerned with health (Section 103). 
Local Peace and Order Councils must have NGO representation as provided for in Executive 
Order No. 309 (Section 116).
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bay an or municipal assembly);27
(3) consultation on programmes and projects planned or administered by national government 
agencies.28
The Code also allows Local Government Units (LGUs) to establish NGOs and POs, to enter 
into joint ventures or cooperative arrangements with them or to provide them with assistance, 
financial or otherwise.29
By mid-1993, 16,834 NGOs were accredited for participation in local government 
structures.30 The accreditation process coordinated by the DILG, however, went far from 
smoothly. Different definitions of NGO were applied in different parts of the country, and 
many development NGOs were denied accreditation by local officials because of their 
perceived ideological orientation.31 Neither the DILG nor any other national office had the 
power to legally enforce a standard definition of an NGO, allowing local officials taaccredit 
often dubious organisations and exclude politically-active but well-established development 
NGOs.
27 Sections 446, 457 and 467 respectively.
28 Sections 26 and 27.
29 Sections 34-36.
30 'N ational Government Agency-Local Government Unit-Non Government 
Organisation Partnership Development Program: Survey Report, prepared by the Bureau 
of Local Government Development, Department of Interior and Local Government, and 
reproduced by the Local Government Academy, Manila, October 1993, pp. 5 and 11.
31 See Rostum J. Bautista and Jorge V. Tigno, "Empowerment and Participation in 
Governance: NGOs and POs in Leyte and Samar", and Carlo L. Navarro, "Status of GO- 
NGO-PO Collaboration in the Province of Pangasinan and Dagupan City", in 
Operationalizing People Empowerment and the Local Government Code of 1991: 
Summary of Case Findings from Selected Local Government Units, A Preliminary 
Report, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, 
September 1993. The report notes that in many provinces only a small minority of NGOs 
have sought accreditation. The 16,834 NGOs nationwide counted by the DILG (see above) 
is therefore a significant underestimate of the total number of NGOs in the Philippines, and 
makes the SEC figures more credible.
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3. NGOs and the Executive.
Within weeks of assuming the Presidency on 25 February 1986, Corazon Aquino 
involved NGOs in the process of government to an unprecedented extent. Firstly, Aquino 
appointed representatives from the NGO community to cabinet positions. Three human rights 
lawyers from the Free Legal Assistant Group (FLAG), Joker Arroyo, Augusto Sanchez and 
Rene Saguisag became Executive Secretary, Labour Minister, and Presidential Spokesperson 
respectively, while Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera, of Alay Kapwa Kilusang Pangkalusugan32 
became Social Welfare Minister. Other prominent NGO activists joined the government at 
sub-cabinet level, notably Karina Constantino-David of the Philippine Partnership for the 
Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (PhilDHRRA) who became Deputy 
Minister for Social Services and Development. Secondly, in Executive Order No. 8 of 16 
March, Aquino established a Presidential Committee on Human Rights (PCHR) in response 
to pressure from human rights and other NGOs, and appointed Jose Diokno of FLAG as 
Chairman, and Sr. Mariani Dimaranan, Chairperson of Task Force Detainees of the 
Philippines (TFDP), as a member. The government also established a Judicial Reorganisation 
Committee (JRC) and a Presidential Committee on Political Detainees, both with FLAG and 
TFDP representation. Thirdly, in Proclamation No. 9 of 21 April, Aquino appointed 48 
members to a Commission charged with drafting a new constitution, over 20% of whom were 
popularly associated with the NGO/PO community.33 These appointments suggested a 
number ofambiguities. Aquino rewarded leading opposition figures for their role in bringing
32 Which translates roughly as The Health Movement for Fellow Filipinos. De Tavera 
also served previously as Chairperson of GABRIELA, the General Assembly Binding Women 
for Reform, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action, the leading women’s cause-oriented 
group, or PO, in the Philippines.
33 These included NGO leaders Ponciano Bennagen, Ed Garcia, Jose Luis Gascon, Minda 
Luz Quesada, Rene Sariemento, and Sr. Christine Tan, as well as PO leaders Jaime Tadeo 
and Jose Suarez.
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down the Marcos regime, and the appointments in many cases resulted from institutional 
pressures on the government.34 Yet, in many cases, the appointees where close friends,35 
while to others, Aquino, the daughter of a leading hacendado, was acting out the traditional 
role of patron with which her upbringing had made her well-acquainted.36
Overall, the first twelve months were characterised by active, albeit tentative and 
suspicious, support for the Aquino government from NGOs of all political persuasions and 
the broad social movements in which they participated. Symbolising the new entente cordiale, 
the new constitution provided for NGO participation in national life to an extent that was 
unique in the developing world. Article XIII Section 15 noted that "The State shall respect 
the role of independent people’s organisations to enable the people to pursue and protect, 
within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations 
through peaceful and lawful means". Section 16 noted that "The right of the people and their 
organisations to effective and reasonable participation at-all levels of social, political, and 
economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The state shall by law, facilitate the 
establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms." Recognition was also provided in Article
34 The appointment of Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera, for instance, followed lobbying on her 
behalf by Concerned Women of the Philippines. (Ruby Paredes, "Ilustrado Legacy: The 
Pardo de Taveras of Manila", in Alfred McCoy (Ed.), Aju Anarchy of Families: State and 
Family in the Philippines, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, 
Madison, 1993, pg. 349). =
35 As Paredes notes, Pardo de_Tavera’s niece was married to Aquino’s brother (Paredes, 
ibid, pg. 350), a distant relationship in other countries, but in the Philippines, the type of 
familial relationship around whichpolitical partnerships have traditionally cemented. Aquino 
was also a close friend of Jose Diokno, a relationship that dated to 1972 when her husband 
Benigno Jr. and Diokno where-detained in adjoining cells while their respective wives 
supported each other. (Maria Socorro Diokno, General Secretary, Free Legal Assistance 
Group, interview with author, Manila, 29 March 1993).
36 To Jaime Tadeo, his appointment was a traditional act of patronage from Aquino, a 
debt which she expected to be repaid in the form of support for her government. He attributes 
his imprisonment in 1990 in part to Aquino’s anger at the affront to her patronage when he 
led the demonstration preceding the "Mendiola Massacre" (see further below) (Jaime Tadeo, 
interview with author, London, 11 March 1994).
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II, Section 23, which sets out general state policies,37 and in Article X Section 14 which 
provides for NGO participation in local government structures.38
By February 1987 however, significant tensions over the role of NGOs began to
emerge, as the interests of the AFP and conservative businessmen within the administration
came to dominate the government. On 22 January 1987, 15,000 farmers led by Jaime Tadeo
of KMP marched on the Presidential Palace to protest government back-tracking on
redistributive agrarian reform. At Mendiola Bridge, police and soldiers opened fire and 18
demonstrators were killed. Immediately, the members of the PCHR resigned.39 On 27
January, rebel soldiers launched their third coup attempt against the government, designed
*
to disrupt the referendum on the draft constitution scheduled for 2 February and to end the 
government’s peace overtures to the National Democratic Front-Communist Party of the 
Philippines-New Peoples Army (NDF-CPP-NPA). Although the coup was defeated, and the 
referendum went ahead as scheduled,40 the coup attempt achieved its other objective, and 
in a speech on 18 March 1987, Aquino promised to "unleash the sword of war" against 
insurgents.41
The basis for state-NGO collaboration was further eroded when Congressional 
elections held on 11 May 1987 restored a House of Representatives dominated by "caciques",
37 Article II Section 23 reads "The state shall encourage non-governmental, community- 
based or sectoral organisations that promote the welfare of the nation".
38 Article X Section 14 reads "The President shall provide for regional development 
councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads of 
departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental 
organizations within the regions for the purposes of administrative decentralization to 
strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth 
and development of the units in the region".
39 The PCHR members however soon resumed their positions,
40 The new constitution was overwhelming ratified by the electorate. 87% of registered 
voters turned out to vote, and 76.4% voted in favour.
41 Miriam Coronel-Ferrer & Antoinette Raquiza (Eds), Motions for Peace, Coalition for 
Peace et al, Manila, 1993, pg. 11.
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the country’s traditional agrarian elite.42 By 1989, agriculture in the Philippines accounted
for only 24% of GNP.43 Compared to 26% in 1965 however,*the importance of agriculture
had barely declined,44 with the Philippines remaining a predominantly rural and agrarian
society with 58% of the population living in rural areas.45 More importantly, landowning
families, by diversifying into manufacturing and tertiary activity, maintained their dominance
overjhe economy. As Rivera notes
Among...stockholding families and economic groups that control the top 120 
manufacturing firms, there are 22 individual families and family groups with 
substantial land holdings. These landed capitalists families and executives make 
up close to half (48%) of all indigenous capitalists, excluding Chinese-Filipino 
families.. .On the other hand, as a percentage of all the 87 family groups in the 
study including Chinese-Filipinos, the landed capitalists still constitute 25% of 
the total.. .Furthermore, the big landed capitalist families control 40 out of 120 
leading manufacturing firms or 33% of the total.46
Given the traditional relationship between socio-economic power and election results, centred
on election spending, landowning family groups dominated the newly elected Congress.
According to Pangilanan et al,
Of the 200 House Representatives, 130 belong to the so-called "traditional 
political families" while another 39 are relatives of these families. Only 31 
Congressmen have no electoral record prior to 1971 and are not related to 
these old dominant families....(O)f the 24 elected Senators, there are a few 
non-traditional figures, but the cast is largely made up of prominent pre-1972 
families.47
While scope for state-NGO collaboration was undermined, such collaboration paradoxically 
became more important for a state strategy of increasing the degree of embedded autonomy
42 See Benedict Anderson, "Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams", 
New Left Review, No. 169, May/June 1988.
43 World Development Report 1991, pg. 208.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid, pg. 264.
46 Rivera,"Class, The State and Foreign Capital...", pp. 96-97.
47 Noel T. Pangilanan et al, All in the Family: A Study of Elites and Power 
Relations in the Philippines, Institute for Popular Democracy, Manila, 1992.
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it enjoyed vis-a-vis socio-economic elites.
The period from January 1987 to December 1989 represented a trough in relations 
between the executive and NGOs. With the collapse of peace talks between the government 
and the NDF, fighting between the armed forces and the NPA was renewed. As a result, the 
Aquino government lurched dramatically to the right, partly because it had little direct 
institutional ties to the NGO community that might have compensated for the increasing 
power of conservative business groups, the Marcos-era mandarins who remained in the 
bureaucracy, and the armed forces. Increasingly, the military view of "progressive” NGOs 
as agents of subversion and unquestioning stooges of the NDF predominated over the view 
of NED A and government ministries of NGOs as important partner s . I n  1988, Aquino 
established the Presidential Social Fund (PSF) to fund NGO initiatives directly. Administered 
by the Presidential Management Staff, it enabled the executive to forge direct ties with 
development NGOs. With guaranteed funding from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming 
Corporation (PAGCOR) (which, by 1993, amounted to P250m or US$9m48), the PSF was 
independent of Congress, and of the patronage-based politics that marred programmes where 
Congress and the executive shared responsibility. Viewed in these terms, the PSF was a 
success, and by 1993, the Manila Bulletin could proclaim it as "perhaps the most outstanding 
and graft-free unit of the government".49 However, the PSF was used extensively to fund 
the civic action and engineering activities of the armed forces, and trumpeted publicly as 
cementing links between the armed forces and conservative NGOs rather than “the 
executive.50
48 Source: advertising campaign in the national press and on radio and television run by 
PAGCOR in June 1993.
49 Wilman N. Yamzon, "Focus on the Countryside", The Manila Bulletin, 30 April 
1993.
50 See Ibid.
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Military influence continued to increase, peaking in 1989 when fighting between the 
AFP and the NPA was at its most intense. At cabinet meetings in July and October 1989 at 
which prospects for govemment-NGO collaboration were discussed, defense and military 
intelligence sources argued that foreign financial support to legitimate NGOs was being 
channelled to the NDF-CPP-NPA. In response, a brief prepared by the Cabinet Secretary for 
the cabinet meeting of 25 October recommended the creation of a database on NGOs, 
"intensive military surveillance by defense and military intelligence networks of suspected 
subversive organisations", and a "Review of existing legislation to determine which laws can 
allow for the monitoring of NGO activities and transactions".51
In December 1989 however, a sixth coup attempt, the most violent and costly to date 
and defeated only after intense fighting,52 dramatically underlined the government’s lack of 
institutionalized support vis-a-vis the military. Aquino was desperate to revive the flagging 
spirit of "People Power" and in a Cabinet reshuffle in January 1990, appointed NGO activist 
Florencio Abad as Secretary for Agrarian Reform.53 Later in the year she grappled with a 
more strategic problem. Without her own political party in Congress, Aquino faced the 
traditional plight of Philippine Presidents implementing a reform-oriented legislative 
programme in the face of implacable opposition from political parties controlled by socio­
51 "Prospects for Govemment-NGO Collaboration", Brief from the Cabinet Secretary, 
Jose P. De Jesus, to the 22nd Cabinet Meeting, 25 October 1989, Malacanang. The original 
context for the discussion was a concern to identify government-approved NGOs to which 
DM25m of existing German ODA channelled to Philippine NGOs could be directed.
52 According to Department of National Defense figures, 99 people were killed during 
the coup attempt, and 570 wounded. The Davide Commission which investigated the coup 
attempt estimated the cost of damage at P800m to Plb (US$28-35m) (The Final Report of 
the Fact-Finding Commission (pursuant to R.A. 6832), Bookmark, Manila, 1990, pp. 376 
and 378).
53 Abad, a prominent leader of the NGO/PO coalition Kilusang Laban sa Kudeta (KILOS, 
Coalition Against Coups d’etat) resigned three months later, after the Congressional 
Committee on Appointments, in a long-delayed vote, vetoed his appointment.
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economic elites. In June 1990, Aquino launched Kabisig (Linking Arms), a non-partisan
Peoples Movement, the government claimed, that was independent of the ruling Laban ng
Demokratong Filipino (LDP, Fight for Philippine Democracy) party, and open to NGOs and
POs that supported the government. Kabisig aimed to speed up the implementation of
government programmes, especially the proposed Local Government Code, by creating a pro-
reform lobby and by creating direct links between policy-makers at the national level and
policy-implementors at the local level. More generally, the movement promoted a philosophy
of "self-reliance", a Philippine equivalent, some officials hoped, of Indonesia’s state ideology
Pancasila.54 Kabisig was a failure however since Congress refused to allocate funds, and
*
since the bulk of the NGOs and POs at which Kabisig was aimed were by now too distrustful 
of the government.55
Overall however, state overtures to NGOs resulted in a number of accomplishments. 
By 1990, 18 government departments and 5 specialised government agencies had established 
NGO Liaison Desks,56 and the government had approved broad principles governing NGO
54 Pancasila, literally^"five pillars" or principles, espouses: belief in one God; just and 
civilized humanitarianism; a united Indonesia; democracy guided by wisdom through 
consultation and representation; and social justice for all Indonesians. To prominent Kabisig 
supporters however such as Governor of Bulacan Roberto Pagdanganan, Pancasila promoted 
national self-reliance, a rhetorical objective of the Kabisig programme (Gerard Clarke, 
"Kabisig: Aquino’s Lasting Legacy?", Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society, Vol.
22 No. No. 1, 1994, pg. 42). _ -
55 On the establishment and collapse of Kabisig, see ibid.
56 The government departments were as follows: Agrarian Reform; Agriculture; Budget 
and Management; Education, Sports and Culture; Environment and Natural Resources; 
Finance; Foreign Affairs; Health; Justice; Labor and Employment; Local Government; 
National Defense; Public Works and Highways; Science and Technology; Social Welfare and 
Development; Tourism; Trade and Industry; and Transport and Communications. The 
specialised agencies were: National Nutrition Council; National Economic and Development 
Authority; National Housing Authority; Housing and Urban Development Coordinating _ 
Council; and the Population Commission. Directory of Non-Government Organisations 
in the Philippines, National Economic and Development Authority, Manila, 1990, pp. 232- 
235.
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participation in government programmes.57 Aquino also brought more NGO leaders into 
government. In addition to the three FLAG lawyers, Dr. .Mita Pardo de Tavera, and 
Florencio Abad, Aquino recruited Vicente Jayme, a prominent member of the PRRM board, 
Fulgencio Factoran, a former activist with the Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace 
(EMJP), and Salvador Enriquez, a former head of the National Economic Protectionism 
Association (NEPA).58
-Aquino also involved NGOs in the making and implementation of socio-economic 
policy. In 1986, NGO and PO representatives participated in the preparation of the Medium 
Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) for 1987-1992.59 The Plan outlined what was 
arguably the most comprehensive programme of collaboration between state agencies and 
NGOs/POs in the developing world, rivalling the Indian government’s seventh Five-Year
57 Board Resolution No. 2 (Series of 1989) of the National Economic and Development 
Authority, reproduced in ibid, pp. 237-240.
58 Jayme joined the cabinet in December 1986 and served as Minister for Public Works 
and Highways before becoming Finance Secretary (Ministries became Departments and 
Ministers became Secretaries after the promulgation of the 1987 constitution). Factoran, who 
had also been active in the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and 
Nationalism (MABINI), Justice for Aquino-Justice for All (JAJA), and KAAKBAY, joined 
the cabinet in March 1987 and served as Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources 
until 1992. Salvador Enriquez joined the cabinet in February 1992 and served as Secretary 
for Budget and Management.
59 NGO/POs represented in sub-committees included Philippine Business for Social 
Progress, KMP, the Federation of Free Farmers, the Medical Action Group, GABRIELA, 
and Philippine-Canada Human Resources Development (PCHRD). NGO activists occupying 
government positions, who later resumed their NGO work, also helped, including Social 
Services and Development Deputy Minister Karina Constantino-David, (who became 
Executive Director of Harnessing Self-Reliant Initiatives and Knowledge Inc. (HASIK) and 
President of the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO)), Gerry Bulatao of 
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) (who became head of Kaisahan tungo sa Kaunlaran 
ng Kanayunan at Repormang Pansakahan (KAISAHAN)) and Leonor Briones of the 
Commission on Audit, later prominent in the Freedom From Debt Coalition (Medium Term 
Philippine Development Plan 1987-1992, Manila, 1986, Appendices).
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Plan (1985-1990).60 In the plan, NGOs were seen largely as an extension of the private 
sector and allocated socio-economic roles, especially the identification, implementation and 
monitoring of specific projects.61 The P5bn. (US$178m) Community Employment and 
Development Programme (CEDP), for instance, one of the successes in the early years of the 
MDPTP, helped create 1.2m jobs in 1987, exceeding the MDPTP target of lm .62 With the 
bulk of CEDP expenditure channelled through the Department of Public Works and 
Highways, a department notorious for corruption and the patronage-based allocation of 
resources, the CEDP was potentially another "pork barrel" to reward local politicians for 
their support of the Aquino government. NGOs however were contracted by the Department 
of Budget and Management to monitor project implementation, and, as a result, helped reduce 
corruption in the CEDP.63
One of the extensive forms of collaboration in the 1987-1992 MTPDP was in the 
provision of-housing for lower income groups. In 1991, the informal sector, largely 
composed of urban poor organisations working closely with NGOs, constructed 22,000 units, 
or 20% of total units constructed, compared to 26,000 by government agencies, and 65,000 
by private developers.64 The sector raised almost P2bn. (£5m or US$7.2m), much of which
60 In which the Indian government planned to channel Rs2bn. (US$150m.) through 
NGOs. See John Echeverri-Gent, The State and the Poor: Public Policy and Political 
Development in India and the United States, University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1993, pg. 187. -
61 Ibid, pp. 35 & 39. The Plan noted that "The private sector shall not only serve as the 
initiator but also as the prime mover of development. Specifically, the business sector, non­
government organisations (NGOs) and private voluntary organisations shall take the lead in 
undertaking and sustaining programs and projects aimed at improving the socioeconomic 
situation" (pg. 39).
62 1987 Philippine Development Report, National Economic and Development 
Authority, Manila, 1988, pp. 17, 53 & 143.
63 Ibid, pg. 17. NGO involvement howeyer did not increase the project completion rate, 
which, for the CEDP, stood at 33% in 1987 (ibid, pg. 53).
64 1991 Philippine Development Report, National Economic and Development 
Authority, Manila, June 1992, pg. 271.
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came from the government, including P27m made available to NGOs under the Home
Development and Mutual Fund Joint Venture Program, administered by the National Housing
Authority.65 The Department of Trade and Industry also funded NGOs engaged in small
enterprise development, including P29.8m channelled through its Tulong Sa Tao Self-
Employment Loan Assistance programme, P30m through the NGO Micro Credit Programme
and PI30m through its Micro-Enterprise Development programme. In total, the department
provided grants or loans to 1,027 NGOs in 1991.66 Government funding was also channelled
to NGOs through the Department of Agriculture’s Livelihood Enhancement for Agricultural
Development programme.
Following his victory in the May^1992 Presidential elections, Fidel Ramos had even
greater cause than Aquino to seek a strategic alliance with NGOs. NGOs were a more
important political force in 1992 than in 1986. With only 23% of the vote in a seven-way
Presidential election, Ramos had a  narrower popular mandate than Aquino while his Lakas
ng EDSA-National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) lacked a majority in
Congress. To create a more popular mandate, Ramos sought a social coalition around a pro-
reform, pro-growth economic programme. Devised by National Security Adviser Gen. Jose
Almonte, "Philippines 2000" aimed to achieve official status as a Newly Industrializing
Country (NIC) by the year 2000. In January 1993, during the programme’s formal launch,
Ramos setj)ut its main objectives: —
During my watch of the Presidency, I want to see our per capita income rise 
to at least US$1000, our economy to grow by at least 6-8% [per annum] and 
our-incidence of poverty to decline to at least 30% from the present 50%.
Guided by this vision, our Medium Term Development Plan for 1993-1998 
has taken up the twin themes of ’global excellence’ and ’people 
empowerment’.[Strengthening the] Export-orientation of the economy [will]
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid, pp. 189 & 236-237.
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enlarge the pie. Peoples empowerment [will] both enlarge the pie and 
distribute it more equitably.67
To achieve these objectives, Ramos noted, "...we must bring down the old economic order"
by eroding the positions of firms that are "too soft, too inefficient, too self-satisfied to
compete in the world"; by dismantling cartels and monopolies; by eradicating corruption in
state agencies; and by upgrading the quality of the country’s infrastructure.68 To this end,
Ramos went on, the government needed "to forge a strategic alliance" with business, labour
and NGOs/POs.69
The basis for this strategic alliance was set out in the Medium Term Philippine 
Development Plan 1993-1998 (MTPDP 1993-1998), approved by the cabinet in December
1992. As with the 1987-1992 MTPDP, the plan provided the private sector with the leading 
role in promoting socio-economic development but it also aimed to reduce the size of the 
government sector wherever possible, a significant commitment since the state sector was 
already relatively smaller than those of its South-East Asian neighbours.70 The plan argued 
that collaboration between state agencies, local government units and NGOs was crucial in 
attaining government targets hTa number of-areas, including sustainable agricultural 
development, redistributive agrarian reform, social services and community development, 
housing, training, and to the more general tasks of human resource development and nation- 
building.
67 Fidel V. Ramos, "Philippines 2000: Our Development Strategy", speech delivered 
before the First MultiSectoral Forum on Science and Technology, Manila Midtown Hotel, 
21 January 1993, published by the MultiSectoral Reform Secretariat, Manila, 1993.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Expenditure by the state sector in 1991 was equivalent to 8.1% of Gross National 
Product, compared to 9.8% in Indonesia, 9.9% in Thailand, 10.9% in Singapore and 14.7% 
in Malaysia. See Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 1992, Asian 
Development Bank and Oxford University Press, 1992, pg. 23.
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Yet, by the time "Philippines 2000" was launched, scope for a reform-oriented 
strategic alliance between NGOs and the executive in opposition to Congress had narrowed. 
In 1991, Congress approved a bill establishing a Countryside Development Fund (CDF), 
enabling Senators and members of the House of Representatives to fund development 
initiatives in their constituencies directly.71 By 1993, the scheme was worth P2.952bn.72 
(US$105m) and allocated P12.5m to each Representative, P18m to each Senator, and P20m 
to the Vice-President. CDF funding can be used to part-finance the local programmes of 
government departments, giving politicians a significant influence over spending priorities, 
but a high percentage is also channelled to NGOs and POs. Although under the control of the 
Department of Budget and Management, Ithe CDF represents pork-barrel politics in its purest 
sense and enables politicians to reward NGOs and POs that provide electoral and other forms 
of support. Dwarfing the President’s own CDF, the Presidential Social Fund, it represents 
a powerful weapon with which to oppose a strategic alliance between the executive and 
NGOs. In October 1993, the new Congress (like the 1987 Congress, dominated by the 
agrarian elite73) approved the 1994 budget, and a CDF worth P2.97 bn., half the estimated 
total value of "pork barrel" measures.74 Yet, few development NGOs with a "progressive" 
or left-wing orientation made arrangements to avail of CDF funding, and Congressmen
71 The CDF was based on the Mindanao Development Fund, established by Congress in 
1988.
72 The Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1993, (Republic Act 7645), Section 
XXXVIII.
73 Of the 199 Congressmen/women elected in May 1992, 132 have interests in land and 
agriculture, 17 in logging and 14 in mining. 145 are members of traditional political families 
or clans, compared to 164 in the 8th Congress (1987-1992). See Eric Guiterrez, Ties That 
Bind: a guide to the family, business and other interests in the ninth Congress, 
Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism, Manila, 1994, pp. 4-5.
74 "House Approves P6b pork barrel", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 15 October 1993.
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experienced problems in using CDF funds to support them.75 The CDF therefore seems 
destined to stimulate the further proliferation of "elite", patronage-based, and business- 
oriented NGOs.
The CDF illustrates a more general problem undermining a strategic alliance between 
the executive and NGOs. Philippine politics, and Congressional politics in particular, remain 
dominated by patronage concerns. The ruling party automatically attracts new affiliates from 
other parties since many Senators or Representatives cannot afford to forego government 
patronage by opposing the ruling administration. Congressional support for Ramos was 
consolidated rapidly in the months following his election. Table 3 shows that by February 
1993, the pro-Ramos coalition, Lakas-NUCD, had 77 seats in the House. With LDP support 
in a "Rainbow Coalition", Ramos had an absolute majority in the 200-seat House. Yet, by 
then 51 members had still to decide their party affiliation, leaving further scope for the ruling 
coalition to increase its support through the magnetic appeal of its patronage. The Rainbow 
Coalition had an even greater majority in the Senate, controlling 18 of 24 seats. In effect 
therefore, the only party-based opposition to Ramos came from the Nationalist Peoples 
Coalition (NPC) led by defeated Presidential candidate Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco. In 
reality therefore, to maintain support in Congress, Ramos has little scope to undermine the 
power of traditional socio-economic elites, or implement "Philippines 2000", even in strategic
75 One member of the House of Representatives, Bonifacio Gillego, wanted to channel 
80% of his CDF to NGO/PO livelihood projects but found that most NGOs were unable to 
provide the necessary counterpart funding. To secure CDF funding of P250,000, for instance, 
an NGO or PO would have to raise P50,000 from its own resources, -and take out a loan 
from the Landbank of P750,000, to be repaid at a commercial interest rate (18% at the time). 
As a result, for the 1992 Fiscal Year, he had only channelled P3m through development 
NGOs/POs. Gillego notes the enormous power the CDF gives Congressmen. In towns where 
mayors are supportive of the Congressman, CDF funding can be coursed through government 
offices while in towns where the mayor is unsupportive, CDF funds can be channelled to 
civic organisations that oppose the mayor and fund projects for which the Congressman can 
claim credit (interview with author, Manila, 28 April 1993).
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alliance with NGOs.
Table 3.
Party Strength in the Senate and House
Party Senate House
Lakas-NUCD 2 77
LDP (including PDP-Laban
and the Nacionalista Party) 16 31
Liberal Party 1 12
-NPC (including KBL) 5 27
Other 0 51
Unaccounted 0 2
Total 24 200
Source: Senate; "Outcome  ^of Philippine Elections 1992",-
Philippine Resource Centre, London, June 1992.
House of Representatives; The Manila Bulletin magazine, 28~ 
February 1993.
Despite these constraints, Ramos took a number of concrete steps to establish both 
institutional and informal links with NGOs in his first 18 months in office. One was the 
appointment of three NGO leaders to cabinet positions: Ernesto Garilao, Executive Director 
of Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) as Secretary for Agrarian Reform; Dr. 
Angel Alcala, an environmental NGO activist, as Secretary for Environment and Natural 
Resources; and-Dr. Juan Flavier, former President of PRRM and its sister organisation, the 
International Institute for Rural Reconstruction (IIRR) as Secretary for Health. In addition,= 
Salvador Enriquez was reappointed as Secretary for Budget and Management. Another 
measure involved frequent trips to the provinces, during which Ramos, accompanied by 
television cameras and journalists, visited local NGOs and POs.76
76 For his birthday on 18 March 1993, for instance, Ramos paid a high-profile visit to 
Basco, Batanes. The busy day was taken up largely with meeting local NGO/POs.
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Ramos also established an institutional basis for relating to the NGO community. 
Aquino’s Kabisig, although smaller than originally intended, was still in existence, due 
largely to support from the conservative, USAID-funded, Philippine Institution of NGOs 
(PINOI). As a result, the movement was retained and given the more limited task of 
coordinating the government’s "moral recovery" programme. Another Kabisig-style initiative 
was attempted however, when Ramos, helped by the Bishops-Businessmens Conference, 
launched a "Social Pact" with the support of 60 conservative NGOs and POs on 17 March 
1993. In July 1992, Ramos established the Presidential Council for Countryside Development 
(PCCD) to link government agencies, NGOs and POs and the private sector in promoting 
rural development.77 The same year, the'government established the Philippine Council for 
Sustainable Development (PCSD) with the cooperation of environmental NGO coalitions, 
partly in response to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. NGOs were also involved in drafting the 
MTPDP 1993-1998. The Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) launched 
in 1989, had a membership of 3,500 primary NGOs by July 1989, providing the government 
with a central body withjwhich to coordinate. CODE-NGO was invited to sit both on the 
NEDA steering committee that drafted the plan, and the Legislative-Executive Development 
Council where it hoped to follow through on the MTPDP.78
77 By January 1993, five NGOs had received contracts worth P8m in total from the 
PCCD to assist ffie PCCD devise strategy, financed by USAID through the Coordinating 
Council for the Philippine Assistance Program and the Development Bank of the Philippines 
("Background on-the PCCD", Presidential Council on Countryside Development, Manila, 
n.d. [1994]).
78 CODE-NGO were unhappy with the final draft of the MDPDP. NEDA made a number 
of concessions but only, CODE-NGO felt, on "motherhood issues", generalised and 
unsubstantive policy commitments such as people empowerment. At an Economic Summit 
held at the Philippine International Convention Centre in September 1992 organised by the 
Presidential Management Staff (PMS), NGOs and POs were invited to prepare a "peoples 
contribution" to the "Philippines 2000" plan. NGOs contributed detailed suggestions, but none
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During a speech to Kabisig’s 2nd National Assembly in July 1993, Ramos spoke of 
his commitment to fostering partnership between national government, local government 
units, and NGOs and POs, and cited models of the partnership he hoped to achieve (the 
National Solidarity Program in Mexico and the Saemaul Undong in South Korea).79 Ramos 
also noted however that the Department of Interior and Local Government (rather than 
NEDA) and the Presidential Management Staff has been ordered to screen NGOs and 
"maintain their integrity",80 sending a clear signal to development NGOs that feared 
government attempts at cooptation.81
4. NGOs and the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
To a significant extent, state-NGO collaboration is undermined by the influence of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). During the Aquino administration’s first year, 
military influence over state-NGO policy was minimal. The AFP of the Marcos days was 
reorganizing itself, armed conflict in the countryside had abated as insurgent groups assessed 
the new government, and peace talks were imminent. By 1988 however, govemment-NDF 
peace talks had collapsed, the armed strength of the JSfPA was at a peak,82 and government 
forces were committed to an aggressive counter-insurgency policy that included the use of
of these were included in the final minutes of the Summit produced by the PMS, exacerbating 
CODE-NGOs suspicions (Marie Laisaso, Program Officer, CODE-NGO, interview with 
author, Manila, 8 November 1993.)
79 "Ramos vows Kabisig will be above politics", The Philippine Daily Inquirer, 10 July
1993. -
80 Ibid.
81 Significantly, CODE-NGO, which has avoided Kabisig since its inception, had no 
representative at the Kabisig Assembly.
82 The military estimated NPA strength in early 1989 at 24,000 regular guerillas with 
10,000 high-powered rifles, with control or influence over 8,000 of the country’s 41,000 
barangays. See Gregg R. Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerilla 
Movement, Westview Press, Boulder, 1989, pg. 8. In probability however, these figures 
were slightly higher in mid-to-late 1988.
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Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs).83 Social activists, especially NGO
workers and human rights lawyers, became significant targets because of their high visibility,
especially in campaigns for local elections held in January 1988, and because of a crackdown
against NGOs and cause-oriented groups perceived as sympathetic to the NDF-CPP-NPA.
Nationally and in parts of the country where it was the only significant cause-oriented NGO,
such as Masbate, TFDP was singled out.84 To intimidate staff at its headquarters in Manila,
the bodies of two dead men were left outside its offices in April 1988.85 Other human rights —
activists were also killed,86 including three human rights lawyers killed in as many weeks.87
Others were arrested and tortured. On 28 November, for instance, 2 human rights NGO
*
workers were arrested and tortured in Baguio, enduring electric shock, water cure, and
83 CAFGUs replaced the hated Civilian Home Defence Forces (CHDFs).
84 Minutes of the TFDP National Board Meeting, 9-11 May 1988. The minutes note than 
on the island of Masbate, the local BAYAN network had been forced to dissolve because of 
intense harassment, leaving TFDP as the only significant cause-oriented group.
85 Malaya, 26 April 1988. —
86 For example: Armando Angueles, killed just before 1988, on 11 December 1987 in 
Negros Occidental. Angueles, a member of Tanggol Karapatan Concerned Citizens for Justice 
and Peace, was shot by vigilantes of the anti-communist Alsa Masa (Masses Arise) while 
campaigning for the Liberal Party (The Manila Chronicle 7 January 1988). On 30 January 
1988, human rights advocate and freelance journalist, Andres Rio, was tortured and killed 
in Leyte, reportedly by elements of the 43rd Infantry Battalion, while campaigning on behalf 
of a local PDP-Laban candidate (TFDP Press Release, 8 February 1988).
87 Ramon Cura, killed in Angeles City on 18 June; Alfonso Surigao of FLAG and the 
Protestant Lawyers League of the Philippines (PLLP), killed in Cebu, 24 June; Emmanuel 
Mendoza, killed in Manila on 2 July. FLAG and PLLP lawyers were targeted over a three 
year period (1987-1989) and others killed within that period were David Bueno, chairperson 
of the Ilocos Norte-Laoag City Human Rights Organisation and a member of the PLLP, shot 
dead on 22 October 1987, Vicente Mirabueno, a FLAG lawyer, shot dead in General Santos 
City on 6 February 1988, and Oscar Tonog, also a FLAG lawyer, killed 21 March 1989. A 
former FLAG lawyer and government prosecutor, Gil Getes, was shot dead on 14 March 
1990 in Agusan del Sur. See Impunity: Prosecutions of Human Rights Violations in the 
Philippines, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, New York, September 1991, Chapter 
L
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cigarette burning.88
Repression continued through 1989, and according to Amnesty international, "dozens 
of activists involved in lawful non-government organisations which military authorities and 
some government officials described as fronts for the CPP/NPA ’disappeared’", a significant 
portion of the estimated 200 victims of extra-judicial killings during the year.89 Overall, 
during 1988 and 1989, NGOs and cause-oriented groups experienced repression of an 
intensity unknown under the Marcos regime.90 By 1990, the violence had lessened, but one 
of the greatest atrocities against a single NGO occurred when three workers from the 
International Institute for Rural Reconstruction were murdered in Negros Occidental by 
cultists armed by the AFP as anti-communist vigilantes.91
Left-of-centre NGOs also faced a new threat from formal links between the AFP and 
right-wing civic organisations. In April 1989, the AFP established Special CAFGU Active 
Auxiliaries (SCAAs), funded by private businesses and organisations. In Negros, where the
88 Susan Aniban of TFDP and Garry Lim of the Northern Luzon Human Rights 
Organisation were arrested on 28 November 1988 while visiting political detainees at Baguio - 
City Ja il, and released on 30 November. Aniban was blindfolded during her torture and 
moved between different locations. On 29 November, two TFDP workers, Wilbert Umalco 
and Eva Faculo who went to the jail to look for Aniban and Lim were themselves arrested, 
along with lawyer Joseph Humiding who accompanied them, to be released later the same day 
(TFDP Press Release, 1 December 1988). -
89 "The Philippines: A Summary of Amnesty International’s Concerns", ASA 35/02/90, 
Amnesty International, London, May 1990, pp. 3 & 5.
90 TFDP statistics, for instance, record 90 involuntary disappearances ("salvagings") 
between January and September 1988. Of these, 19 are listed as NGO workers or members 
of student or farmer organisations. This figure probably underestimates the number with 
affiliations to cause-oriented groups due to omissions in reports from TFDP’s unit and 
regional offices. ("List of Involuntary Disappearances 1 January to 30 September 1988", 
TFDP archives).
91 The three, Wilfrido Villaruz, Ernesto Biasong and Ladislao Pillones, worked on IERR’s 
Family Food Production programme, funded by the United Nations Children’s Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF) and were abducted on 11 August 1990 by six members of the Greenan 
fanatic cult. All three were active in a Basic Christian Community (the assumed reason for 
their abduction) and Villaruz was chairman of the Sipalay branch of BAYAN.
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counter-insurgency campaign was especially intense, the Sugar Development Foundation, an 
NGO established by the Confederation of Sugar Planters Associations, funded the training of 
over 1400 SCAA members and allocated over 75% of its revenues to the military’s 
counterinsurgency campaign.92 By 1991 however, tensions between NGOs and the AFP had 
abated slightly, and the AFP signed a memorandum of agreement with CODE-NGO, 
governing security for NGO workers. The agreement remained inoperable however, largely 
because the Department of Interior and Local Government wanted it approved by local Peace 
and Order Councils, while CODE-NGO wanted a national-level agreement.93
Following the election of President Ramos, the level of violence directed against NGO
*
workers increased again, and at least two NGO workers were killed in the first 18 months: 
Chris Batan of TFDP, killed by CAFGU para-militaries in February 1993; and William Rom, 
head of SILDAP-Sidlakan, an NGO working with tribal communities in Surigao, killed by 
para-militaries in July 1993. While the level of insurgency declined considerably after 1989, 
NGOs remained wary of violence from the armed forces because of continued indiscipline 
within the AFP, the government’s unwillingness to disband the CAFGUs, the presence in 
elective office of ex-military officers previously involved in the harassment of NGOs, and 
the continued existence of private armies.
~~ The other significant aspect of AFP policy that affects the NGO community is the 
cooptation of NGOs in support of the military’s counter-insurgency campaign. The strategy 
is implemented through a number of mechanisms in addition to the Presidential Social Fund.
92 See G. Sidney Silliman, "Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy", in James 
F. Eder and Robert L. Youngblood (Eds.), Patterns o f Power and Politics in the 
Philippines: Implications for Development, Arizona State University, Tempe, 1994, pg. 
129.
93 Annie Calma, CODE-NGO Program Officer, interview with author, Manila, 8 
November 1993.
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The first and most important is the National Reconciliation and Development Program 
(NRDP), created by Executive Order 103 of 24 December 1986. The NRDP, worth P220m 
(US$8m) in the 1993 fiscal year,94 includes a National Reconciliation and Development 
Council which works through Kabisig, the Cooperatives Development Authority, and the 
Philippine Institution of NGOs (PINOI).95 Another is the Rebel Returnee Livelihood 
Assistance Financing Program, in which NGOs are used as conduits for lending to rebel 
returnees.96
One important figure pioneering strategy on the use of civic organisations in counter- 
insurgency is Lt. Col. Victor Corpus. Corpus achieved fame in the 1970s when he defected 
to the New Peoples Army and served 6 years as an NPA commander before being captured 
and jailed. Released with other political prisoners in March 1986, Corpus rejoined the AFP. 
In a book on counter-insurgency which became a best-seller in the Philippines in 1989, 
Corpus argued that
The AFP and the civil government will exert all efforts to mobilize the 
strategic sectors of society (the working class, the peasantry, the teachers, the 
students, the business sector, the professionals, the clergy, the women and the 
media) into a broad United Front Tor a ’Peoples War For Democracy’. As 
peoples’ power was used to bring down the Marcos dictatorship, peoples’ 
power will again be utilized to bring down the communist threat of another 
totalitarian dictatorship.97
To this end, military officers are actively involved in a number of prominent NGOs. Some
94 The Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1993, (Republic Act 7645), Section 
XLVI.
95 Owen Masaganda, "National reconciliation program gains headway", The Manila 
Bulletin, 7 April 1993.
96 In 1987, for instance, the Rebel Returnee Livelihood Assistance Program was worth 
P30m. (1987 Philippine Development Report, National Economic and Development 
Authority, Manila, 1988, pg. 55).
97 Victor Corpus, Silent War, VNC Enterprises, Manila, 1989, pg. 141.
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foreign funders are prepared to support military attempts to establish civic organisations98, 
and soldiers are permitted to establish their own NGOs by AFP regulations. Corpus, for 
instance, as Operations Officer of the 3rd Infantry Division, based in Capiz on the island of 
Panay, implements his ideas through Barangay Communal Forest Cooperatives Inc. (BCFC), 
an NGO which he heads. BCFC organises farmers’ cooperatives in 25 barangays (villages) 
located on a 33,000 hectare military reservation,99 and is funded by the NRDP and the 
Countryside Development Fund of Senator Rodolfo Biazon, a former AFP General.
AFP responsibility for counter-insurgency, and the associated use of NGOs, made 
leaders of centre-left and left-wing NGOs wary of establishing concrete ties with government 
departments or with the executive itself. With the decline in encounters between the AFP and 
the NPA, responsibility for counter-insurgency policy was to have been transferred from the 
AFP to the Philippine National Police,100 and moved from the control of the Department 
of National Defense to the Department of Interior and Local Government at the end of 1993. 
Postponed however, the transfer was finally completed in late 1994. But with renewed 
insurgency in 1993 and the continuing failure of peace initiatives, NGOs suspect that 
insurgency will endure and that the AFP will retain significant influence over counter- 
insurgency policy in areas where insurgency endures.
5. NGOs and the Bureaucracy. —
Despite the largely unsubstantive and rhetorical commitment from the executive to the 
creation of institutional ties with NGOs, and the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust
98 The Hanns Seidel Foundation, for instance, has paid for senior AFP officers to study 
cooperative building (The Manila Bulletin, 13 August 1993.)
99 Owen Masaganda, "Ex-rebels grow trees for a living in Panay", The Manila Bulletin,
8 April 1993.
100 The former Philippine Constabulary which in 1992 separated from the AFP.
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promoted by the AFP, individual government departments have developed close ties with the 
NGO community. In 1986, the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganisation 
launched the most far-reaching reform of the bureaucracy ever undertaken. The reform 
programme sought to remove civil servants who had loyally supported the Marcos 
dictatorship, and tens of thousands were dismissed, largely indiscriminately. But the 
reorganisation also promoted privatization, decentralization, and community self-reliance, and 
as its powers and functions were whittled away, the bureaucracy established new relationships 
with local government units, the private sector, and the NGO/PO community.101 Often the 
process was antagonistic as Marcos technocrats battled to preserve their powers while new 
reformers actively sought out new partnerships to democratise die process of socio-economic 
development.
In many cases, the establishment of NGO desks represented a tokenistic commitment 
to democratization and popular empowerment, but in others, links with NGOs represent an 
attempt to overcome strategic restraints on state capacity. A case in point is the Philippine 
Coconut Authority (PCA). During the Marcos dictatorship, the purchase and supply of key 
agricultural commodities and production credit were nationalized by the government with 
individual sectors controlled by Marcos cronies who used the monopoly privileges to enrich 
themselves. One notorious crony, Eduardo Cojuangco, became one of the Philippines’ 
wealthiest men with the proceeds of a levy on coconut production collected by the PC A. 
During the Aquino years, a batde waged for control of an estimated P70bn. hr PCA funds 
frozen after the fall of Marcos as the Department of Finance sought their return to the 
national treasury and the PCA aimed to retain them. When Fidel Ramos became President,
101 Ledivinia V. Carino, Bureaucracy for Democracy: The Dynamics of Executive- 
Bureaucracy Interaction During Governmental Transitions, University of the Philippines 
College of Public Administration et al, Manila, 1992, pp. 127-141.
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the PCA funds were worth an estimated P140bn. (US$5bn.), and a special committee was 
established under the Office of the President to determine their future.102 In his Presidential 
campaign, in which Cojuangco also ran, Ramos promised to return the money to farmers and 
following his election he appointed General Virgilio David to head the PCA. David, PCA 
Chairman 1974-1977, was a noted critic of corruption within the organisation, and his 
appointment suggested government willingness to confront Cojuangco. Cojuangco’s National 
Peoples Coalition (NPC) however controlled 5 Senate and 27 House seats, a significant base 
from which to oppose attempts in Congress to pass a bill declaring the funds public and 
available for distribution to farmers.103
In 1993, the PCA concluded an agreement with Katipunan ng Maliit Magnuniyag sa 
Pilipinas, (KAMMPIL, Alliance of Filipino Small Coconut Farmers), to channel P12m 
(US$0.5m) of PCA funds to local KAMMPIL affiliates in Mindanao, Leyte, Laguna and 
Quezon. The project was negotiated with the help of the NGO/PO coalition, Convergence for 
Integrated Community-Based Area Development (CONVERGENCE), and aimed to organise 
small coconut farmers at the barangay level prior to the return of the coconut levy and break 
the captive vote which they have long represented for Cojuangco candidates.104 Although 
tiny in proportion to the estimated value of PCA funds, the project is intended as a starting 
point for further collaboration between NGOs and the PCA. Yet the project also illustrates 
a dilemma for NGOs attempting the interpret the government’s strategy.105 PCA-NGO-PO
l0?L Bernardo V. Lopez, "Coveting the coco funds", The Manila Chronicle, 16 August 
1993.
103 NPC Senators, led by Nikki Coseteng, were instead intent on securing a bill that 
abolished the PCA and therefore paved the way for the private recovery of PCA funds.
104 The NPC was reputedly the biggest spending party in the 1992 elections and 
Cojuangco remains a substantial force in the coconut industry.
105 Amee Coronel, Deputy Executive Director, CONVERGENCE, interview with author, 
Manila, 16 August 1993.
i l l
collaboration may undermine the patronage-based dependency of small coconut farmers yet 
many NGOs suspect that securing the personal and immediate.position of President Ramos, 
by undermining the power-base of one of his main opponents, rather than structural change, 
is the ultimate objective of government policy.
6. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
In July 1990, 1,700 people were killed when a mud-slide engulfed the town of Ormoc 
in Leyte. Caused by heavy rain, and a dam bursting on the mountain-side that overhung the 
town, the disaster was blamed on illegal logging that denuded the mountain, exposing the top- 
soil to the ray ages of the rainy season. The disaster highlighted a greater problem: under a 
rate of deforestation of 200,000 hectares a year from 1950 to 1960, (down to 100,000 
hectares a year by 1989), total forest cover in the Philippines fell to 23% by 1993.106 The 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources^ noted for corruption and ties to illegal 
loggers, seemed poorly placed to respond. In March 1987 however, Aquino appointed former 
human rights lawyer Fulgencio Factoran as Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources 
and during his five year tenure, the department developed some of the closest and most 
extensive ties with NGOs and POs.107 Under Factoran’s leadership, and with the 
recruitment of Delfin Ganapin, head of the Philippine Federation for Environmental 
Concerns, as Department Under-Secretary, more than US$lbn. was lent to the Philippine 
government for environmental projects involving NGOs between 1986 and 1992,108 boosting
106 Marites Danguilan Vitug, Power From The Forest: The Politics of Logging, 
Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism, Manila, 1993, pp. 66-67.
107 Florencio Abad might have forged even greater ties between the DAR and NGOs, 
given time, but served three months in office before his appointment was vetoed by Congress.
108 Yasmin Arquiza, "Funding Agencies shape RP agenda", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
2 November 1993.
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the DENR’s budget from P1.08bn. in 1986 to P4.5bn. in 1990.109 One of the biggest ODA-
funded projects was the Contract Reforestation Programme (CPR), financed by a $120m loan
from the Asian Development Bank and $120m from the Japanese Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund110 but others included a Natural Resources Management Program, funded
by a $125m loan from USAID, a US$2m Debt-for-Nature Swap funded by the World Wide
Fund for Nature (WWF), and the Integrated Protected Area System (IPAS) programme,
funded by the World Bank.
With the strengthening of capacity that resulted from the ODA receipts, the
collaboration with NGOs, and a decentralization programme that saw 85% of the DENR’s
*
24,000 personnel assigned to regional offices, the department achieved some notable 
successes. Reforestation rates had risen slightly in 1986 and 1987, but between 1988 and
1991, they leapt to an annual rate ranging from 80,000 to 88,000 hectares. The DENR also 
succeeded in imposing an environmental fee on loggers in 1990, and from 143 in 1987, 
Timber Licensing Agreements issued by the department on an annual basis fell to 32 by June
1992. Between 1987 and 1992, 443 cases were taken against DENR employees suspected of 
corruption, sending a strong signal about the anti-corruption drive.111
Links established during the Aquino years have been consolidated under Ramos. In 
August 1992, Dr. Angel Alcala, an environmental scientist and board member of Haribon 
Foundation, was appointed Secretary of the DENR, after Ramos’s other choices met with the 
disapproval of environmental NGOs, and after Alcala’s name was recommended by NGOs
109 Vitug, Power From The Forest..., pg. 58.
110 See Community Participation, NGO Involvement and Land Tenure Issues in the 
Philippine Reforestation Program: An Assessment of the ADB-funded Contract 
Reforestation Program in the Philippines, Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and 
Rural Development (ANGOC), Manila, 1991.
111 Vitug, Power From The Forest..., pp. 48-49 & 59-61.
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including Haribon112. Delfin Ganapin remained as departmental Under-Secretary, giving 
NGO activists the top two positions in the DENR. Ramos also established the Philippine 
Council for Sustainable Development, again in response to pressure from environmental 
NGOs.113 By 1993, as a result of this collaboration, the DENR had developed significant 
expertise in managing debt-for-nature swaps, and during a visit to the United States in 
November 1993, President sought further swaps to reduce the country’s US$33bn. dollar 
foreign debt, which required 14% of the national budget to service.114
The DENR however also encountered significant problems in its dealings with NGOs. 
First, with the significant infusion of ODA funding, commercial enterprises masqueraded as 
NGOs to avail of DENR contracts. Many were established or secured contracts with the 
connivance of local DENR officials,115 while others overcharged for elaborate expenses 
such as aircraft hire, and corruption remained at a high level.116 Second, the DENR was 
“unable to find sufficient community-based NGOs with forestry management skills to 
implement its US$1.65m USAID-funded Community Forestry Programme (CFP). Many 
contracts for the CFP and the ADB-funded Contract Reforestation Programme were issued
112 Ibid, pg. 173.
113 Ibid, pp. 192-193.
114 Booma Cruz, "Ramos to push for debt-for-nature plan", The Manila Chronicle, 15 
November 1993.
115 Dante Aquino, "The Remaining Philippine Forests: Problems and Solutions", paper 
presented to the Second European Conference on Philippine Studies, SOAS, University of 
London, 13-15 April 1994.
116 The DENR estimated that corruption ate up 15% (P390m, or US$14m) of the funds 
spent on the reforestation programme while the Commission on Audit estimated that between 
1989 and 1990, 90 contractors who received initial fees of P26m (US$lm) failed to reforest 
a single hectare (Vitug, Power From The Forest..., pp. 60-61). The national coordinator 
of the DENR’s Community Forestry Program acknowledged that many of the NGOs involved 
as contractors "are hiding behind the cloak of community development when their main target 
is forest products extraction" (quoted in ibid, pp. 159-160).
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to community-based NGOs that lacked the necessary experience.117 Third, many NGOs 
involved in DENR contracts, especially those involved in monitoring illegal logging, endured 
harassment and violence which undermined their role.118 Fourth, despite DENR-NGO 
collaboration, links between illegal loggers, local government officials, the military and 
national politicians undermined attempts to reduce illegal logging.119 Fifth, many of the 
environmental NGOs argued over access to millions of dollars of foreign funding. Factoran 
incurred the wrath of many environmental NGOs and a bitter dispute raged among members 
of the PCSD over Stage II of the Integrated Protected Areas System project, threatening to 
halt its implementation by late 1993.
Overall, the DENR maintains a constructive relationship with NGOs, a relationship 
which is still at an early stage, and which has yet to be fully tested. Yet already, a key 
characteristic of the way in which state agencies relate to NGOs has become apparent. Studies 
of NGO-state relations emphasise the importance of direct personal and informal
117 Vitug, Power From The Forest..., pp. 160-161. The ADB, while happy overall with 
the DENR’s implementation of the Contract Reforestation Programme, did have reservations 
about the managerial abilities of many of the NGOs that worked on it (Dieter Bucher, Senior 
Policy-Adviser, Social Dimensions Unit, Asian Development Bank, interview with author, 
Manila, 20 May 1993). z.
118 For instance, one staff member of the Southern Luzon Jurisdictional Conference 
(SLJP) was severely beaten by a local government official found illegally hoarding 10,000 
board feet of timber in July 1993. The SLJP was a contractor to the DENR under the 
US$40m Low Income Upland Communities Project on the island of Mindoro, financed by 
a US$32m soft loan from the ADB and US$8m from the national government (The Manila 
Bulletin, 10 July 1993). See also Robin Broad with John Cavanagh, Plundering Paradise: 
The Struggle for the Environment in the Philippines, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1993, pp. 108-116.
119 For instance, the DENR’s 1993 "Operation Jericho" aimed at reducing illegal logging 
in Cagayan Valley, one of the provinces most affected was a "total flop" because many of 
the officials involved in its implementation were in cahoots with the loggers (Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, 30 October 1993).
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relationships.120 Yet, although Alcala enjoys the support of most environmental NGOs, his 
close association with one particular NGO, Haribon, suggests a relationship that is 
personalistic.121 State-NGO relationships which aim to undermine the patronage-based 
nature of Philippine politics, are, in some respects, succumbing to the very problem that they 
seek to cure.
7. The Department of Agrarian Reform.
The Philippines has one of the most inequitable structures of land ownership in the 
developing world: roughly 5% of families own 83% of all farmland while 85% of the 10m 
people directly employed in agriculture are landless in the sense of having no secure title.122 
Given a population density of 202.3 per square kilometre, twice the South-East Asian 
average123, land resources are under enormous pressure, and rural poverty is significantly
120 For instance, John Farrington and Anthony Bebbington (Eds), Reluctant Partners: 
Non-Governmental Organisations, the State and Sustainable Agricultural Development, 
Routledge, London, 1993, pg. 190; or Somthavil Klinmahom and Kevin Ireland, "NGO-— 
Government Collaboration in Bangkok" in Michael Edwards and David Hulme (Eds.), 
Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a Changing World, Earthscan, 
London, 1992, pg. 61.
121 Since becoming Secretary, Alcala has worked closely with Haribon (Vitug, Power 
From the Forest..., pg. 177). In one case at least however this has led to concern. Maximo 
Kalaw, Haribon’s influential head, the main figure in the environmental NGO coalition, 
Green Forum, and a PCSD member, was a noted critic of Factoran. Kalaw was especially 
critical of the DENR’s decision to award a contract under the second stage of the World 
Bank-funded Integrated Protected Areas System project, worth P500m or US$18m, to PRRM.
In 1993, Alcala wrote to the World Bank to say that the DENR was reconsidering its contract 
with PRRM, and was instead considering awarding the contract to a consortium of NGOs in 
which Haribon, and Maximo Kalaw, would play a leading role (Arquiza, "Funding 
agencies...").
122 Putzel, A Captive Land..., pp. 23 & 27.
123 1990 figure. Harvey Demaine, "The Philippines: Physical and Social Geography", in 
The Far East And Australasia, Europa Publications, London, 1994, pg. 837.
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greater than in urban areas.124 A close relationship has long existed between land ownership 
and political power. A similar relationship exists between* land ownership and wealth 
distribution, and the Philippines has the second highest level of wealth inequality in South- 
East Asia.125 Redistributive land reform is therefore a crucial component in a programme 
of structural reform and collaboration between state agencies and NGOs in implementing a 
land reform programme constitutes a "strategic alliance" in its most fundamental sense.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), or rather a strong element of reform- 
oriented officials within it, had long sought a strategic alliance with NGOs. In August 1986,
a UN inter-agency mission visited the Philippines at the invitation of the DAR to seek
✓
opportunities to implement the Principles and Programme of Action of the World Conference
on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development agreed in Rome in 1979. As a result of the
mission, the DAR, with funding from the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and in
collaboration with the Asian NGO Coalition of Agrarian Reform and Rural Development
(ANGOC) and PhilDHRRA, organised a series of regional consultations on land reform in
1987/88, following the establishment of the Congress for a Peoples Agrarian Reform
(CPAR).126 In May 1987, a Cabinet Action Committee tabled proposals for significant
NGO participation in a liberal reform programme. According to Putzel, the proposals
spelled out in detail the powers of the DAR ... to acquire land, to determine 
the application of the right of retention by landowners and the ’compensability’ 
of their claims, and to preside over virtually every aspect of the reform. The 
DAR’s decision would be binding and the only appeal would be to the Office 
of the President. This idea was based on the principle that a DAR transformed
124 Between 1977 and 1989, those living in absolute poverty constituted 63% of the 
population in rural areas, compared to 48% in urban areas (Human Development Report 
1993, pg. 170).
125 For wealth inequality, the Philippines has a Gini co-efficient of 0.45, compared to
0.47 in Thailand (ibid), although for land inequality, the Gini co-efficient, at 0.647, is more 
severe (Putzel, A Captive Land..., pg.30).
126 Cooperation with NGOs..., Asian Development Bank, Volume 1, pg. 303.
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and working with peasant organisations, NGOs and a strong network of 
’Barangay People’s Councils’ would be free from interference by the political 
networks behind elected members of government and the courts which were 
known to be dominated by powerful local interests.127
The proposals were defeated however by conservative forces within the cabinet, notably
Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo, Defence Secretary Rafael Ileto and Finance Secretary
Jaime Ongpin,128 and a more conservative programme, signed into law by Aquino as
Executive Order No. 229, became the basis for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Programme (CARP) eventually approved by Congress in 1988. Following its enactment into
law, CARP was implemented at a ponderous pace: between 1987 and 1990, Putzel notes,
"only 9,949 hectares of privately held lands, or 4.6% of the ...target, were distributed".129
The failure arose in significant part because, Putzel continues, "there was virtually no
tradition of state action independent of the powerful political clans in society upon which the
Aquino government could draw",130 and because the state-NGO alliance that could have
created such a tradition, "was ruled out by those who defended the conservative
approach".131
Land reform was largely ignored as an issue in Fidel Ramos’s presidential campaign,
127 Putzel, A Captive Land..., pp. 248-249.
128 Ibid, pp. 226-227.
129 Ibid, pg. 358.
130 Ibid, pg. 249.
131 Ibid, pg. 361. A concrete example was Congressional Committee on Appointments’ 
veto of the appointment of Florencio Abad as Secretary for Agrarian Reform in 1990. During 
his brief three month tenure, Abad attempted to mobilise NGOs as a pro-agrarian reform 
lobby. He encouraged the formation of the Peasants Forum, a coalition that (briefly) united 
three main peasant alliances, the Congress for a Peoples Agrarian Reform (CPAR), the 
Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) and SANDUGUAN. Abad also coordinated an informal 
cluster of cabinet members and government officials concerned with agrarian reform and rural 
development that met regularly with NGOs and farmer representatives. See Benjamin Tolosa, 
"What Difference Can Three Months Make?", Philippine Politics and Society, Vol. 1 No. 
1, January 1992.
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and since he took office, the implementation of CARP has continued to proceed very 
slowly.132 One reason is cost; P221bn. or US$10.35bn. for the total ten-year programme. 
63% of the budget, P139bn. or P13.9bn. per year should be spent on support services, yet 
for the 1993 fiscal year, the government allocated only P3.6bn.133 Another reason is 
administrative capacity; in October 1993, NED A admitted that with three quarters of the 
fiscally ear already gone, only 30% of planned government expenditure of P126bn. had been 
spent, due partly to delays in the release of funds. 134The work of the DAR- has been 
significantly affected by this problem, and other forms of red tape. A third problem is a
provision allowing for the redesignation of lands from agricultural to residential, industrial
✓
or commercial use five years after the enactment of CARP, leading to a rash of conversions 
which has reduced the land area devoted to agricultural production and available for 
redistribution. In the provinces surrounding Manila targeted by the government for rural 
industrial development, collectively known as CALABARZON, an estimated half a million 
farmers will be displaced by land conversions.135 By September 1992 alone, 833 of 1209 
conversion applications for the CALABARZON area had been approved.136 Other regions 
targeted for industrial development such as Cebu or the Cagayan-Iligan corridor in Mindanao 
have also been affected. CARP is also being undermined by the government’s decentralization 
programme. Section 20 of the 1991 Local Government Code transfers the power to reclassify
132 Garilao admits "we have a lot of catching up to do" and that further progress will be 
undermined by land conversions (see further below). He estimated that 350,000 hectares 
would be distributed in 1993 ("Garilao:’Land conversions have to be made’", Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, 26 April 1993).
133 The Manila Bulletin, 4 June 1993.
134 The Manila Bulletin, 25 October 1993.
135 Bernardo V. Lopez, "Farmers versus Industrialists", The Manila Chronicle, 12 April 
1993, quoting an estimate from the Philippine Peasant Institute. CALABARZON is an 
acronym for the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal and Quezon.
136 Ibid.
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lands from the DAR to local governments, opening new opportunities for land developers and 
speculators.
Working within the context of the government’s overall lack of commitment to land 
reform, Agrarian Reform Secretary Ernesto Garilao is using NGOs to maximise the limited 
scope available: "without the active participation of the private sector, particularly the non­
government organisations (NGOs)", Garilao argues, "the DAR cannot cope with the 
implementation of CARP".137 On paper, government targets are impressive: between 1993 
and 1998, the DAR plans to distribute 7.57m hectares of land, 2.75m hectares of it privately- 
owned, to 4.6m farmer-beneficiaries.138 The DAR however plans to allocate 70% of the 
planned P103bn. expenditure between 1993 and 1998 to landlord compensation,139 
undermining its capacity to provide the support services to beneficiaries on which CARP’s 
success may ultimately depend. NGOs, and the ODA funds which they have secured, will 
therefore be vital, since ODA donors are unwilling to fund the landlord compensation 
component of CARP.
One innovative strategy based on close collaboration between the DAR, NGOs and 
POs, involves the-establishment of over 200 Agrarian Reform Communities (ARCs) around 
the country, using collective Certification of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs). The ARC 
concept is based on the use of privately-owned land or estates foreclosed by banks when 
prices for_commodities fell in the early 1980s, much of which had already been occupied by 
POs. In Negros Occidental, for instance, the Agrarian Reform Alliance of Democratic 
Organisations in Negros (ARADO) is working with the DAR to create an ARC near
137 "P3.6b for land reform", The Manila Bulletin, 4 June 1993.
138 Manny Mogato, "Landowners to get shares for land", The Manila Chronicle, 10 
June 1993.
139 Ibid.
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Himamaylan, 75km. from the provincial capital, Bacolod.140 An alliance of 12 NGOs and 
22 POs, including the militant National Federation of Sugar Workers, ARADO and its 
affiliates were responsible for the occupation of 65,000 hectares of idle or abandoned land 
in 1987, an amount that had dropped to 45,000 by 1990 and 30,000 by 1993 as POs were 
driven off by landlords reoccupying their foreclosed land and by military counter-insurgency 
operations. ARADO had long demanded action by the DAR to enforce individual CLOA’s 
already awarded, but the local Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer only agreed to implement 
the Aquino government’s Administrative Order No. 5141 and cooperate with NGOs and
POs, in March 1993. Of 93 cases taken by ARADO since 1987, involving more than 5000
  *
hectares of land, only 31 have been resolved of which only 6 have resulted in CLOAs being
issued. In a desperate attempt to speed up the implementation of CARP, ARADO is working
with the DAR on additional ARC projects, a case of "critical collaboration" however rather
than "strategic alliance".142 Equally, ODA donors such as the Japanese International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) that have yet to channel significant amounts to NGOs or POs
have embraced the ARC concept enthusiastically, as have donors who were hesitant about
supporting the redistributive, as distinct from the technical, aspects of CARP. In March 1993
for instance, President Ramos launched a project to establish an ARC in Jalajala, Rizal, based
on collaboration between the DAR an<Ttwo NGOs, funded by JICA.143 In October 1993,
140 Ramon Consing, Para-legal Officer, Agrarian Reform Alliance of Democratic 
Organisations in Negros (ARADO), interview with author, Bacolod, 1 November 1993.
141 AO No. 5, issued by Aquino in 1990, obliged the local and national offices of all 
government departments to coordinate with NGOs and POs.
142 Consing, interview.
143 Under the plan the two NGOs, the SEAMEO Regional Centre for Graduate Study in 
Agriculture (SEARCA) and the National Confederation of Cooperatives (NATTCO) will 
establish a number of institutions, including a federation that links all existing cooperatives 
in the area to manage rice milling, packaging and marketing operations ("Land reform 
community set up in Jalajala", The Manila Chronicle, 10 October 1993).
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Ernesto Garilao secured a major boost for the ARC concept, signing a contract with the 
European Community for PI .2bn. (US$43m) in aid to finance the establishment of 254 ARCs 
after 1995.144
The DAR relies on NGOs and POs in other ways also. CARP has been badly affected 
by illegal land rezoning carried out with the connivance of local government officials, and 
NGOs have been instrumental in bringing "land scams" to light.145 Hindered by insufficient 
staff numbers, an inability to reach all potential land reform beneficiaries, and intimidation 
of its staff by landlords, the DAR also relies on NGOs to organise farmers and identify land 
for redistribution and potential beneficiaries. In North Cotabato, for instance, PRRM has 
signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the DAR to identify lands and potential 
beneficiaries, and works closely with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers (MAROs) in 
localities in which it is active, encouraging relationships between MAROs and local POs.
As with the DENR however, the personal relationships needed to ensure effective 
state-NGO collaboration often border on patronage. After becoming Agrarian Reform 
Secretary, Ernesto Garilao, a former Executive Director of PBSP, the largest NGO in the 
country, recruited Butch Olano of PhilDHRRA as DAR Under-Secretary for Operations. 
Other NGOs say however that Garilao and Olano have favoured PBSP and PhilDHRRA in 
the awarding of contracts, and that staff from these and other social democratic-oriented 
NGOs have been recruited to work in the DAR, especially in the Planning, and Management
144 Carlos Marquez, "PI.2b Europe aid to finance agrarian reform", The Manila 
Chronicle, 30 October 1993.
145 In April 1993, for instance, President Ramos ordered an investigation by the DAR and 
Department of Interior and Local Government, after attempts to force 600 families from land 
near Trece Martires City, Cavite, were brought to light by a local NGO, Cavite Mission. The 
owner had wanted to convert an estimated 900 hectares spread over two sites into industrial 
estates ("Ramos: Probe Cavite Mess", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 19 April 1993).
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Services departments.146 In addition, the DAR has experienced problems with NGOs 
abusing funds, and in October 1993, Garilao was forced to order a nationwide performance 
audit of NGOs awarded contracts under CARP following complaints from NGOs in Northern 
Mindanao about rampant abuse in the region.147
8. The Department o f Health
Population growth in the Philippines averaged 2.7% between 1960 and 1991,148 
(although down to 2.4% in 1992), and represents a major impediment to raising living 
standards for the population as a whole. Both President Fidel Ramos and Health Secretary 
Juan Flavier are Protestants and determined to face down the Catholic Church on family 
planning. To do so however, the DOH needs NGO support in implementing the Ramos 
government’s Philippine Family Planing Program (PFPP), launchedTn 1993, which aims to 
cut population growth to under 2% by 1998.149 With only 200 population control staff when 
Flavier took office, compared to a peak of 10,000 under the Marcos regime,150 the DOH 
is therefore heavily reliant on NGO coalitions including the Philippine NGO Council on 
Population, Health and Welfare (PNGOC), the Eamily Planning Organisation of the 
Philippines (FPOP) which claims a membership of 12,000 people, and other spontaneous 
coalitions formed to support a government crusade.151
146 Anonymous interviews.
147 Lulu Principle, "Garilao orders audit of NGOs", The Manila Bulletin, 8 October 
1993. r
148 Human Development Report 1993, pg. 180
149 "FVR launches birth control program today", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 August 
1993.
150 "Cory now blamed for overpopulation", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 20 July 1993.
151 On 11 July 1993 for instance, 34 NGOs, POs and coalitions published an 
advertisement in the national press to commemorate World Population Day and appeal for 
population programmes as part of a sustainable development strategy. Signatories included 
the FPOP, the PNGOC, PRRM and the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines.
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The DOH also relies on NGOs more generally in the provision of health services. 
Public health expenditure in the Philippines, equivalent to 5.6% of GNP, is the highest in 
South-East Asia.152 Much of it is squandered however on bureaucracy, urban-based 
facilities, and capital-intensive operations such as an Asian Heart Centre, built in Manila 
under Marcos. In contrast, health services in rural areas are sparse and inadequate, and the 
country as a whole has only one doctor for every 6,570 people, the second lowest rate in 
South-East Asia, and only one nurse for every 2,680, the lowest rate by far.153 As a result, 
the DOH relies heavily on NGOs for the provision of primary health care in rural areas,
medical support services in the event of natural disasters, and medical assistance for
*  ~~ 
communities displaced or affected by counter-insurgency operations. The J)O H  has had
particular problems in recruiting young doctors to serve in rural areas, because government -
pay is so low, and because doctors, mostly from urban areas and privately-educated at great -
cost to themselves or their families, emigrate or opt for lucrative practice in urban areas. In
July 1993, Flavier announced that young doctors going to the barrios would be paid P24,000
per month (US$800), the rough salary of an urban-based professional, yet with the
decentralization of his department’s budget, the DOH will have difficulty enforcing the policy
on a nation-wide basis. Most doctors in rural areas receive only P6,800 per month under the
Salary Standardization Law, and as a result, many towns with populations exceeding 20,000
lack even a single doctor. For many rural doctors, NGOs have become a lifeline and NGOs _
now supplement doctors’ salaries (by as much as 300% of the government salary) or provide —
152 Human Development Report 1993, pp. 158-159.
153 Ibid. Indonesia has only one doctor for every 9,410 people. For nurses, Indonesia is 
second to the Philippines, but with one for every 1,260 people, more than double the rate in 
the Philippines.
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equipment and medicine.154
»
9. Conclusion.
Analysis of state-NGO relations between 1986 and 1993, reveals a number of 
characteristics. The first is the fragmented nature of government policy-making: The National 
Economic and Development Authority, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
Presidential Management Staff, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the 
Presidential Adviser on Rural Development all share responsibility for monitoring and 
regulating the NGO community, while none has the powers or resources to carry out its 
functions effectively. Second, policy at the executive level is geared primarily towards 
securing NGO support for a social consensus that boosts democratic legitimacy. A plethora 
of executive-level committees have been established for this purpose, but few have led to 
substantive policy innovations. Third, individual government departments, lacking firm policy 
direction from the executive, have shaped their own relationships with NGOs. Fourth, as in 
other developing countries, a clear distinction exists between the policy of reform-oriented 
ministries such the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the 
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and the Department of Health (DOH), and ministries 
concerned with maintaining order such as the Department of National Defense and the 
Department of Interior and Local Government. Fifth, the executive has brought a significant 
number of NGO leaders into the government at cabinet level, and these leaders have in turn 
recruited NGO personnel into their departments, maintaining close ties to the NGOs with
154 Carlos Conde, "Flavier pays UP doc a visit", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 5 July
1993.
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which the were previously associated.155 Sixth, state-NGO relationships are to a significant 
extent based on personal ties.
The same analysis also shows that state-NGO relationships represent an important
characteristic of the degree of partial embedded autonomy which characterises the Philippine
state. First, pockets of efficiency have been created through mechanisms such as the
Presidential Social Fund, and through involving NGOs on a wide-scale basis in monitoring
the implementation of major socio-economic projects, reducing corruption and undermining
the patrimonial character of resource allocation policies.156 Second, a degree of strategic
partnership has between achieved been reform-oriented ministries and NGOs to attack
*
entrenched socio-economic elites, including landlords in the case of DAR-NGO collaboration, 
and illegal loggers in the case of DENR-NGO collaboration.157 Third, NGOs have helped 
to fill significant voids in the government’s-service delivery functions, as illustrated by the 
examples of housing and health service provision. Fourth, NGOs represent an intermediate 
institutional tier, linking the state to traditionally disempowered strata of society, as their 
initial cooperation with the Philippine Coconut Authority, and their on-going collaboration
155 Few NGOs debate this point, although one noted left-wing intellectual has argued that 
"A weak or unmotivated state will always be tempted to let the NGOs, all fired up by the 
slogan of "People Power", take up the work that it should be doing in.. .underdeveloped 
areas" (Armando Malay Jr., "Old Reflexes, New Slogans: The Mid-life Crisis of the 
Philippine Left", paper presented to the Second European Conference on Philippine Studies, 
SOAS, University of London, 13-15 April 1994).
156 On her government’s record of collaboration with NGOs, former President Corazon 
Aquino noted in 1992 that "The most successful school building programme was funded by 
the government [through the PSF] but implemented by NGOs- in record time and with 
extraordinary economy, integrity...[and] an unprecedented efficiency in the allocation of 
public funds" (Corazon Aquino, "Reflections on Our Democracy", in Corazon Aquino et al, 
The Aquino Administration: Record and Legacy (1986-1992), University of the 
Philippines Press, Quezon City, 1992, pg. 9).
157 Significantly, the only two cabinet ministers to serve full five-year terms, Dr. Mita 
Pardo de Tavera and Fulgencio Factoran, came from NGO backgrounds, which offered 
partial protection at least from Congressional opposition.
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with the DAR illustrates.
The analysis also emphasises the point made in Chapter 1, that states in the Asia, 
Africa and Latin America instinctively relate to NGOs by trying to co-opt them. A partial 
explanation for this reflex can be found in what Migdal describes as the "duality of state 
strength", where states seem able to penetrate society extensively, yet "are unable to 
implement goal-oriented change".158 To NGOs however, this duality is less apparent than 
the actual manifestations of state strength, namely its control over the allocation of resources ~ 
and its infrastructure of military power, weapons used systematically against them. Yet, in 
this light, the links forged between 1986 and 1993 seem all the more remarkable. The 
executive, the military and every government ministry now relate to NGOs in various forms 
of partnership and alliance and these relationships represent a significant characteristic of 
state-society relations.
The Philippines lacks the long tradition of NGO-state collaboration found in India. 
Yet, the great strides made in the period since 1986 suggest a new, durable, tradition of 
collective action and of intermediate institutional linkages between state and society that help 
consolidate the quasi-democratic character of the Philippine polity. Effective state-NGO 
relationships are by no means a panacea for the development dilemmas with which the 
Philippines is faced. They have however proved Themselves to be an important component 
in an overall programme of reform. Here, the central argument is that NGOs have a 
significant role to play in empowering states in the developing world and helping them to 
implement structural and public policy reforms. Chapters 4-6 look at popular empowerment 
and the role of NGOs, a more central concern in the contemporary NGO literature.
158 Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988, pp. 8-9.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Beyond the State: The Politics of NGO Action
1. Introduction.
One of the advantages of the term "non-governmental organisation" is that it suggests
an inverse, even a dialectical, relationship between NGOs and the state. In practice, this
inverse and dialectical relationship represents the very raison d'etre of NGOs. In the
developing world, counter-mobilization in response to short-comings in state performance in
promoting economic development and in mobilizing broadly-based popular support represents
the most significant aspect of NGO action. Strong NGO communities are invariably found
* — 
in developing countries where the state lacks the capacity to promote economic development
and political participation effectively and where the state tolerates, if not encourages, the-
voluntary sector. Thus, while the mainstream NGO literature suggests that development -
NGOs represent a response primarily to socio-economic deprivation, in reality, the response
of NGOs to development dilemmas is determined primarily by the particular character of the
state. -
Much of the political significance and the political character of NGOs however can 
only be seen by looking beyond the state and beyond the limited framework of state-NGO 
relationships. This chapter examines three important aspects of NGO politics; the organisation 
of the NGO community; the institutional forces that underpin it; and particular mechanisms- 
by which NGOs participate in politics. The level of organisation among NGOs is an_ 
important determinant of their political character and efficacy. As Chapter 1 noted, where - 
NGOs are not outrightly suppressed, states instinctively relate to NGOs by trying to attract 
and coopt their support. Opposition to the vast financial resources and coercive machinery 
of the state therefore depends on organisation among and coordination between NGOs.
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Second, the political character of the NGO community is also a reflection of the institutional
forces that underpin it. In the Philippines, four institutional forces have been particularly
influential in the growth of the NGO community: elite philanthropists; the Christian
Churches; overseas development assistance agencies and the underground left. For different
reasons and to varying effect, each force has promoted separate but overlapping sections of
the NGO community. Few NGO studies discuss the influence of non-state institutional forces
yet, like the state, such forces threaten the autonomy of NGOs and exert a powerful influence
over NGOs and the NGO community. Third, the political character of the NGO community
is influenced by the particular mechanisms that facilitate participation. Philippine NGOs
*
participate in politics through a number of mechanisms but four have proved especially 
significant since 1986: coalition-building; contemporary social movements; local government 
structures; and election campaigns. Each is considered below in turn.
2. The Organisation of the NGO Community.
The Philippine NGO community is characterised by a high degree of heterogeneity 
ancLby conflicting political or strategic orientations. In a refinement of typologies developed 
by Korten and Carroll (see Chapter 1) Constantino-David captures much of this heterogeneity 
and conflict in Figure 3.1 The typology illustrates two important features of the Philippine 
NGO community ^ First, a strong distinction exists between membership-based organisations
1 Refining her earlier typologies in "The Limits and Possibilities of Philippine NGOs in 
Development", paper presented to the LAMBATLAYA National Conference on "Networking 
in the ’90s: Affirming Commitment to the Decade of Nationalism", University of the 
Philippines, 22-24 November 1990, pp. 1-3; "The Need for Greater Unity and the CODE- 
NGO" in Forging Unity Towards Development, Proceedings of the First National NGO 
Congress, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, 4 December 1991, pg. 9; and "The 
Philippine experience in scaling up" in Michael Edwards and David Hulme (Eds.), Making 
a Difference: NGOs and Development in a Changing World, Earthscan Publications, 
London, 1992, pg. 138.
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and those established as service agencies or institutions, echoing similar distinctions 
internationally. Since 1986, "Peoples Organisation" has become a generic label for a complex 
range of largely traditional organisational structures such as trade unions, peasant associations 
or rural cooperatives. NGOs by contrast represent a more recent institutional innovation, 
dating largely to the 1970s. Boundaries between POs and NGOs in the Philippines are rapidly 
blurring: many NGOs are promoting membership while POs are acquiring professional staff, 
and bureaucratic structures and are by-passing NGOs to secure foreign funding directly. 
Second, DJANGOs2 (development, justice and advocacy-focused NGOs) account for only
11.5% of the total number of (non-membership) NGOs according to Constantino-David, 
numbering over 2,000 in 1991 .3 Writers such as Carroll however equate DJANGOs (using 
equivalent labels) with the NGO community as a whole, and often ignore the complex and 
hostile political environment in which DJANGOs invariably operate.
A survey of 69 NGOs in Cebu by Uy-Etemadi suggests however that DJANGOs are 
stronger and more prevalent than Constantino-David concedes. According to the survey, 27 % 
of Cebu’s NGOs are committed to consciousness-raising and 21% to community organising 
as the primary strategy through which they fulfil their goals. A further 8.29% concentrate on 
lobbying and 6.08% on rallies and demonstrations, leaving a minority committed to Korten’s 
"first generation" strategies; 18.78% to service delivery and the remaining 18.84% 
to relief operations and to charitable activities.4 Uy-Etemadi’s findings may need to be 
treated with caution however since elite/pliilanthropic NGOs or Constantino-David’s
2 An acronym derived from a common term in the Philippines for poor street children, 
originating from an American film where the main character came from a similar background 
(Karina Constantino-David, interview, 29 April 1993).
3 Constantino-David, "The Philippine experience in scaling-up", pg. 138. Based on an 
estimate of around 20,000 NGOs in the Philippines in 1991.
4 Felisa Uy-Etemadi, "NGOs in Cebu in Pursuit of Development", Data Links 
(University of the Philippines-Cebu), Vol. 2 No. 3, April 1993, pg. 4.
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"MUNGOs" actively engage in community organising.
Figure 3:
Typology of Philippine NGOs
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Source: Karina Constantino-David^ interview, 9 July 1993.
Philippine NGOs are predominantly small. According to ADB research, Philippine 
NGOs typically have less than 50 staff and annual budgets of less than P2m (See Table 5).5
5 The research identified 9 NGOs capable of participating in ADB-funded government 
projects, including PBSP and PRRM. The remaining seven are listed in Table 3. Supporting 
ADB’s data, Wegner’s analysis of 1988 CIDA data on 159 NGOs reveals that 66% had less 
than 20 staff while 69% have annual income of less than P2m. See Rodger Wegner, Nicht- 
Regierungs-organisationen als entwickungspolitische Hoffhungstrager: Eine Studie zur 
privater Entwicklungshilfe auf den Philippinen [Non-Governmental Organisations as 
Vehicles of Development: A Study of Private Development Assistance to the Philippines],
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Only three Philippine NGOs have more than 200 staff (See Table 4). Most national-level 
NGOs function effectively as networks that coordinate autonomous local-level organisations, 
and primary NGOs with unitary structures and nationwide reach such as PRRM and TFDP 
are very much the exception. PBSP, for instance, engages in direct programme work but is 
primarily a donor institution which coordinates a network of supported NGOs and POs. 
Similarly, the Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural 
Areas (PhilDHRRA) had 75 staff and income of P5.2m in 1992 but, with 62 member 
organisations scattered throughout Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao, is one of the few NGOs 
with a genuinely national presence.6
A number of factors account for the prevalence of small NGOs.7 First, of 7,000 
islands in the Philippines, 2000 are inhabited, with about 100 islands accounting for 80-90% 
of the population. Similarly, 80 distinctive languages are spoken with 8 languages accounting 
for 90% of the population, enhancing cultural diversity.8 Inter-island NGO programmes
Table 4.
The Top Three: The Philippines' Largest NGOs, 1992
Name Income
(Pesos)
Staff
Philippine Business for Social Progress 
Philippine Rural Reconstruction
" - 141m 237
Movement 49m 361
Task Force Detainees of the Philippines n/a - 288
Notes:
(1) Income: calendar year 1992.
(2) Staff: as at 31.12.1992. Includes contract or part-time
workers.
Sources: PBSP, PRRM, TFDP.
Demokratie und Entwicklung Band 10, LIT Verlag, Hamburg, 1993, pg. 182.
6 PhilDHRRA 1992 Annual Report, pp. 3, 119, and 128-129.
7 The following factors draw on interviews with Karina Constantino-David and Terrence 
George.
8 David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1988, pg. 27.
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Table 5 
Selected Development NGOs
NGO Income
(Pesos)
Staff
Agency for Community Education 
Services Inc. (ACES) 1. 5m 22
Farmers Assistance Board (FAB) 1. 5m 25
Kapwa Upliftment Foundation (KAPWA) N/A 18
Leyte-Samar Rural Development Workers 
Association (LABRADOR) 3. 8m 66
National Confederation of Cooperatives 
(NATCO) N/A 17
Organisation for Training, Research and 
Deve1opment (OTRADEV) 1.7m N/A
Participatory Research Organisation 
of Communities in the Struggle for 
Self-Reliance (PROCESS) ' 1.5M 36
Notes:
(1) Income: annual budget 1987
(2) Staff: 1987. Includes part-time workers and consultants but 
excludes volunteers.
Source: Cooperation with NGOs in Agriculture and Rural
Development, Volume 1, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 1989, pp. 
308-336.
require considerable resources (financial, administrative and personal) to maintain, making 
it difficult for national NGOs to maintain nationwide structures. Second, during martial law, 
political activists consciously promoted small and multiple NGO programmes to prevent the 
repression that a more centralised NGO community would have incurred. Third, in the 
difficult environment of the 1970s and 1980s, building NGO programmes of above-average 
size required enormous charisma and leadership skills but many potential NGO leaders 
associated with the NDF or other left groups were killed or imprisoned. Fourthly, the value 
placed on affinity groups in Filipino culture undermines larger structures dependent on less 
personal structures. Finally, many NGOs eschew the bureaucratic structures associated with 
the government bureaucracy to which they seek an alternative, enhancing the preference for
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small NGOs.
Philippine NGOs are primarily local-based, focused on operations at the municipal,
provincial or regional level. Generally, they proliferate in areas with a tradition of collective
organisation and mobilization, rather than the poorest regions where the need for development
NGOs is greatest but where political obstacles to NGO or PO organising are significant. A
survey of NGOs registered under the 1991 Local Government Code provides one guide to
NGO regional distribution (see Table 6) but should be treated with caution since many NGOs
do not participate in local government structures. When correlated with population and
average family income data (see Table 7), the survey indicates that NGO density is high in
*
the Cordillera mountains, a region with a strong tradition of collective mobilization and anti- 
state protest but with above average family income for rural areas. By contrast, NGO density 
is lowest in the Central Visayas (excluding the capital, Manila, which
Table 6
Regional Distribution of NGOs
Region Accredited 
NGOs (Total)
Region 1 (Ilocos) 2,470
Region 2 (Cagayan Valley) 875
Region 3 (Central Luzon) 1,528
Region 4 (Southern Tagalog) 1,848
Region 5 (Bicol) 1,151
Region 6 (Western Visayas) 1,819
Region 7 (Central Visayas) 702
Region 8 (Eastern Visayas) 1,245
Region 9 (Western Mindanao) 973
Region 10 (Northern Mindanao) 1,293
Region 11 (Southern Mindanao) 1,009
Region 12 (Central Mindanao) 768
National Capital Region (Metro Manila) 343
Cordillera Autonomous Region 810
Total 16,834
Source: "NGA-LGU-NGO Partnership Development Program Survey
Report", Bureau of Local Government Development, Department of 
the Interior and Local Government, October 1993, pg. 11.
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Table 7
Regional Distribution of NGOs: 
Population and Poverty Correlations
Region
Population
(000's)
NGO
Density
Average
Family
Income
Region 1 3,551 0.69 34,031
Region 2 2,341 0.37 32,939
Region 3 6,199 0.24 46,855
Region 4 8,266- 0.22 37,978
Region 5 3,910 0.29 “  26,570
Region 6 5,392 0.33 31,164
Region 7 4,593 0.15 27,972
Region 8 3,055 0.40 25,345
Region 9 3,159 0.30 31,984
Region 10 3,510 0.36 35,801
Region 11 4,457 9 * 0.22 37,132
Region 12 3,171 0.24 35,090
NCR 7,929 0.04 79,314
CAR 1,146 0.70 33,838
Total/Average 60,685 0.27 40,408
Notes:
(1) Population: 1990 data.
(2)_ NGO density: NGOs per 1,000 people as per Table 6.
(3) Average family income: Pesos. 1990 data. Average urban family 
income = P60,330. Average rural family income = P28,284.
Source (Population and income data): 1991 Philippine Statistical 
Yearbook, National Statistical Coordination Board, Manila, 1991, 
pp. 2 and 2-13. —
is anomalous) where family incomes are below the rural average, but where social 
polarisation is intense and where links between landlords, politicians, the military and local 
government officials inhibit the proliferation of "DJANGOs". The link is not clear cut 
however. The Eastern Visayas, the poorest region in the country, has a relatively high NGO 
density, while Central Luzon, the traditional focal point for peasant rebellion has a relatively 
low density, reflecting the relatively greater availability of government support services.
1 3 5
3. Forces Behind the Proliferation of NGOs.
The heterogeneity of the Philippine NGO community is explained in large part by the
institutional forces that underpin it and the competing objectives that motivate their support.
Implicit in most analyses of NGOs, especially of development NGOs, is the assumption that
NGOs share an almost uniform political orientation, characterised by concern primarily for
the poorest of the poor and a commitment primarily to their political and economic
empowerment. David Korten, for example, argues that
A healthy voluntary sector is characterized by a substantial number and variety 
of independent [voluntary organisations], representing an array of distinctive 
and often conflicting commitments. Their small size, independence and 
focused value commitments give them a capacity for social and institutional 
innovation seldom found in either government or business....Their 
commitment to integrative values over political or economic values gives them 
a natural orientation to the perceived needs of politically and economically 
disenfranchised elements of the population that are not met through the normal 
processes of government or the economic processes of the market.9
In reality however, "the conflicting commitments", which he acknowledges, rule out any
uniform or coherent "natural orientation" towards "disenfranchised elements of the
population". As the previous section illustrates, NGO "communities" are characterised by
ideological, personality and regional cleavages. As the following section illustrates, different
institutional forces promote NGOs in the Philippines, leading to important institutional
cleavages.
9 David Korten, Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global 
Agenda, Kumarian Press, West Hartford, 1990, pg. 98. In a similiar vein, Hirsch argues that 
the ideology of Thai NGOs is distinctly non-statist. "Foremost in the NGO discourse", Hirsch 
writes, "are concepts of dignity, self-reliance, decision-making power, bargaining power and 
others reflecting an alternative conceptualization of rural development" (Philip Hirsch, 
Development Dilemmas in Rural Thailand, Oxford University Press, Singapore, 1990 pg. 
15). In reality however, a large section of the Thai NGO community, dominated by 
philanthrophic NGOs, adheres to more conservative values (See Amara Pongsapich and 
Nitaya Kataleeradabhan, Philanthropy, NGO Activities and Corporate Funding in 
Thailand, Chulalongkom University Social Research Institute, Bangkok, 1994).
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4. Elite Philanthropy.
In the Philippines, elite philanthropy represents a political force in a number of 
respects. First, prominent business groupings support the work of Philippine Business for 
Social Progress (PBSP), the largest NGO in the Philippines, established in 1970 by the 
Council for Economic Development, the Philippine Business Council and the Association for 
Social Action. Inspired by the Venezuelan Dividendo Voluntario para la Comunidad 
(Voluntary DividendTor the Community) and established as "the private sector’s united and 
systematic response to the [country’s] socio-economic problems", PBSP aims to support 
economic projects implemented by low-income groups.10 Corporate members set aside 1% 
of net profit before tax for social development, of which 20% is committed to PBSP.11 
Second, many of PBSP’s 158 corporate members (1992) support their own foundations with 
the remaining 0.80% of net profits committed to social development. The Soriano family, for 
instance, lead shareholders of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), the Philippines’ largest 
business conglomerate,12 supports community development projects through the Andres 
Soriano Group of Foundations,13 in addition to direct support for PBSP.14 Companies and 
families not associated with PBSP also support their own development NGOs. The Zobel de 
Ayala family, lead shareholders of Ayala Land, another of the Philippines’ largest 
conglomerates,15 funds development activities through the socio-economic division of the
10 Ruth Callanta, "Philippine Business for Social Progress", NGO Strategic 
Management in Asia: Focus on Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines, Asian NGO 
Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ANGOC), Manila, 1988, pg. 121.
11 Philippine Business for Social Progress 1992 Annual Report, pg. 1.
12 With capitalization of US$2.7b in 1992, ("SMC listed among world’s leading firms", 
The Manila Chronicle, 15 July 1993).
13 See Chay Florentino Hofilena, "Doing Good- And Making Profit", The Manila 
Chronicle, 24 October 1993.
14 SMC Chairman Andres Soriano III was PBSP Chairman in 1992.
15 With capitalization in 1992 of US$2.17b ("SMC listed...").
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Ayala Foundation. In addition to Ayala family backing, the foundation receives funding from 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Chase Manhattan Bank, 
Levi’s International and J.P. Morgan.16 Third, family or business foundations consolidate 
their influence through coalitions such as the Association of Foundations (AoF) which 
includes 9 corporate and 14 family foundations among its 102 members.17 As founding 
networks, AoF and PBSP helped to establish the Caucus of Development NGO Networks 
(CODE-NGO) in 1991. “
Elite philanthropy is used to pursue a variety of political objectives. Often it is 
directed to securing commercial gain. Ayala Foundation activities in Cebu City and Bacoor, 
Cavite, for instance, support Ayala Land property developments; "squatters on properties 
bought by Ayala Land are resettled elsewhere with the foundation providing infrastructure, 
credit facilities and skills training".18 Second, in the Philippines, where Presidents must seek 
cabinet ministers and other officials outside Congress, prominent businessmen also support 
philanthropic activities to increase their public profile and to secure political office. In the 
case of PBSP, for instance, 10 board members joined the Ramos administration in 1992 
including Alberto Romulo (Foreign Secretary), Ramon del Rosario, (Finance Secretary), 
Rizalino Navarro (Trade and Industry Secretary), Roberto Sebastian (Agriculture Secretary) 
and Jose Cuisia (Central Bank Governor).19 Third, philanthropy helps to undermine 
insurgency and business donations to NGOs echo the ebb and flow of insurgency (see further 
in Chapter 5); PBSP was established in 1970 amid renewed rural unrest but as insurgency
16 Hofilena, "Doing Good...".
171990 Directory of Philippine Foundations and Non-Governmental Organisations,
Association of Foundations, Manila, 1990. 81 member organisations were established before 
1986, the first in 1926.
18 Hofilena, "Doing Good...".
19 [PBSP] 1992 Annual Report, pg. 7.
138
weakened after 1990, its corporate donations fell from P36.6m in 1991 to P27.9m in 1992 
and were expected to fall further in 1993.20 Finally, philanthropy helps to undermine 
pressure for increased state spending on social services, increased taxation, or structural 
reforms such as land redistribution while also helping to depoliticize NGO action.21
Elite philanthropic NGOs represent an even greater force in local politics. Well-funded 
and politically-connected foundations of prominent local families attract foreign funding, 
undermine insurgency and popular organisation initiatives, influence other NGOs or NGO 
coalitions or oppose government structural reform programmes. In Panay, the Gerry Roxas 
Foundation secured a large share of USAID funding to the island in 1993, and its role in 
providing credit to other voluntary organisations coincided with the USAID and Philippine 
government strategy of undermining communist insurgency on the island.22 In Cebu City, 
the Ramon Aboitz Foundation Inc. (RAFI) has become an influential force in local NGO 
politics. With funding from USAID, RAFI began construction in 1993 of the Eduardo Aboitz 
Development Centre Inc., a purpose-built six-story building, to house other NGOs and to host 
NGO conferences and training seminars. "Progressive" NGOs saw the planned centre as an 
attempt to co-opt Cebu’s vibrant NGO community, to undermine its political and socio­
economic impact and to make it a captive force for local elite politicians.23
The island of Negros illustrates the competing political objectives that often animate
20 Ibid, pg. 41 and anonymous interview with a PBSP manager. To stem the collapse in 
corporate donations, PBSP launched a Center for Corporate Citizenship in July 1993.
21 On the latter point, Ernesto Garilao, PBSP’s former Executive Director, argued in 1987 
that Philippines NGOs were "creating a new service sector- the social development industry" 
(Ernesto Garilao, "Indigenous NGOs as Strategic Institutions: Managing the Relationship with 
Government and Resources", World Development, Vol. 15 (Special Supplement), 1987, pg. 
116.
22 In May 1993 for instance, GRF received P5.75m to fund a credit window for NGOs 
and small businesses under USAID’s Food for Peace and Voluntary Cooperation programme 
(The Manila Bulletin, 10 June 1993).
23 Anonymous interviews with NGO activists and academics in Cebu, May 1993.
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the socio-economic development strategies of elite philanthropic NGOs. According to mid- 
1980s statistics, Negros accounts for 68% of Philippine sugar production, while 90% of the 
1.8m population is dependent on the sugar industry.24 Underpinning intense social 
polarization, 4% of landowners own nearly 50% of land while 72% of the population of 
Negros Occidental and 80% in Negros Oriental, the island’s two provinces, are poor, 
compared to 49% nationally.25 Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, Negros was 
racked by crisis as prices for sugar fluctuated on world markets. The worst occurred in 1985 
when sugar production fell to 1.6mt (metric tons) (from 2.9mt in 1975 and 2.2mt in 
1979),26 leaving 250,000 sugar workers unemployed and famine conditions that killed 
hundreds. In the municipality of Kabankalan, 25 to 30 children a month died at the height 
of the famine.27
Traditionally, landlords in Negros supported workers during the fallow season between 
sugar crops, and bore significant responsibility for food supply, housing, education, health 
and credit on the island. State agencies, except those concerned with security and the 
purchase of sugar, were relatively weak. During and following the famine of 1985, ODA 
donors sought partners in Negros to deliver emergency food supplies to vulnerable 
communities and to boost the production of subsistence foodstuffs. By 1985, a number of 
landlord foundations were already active in providing emergency relief, and in the absence 
of appropriate state agencies, ODA donors provided substantial funding to them. As a result,
24 Larry Jagan and John Cunnington, Social Volcano: Sugar Workers in the 
Philippines, War on Want, London, 1987, pg. 4.
25 "Negros: Weathering The Storm", IBON Facts and Figures, Vol. 17 No.7, 15 April 
1993, pg. 3.
26 Amal Malhorta, John P. McAndrew and Angelito P. Dela Vega, "A Critical 
Assessment of the UNICEF Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Program in Negros 
Occidental", A Report prepared for Oxfam America, February-March 1988, pg. 2.
27 Jagan and Cunnington, Social Volcano..., pg. 4.
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landlord-controlled development NGOs, established to attract and to channel ODA funding, 
proliferated on Negros.
After 1986 however, Negros’s special plight intensified national debate about land 
reform, and, under pressure, the island’s elite NGOs pursued three distinct political strategies. 
The first strategy was pioneered by PBSP, some of whose corporate members owned land in 
Negros (for instance^ SMC and the Central Azucarera Don Pedro). After February 1986, 
PBSP focus in Negros shifted from micro-enterprise development to land reform, and under 
its Negros Land for a Productive Life Programme (NLPLP), PBSP collaborated with the 
provincial government and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to enable 1,005 farmer 
beneficiaries in 13 settlement areas to acquire 3,000 hectares of land foreclosed by PNB.28 
In 1988, it helped 817 employees of the Kabankalan Sugar Company (KABUCO) to form the 
KABUCO Agricultural Workers Co-operative Inc. and buy a 1,000 hectare KABUCO farm 
under CARP from Philippine Investments Management Consultants (PHINMA), a PBSP 
member.29
Many sugar planter NGOs however were against CARP and sought to balance the 
return of sugar estates to their owners with a diversification of Negros’s monocrop economy 
and a more liberal and institutionalized approach to traditional paternalism. Organised by 
Daniel Lacson,30 a number of sugar planter NGOs formed the Associated Council of 
_ Organisations for Development (ACCORD) and the Multi-Sectoral Alliance for Development 
~ (MUAD) to provide project partners for ODA donors who pumped millions of dollars into
28 Ramon Consing, Para-legal Officer, Agrarian Reform Alliance of Democratic 
Organisations in Negros (ARADO), interview, Bacolod, 1 November 1993. Consing is a 
former PBSP employee.
29 [PBSP] 1992 Annual Report, pp. 9 & 19.
30 Founder of the Negros Economic Development Foundation; Officer-in-Charge, Negros 
Occidental March 1986-June 1987; and Governor, Negros Occidental, 1987-1992.
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Negros following the 1985 famine (see footnote 71). Most of these NGOs, and their patrons, 
supported Lacson’s "60-30-10" plan to rehabilitate an estimated 330,000 hectares of 
foreclosed land (under which 60% would be returned to landowners, 30% committed to 
nucleus estates owned by farmer co-operatives producing high-value non-food crops, and 10% 
given to landless farmers for subsistence crop production).31 Lacson promoted a number of 
ambitious ODA-funded plans which depended on broad support from sugar planter NGOs. 
Instead however, schemes such as the Negros Relief and Development Programme (NRDP) 
and the Economic District Management System (EDMS) divided them, and by 1991 the 
EDMS had collapsed.
The conflict essentially pitted the traditional paternalism of the Council of Service 
Delivery NGOs, the main alliance of landlord-financed NGOs in Negros, against the 
technocratic approach of-Daniel Lacson and Sixto K. Roxas.32 Yet it also illustrated the 
extent to which NGOs had become new institutional vehicles to advance the political interests 
of traditional family clans. Liberal planter NGOs such as the Chito Foundation, founded in 
1976 by sugar planter Eduardo Locsin in memory of his son, were estranged by Daniel 
Lacson’s hostility to established-NGOs in Negros such as PBSP33 and his attempts to 
displace them. Many also suspected that ACCORD and MU AD served primarily as vehicles 
to advance the political career of Lacson and felt the NRDF and EDMS created a bureaucracy 
that curbed their autonomy. Emerging triumphantly from the conflict however, Lacson was
31 "Negros: Weathering the Storm", pg. 4.
32 The EDMS and a-broader Fifteen Year Master Plan aimed to eliminate poverty in 
Negros by 2002 by converting a monocrop economy into an industrial hub, a mini-Taiwan. 
Both were designed by Sixto K. Roxas, Sixto K. Roxas Managers and Advisors (SKRMA) 
and the Foundation for Community and Management Technology (FCOMT).
33 Despite corporate membership through the family-owned Negros Navigation Company, 
Lacson frequently condemned PBSP as communist-infiltrated. (Edgar Cadagat, 
Correspondents, Broadcasters and Reporters Association- Action News Service, interview, 
Bacolod, 1 November 1993).
142
fappointed by President Ramos as Chairman of the state-owned Philippine National Bank 
(which controlled much of the foreclosed land on Negros) and Presidential Adviser on Rural 
Development in June 1992.
Sugar planters to Lacson’s right used NGOs to mobilize a third political strategy. The 
most important was the Sugar Development Foundation, an adjunct to the anti-communist and 
anti-land reform campaigns of the Movement for an Independent Negros (MIN) and the 
Negros Anti-Communist Crusade (NACC). The Sugar Development Foundation paid for arms 
and training for Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units (see chapter 3) which attacked 
mass-based POs occupying foreclosed land. The most prominent targets were the 80,000 
strong National Federation of Sugar Workers-Food and General Trades (NFSW-FGT) and 
the Small Farmers Association of Negros (SFAN). By the early 1990s, as the level of 
insurgency declined, the SDF had fragmented into 12 units, corresponding to Negros 
Occidental’s 12 sugar milling districts, each supporting CAFGU units in its area. Charting 
its demise, a journalist noted in 1993, "some planters believing that communists [are] no 
longer a threat and many planters have stopped contributions to the SDF altogether. In one 
district, only 8.5% of about 1,000 planters now contribute".34
5. The Christian Churches. ~
In the Philippines, the Christian churches were uniquely placed to promote the 
proliferation of NGOs. With Muslims, concentrated in Manila and Mindanao, accounting for 
almost 10% of the population, Islam played a small but increasingly important role in
34 Eli Tajanlangit, "As Negros prepares for peace, a new cycle of war begins", The 
Manila Chronicle, 16 March 1993.
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promoting NGOs in the early 1990s.35 With 85% of the population Catholic however, the
Catholic church was especially well placed. It rivalled state institutions in ideological
coherence, nation-wide reach, ability to permeate remote barrios and to affect the lives of
marginalised social strata. Yet, throughout the twentieth century, Protestants in the
Philippines have contributed to national life out of all proportion to their small numbers, and
the Protestant churches are another important force in NGO politics.
Catholic church institutions began to organise peasants and farmere during the 1940s
and in 1953 the Catholic Charities was established to coordinate Catholic welfare activities.36
During the mid-1960s, the Catholic Church’s involvement in socio-economic development
was consolidated under the influence of Vatican II and liberation theology. In 1966 the
Catholic hierarchy established an independent Episcopal Commission on Social Action which
in turn established the National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA).37 By mid-1968,
—2,000 church-sponsored projects existed, including
credit unions, improved rice production, cottage industries, medical clinics, 
youth recreational centers, farmers’ associations, piggeries, poulteries, housing 
projects, ...land tenure [projects], and one electricity cooperative...In 42 out 
of 48 dioceses and prelatures..., a social action director had been _  
appointed.. .Eight dioceses had established social action secretariats manned by 
full-time priest-directors and about twenty professionally-trained lay workers.
About 400 parishes out of 1,650 were engaged in some socio-economic
35 NGOs are increasingly responsible for mobilising and allocating zakat (legal alms) and 
sadaqqa (voluntary alms), religious contributions traditionally managed by mosques. Usually 
these contributions fund madrasah (educational institutions) that do not receive state funding, 
but increasingly they are used to fund community development activities (See Carmen 
Abubakar, "Zakat and Sadaqqa Practices Among the Moros of the Philippines", in Mohamed 
Ariff (Ed.), The Islamic Voluntary Sector in Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore, 1991).
36 See Fabros, The Church and Its Social Involvement..., Chapter 2. Catholic church 
organisations such as the Institute of Social Order and the Knights of Columbus played an 
important role in establishing the Federation of Free Workers in 1950 and the Federation of 
Free Farmers in 1953, dominant (and state-approved) trade union and peasant association 
respectively through the 1950s and ’60s.
37 Ibid, pg. 97.
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endeavour.38
These activities "went beyond the social welfare and relief orientation" but, Fabros notes,
they dealt primarily with cooperative and nonconflictual aspects of community 
development. Nothing significant was done toward the organisation of farmers, 
land distribution, and other community development projects that would 
involve conflict between groups and change the existing social structures.39
With the declaration of martial law in 1972 however, powerful church institutions
responded by intervening directly in group conflicts. NASS A established three regional
secretariats by 1974; the Luzon Secretariat for Social Action (LUSSA); the Visayas
Secretariat for Social Action (VISSA); and the Mindanao-Sulu Secretariat for Social Action
(MISSA). By 1981, there were 68 diocesan social action centers nationwide,40 important
*
umbrellas that sheltered popular organisational initiatives from military repression-NASSA 
promoted community organising further in 1975 through its Basic Christian Community- 
Community Organizing (BCC-CO) programme. In time, BCCs, "priestless prayer groups of 
thirty to fifty people",41 became an important force in launching POs and NGOs. Lay 
facilitators sought to "conscienticize", ie. raise the critical consciousness of, parishioners 
through bible-sharing sessions and seminars and invited members to join sectoral 
organisations. By 1980, according to Jones, BCCs were active in one-third of dioceses and 
were viewed by one military authority as "practically...an infrastructure of political power 
in the entire country".42 In another important stimulus to the establishment of sectoral-based 
POs and NGOs, the Association of Major Religious Superiors (AMRSP) established a number
38 Ibid, pg. 127.
39 Ibid.
40 Robert Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church: Economic Development and 
Political Repression in the Philippines, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990, pg. 76.
41 Alfred McCoy, Priests on Trial, Penguin Books, Victoria, 1984, pg. 161. Chapter 
4 provides a vivid account of BCCs in Negros.
42 Gregg R. Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement, 
Westview Press, Boulder, 1989, pg. 209.
145
of task forces in 1974,43 many of which were run by nuns.44 The AMRSP also established 
an Office for Justice and Peace to assist NASSA’s Justice and Peace Commission, and 
continued financial support for prominent POs including the Zone One Tondo Organisation, 
the Samahan ng Kristiyang Komunidad (Christian Community Association) and the National 
Federation of Sugar Workers.45
A number of factors animated this process of institution-building. First, Catholic 
funding agencies in Europe and North America such as CEBEMO (The Netherlands), or 
MISEREOR (Germany) multiplied the financial resources which Catholic church institutions 
committed to NGOs and POs. Similarly, Protestant funding agencies associated with the 
Geneva-based World Council of Churches, such as ICCO (Netherlands), Bread for the World 
(Germany) and Christian Aid (Britain) funded programmes of the National Council of 
Churches in the Philippines (NCCP). Second, the diversity of ideological opinion within the 
church enabled it to work with other important forces: elite philanthropists, foreign donors 
and the underground left, cementing the role of NGOs in mobilising opposition to the Marcos 
regime. NASSA and the NCCP coordinated with foreign donors while the Catholic Bishops 
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) and the Bishops-Businessmens Conference (BBC) 
worked closely with prominent philanthropists. Philippine Priests Incorporated (PPI), and the 
underground Christians for National Liberation (CNL) (among others) linked church 
institutions to the underground left. Third, NGOs and POs provided an important institutional 
base for activists to develop the "praxis" of liberation theology, institutionalizing a split
43 Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), Task Force Data Gathering, Task 
Force Urban Conscientization, Task Force Rural Conscientization and, later, Task Force 
Tribal Filipinos.
44 A PPI survey of 250 priests in 1980 discovered that women religious were regarded 
as "united in their involvement in social action", (Jesus Fernandez, The Church of the 
Philippines on the Threshold of the ’80s, Philippine Priests Inc., Manila, 1980, pg. 125
45 Youngblood, Marcos Against The Church..., pg. 85.
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between a popular church, and the hierarchical church embodied in the CBCP.46
The debate over liberation theology was sharpest in Mindanao. In 1980, Mindanao had 
only one priest per 14,634 Catholics (1 to 20,000 in parts) and only 14% of available priests 
(compared to 21.5% of the population).47 As a result, the Mindanao church depended on 
the participation of the laity and a level of organisation among local communities that made 
their Christian character self-sustaining. To institutionalize lay participation in church life, 
Mindanao’s bishops established the Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Conference (MSPC), a body of 
bishops, priests, religious and laity modelled on the All-India Pastoral Conference. The 
MSPC met triennially from 1971.48 In 1977, a MSPC secretariat (MSPCS) was established, 
Karl Gaspar, former manager of PBSP’s Mindanao programme, was elected as MSPC 
Executive Secretary and in 1978, MSPC absorbed MISS A. The three developments further 
stimulated MSPC’s role in supporting NGOs. In 1982 however Mindanao’s bishops 
disassociated themselves from MSPC over fears of collaboration between NASSA, the various 
MSPC apostalates, (especially social action) and the underground left.49
The 1982 disassociation shattered what Kinne describes as the "main point of 
convergence in Asia of Christian and Marxist social struggle".50 Over 15 years, thousands 
of BCCs mushroomed in Mindanao,51 but were violently suppressed by AFP counter-
46 Bishop Julio Labayen, a leading proponent of liberation theology_within the Catholic 
church, served as Director of NASSA from 1967 to 1981. On the tenets with which he 
infused the work of NASSA, see Julio Xavier Labayen, To Be The Church Of The Poor, 
Communications Foundation for Asia, Manila, 1986.
47 Warren Kinne, The Splintered Staff: Structural Deadlock in the Mindanao 
Church, Claretian Publications, Quezon City, 1990, pg. 14.
48 Ibid, pp. 43-44.
49 The bishops were particularly influenced by policy guidelines adopted at NASSA’s 
1981 National Convention which stated that "burning issues of violence and revolution" could 
not be ignored and which called on the bishops to support popular struggle (Ibid, pg. 153).
50 Ibid, pg. 155.
51 Ibid, pg. 62.
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insurgency operations; of 1,200 grass-roots lay leaders trained by the Community Formation 
Center between 1967 and 1988, for instance, 15 met with violent deaths. NGOs however, 
often located within diocesan social action centers, enjoyed greater physical security, and 
greater financial security than BCCs which mostly eschewed foreign funding.52 
Professionally-trained staff also strengthened the capacity of NGOs to endure military or para­
military repression, while the socio-economic thrust of NGO programmes made them less 
"vulnerable to hierarchical censure. As a result, NGOs represented arguably the main 
institutional legacy of MSPC.
Church-based NGOs, Thompson notes, played a significant role in the "EDSA 
Revolution" of February 1986, the rallies along Manila’s Epifanio de la Santos Avenue that 
precipitated the collapse of the Marcos regime. The rallies were largely spontaneous and led 
by individuals, but Church organisations, notably Aksyon sa Kapayapaan at Katarungan 
(AKKAKPA, Action for Justice and Peace), had trained many of the leading activists in the 
preceding months.53 Since 1986, the Christian churches have remained a significant 
force in NGO politics. Church-based NGOs played a prominent role in the main sectoral 
coalitions active between 1986 and 1993, especially those concerned with peace,54 and three 
of the 10 NGO networks that founded CODE-NGO in 1991 were church-based; NASSA, 
NCCP and the Ecumenical Center for Development. At the Second Plenary Council of 1991, 
NGO action was reaffirmed by the Catholic hierarchy as "a concrete putting into practice of —
52 Ibid, pg. 78. z
53 Mark R. Thompson, "Searching for a Strategy; Th&Traditional Opposition to Marcos 
and the Transition to Democracy in the Philippines", Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1991, 
pp. 458 & 461.
54 Dr. Fely Carino of the NCCP and Fr. Frank Vargas of the AMRSP for instance played 
a prominent role in launching the Multi-Sectoral Peace Advocates, an informal but influential 
lobby that promoted peace talks between the Philippine government and the CPP-NPA-NDF 
(Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, "Peace Coalitions", in Coalition Experiences in the 
Philippines, IPD and PCHRD, prepublication draft, 1993).
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two key ideas much stressed in recent papal teaching on social issues: solidarity and love of 
preferences for the poor".55 Overall however, church antagonism to the CPP affected the 
NGO community in a number of respects. First, NASSA was reorganised in 1987 to bring 
it under greater CBCP control. The CBCP also strengthened its Basic Ecclesial Communities 
(BEC) programme at the expense of NASSA’s BCC-CO programme, especially in decisions 
taken_at the Second Plenary Council.56 Second, AMRSP relationships with its subordinate 
task forces led to acrimonious debate at annual conventions after 1986. Although dwarfing 
the AMRSP itself, task forces (especially TFDP) sought continued AMRSP sponsorship,
given the uncertain character of the democratization process while opponents condemned them
✓
as national democratic (ie. pro-NDF). By 1993 however the task forces retained AMRSP 
sponsorship, an important protective umbrella for associated church-based NGOs. Third, 
CNL activists who previously supported NDF united front work by establishing NGOs in so- 
called- " white areas", turned to new NGOs after 1986 to develop an institutional base to 
challenge CPP hegemony. Edicio de la Torre, for instance, one of CNL’s founders, helped 
establish the Institute for Popular Democracy in 1987 and later, the Education for Life 
Foundation. Gerry Bulatao, AMRSP Secretary General from 1974 to 1976 before going 
underground with CNL, worked with the DAR before he helped establish KAISAHAN with 
Florencio Abad in 1990, becoming its Executive Director.
6. Development Assistance.
Development assistance, official and unofficial, is the life blood that sustains the 
Philippine NGO community. In 1991, development assistance to the Philippines amounted
55 Acts and Decrees of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines, Catholic 
Bishops Conference of the Philippines, Manila, 1992, pg. 13.
56 Ibid, pp. 52-53.
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to US$1.4b.57 of which roughly $102m or 7.2% (equivalent to 0.22% of GNP) was 
channelled through NGOs.58 Development assistance, however, is a controversial force in 
Philippine NGO politics. According to David, it promotes "parasitism and dependence... 
exacerbating jealousies and rivalries... imposing an externally-generated priority 
system...eroding the norm of selflessness and commitment...[and depoliticizing] NGO 
work".59 ODA first became a significant factor in the growth of the NGO community in 
1972 when a small number of governments, mainly European, replaced support for 
government projects with aid to NGOs through co-financing agencies. Dutch aid after 1972, 
for instance, was channelled almost exclusively through CEBEMO, ICCO, NOVIB and SNV, 
averaging $7m to $8m per annum.60
Among voluntary organisations influential in NGO politics, the Rockfeller, Ford and 
Asia Foundations had a virtual monopoly until the mid-1960s when European Catholic and 
Protestant church funding agencies began to support NGO programmes through Philippine 
church partners (primarily NASSA and NCCP). European support (church and non-church) 
increased dramatically after 1972 and by the late 1970s, agencies such as NOVIB, CEBEMO 
and ICCO (Netherlands), MISEREOR (Germany) and Oxfam (Britain) had become important
57 Philippines Development Cooperation 1991 Report, United Nations Development 
Programme, Manila, July 1993, Foreword.
58 Analysis of Table B.3, ibid, pp. 47-57, suggests that $82m was channelled to NGOs 
and POs in 1991 (excluding QUANGOS, private-educational establishments and commercial 
enterprises). $20m has been added to compensate for an error in Table A.3, ibid, pg. 33, (see 
further below). In 1990-1991, ODA was equivalent to 3.0% of GNP (Development 
Cooperation, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1992, pg. 
A-27). -
59 Randolf David, "The Role of International Development Agencies in the Philippines" 
in Partnership: The Philippine-Canadian NGO Consultation for the CIDA Country 
Review Program, Manila, 1988, pp. 71-72.
60 Hanneke Van Eldik Thieme, "Dutch Development Assistance to the Philippines" in Joel 
Rocamora, Hanneke Van Eldik Thieme and Ernesto Hilario (Eds.), European Official 
Development Assistance to the Philippines, Council for Peoples Development (CPD) and 
Transnational Institute (TNI), Manila, 1992, pg. 2.
1 5 0
supporters of "progressive" (ie left-of-centre) Philippine NGOs, leading to accusations of their 
support for insurgency.61 NOVIB’s philosophy, for instance, of providing large grants to 
large NGOs and acting as lead agency in consortia provides significant influence over the 
strategies and orientations of some of the biggest NGOs, including PRRM and TFDP. In the 
case of Ford and Asia Foundations, the presence of representative offices and staff in Manila 
and the particular programme strategy enhances their influence, despite the relatively small 
size of their programmes.62 By 1991, support from voluntary agencies in Europe, North 
America and Japan amounted to roughly $40m or 40% of total foreign funding to Philippine 
NGOs.63
Of the official donors, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) are the most
61 Mainly from right-wing anti-communist think-tanks in the US or Australia. "Financing 
a revolution: the NPA’s European backers",in Investigation, EIR News Service, 
Washington, 16 December 1988, pg. 57, for instance, argues that "[European] church-related 
foundations account for most of the aid that is finding its way into secret NPA bank 
accounts".
62 Of Ford Foundation’s 1993 Philippines^-programme, worth $3m, roughly 50% was 
channelled to NGOs. Asia Foundation’s programme was worth a little less (Terrence George, 
interview, 12 July 1993). Both programmes, however, are strongly policy-oriented and 
support research institutions concerned with NGO issues. Both programmes also seek to 
support pluralism and NGOs concerned with public-advocacy (Current Interests o f the Ford 
Foundation !992 and 1993, pg. 20, and The Asia Foundation 1991 Annual Report, pg. 
32). Thus, most NGOs supported are social democratic in political orientation. Before the 
February 1986 elections, USAID channelled $369,000 to Asia Foundation for election-related 
projects. Asia Foundation in turn made a grant to the Federation of Catholic Broadcasters to 
fund the election activities of 19 radio stations (Sandra Burton, Impossible Dream: The 
Marcoses, The Aquinos and the Unfinished Revolution, Warner Books, New York, 1989, 
pp. 344-345).
63 According to Philippines: Development Cooperation 1991 Report, Table A.3, 
Section 3, pg. 33, NGOs channelled $20m to the Philippines in 1991, the main donors being 
CARE, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ford Foundation and Asia 
Foundation. The table however omits details of European funding agencies. In 1991, 
Christian Aid channelled £0.75m ($lm) (Christian Aid, letter to author, 25.5.1994), while 
at least 10 agencies gave as much or more. At a conservative estimate, therefore, these 
agencies channelled an additional $20m to Philippine NGOs in 1991.
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influential. Between 1980 and 1991, USAID provided over $45m to more than 200 NGOs 
and POs,64 $10m in 1991 alone,65 making it the single most important foreign source of 
NGO funding. Most went to philanthropic NGOs,66 leading to criticisms that USAID was 
promoting "a network of elite NGOs identified with and beholden to big business".67 In 
January 1992, in a pioneering debt-for-nature swap designed to support environmental NGOs, 
USAID launched the Foundation for the Philippine Environment (FPE) with the World-Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF), PBSP, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and 
the Philippine Central Bank. Under the plan, USAID agreed to release US$25m in phased
tranches for the purchase of discounted Philippine debt on international markets. Interest and
* __
capital repaid on the debt, honoured in full by the Central Bank, finances a FPE endowment
fund, which in August 1993 stood at US$22m, yielding annual interest of roughly $2m to
fund NGO environmental projects.68
Since 1986, CIDA has established a firm rapport with broad sections of the NGO
community, through support for NGO coalition-building initiatives and innovative funding
64 Partnership in Development: A PVO Network for Sustainable Development,
USAID, Manila, September 1992, pg: 1.
65 Donald Goertzen, "Agents for Change: NGOs take the lead in development process", 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1991, pg. 20.
66 USAID’s Enterprise in Community Development (ECD) programme, for instance, 
promotes corporate social development activities. Under the ECD, 22 NGOs associated with 
some of the Philippines’ largest corporations received grants totalling $11.4m between 1986 
and 1990 ("How USAID’s Programs Help the Philippines", n.d., and Enterprise in 
Community Development Annual Report Financial Year 1992, USAID, Manila, 
September, 1992).
67 Francisco Lara Jr., "The Impact of Foreign Aid on People’s Initiatives in Agrarian 
Reform", Philippine Peasant Institute research paper, Manila, 1990, pg. 4.
68 G. Sidney Silliman, "Philippine Non-Governmental Organizations and Official 
Development Assistance", paper presented to the annual meeting of the Association for Asian 
Studies, 24-27 March 1994, Boston, pg. 18.
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mechanisms.69 In March 1993, for instance, CIDA had C$46m (US$25m) committed to 
"third generation" projects (see table 8), including the Philippine Cooperative Development 
Assistance Programme, the WID NGO Umbrella project and the Philippine-Canada Human 
Resources Development programme (PCHRD).70
Table 8
CIDA Project Support to NGOs, March 1993 --
Project Title Duration Cost C$m
Philippine Cooperative Development 
Assistance Programme 1987-92 4.974
Dissemination of Ferrocement 
Rainwater Catchment System 1989-93 0.474
NCRFW Institutional Strengthening 
Project 1990-95 1.53
Women in Development NGO Umbrella 
Project 1990-95 3.65
Philippines-Canada Human Resources 
Development Programme (PCHRD)
—
1990r95 15.00
Philippine NGO Assistance 
Development Programme (PDAP) Phase 1 1986-90 4.88
Phase 2 1990-95 15.00
Canada Fund for Local NGO Initiatives 1992-93 0.50
Total 46.008
Source: CIDA In The Philippines: A Guide to Operational Projects, 
CIDA, Manila, March 1993. —
In the late 1980s however, CIDA was criticized for marginalising established 
development NGOs from the design and implementation of ODA programmes, especially in
69 In 1991, 35% of CIDA’s US$17.6m programme was channelled directly through 
NGOs. Other funding was channelled indirectly through Philippine government departments 
(Goertzen, "Agents for Change...", pg. 20.
70 These projects aim respectively to promote unification efforts among cooperatives and 
links with NGOs and government organisations; to empower women through the 
Development for Women and Transformative Action Foundation Inc. (DIWATA); and to 
strengthen NGO/PO capacity in training, advocacy, development education, networking and 
coalition building.
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Negros where CIDA projects served mainly to strengthen sugar planter NGOs.71 In
response, 30 Philippine and 12 Canadian NGOs attended a conference on CIDA’s Country
Review Programme in June 1988 leading to the establishment of the PCHRD. As Arquiza
notes, "...PCHRD...set a precedent. For the first time, Philippine NGOs would have
substantial control over funding [and] more than 90% of funds would now pass through the
Manila-based [Philippine-Canadian Joint Committee]".72
The early 1990s heralde&innovative donor-NGO relationships. As Arquiza notes, by
late 1993, FPE and PCHRD had proved relatively successful:
In both cases, the Philippine NGO community succeeded in gaining access, 
albeit in a limited sense, to ODA decision-making processes. In both...a 
coalition of Philippine NGOs positioned themselves to be a major recipient or 
conduit of ODA monies. In the process of two consecutive coalition successes, 
the Philippine NGO participants have developed among themselves substantial 
points of unity.73
Despite the FPE and PCHRD successes however,74 substantial differences remain between
71 In 1986, CIDA launched a C$100m five-year programme in the Philippines, increasing 
ten-fold 1981-1986 aid of C$1 lm. The central objective was to support immediate-impaet 
community-based government and non-government initiatives. C$1 lm  (P165m) was 
committed to the 3-year Negros Relief and Development Programme (NRDP), designed as 
a follow up to UNICEF’s US$2.4m Emergency Quick Action Programme (ENQAP) 1985- 
1986, and in September 1989 CIDA provided an additional C$0.6m (P9m)for the first stage 
of the Economic District Management System (EDMS) programme. The bulk of the C$1 lm 
however was captured by sugar planter NGOs empowered by the ENQAP ("Report on the 
Economic District Management System: The Case of SALVAPUL BAMUR", Broad 
Initiatives for Negros Development (BIND), Bacolod, February 1990, and Edgar Cadagat, 
"An Evaluation of the EDMS Project in Negros", n.d.). According to one source, more than 
400 sugar planter NGOs were established to avail of ENQAP, NRDF or EDMS funding^ 
marginalising reputable development NGOs and mass-based POs (Ramon Consing, interview,- 
1 November 1993). See also Donald Goertzen, "Sweet and Sour: Planters and Peasants battle 
it out", Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1991, pg. 24.
72 Racquel Arquiza, "ODA Research", paper prepared by the Council for Peoples 
Development for the Institute for Development Research-sponsored Research Consortium on 
Policy Influencing, September 1993, pg. 17.
73 Ibid, pg. 25.
74 On these and other innovative NGO-donor relationships, see Resource Manual on 
NGO-Managed Fund Mechanisms, Caucus of Development NGO Networks and 
Transnational Institute, Quezon City, 1992.
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foreign funders and Philippine NGOs, making ODA a significant variable in NGO politics.
7. The Underground Left.
The Communist Party of the Philippines, with its armed wing, the New Peoples Army 
and its united front, the National Democratic Front (CPP-NDF-NDF), has long been an 
important force in Philippine NGO politics. Since the late 1970s, the triumvirate has 
influenced existing NGOs, established new ones and used NGO funding to support its armed 
struggle. Yet, within the CPP itself, NGOs have also been a bitter source of tension,
especially in the post-1992 "Reaffirm" Vs. "Reject" debate (see further below).
*
The CPP-NPA-NDF played a relatively minor role in NGO politics until the late 
1970s. Under the Chairmanship of Jose Maria Sison, the CPP adhered to orthodox Marxist- 
Leninist-Mao Tse-Tung Thought (MLMTT). Broadening the anti-Marcos united front through 
the NDF was relegated in importance to strengthening the CPP’s vanguard role and 
establishing the primacy of armed struggle, so the party itself paid little attention to legal 
front organisations.75 Secondly, organisations such as CNL that could have established 
NGOs to strengthen the-united front were in disarray in the early years of martial law as 
activists were arrested or fled to the mountains.76
Nevertheless, between 1972 and 1978, leading underground activists such as Ed de 
la Torre, Gerry_Bulatao and Edgar Jopson helped establish important NGOs. With close
75 Emphasising his antipathy towards the national bourgeoisie, Sison, using a nom de 
plume, wrote in 1970 that "The correct policy is to unite with it only to the extent that it 
supports the revolution at a given time and at the same time to criticize it appropriately for 
its vacillations or tendency to betray the revolution" (Amado Guerrero, Philippine Society 
and Revolution, International Association of Filipino Patriots, 1979, pg. 161). On the 
NDF’s ephemeral character see also, Jones, Red Revolution..., pp. 145-153, and William 
Chapman, Inside the Philippine Revolution: The New Peoples Army and Its Struggle 
for Power, W.W. Norton and Co., New York, 1987, pp. 214-233.
76 Edicio de la Torre, interview, 17 August 1993.
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church and social democrat connections, each brought ideas to the underground of institutions 
that could organise legitimately and secure foreign funding. Building on the successful La 
Tondena strike of October 1975, for example, Jopson, founder of the Church Labor Center, 
and other activists mobilized church-based NGOs, cementing ties with the NDF.77 NGOs 
were thus, according to one former NDF leader, an idea that the CPP borrowed from the 
church.78
In 1978, serious tensions developed between the CPP and NDF activists following the
arrest of Jose Maria Sison in November 1977. Even more hostile than Sison to the concept
of a united front, new CPP Chairman Rodolfo Salas ordered a review of the Community
Organising (CO) approach ^ popularised by NASSA, and in the resultant paper presented to
the Central Committee in January 1978, CO was roundly condemned:
...CO radicalism should read reformism...Its main concern is small events, 
small issues, small targets, tangible victories, small communities, small and 
manageable organisations etc. It goes around structural problems and deals 
with only their manifestations like poor water, light, health and recreational 
facilities. It builds issues around them, identifies personally responsible targets 
and concentrates agitation, mobilization and organisation on them. By avoiding 
real and substantial issues and targets and keeping people from revolutionary 
actions, CO objectively works only to amend some sick parts of the rotten 
totality. It evades as much as possible alLproblems which require armed 
struggle for their solution.79
Despite its unease however, the CPP was unable to enforce effective discipline, especially
beyond Manila or Central Luzon were the leadership was largely concentrated. NDF activists
enjoyed a significant degree of individual autonomy, and the number of NGOs and POs
77 Mila Aguilar, interview, 14 November. See also Benjamin Pimentel Jr., EDJOP: The 
Unusual Journey of Edgar Jopson, KEN Inc., Quezon City, 1989, pp. 152-156.
78 Aguilar, interview.
79 "Community Organisation: Reform or Revolution (A Critique of the CO Approach)", 
Peasant Section, January 1978. The paper acknowledged however that CO "has produced 
some tangible results and expressions"; eg. "CO experts and organisers have to a certain 
extent helped people to transcend the so-called ’culture of silence’ and ’climate of fear’ 
spawned by martial law".
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established with their help grew rapidly in the late 1970s, especially in Mindanao.
By 1985, according to Chapman, the CPP’s united front had become enormously 
successful:
NDF organisers were active in at least one-fifth of the country’s barrios...and 
in hundreds of them NDF Barrio Committees were the actual government. The 
penetration of labour unions and other non-communist organisations was 
proceeding swiftly even in Manila where grassroots work had been 
traditionally slow. Perhaps most significantly the party had in place the 
semblance of a true popular united front in Bayan, especially in the cities of 
Mindanao and the Visayas...The front’s own strategy of promoting people’s 
strikes as the first stage of a national insurrection was becoming more and 
more popular.80
Behind this apparent success however, relations between the CPP and NDF progressively 
deteriorated between 1980 and 1986, soured by NDF draft programmes of January 1982 and 
January 1985 which sought to erode the CPP’s vanguard role.81 During the early 1980s, the 
CPP leadership expanded its effective authority beyond Luzon and the autonomy of NDF 
activists was significantly reduced. By 1986, according to Putzel, the NDF was "more of an 
idea or a political programme than an independent organisational reality",82 and NDF barrio 
committees were, in reality, tightly-controlled CPP structures. The clampdown was, in many 
respects too late however, and NGOs established by NDF activists became an institutional 
base from which the CPP soon faced significant opposition.
CPP failure to give meaningful autonomy to the NDF fuelled the proliferation of 
NGOs after 1983. First, activists in sympathy with the NDF programme but frustrated by its 
organisational weakness used NGOs to bring organisational strength (and foreign funding) to 
their efforts. Disenchantment increased following the CPP’s boycott of the 1986 Presidential
80 Chapman, Inside, the Philippine Revolution..., pg. 232.
81 See Joel Rocamora, "The NDF Program and the CPP Program for a People’s 
Democratic Revolution: Umbilical Cord or Lifeline?", Debate, No. 5, December 1992.
82 Putzel, A Captive Land..., pg. 168.
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elections. Second, break-away national democrats regrouping under the new rubric of popular 
democracy used NGOs as a critical institutional base to launch a new tendency within the 
Philippine left. Third, activists associated with left-wing groups opposed to armed struggle 
(ie the social democrats, democratic socialists, and independent socialists) established their 
own NGOs in an attempt to create rival institutional power-bases of the left and to prevent 
their marginalisation by the underground left.
Between 1987 and 1990, the CPP’s mass base eroded under the impact both of the 
government’s intensive 1987-1990 counter-insurgency programme and its own strategic
blunders. "From 1987 to 1990", the party admitted,
✓
the membership of the mass base was reduced by almost 60% from the base 
year of 1986,.. .the number of barrios covered by guerrilla fronts by 16% and 
...Party membership by 15%...Furthermore, the number of officers and 
fighters of the people’s army fell by 28% or below the level of 1985.83
As a result, the CPP came to rely increasingly on NGO funding from 1987.
Throughout the 1970s, the CPP derived barely enough income from NGOs to finance
the United Front Commission. Under Rodolfo Salas’s chairmanship, however, CPP finances
were systematized.84 According to one source, CPP cadres in NGOs began to submit
funding proposals to overseas donors in "the latter part of the 70s",85 and in 1980, according
to another, regular "taxation" of NGOs was introduced.86 By 1989, according to the
Philippine military, 60% of an estimated US$6m-$9m received by Philippine NGOs from
83 "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors", Central Committee, Communist 
Party of the Philippine, July 1992, pg. 37. The document provides a revealing analysis of 
acknowledged strategic blunders, especially the concepts of "strategic-counter offensive" and 
"three strategic coordinations" originating from 1981 which in 1985 led, the document 
claims, to premature "urban insurrectionism" and "regularization" of the NPA’s forces.
84 Mila Aguilar, interview, 14 November 1993.
85 Satur Ocampo, interview, 19 November 1993.
86 Mila Aguilar, interview.
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abroad was funnelled to the CPP/NPA.87 This is a gross overestimate however. According 
to Clad, the CPP spent P22m (US$0.75m) in 1987 of which 60% came from "legal ’projects’ 
...including laundered businesses", and 22% from "’revolutionary taxation’ including the 
confiscation of assets from ’reactionaries’".88 Since the CPP derives income from NGOs in 
2 main ways (levies on NGOs operating in CPP-controlled territory89 and appropriations 
from a minority of directly-influenced NGOs), NGO income probably falls under these two 
categories. Assuming that NGOs accounted for 40% of 1987 CPP income, and projected 
1988 income of P55m (US$1.9m),90 it accounted for a tiny portion of overall foreign 
assistance channelled to Philippine NGOs, and an even smaller portion of total NGO income.
By the early 1990s however, this level of support had begun to decline. First, NGOs 
and other legal front organisations became increasingly resentful of CPP "taxation". Ka Mer, 
a leading CPP cadre in Bicol, notes that in 1989 the regional party was forced to reduce its
87 Pamela Balcena, "De Villa says some NGOs give aid to rebs", Daily Globe, 6 
October 1989. NDF Spokesman Luis Jalandoni reportedly replied "Of course we are getting 
various forms of support from these NGOs that are sympathetic to our cause but it is not what 
[the military] would like to think that we are getting" (See Noli Cabantug, "NGOs are rebels’ 
major source of overseas funding", The Manila Chronicle, 18 September 1989). Jalandoni’s 
comments echo broader acknowledgment of CPP influence over NGOs and POs. In l986, 
Urbana Cruz, reputedly a member of CPP Visayas Commission, claimed the CPP was 
involved in the drafting of the new constitution through legal front groups represented on the 
Constitutional Commission (Agence France Press report in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
24 June 1986). In 1987, the NDF’s own publication acknowledged that foreign-fiinded health 
projects and organisations helped it increase its reach in rural areas (See Liberation, October- 
November 1987).
88 James Clad, "Anatomy of a Red Revolution", Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 July 
1988, pp. 12-14, citing captured CPP documents. The other sources listed were: donations 
from abroad 7%; and monies gained by CPP’s Military Commission and Mindanao 
Commission 11%.
89 In 1988, the CPP claimed a strong presence in 3,000 barangays and had infiltrated 
4,800, giving it influence in 19% of the country’s 41,000 barangays (Ibid). As of 1993, 
NGOs of all orientations routinely secured permission from local CPP commanders and paid 
levies to operate in CPP-influenced territory, a fact widely acknowledged in NGO circles, 
albeit anonymously and in hushed tones.
90 Ibid.
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revenue intake from legal organisations under pressure from NGO and PO staff.91 Second, 
CPP internal splits led to further revenue falls. Following the reaffirmation of CPP orthodoxy 
at the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee, public attacks on former leading cadre, and 
the July 1993 breakaway of the Manila-Rizal Committee,92 NGOs and POs were drawn into 
a bitter dispute.93 Legal organisations traditionally sympathetic to the CPP-NPA-NDF such 
as Kilusang May Uno (KMU, May First Movement) and Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas 
(KMP, Philippine Peasants Movement) fragmented into opposing camps, and "rejectionists" 
secured control of important bank accounts, reducing the revenue and assets of the "reaffirm" 
or orthodox camp.
Amid intense polemical debate within the CPP, CPP relations with legal front
organisations and the very basis of NGO action were called into question. As former NDF
Spokesperson Satur Ocampo explains:
...the [CPP] place[s] great emphasis on basic organising among 
...workers...peasants and other sectors, mainly to develop these potential 
forces in support of the armed struggle. There is a very strong current within 
the party that discourages, if not outrightly opposes, organising for above
91 Quoted in James Putzel, "Managing the ’Motive Force’: The Communist Party and the 
Peasantry"—Journal o f Peasant Studies, July 1995, forthcoming.
92 For a concise chronological analysis of the split, see Christopher Collier, "Bringing 
Civil Society Back In: Rectification and the Idiom of Resistance in Davao", South East Asia 
Research, Vol. 3 No. 1, 1995. A more detailed analysis from an orthodox party perspective 
is set out in "General Review of Important Events and Decisions From 1981 to 1991", 
supplement to "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles...".
93 Pitting "reaffirmists", supporters of decisions taken at the Tenth Party Plenum 
contained in "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles..." against "rejectionists", those opposed to 
orthodox MLMTT and the Chairmanship of Armando Liwanag (Jose Maria Sison). As of late 
1993, the rejectionist camp was composed mainly of party members in Metro Manila and the 
Visayas. Prominent "rejectionists" include Romulo Kintanar, Benjamin de Vera, and Ricardo 
Reyes, former Mindanao Commission members implicated in the Mindanao "AHOS 
Campaign" of July-December 1985. During this campaign, "close to a thousand" party 
members ("Reaffirm Our...", pg. 33) were arrested, tortured, tried, and in unknown 
numbers, killed, in a search for government agents. Many of the victims worked for legal 
organisations in "white" areas and NGO activists numbered prominently among those killed 
(anonymous interviews).
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ground, for socio-economic programs, because of the probability that such 
activities, such organising and mobilizing among the people, would tend to 
deflect their interest and efforts in supporting the underground, particularly the 
armed struggle, and would be siphoned into what the movement refers to as 
reformist tendencies.94
Underlining this hostility, the CPP in "Reaffirm...'’, condemns Church NGO attempts to
promote peace talks between the Ramos government and the NDF.95 It also attacks party
cadres on government wanted lists for endangering security by maintaining contact with
"former political detainees ...personalities, organisations and institutions under probable and
certain enemy surveillance", an explicit attack on links with prominent NGO activists.96
Despite these attacks, by late 1993, no significant NGO of national democratic
orientation had fragmented or collapsed" as a result of the split, evidence of a successful
defence of institutional integrity.97 Satur Ocampo, however, voiced the concern felt by many
NGOs: ~ _
I have always taken the position that the internal struggle should be resolved 
within the proper structures so that the spill over into the NGOs and open 
formations may be prevented from causing more damage. The argument put 
forward by the dominant side in the debate [however], the mainline party 
leaders, is...let the process run its course and then lets pick up the pieces 
later... Hopefully, reason and practical considerations and the overall 
consideration of what is good for the people and the progressive movement 
will prevail.98
Whatever the outcome, the dispute served to illustrate the complex ideological environment 
in which NGOs sympathetic to the national democratic perspective have traditionally worked.
94 Satur Ocampo, interview, 19 November 1993. See also Putzel, "Managing the ’Motive 
Force’".
95 "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles...", pg. 61.
96 Ibid, pg. 77.
97 On events in 1994 however, see Chapter 6.
98 Satur Ocampo, interview, 19 November 1993.
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8. Arenas of Intervention.
Organising and sustaining POs and PO-NGO coalitions have become critical roles of
Philippine NGOs. "As the heart of NGO work, mass-based organising is the lynchpin [sic]
of all other...activities", Horacio Morales argues; "NGOs have increasingly engendered a
heightened level of consciousness among peasants. Simultaneously, perhaps as a result, mass
action has also been on the rise".99 Another activist, Cesar Cala, agrees:
[Since 1986]. ^ NGOs... [increasingly] locate themselves...in new and less- 
ideologically encumbered areas of progressive discourse: development, peace 
and empowerment. From their initial single-concern or localized days, they 
have grown to tackle the larger issues of development.. .Through these efforts,
NGOs have introduced a new frontline in progressive praxis in the Philippines.
The groups in this frontline confront the question of powerlessness and strive 
for immediate impact and gains even while the conservative overhang of the 
state remains and continues to be struggled against.100
Two main factors explain the centrality of NGO mass-organising. The first is the 
transition from semi-feudalism to more capitalist-based relations of production and of social 
formation. Philippine society was predominantly rural in 1990-91, with 57% of the 
population living in rural areas. However, although agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
employed close to half the labour force, it accounted for only 22% of GNP.101 Slowly, the 
relationship between land and economic power and in turn with political power is unravelling, 
enhancing scope for political participation by marginalised rural communities.102
99 Cesar Cala and Jo Dongail (Eds.), A Call for Peoples Development: Selected 
Speeches 1986-’89 by Horacio "Boy" Morales, National Council of Churches in the 
Philippines, Quezon City, 1990, pp. 124 & 127. —
100 Cesar Cala, "Synthesis: A Scan of Themes in Coalition-Building", in1 Coalition 
Experiences..., pg. 266.
101 Human Development Report 1993, United Nations Development Programme, pp. 
178 and 186, and Putzel, A Captive Land..., pg. 23.
102 145 of 199 members of the House of Representatives elected in May 1992 are 
members of families associated with the Philippines’ traditional rural-based oligarchy, 
compared to 164 in the House elected in 1987 (Eric Gutierrez, Ties That Bind: A Guide 
to Family, Business and Other Interests in the Ninth House of Representatives, 
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, Manila, 1994, pg. 4)
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Nevertheless, rural elites remain a substantial economic and political force.103 As Putzel 
notes, despite a horizontal diffusion of power within the elite.(and within the state), "there 
has not been a vertical diffusion of economic and political power to the broader base of 
society".104 Obstacles to reform resulting from this stand-off between traditional agrarian 
elites and the state have been an important stimulus to the increasingly political profile of 
NGOs.
Second, NGOs fill a vacuum left by the party political system. From 1946 to 1972, 
two parties dominated politics, the Nacionalistas and the Liberals. Both were characterized 
by minimal inter-party ideological debate, minimal intra-party solidarity, endemic inter-party 
switching for personal advancement and very narrowly-based party membership.105^ Thus, 
parties functioned as electoral vehicles for the interests of a small number of powerful 
families dependent on semi-feudal agriculture. But during the martial law period, profound 
social changes undermined the social structure on which the two-party system thrived. 
Agriculture declined in importance as industry and the service sector expanded. In response, 
the formerly homogenous economic interests of the elite106 became more differentiated, with 
participation in or exclusion from the economic opportunities of martial law a critical 
cleavage. When martial law was lifted in 1981, new political parties were established. Again, 
their ideological basis was weak and they served mainly to advance the interests of prominent
103 See Gutierrez, Ties That B ind..., for instance, for details of the enduring power of 
rural-based elites in Congress.
104 Tames Putzel, "A Fractured State in the Philippines: Clan Politics, the Military and 
the Left on the Eve of the 1992 Elections" paper delivered at the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, London, 31 October 1991, pg. 6.
105 See Carl Lande, Leaders, Followers and Factions: The Structure of Philippine 
Politics, Monograph Series No. 6, South East Asia Studies, Yale University, 1964, pg. 1.
106 See Mark Turner, "National Level Elites in the Philippines 1945-1984: A Framework 
for Analysis", Occasional Paper No. 8, Centre for South-East Asian Studies, The University 
of Hull, 1984, pp. 6-9.
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personalities or clan-machines. Political parties proliferated, some of them ephemeral, 
forming loose coalitions which lacked discipline or durability. Political parties failed to 
expand membership beyond the ranks of professional politicians, especially at the local level 
where parties had no permanent infrastructure, or to present issued-based manifestos with 
which the public could identify. Effectively the toys of the elite, parties remained by the early 
1990s, the objects of profound popular cynicism.107 As a result, NGOs and POs play an 
important role in mobilising and articulating the political demands of workers, peasants, 
marginalised sectors and sections of the middleclass traditionally estranged from the party 
political system.
Despite successes to date however, NGO strategy remains largely experimental and 
NGOs represent a far from coherent or autonomous force. According to Abad, NGOs must 
increasingly manage rather than ignite change and "consolidate further to become a respected 
force in the arena of politics... not only [by] closing our-ranks but [by] establishing linkages 
with allies in...other sectors".108 Since the late 1980s, Philippine NGOs have responded to 
this challenge, and in the following section, the main mechanisms through which NGOs 
participate in politics are assessed.
9. NGO Coalitions.
Given the prevalence of small, locally-based NGOs in the Philippines, the NGO
107 A common label for the headers of the main political parties is "trapo", an acronym 
for "traditional politician" meaning "dirty rag" in Tagalog. Ramon Mitra, leader of the Laban 
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), the largest "party" (in reality, a coalition of smaller 
cliques) was the popular epitome of the trapo, partly explaining his unexpectedly poor 
showing in the May 1992 Presidential elections.
108 Florencio Abad, "Peoples Participation in Governance: Limits and Possibilities: The 
Philippine Case", in Ed Garcia, Julio Macuja and Benjamin Tolosa (Eds.), Participation in 
Government: The Peoples Right, Ateneo de Manila University Press, Quezon City, 1993, 
pg. 157.
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community faced the threat of political marginalization following the collapse of the Marcos 
dictatorship in February 1986. Opposition to the Marcos regime provided a platform around 
which NGOs could unite and coalesce with other political forces, and with its collapse, 
important sectoral, ideological, regional and personality differences threatened to dominate. 
By the early 1990s however, the political prominence of NGOs had increased. NGOs 
consolidated and strengthened through a plethora of coalitions, especially through tertiary 
NGOs, secretariats that coalesced national and/or regional networks and their primary 
NGO/PO memberships. By 1993, according to one source, the Philippines had "the most 
organised and well-developed NGO community in the world".109 The most important and 
elaborate NGO coalition formed was the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE- 
NGO), established in May 1990 by 10 of 13 national NGO networks (see Figure 4). By 
1991, CODE-NGO had 1,500 primary NGOs,110 and by July 1993, as regional networks 
joined, an estimated 3,500.111
CODE-NGO was formed for a number of reasons.112 First, with the proliferation 
of "MUNGOs", mutant NGOs, many development NGOs "felt it necessary to...rescue the 
definition of non-governmental organisations from...being devalued and...to define the 
parameters of social development".113 One of CODE-NGO’s first successes was the 
approval in 1991 of a Covenant on Philippine Development, "a milestone in NGO efforts to
109 Canadian Embassy officials quoted in Goertzen, "NGOs take the lead...", pg. 20.
110 Constantino-David, "The Philippine experience...", pg. 138.
111 Marie Laisaso, Program Officer, CODE-NGO, interview, Manila, 8 November 1993.
112 Only a few are covered here. For a broader overview, see Constantino-David, "The 
Philippine Experience..." and "The Need for Greater Unity" and Fernando Aldaba, "The 
CODE-NGO: Unifying the Development NGO Community", Development NGO Journal, 
(CODE-NGO), Vol. 1 No. 1,1992, pp. 1-15, and "Caucus of Development NGO Networks" 
in Coalition Experiences..., pp. 23-37.
113 Constantino-David, "The Need for Greater Unity...", pg. 9.
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promote an alternative vision of Philippine development".114 Second, NGOs felt 
increasingly threatened by governmental and donor attempts to influence NGOs programmes 
and sought greater autonomy through force of numbers and enhanced coordination. 
Similarly,ODA donors faced enormous difficulties in dealing with a fragmented NGO 
community and CODE-NGO became a forum through which Philippine NGOs could 
strengthen relationships with national government agencies, ODA donors, and foreign 
partners. Third, NGOs increasingly engaged in advocacy and campaigning after 1986 but as 
Aldaba notes, became disillusioned by unsuccessful campaigns on issues such as agrarian 
reform and increasingly aware of the need to act collectively.115 Fourth, during the 1980s, 
many NGO networks effectively operated as ideological "transmission belts"116 for left-wing 
groups (specifically, the Bagong Atyansang Makabayan (BAYAN, the New Nationalist 
Alliance), Demokratikong Sosyalista Koalisyon (DSK, Democratic Socialist Coalition) _and 
Bukluran sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalista Isip at Gawa (BISIG, Movement for the Advancement 
of Socialist Ideas and Action)).117 While CODE-NGO’s 10 national networks were mostly 
aligned with specific political positions, labels endemic to debate within the Philippine left 
were avoided and NGO distance from the "Reaffirm V Reject" and other intra-left debates 
was enhanced.
Other important NGO and PO coalitions were formed at the national level. As 
environmental NGOs proliferated after 1986, for instance, four environmental NGO coalitions 
were established; the Philippine Ecological Network (PEN), formed in 1988, and three
114 The Covenant on Philippine Development: A Primer, Council for People’s 
Development, Manila, 1992, pg. 3.
115 Aldaba, "Caucus of Development NGO Networks", pg. 28.
116 The phrase comes from ibid.
117 On the ideological underpinnings of, and tensions between, these groups, see James 
Goodno, The Philippines: Land of Broken Promises, Zed, London 1991, chapters 13-15.
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launched in 1990, the Sustainable Agriculture Coalition (SAC), the Philippine Environmental 
Action Network (PEAN), and Green Forum Philippines (GFP). Environmentalism is 
popularly regarded an issue that unifies both traditional and non-traditional activists, and 
despite problems with funding, leadership, low technical capacity and political strategy, GFP 
alone had 200 primary NGO members in mid-1992,118 signalling growing unity and 
enhanced capability among environmental NGOs.
I Other NGO coalitions were established at the regional level such as the Mindanao 
Coalition of Development NGOs (MINCODE). MINCODE was established in 1992-93 by 
11 island-wide NGO networks.119 Inspired by CODE-NGO, though not formally related, 
it sought to unify NGO responses to development planS for South Cotabato and the Cagayan- 
Iligan Industrial Corridor programme sponsored by the multilateral Philippine Aid Plan (PAP) 
consortium.120 At the Mindanao NGO-PO Congress of July 1993, however, NGOs disagreed 
over a unified development agenda and were unable to mount a unified opposition campaign 
to the projects. Despite this failing, the Congress led NGO-PO consortia to prepare alternative 
economic development plans which NGOs and POs subsequently promoted in local 
government bodies and in election campaigns.121
10. Contemporary Social Movements.
Contemporary social movements in the Philippines represent a complex blend of
118 Eileen Legazpi, "Environmental Coalitions" in Coalition Experiences..., pp. 113-
143.
119 Billy de la Rosa, "Developing an Alternative Model: A Mindanao NGO Experience", 
paper delivered at the Philippine Resource Centre, London, 2 March 1994.
120 Both important components of the 1993-1998 Medium Term Philippine Development 
Plan’s objectives for Mindanao.
121 Including the Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao’s (AFRIM) Basic Industrial 
Development Strategy (BIDS) 2010 plan, discussed in de la Rosa, "Developing an Alternative 
Model...".
168
institutional or organisational types, including trade unions, peasant associations, student
groups and more recently, sectoral- or issue-based POs and NGOs. There are a number of
general sociological reasons for the increasing role of coalitions, and of NGOs. First, class-
based social movements have fragmented considerably in recent decades. From the 1930s to
the early 1980s, class represented a central and straight-forward cleavage around which social
movements were mobilized (eg. the Sakdalistas in the 1930s, the Huks in the 1950s (see
Chapter 2)); political actors were either for or against a semi-feudal, semi-colonial system of
export agriculture and the government apparatus which protected it. Through the 1980s and
early 1990s however, social movements became increasingly focused, pursuing more concrete
*
objectives, and more sectoral- or issue-specific agendas, drawing a narrower range of actors. 
Second, the archipelagic nature of the Philippines, the enduring cultural resonance of small 
affinity groups and the lack of a geographically-concentrated industrial sector all prevented 
the emergence of a mass party of the left. —
Organisational factors however played an equally significant role. First, NGOs have 
access to significant ODA funding (multilateral, governmental and non-governmental) 
dwarfing resources mass organisations can derive from their own memberships.122 Second, 
the well-resourced nature of the NGO sector makes it both a training ground and source of 
employment for the leaders and personnel needed to sustain social movements. Third, NGOs 
use direct experience in providing services as a springboard to more political activity since 
a history of effective service delivery enhances their "legitimacy” in the eyes of other political 
actors. Equally, direct experience informs NGO political activity which is therefore more 
clearly conceptualised, more thoroughly researched and documented and more clearly based
122 PANDAYAN, for instance, a political formation associated with DSK, is reputedly 
50% dependent financially on trade union support and 50% on NGOs and POs (anonymous 
interviews).
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on practical realities. Fourth, while the notoriously-fractious tendencies of the Philippine left
are increasingly willing to cooperate with each other, NGOs and NGO leaders acting as
autonomous "honest brokers" are needed to generate and sustain momentum. Fifth, for the
national democratic movement, NGOs continue to provide an important legal front through
which to explore the post-1986 boundaries of "democratic space", albeit one which
increasingly exercised its autonomy from party dictat.
Two of the most important multi-institutional, social movement-based, coalitions
between 1986 and 1993 were the Congress for a Peoples Agrarian Reform (CPAR) and the
Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC). CPAR was launched in May 1987 in anticipation of
an inevitable battle with a landlord-dominated Congress elected that month. Composed of 12
national peasant organisations/ coalitions, CPAR united a peasant sector long divided by
ideological, territorial and regional disputes, and its broad political character represented a
landmark in Philippine politics. NGOs such as PhilDHRRA, the Philippine Peasant Institute
(PPI) & PRRM and NGO leaders such as Joel Rodriguez of Forum for Rural Concerns
(FRC) & Corazon "Dinky" Juliano-Soliman of ACES played an important role in launching
CPAR and in sustaining the unity to which itgave birth. In 1986, for instance, PhilDHRRA
and the Centre for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Asia (CENDHRRA)
organised regional and national consultations which improved the climate for a major
organisational initiative on land reform. As Grageda notes, _
Parallel efforts were also [initiated] by several other NGOs [including] FRC,
PRRM, the Center for Community Services (CCS), Ramon Magsaysay Award 
Foundation (RMAF) and the Asian NGO coalition, which conducted 
consultations with their respective partner organisations. Church-based groups 
like the Urban-Rural Missionaries of the NCCP and NASSA were likewise 
involved.123
123 Jose Grageda, "Congress for a People’s Agrarian Reform" in Coalition 
Experiences..., pg. 66.
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CPAR became an important actor in the national debate on land reform legislation. 
It drafted its own legislative programme, the Peoples Agrarian Reform Code (PARCODE), 
advocating essentially liberal measures124 and campaigned for its adoption in Congress. 
PARCODE attracted significant support, including that of Rep. Bonificio Gillego, Chairman 
of the House Committee on Agrarian Reform and Rep. Florencio Abad (later appointed 
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform). In newspapers, PARCODE was debated 
with almost the same attention and vigour as the Congressional proposals, attracting 
unprecedented attention for an extra-parliamentary initiative. According to the 1987 
constitution, a national referendum could be called by popular demand if supported by 10% 
of registered voters. CPAR therefore launched a popular petition seeking 2.5m signatures in 
support of PARCODE, the first initiative of its kind.125
The second great issue of national political debate in the late 1980s/early 1990s in 
which NGOs played a significant part was foreign debt. In 1988, total Philippine foreign debt 
amounted to US$28bn., equivalent to 10,000 pesos for every Filipino.126 Interest payments 
on foreign debt of US$3.67bn. in 1989127 consumed 17% of export earnings.128 To 
coordinate public pressure on the government to adopt a tougher stance with international 
creditors, FDC was established in March 1988. Membership was drawn primarily from the 
main political blocs, yet FDC was viable because NGOs (including PRRM, and the Philippine
124 Ibid, pg. 276.
125 NGO involvement in CPAR is also discussed in: Wegner, Nicht- 
Regierungsorganisationen..., pp. 242-257; AngelitaGregorio-Medal, "DevelopmentNGOs 
and the Democratization of Philippine Society", Ph.D. thesis, Faculty of Sociology, 
University of Bielefeld, Germany, May 1992, pp. 197-229; and James Putzel, A Captive 
Land..., pp. 217-219.
126 Rosalinda Pineda-Ofreneo, The Philippines: Debt and Poverty, Oxfam, Oxford, 
1991, pg. 2.
127 Ibid.
128 World Development Report 1991, World Bank and Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1991, pg. 250.
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Center for Policy Studies) acted as brokers, helped with secretariat support, and undertook
the research needed to make a complex issue accessible. As with CPAR, FDC leaders advised
legislators while the media brought the campaign to a national audience. In March 1988, 90
NGO/PO leaders attended FDC’s national Congress, again underlining a new degree of unity
over a divided landscape.
CPAR and FDC failed to achieve their main objectives. The 1988 Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law was the very antithesis of PARCODE, while Congress refused to
impose a debt cap and Philippine foreign debt was rescheduled on terms notably less
favourable than those achieved by Latin American debtor nations. According to former KMP
*
leader Jaime Tadeo, CPAR was too broad, and too far removed from the real frontline of
peasant struggle.129 Others felt FDC was similarly too broad:
[FDC] should really have concentrated its efforts on Congress. Policy-making 
with respect to debt is fairly centralised, much more so than other policy 
issues such as labor or electricity. A broad base was not necessary to effect a 
policy change. A focus on Congress was also necessary because it was very 
much a battle between the Executive and Congress and ultimately Congress 
won.130
Yet, CPAR and FDC achieved specific results. FDC for instance launched a 
nationwide educational drive that increased popular interest in the debt debate and helped 
sustain a global anti-debt campaign that led the US government to introduce the Brady 
Plan.131 Primary NGO/PO/Political bloc membership grew from 90 in 1988 to 250 in 1992 
and three regional coalitions were established in Naga, Iloilo and Cebu cities.132 CPAR
129 Jaime Tadeo, interview, London, 11 March 1994.
130 Joseph Lim, Fellow, Philippine Center for Policy Studies, interview, Manila, 14 June 
1993. See also Renato Velasco, "The Politics of Philippine Debt 1986-1990", Ph.D. thesis, 
College of Social Science and Philosophy, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, March 
1992, pg. 152.
131 Lim, ibid.
132 Jose Grageda, "Freedom From Debt Coalition" in Coalition Experiences..., pp. 154-
155.
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meanwhile collected almost lm signatures supporting a national referendum on agrarian 
reform, and in 1989, secured an increase in the government support price for rice, from 
P3.00 to P5.00 and then P6.00.133 More importantly however, nationwide multi-tiered 
coalitions represented a major innovation in a country where legal mass movements have 
proved difficult to sustain on a nationwide basis.
Benedict Kerkvliet’s seminal 1990 study of village-level politics in the Philippines 
documented everyday peasant resistance to prevalent patterns of authority, centred on status 
and class, counterpoised against a weakness that stemmed from a lack of opportunities to 
organise and to undermine these patterns.134 By then, however, NGOs had become 
important intermediary institutions linking local-level struggles to national level debates.135 
Cala argues that "coalitions have been and will continue to be an important, if not the most 
important facet of Philippine progressive work"136 and Tadeo agrees; "NGOs are very 
important if they carry the same political line and see their role as helping Peoples 
Organisations".137
133 Grageda, "Congress for a Peoples Agrarian Reform", pg. 72.
134 Benedict Kerkvliet, Everyday Politics in the Philippines: Class and Status 
Relations in a Central Luzon Village, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1990.
135 One interesting case-study for instance documents linkages between NGO/PO anti­
mining campaigns in the Cordillera and the nascent national environmental movement. See 
Jessica Carino, "People’s Organisations, Non-Government Organisations and Open-Pit Mining 
in the Cordillera", paper presented at the Fourth International Philippine Studies Conference, 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1-3 July 1992. The general nexus between local- 
and national-level NGO/PO environmental activism is analyzed in Broad with Cavanagh, 
Plundering Paradise...; and Marites Danguilan Vitug, Power From The Forest: The 
Politics of Logging, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, Manila, 1993.
136 Cala, "Synthesis: A Scan of Themes...", pg. 260.
137 Jaime Tadeo, interview, London, 11 March 1994.
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11. Local Government.
The passage of the Local Government Code (LGC)138»in 1991 presented Philippine 
NGOs and POs with a dramatic opportunity to increase the scale and impact of their 
participation in politics. Arguably the most important piece of legislation passed during the 
Aquino presidency, the Code increases the local government share of the Internal Revenue 
Allotment (IRA) from 11% to 40%, transfers over 70,000 civil service staff to Local 
Government Units (LGUs) and provides the private sector, especially NGOs and POs,-with 
a major role in local government.139
The Code’s passage provided NGOs and POs with acute dilemmas. First, many 
doubted whether local institutions had the capacity to absorb the functions devolved to 
them140 and felt the code provided a licence for rampant graft and corruption. Local elites 
were expected to be the primary beneficiaries, using MUNGOs and private sector 
representative associations to marginalise "genuine" NGOs and POs.141 Second, NGOs 
steeled by the years of resistance to authoritarian rule remained wary of the Aquino and 
Ramos administrations and viewed participation as a stamp of approval on democratic reforms 
instituted since 1986. Third, militant NGOs feared the confrontation with landlords,
138 Republic Act 7160.
139 Alex Brillantes, "Redemocratization and Decentralization in the Philippines: Focus on 
the Increasing Role of Non-Governmental Organisations and the Local Government Code", 
paper presented to the International Association of Administrative Sciences conference, 
"Redesigning the State Profile for Social and Economic Change", Toluca, Mexico, 27-30 July 
1993. See also Chapter 3.
140 For a list of functions devolved, see Alex Brillantes, "Local Governments and NGOs 
in the Philippines: Development Issues and Challenges" paper presented to the Fourth 
International Philippine Studies Conference, Australian National University, Canberra, 1-3 
July 1992, pg. 14 n6.
141 See for instance Jessica Carino, "The Local Government Code of 1991 and Peoples 
Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations in Northern Luzon", Working Paper No. 
20, Cordillera Studies Centre, University of the Philippines, Baguio, September 1992, 
especially pp. 23-24 and 34-39.
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businessmen, military officials, politicians and bureaucrats to which their participation would 
inevitably lead in many parts of the country. To vent these tensions, to plan strategy and to 
maintain a unified position on the LGC, NGOs and POs formed another NGO coalition, the 
National Coordinating Council on Local Governance (NCC-LG). The NCC-LG was launched 
in December 1992 by 22 national NGO and PO networks,142 and in October 1993 held a 
major conference in Bulacan with local government agencies to review the LGC’s 
implementation.143
Evidence to date suggests that many of the expected problems have materialised, 
including faulty accreditation processes, resentment on the part of LGU officials at the 
involvement of NGOs and marginalization or exclusion of NGOs perceived as "political”.144 
One major problem is that NGOs to the right-of-centre see the LGC as a potent weapon in 
undermining insurgency. The LGC "will definitely pull the rug under the insurgency" 
according to a quoted PBSP official; the newspaper concerned noted "The local government — 
program appears to be part of USAID’s [1992-1998] Democratic Pluralism Initiative".145 
As a result, many national democratic NGOs and POs are boycotting LGC structures. In
142 "Proceedings of the National NGO-PO Conference on Local Governance", 11-12 
December 1992, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon, NCC-LG.
143 "Working Papers of the LGU/GO-NGO/PO Conference on Partnership For Local 
Development", 12-13 October 1993, Malolos, Bulacan, Local Government Academy, League 
of Provinces, NCC-LG and the Department of Interior and Local Government.
144 See Operationalizing People Empowerment and the Local Government Code of 
1991: Summary o f Case Findings From Selected Local Government Units; A 
Preliminary Report, Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, University of the 
Philippines, September 1993; and Crisandro Bruno and Luce Agnes Simeon, "NGO 
Accreditation in Baguio and Benguet", Issue Paper No. 6, Cordillera Studies Center, 
University of the Philippines, Baguio, March 1993.
145 USAID’s US$50m programme of support for the LGC, the Local Development 
Assistance Program (LDAP) (Carino, "The Local Government Code...", pg. 12), provided, 
the article noted, US$2.5m in grants towards PBSP’s own LDAP which funds projects 
connected with the code. See Jo Calderon, "GO-NGO partnership: Growing Together?", 
Today, 7 February 1994.
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Negros for instance, the NGO-PO coalition ARADO (the Agrarian Reform Alliance of 
Democratic Organisations) aims to "expose and oppose" features of the LGC such as Section 
19 (dealing with immanent domain) and Section 20 (re. the reclassification of agricultural 
lands). ARADO is also protesting the failure to include farmers among the sectoral 
representatives in Negros Occidental’s various sanggunian.146
On a more positive note, many NGOs see considerable opportunity, given the 
complementarity between LGU technical capabilities and NGOs/PO community organising 
strengths, matching services and peoples.147 To date however, successful partnerships have 
only been established in a small number of areas, predominantly those with strong NGO-PO 
networks where ex-NGO or political activists occupy important local government positions. 
In Davao, for instance, NGOs have become an important force on the Davao City 
Development Council148 and in Central Luzon NGOs and POs are active in the Regional 
Development Council.
12. Election Campaigns.
Party politics in the Philippines means effectively transactional politics, the politics 
of patronage and especially of election-time dole-outs. Election campaigns are expensive, an 
average P4m to P6m (US$140,000-210,000) for a seat in the House of Representatives and 
P10m-P20m ($350,000-710,000) for the Senate.149 Most House or Senate members fall into
146 Ramon Consing, Para-Legal Officer, ARADO, interview, Bacolod, 1 November 1993.
147 Rostum J. Bautista and Jorge Tigno, "Empowerment and Participation in Governance: 
NGOs and POs in Leyte and Samar" in Operationalizing People Empowerment..., pg. 12.
148 National democrat organisations reputedly control 66% of the NGO/PO seats 
(anonymous interviews in Davao City and London).
149 Interviews with anonymous Congressional sources.
debt during elections.150 Congressmen expect a return on their investment and expect 
government to smoothen their paths in future election campaigns, reducing their appetites for 
significant opposition. Yet, given Filipinos’ deeply ingrained faith in the electoral process, 
NGOs must participate in elections if they are to become a legitimate force for structural 
change. As Rivera notes, ".. .a strategy of building a broad, popular political coalition.. .must 
necessarily emphasize the various legal forms of struggle, with the electoral struggle as a 
special case".151 Abad agrees: "NGOs cannot simply avoid politics or leave it in the hands 
of traditional politicians".152
Until the May 1992 elections (Presidential, Congressional and local), NGOs had little
*
experience in projecting their growing political influence into the electoral arena. In the 1987 
Congressional elections, a number of NGO and PO leaders, including PRRM’s Horacio 
Morales, ran with Partido ng Bayan (PnB, Peoples Party), but fared poorly. PnB’s pro­
national democratic campaign suffered from military and church opposition, a large part of 
the explanation for its defeat, yet PnB also suffered from prematurely launching a national 
campaign in a country where elections are won and lost at the local level. NGOs fared even 
more poorly in the local elections of 1988, largely because of violence that saw many NGO 
candidates killed, but also from the lack of campaign machinery.
By 1992, according to Abad, NGOs had matured "in size, expertise and political 
wisdom"153 and, compared to 1987, were much better placed for electoral participation.
150 One reason why House members resent appointed sectoral representatives who have 
not had to finance expensive election campaigns.
151 Temario C. Rivera, "The New World Order: Problems and Prospects for the People’s 
Movements in the Philippines", in Carmencita Karagdag and Augusto Miclat Jr. (Eds.), 
Beyond the Cold War: Philippine Perspectives on the Emerging World Order, Peoples 
Training Program for Philippine NGOs et al., Quezon City, 1992, pg. 194.
152 Abad, "People’s Participation in Governance...", pg. 159.
153 Ibid, pg. 155.
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Progressive political formations such as BAYAN, BISIG and DSK had weak local machinery 
but expectations were high that NGOs could provide the infrastructure the left needed to make 
an electoral breakthrough. Abad noted five causes for optimism: 1. a relatively young 
electorate, with wide exposure to the media; 2. the prevalence of non-traditional groups, 
especially NGOs; 3. Church determination to counter terrorism, coercion and bribery; 4. 
previous successes by reform-oriented candidates; and 5. a decline in the utility of traditional 
mechanisms for voter registration.154
In the first organised and deliberate intervention in the electoral arena by NGOs, three 
political blocs, the Movement for Popular Democracy (MPD), BISIG and DSK, in alliance 
with supportive NGOs, formecLAKBAYAN to merge two main NGO electoral coalitions: 
Project 1992, coordinated by MPD, and Project~2001, a DSK initiative with PANDAY AN 
as its main member. Running no candidates of its own, AKBAYAN supported the Liberal 
Party-Partido Demokratikong Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (LP-PDP-Laban) coalition at the 
national level,155 including Jovito Salonga’s candidacy for President and Aquilino 
Pimentel’s for Vice-President. AKBAYAN support proved crucial to the LP-PDP-Laban 
ticket. Early in the election campaign, defections by Orly Mercado, Ernesto Maceda, and 
Teofisto Guingona and failed attempts to coalesce with Joseph Estrada’s Partido Masang 
Pilipino led to a collapse in financial support from the business community for the LP-PDP- 
Laban slate. Without this support, LP-PDP-Laban would have been unable to finance its local
154 Ibid, pp. 159-160. Abad’s optimism was also tempered with a caution that reflected 
broader sentiment: "The size and limited resources of NGOs makes them unlikely challengers 
of economic and political systems sustained by prevailing big government and oligarchic 
interests". See John McBeth, "A new people power: Voluntary bodies to play role in 
elections", Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1991, pg. 22.
155 On the formation of the alliance between AKBAYAN and LP-PDP-Laban, see Julio 
Macuja, "The Mass Movement and the 1992 Elections", Issue Paper No. 2, Cordillera 
Studies Center, University of the Philippines, Baguio, June 1992.
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campaign but with NGO support it acquired a nation-wide machine with significant potential 
to mobilize voters and monitor election count centres. AKBAYAN also supported Florencio 
"Butch" Abad, a former member of the House of Representatives and former Secretary of the 
Department of Agrarian Reform, who ran for the Senate as an NGO activist under the LP- 
PDP-Laban umbrella.
_  Despite expectations, AKBAYAN and LP-PDP-Laban fared poorly. Jovito Salonga 
won only 2.3m votes, 9% of votes cast, finishing sixth in the seven-way Presidential race. 
Compounding matters, Imelda Marcos finished fifth, a clear victory for the trapos, traditional 
politicians over guapos, the alternative, issue-based politics of AKBAYAN and LP-PDP- 
Laban.156 In the race for the 24 seats in the Senate, "Butch" Abad finished 38th with 1.8m 
votes. But even Abad’s vote couldn’t be counted as an NGO vote, more an "NGO plus" vote, 
given his use of the Liberal Party’s reputation and the coat-tails of Salonga and Pimentel.157 
Even at the local level, AKBAYAN fared poorly. Only 5 AKBAYAN-supported candidates 
won office as mayors: 3 MPD candidates and one each from BISIG and PANDAY AN.
A number of factors help explain AKBAYAN’s poor performance.158 First, it is still 
very difficult for NGOs to make an impact at the national level. They have minimal financial 
resources159; have few nationally-known personalities and find it difficult it replicate 
national-level coalitions at the local level. Second, NGOs were divided over forms of
156 Guapo is an acronym for genuine alternative politician and derives from the Tagalog 
for "handsome".
157 Gerry Bulatao, interview, Manila, 13 August 1993. Bulatao served as one of Abad’s 
main election campaign strategists.
158 For an alternative, albeit rather vague, account of Akbayan’s poor performance, see 
Olle Tomquist, "Democratic ’empowerment’ and democratisation of politics: radical popular 
movements and the May 1992 Philippine elections", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14 No. 
3, 1993.
159 Abad spent only PI.8m on his campaign, 1 peso for very vote received (Gerry 
Bulatao, interview, Manila, 13 August 1993). Salonga’s campaign cost an estimated P65m, 
the bulk of which came from business sources (anonymous interview).
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electoral intervention and over co-operation with rival left formations. Project 2001, for 
instance, was adopted as an official project of CODE-NGO but the breadth of political 
positions represented within the coalition ensured tension over levels of electoral 
intervention.160 Within CODE-NGO, the Association of Foundations eschewed formal 
participation, others confined their activities to voter education and mobilization, while some, 
notably PhilDHRRA, intervened directly to support particular candidates. Third, AKBAYAN 
failed to establish a modus vivendi with the national democratic-aligned Partido ng Bayan, 
splitting left-wing ranks.161 Fourth, NGOs and left formations alike waited until too late in 
the election campaign to launch their campaigns. Fifth, NGOs placed too much emphasis on 
the national level when their strengths (community mobilization, voter education and election 
count monitoring) were best deployed at the local level. Sixth, traditional patronage politics 
remained the dominant force in provincial campaigns, coopting many NGOs.162
160 Karina Constantino-David, Chairperson, CODE-NGO, interview, Manila, 29 April 
1993.
161 According to PnB, "The conduct of the organised forces during the election period 
showed that organised forces (people’s organisations and NGOs) were disunited among 
themselves, and marginalized against the mainstream political forces. More contemptuously, 
PnB argued "When the day of reckoning came, the ’thousands upon thousands of NGOs’ 
expected to deliver the Salonga votes were nowhere to be seen.TTThe ’broadly-based NGO 
electoral movement’ AKBAYAN counted on failed to deliver". Of a total of 17,260 positions 
contested (200 congressional seats, 73 for governors, 73 for vice-governors, 650 provincial 
board members, 60 city mayors, 60 city vice-mayors, 1,542 municipal mayors, 1,542 
municipal vice-mayors, and 12,386 municipal councillors), PnB claimed a contribution in the 
winning ("actively supported rather than directly fielded") of 622, 3.6% of the total. See 
Grassroots Electoral Politics: An Evaluation of the Electoral Performance o f PnB and 
Allied Organisations in the 1987 and 1992 Elections, Partido ng Bayan, April 1993, pp. 
36, 42-43, and 52.
162 On the enduring role of traditional patronage in elections, see John McBeth, "The 
Final Test...", Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 June 1991, pp. 33-34 and Roberto Tiglao 
and Rodney Tasker, "Fidel’s Challenge...", Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 June 1992, 
pg 16. Suspicion that NGOs were used extensively to support established politicians during 
the May 1992 elections were fuelled in June 1993 when Rep. Ramon Bagatsing filed House 
Bill 9195 to amend the Omnibus Election Code of 1992. The bill sought to prohibit public 
officials awarding grants to NGOs within 45 days of elections ("Aid grant ban on NGOs 
sought", The Manila Bulletin, 4 June 1993, pg. 17).
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In some parts of the country, NGO electoral participation met with some success. In 
Irosin, Sorsogon, according to George, NGO activists were elected as Mayor and Deputy 
Mayor while a slate of 8 NGO/PO activists won 7 seats on the local Municipal Council. 
Illustrating attempts by political parties to attract or co-opt NGO/PO support, and NGO/PO 
willingness to mix "traditional" with "alternative" politics, the slate received endorsement and 
funding from Lakas-NUCD, the Nationalist Peoples’s Coalition and the Liberal Party.163 
In Cebu, 25% of NGOs surveyed by Uy-Etemadi joined Project 2001 while others supported 
the United Rural Sectors Electoral Coalition (URSEC) which remained outside 
AKBAYAN.164 URSEC asked leading candidates to sign a social contract reflecting 
development NGO demands and on 1 May 1992, in one of the biggest election rallies held 
in Cebu City, Vicente de la Serna and Apolonio Abines Jr., LDP candidates for Governor 
and Vice-Governor, signed,165 publicly tapping NGO support.166 De la Serna and Abines 
were both elected and by mid-1993, URSEC members had met the new Governor to monitor 
the implementation of the contract.167
163 Terrence George, "People Power in the Provinces? NGOs and Politics After the Local 
Government Code’s Promulgation", paper presented to 1994 meeting of the Association of 
Asian Studies, Boston, 24-27 March 1994.
164 Uy-Etemadi, "NGOs in Cebu...", pg. 9.
165 The URSEC contract contained many provisions in de la Serna’s own planned 
Community Development Outreach Program, in areas such as medical facilities, livelihood 
projects and cooperatives development.
166 Thomas Osmena’s successful campaign to become Mayor of Cebu in January 1988 
demonstrated the increasing importance of NGO/PO support and their increasing use by 
traditional elites in election campaigns. On Osmena’s use of NGOs/POs before and after his 
election, see Resil Mojares, "The Dream Goes On and On: Three Generations of the 
Osmenas, 1906-1990", in Alfred McCoy (Ed.), An Anarchy of Families: State and Family 
in the Philippines, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 
1993, pp. 342 and 346 n32. Osmena was reelected Mayor in May 1992.
167 By mid-1993, the Farmers Development Education Center (FARDEC), an URSEC 
member, had held a number of meetings with De la Serna and was happy with his adherence 
to the contract, particularly his commitment to the implementation of agrarian reform (Gigi 
Labrodores, Executive Director, FARDEC, interview, Cebu, 16 May 1993).
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Overall, failure in the 1992 elections made NGOs more realistic about future electoral
prospects. According to Bulatao, the alternative to traditional politics is not necessarily one
that rejects traditional politics totally. Name recall, he argues, is important and NGOs need
links with mainstream parties to avail of this ingredient. For future elections, Bulatao argues,
greater territorial focus, a scaling down of national expectations and a political party distinct
from NGOs (ie. a new NGO political project) are needed.168 For Macuja, future priorities
include sustained participation in local government structures, greater territorial focus and
multi-sectoralism, and electoral training and "conscientization" among NGOs and POs.169
Factors such as the continuing debility of the political party system, fragmentation among
0
left-wing political blocs caused by the "reject” V "reaffirm" debate and the declining utility 
of traditional voter mobilization mechanisms, however, ensure a definite and important role 
for NGOs in future election campaigns. NGOs with a socio-economic focus tentatively 
welcomed the opportunity to participate in local politics, especially in influencing local 
development strategies, yet feared being marginalized by "MUNGOs", the proliferation of 
which the LGC would inevitably encourage.
13. Conclusion.
"In aristocratic societies", Alexis de Tocqueville first wrote in 1840,
men do not need to combine in order to act because they are strongly held 
together. Every wealthy and powerful person constitutes the head of a 
permanent and compulsory association composed of all those who are 
dependent upon him or whom he makes subservient to the execution of his 
designs.170
168 Gerry Bulatao, interview, Manila, 13 August 1993.
169 Macuja, "The Mass Movement...", pg. 20.
170 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume II, Revised edition, P.F. 
Collier and Son, New York, 1900, pg. 115.
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But in "democratic nations", de Tocqueville countered, "associations ought...to stand in lieu 
of those powerful private individuals whom the equality of condition has swept away".171
De Tocqueville’s prescription echoes an important theme in contemporary Philippine 
political discourse. Growing "equality of condition", wrought by political reform and 
economic change, is sweeping "powerful individuals" away and NGOs have become 
important institutions in sustaining the process. Inevitably, vested interests fight for influence 
if not control over institutions which disrupt the status quo. In the Philippines, traditional 
politicians, landlords and businessmen opposed to structural reform use NGOs to advance 
their political agendas. In this sense, the^associations that De Tocqueville sees as important 
instruments in undermining feudalism are also potent weapons in the hands of recalcitrant 
elites. In sections 3-7, this chapter described a  range of forces that have stimulated the 
proliferation and growth of NGOs, each interacting, sometimes supporting sometimes 
opposing each other. For the NGO community as a whole, development assistance has been 
the most influential source, helping established NGOs to consolidate and expand their 
programmes but also injecting resources that are eagerly sought by other political forces. For 
development NGOs, or Constantino-David’s "DJANGOs", the underground left was the most 
important influence, even in the establishment of church-based NGOs, and remains an 
important force despite the CPP split. The Philippine NGQ community is extraordinarily 
heterogeneous and as Sections 2 & 3 discussed, characterised by distinct cleavages: between 
NGOs and POs, between different types of NGOs, and between different levels in a complex 
hierarchy. Sections 8-12 discussed the main political intervention mechanisms used by NGOs 
to participate in politics, especially those used by "DJANGOs", the primary focus of the
171 Ibid, pg. 117.
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research. Fuelled by a rapid expansion in numbers and government incentives, the NGO
community has been propelled to political prominence, only acquiring the pivotal role
suggested by De Tocqueville after 1986. The NGO community is now an important arena in
which political forces contest for influence and resources. Sections 8-12 however illustrated
some of the more particular arenas in which NGOs contest for resources and influence.
As chapters 2 & 3 argued, the state plays a critical role in defining the context in
which NGOs can elaborate their own political role. The consolidation or institutionalization
of "civil society" essentially involves the state making areas of society beyond its control
increasingly subject to rules. But as chapter 4 discusses, DJANGOs also contend with a
0
complex political environment shaped by actors beyond the state, complicating attempts to 
promote popular empowerment. That context represents a vital backdrop to the heart of the 
research set out in the following chapters, a study of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction 
Movement and Task Force Detainees of the Philippines as political actors.
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fCHAPTER FIVE: The Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement.
1. Introduction
For analysis of NGO political roles and politics, readers must turn to mainstream 
NGO, rather than political science, literature, partly, as Chapter 1 noted, because political 
scientists have been slow to treat NGOs as significant political actors. The socio-economic 
thrust to the NGO literature, however, has meant that economic strengths and weaknesses of 
NGOs have overshadowed their political impact. Similarly, concern with participation has 
meant that the role of NGOs in mobilizing beneficiary communities has been highlighted at 
the expense of a more complex range of political interventions. Third, focus on links between 
"Northern" and "Southern" NGOs has underscored their influence in multilateral fora, 
overshadowing their influence in national politics.
In a review of the dominant literature, Sanyal argues that "the political impact of 
bottom-up [NGO] projects has been...less striking than their economic impact".1 As 
solidarity groups, Sanyal argues, NGOs and POs have largely failed in pressuring local elites 
or local government. Their main success has been to enforce discipline and compliance 
among beneficiaries or members, especially in the repayment of credit. Sanyal lists a number 
of reasons for this putative failure. First, NGOs needed elite support but in reality elites have 
proved adept at manipulating NGO programmes for their own benefit. Second, NGOs lacked 
the wider institutional linkages (with political parties, government etc.) needed to confront 
local elites. Third, because of competition for donor funds, NGOs were unable to cooperate
1 Bishwapriya Sanyal, Cooperative autonomy: The Dialectic o f State-NGOs 
relationship in developing countries, [sic], Research Series 100, International Labour 
Organisation, Geneva, 1994, pg. 40.
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Iwith each other, or form institutional linkages among themselves.2
Lacunae in Sanyal’s arguments and in the broader literature are best illustrated with 
respect to individual NGOs and Chapters 5 and 6 provide detailed case-studies of two of the 
Philippines’ leading NGOs. The Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), the 
focus of this chapter, is the second largest NGO in the Philippines and the largest primary 
NGO committed to rural development. Founded in 1952, it is also one of the Philippines’ 
oldest rural development NGOs, and its rich political history illustrates the essentially political 
character of NGO action.
The economic and political fortunes of prominent NGOs in the developing world are 
. *
dependent on trends in national politics as much as on support from foreign donors. First, 
particular regimes exert great influence in promoting or retarding the development of NGOs. 
PRRM’s fortunes closely mirror developments in Philippine politics over four decades, rising 
with President Ramon Magsaysay’s inauguration in January 1954, falling with the declaration 
of martial law in September 1972 and rising again with the collapse of the Marcos 
dictatorship in February 1986. Second, the political fortunes of individual NGOs are 
significantly influenced by institutional forces. Like many of the developing world’s leading 
NGOs, PRRM’s success at particular stages in its history correlates closely with the 
involvement of highly dynamic individuals with significant leadership skills. Elite 
philanthropists, foreign donors and the underground left have been important influences on 
PRRM strategy and PRRM’s political strengths and weaknesses stem in large part from the 
need to reconcile the competing political objectives of each. Third, the ability of NGOs to 
influence elites, government agencies etc. and to advance their political agendas or those of 
beneficiary POs or communities depends on the particular means by which NGOs participate
2 Ibid, pp. 40-41.
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in politics. This chapter examines PRRM’s role in Philippine politics.
k
2. PRRM 1952-1986
PRRM’s early history is inextricably bound up with the history of the Chinese Mass 
Education Movement (MEM), and its founder, Dr. Yang-Chu (Y.C.) James Yen. Bom in 
Szechuan province in 1897, the son of a Protestant pastor, Yen graduated from Yale 
University in 1918 as a medical doctor and travelled to France to work with Chinese 
labourers. Appalled at their illiteracy, Yen reduced the complex character-set of classical 
Chinese to 1,000 characters, organised literacy classes, and established a newspaper, The 
Chinese Worker, based on the new character-set.3 Returning to China, Yen established the 
Mass Education Movement in 1923 to popularise his innovative teaching methods.
In 1929, Yen established a "social laboratory" at Ting Hsien in Hopei province to 
pioneer broad approaches to rural development. Schools were built and experimental 
agricultural production centres constructed on donated land. Health workers were trained in 
conjunction with the Department of Public Health. Other organisations were also established, 
including Self-Help Societies, Village Cooperatives, Integrated Cooperative Societies and 
Farmers’ Institutes. Based on experience at Ting Hsien, Yen popularised a four-fold approach 
to challenge the "fundamental weaknesses of Chinese life": livelihood to combat poverty, 
education to combat ignorance, health to combat disease, and self-government to combat civic 
disintegration.4 ~
3 Robert Bartlett, "Yang-Chu James Yen", in John C.K. Kiang (Ed.), Dr. Y.C. James 
Yen: His Movement For Mass Education and Rural Reconstruction, South Bend, 
Indiana, 1976, pg. 4.
4 Y.C. James Yen, The Ting Hsien Experiment, Chinese National Association of the 
Mass Education Movement, Peiping, 1934, pg. 5. Developed by Chen Chu-san, Head of the 
MEM’s Department of Citizen Training, and Kan Nai-kwang, Vice-Minister of Interior, the 
self-government thrust only evolved from 1932. See Pearl S. Buck, Tell the People: Talks
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During World War II, Japanese forces closed Yen’s schools and the MEM never
recovered. In 1948, Yen became a Commissioner of the newly established and US-funded
Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), and moved to Taiwan in 1949 with the
JCRR following the collapse of the Kuomintang regime.5 Yen resigned from the JCRR in
1950 and, with the support of American friends, established the International Mass Education
Movement (IMEM) in New York in 1951. In February 1952, he embarked on a tour of Asian
countries including the Philippines, seeking a base for a new movement.6
Yen was invited to the Philippines by a group of prominent philantrophists led by
Dean Conrado Benitez, a University of the Philippines educationalist. Touring the country,
*
he was accompanied by Senator Tomas Cabili, prominent Chinese banker Dr. Albino Sycip 
and Manuel Manahan, publisher of the Tagalog daily Bagong Buhay.7 Back in New York, 
Yen recommended the Philippines to the IMEM board, but was opposed by others who 
favoured India.8 According to Yen, the decisive factor in favour of the Philippines was "the 
presence of a small but influential group of public-spirited civic leaders who have a profound 
concern for the sad plight of their peasant countrymen".9 A more probable explanation,
with James Yen About the Mass Education Movement, John Day, New York, 1945, pp. 
60-63.
5 Joseph Yager, Transforming Agriculture in Taiwan: The Experience of the Joint 
Commission on Rural Reconstruction, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1988, Chapter 1.
6 James B. Mayfield, Go To The People: Releasing the Rural Poor through the 
Peoples School System, Kumarian Press, West Hartford CT, 1985, pg. 29. Earlier, Yen 
helped establish a Board for mass education and social reconstruction in Cuba (See Pearl 
Buck, Tell The People: Conversations with James Yen about the Mass Education 
Movement, John Day, New York, 1945, pg. 15).
7 Manuel Manahan, "Dr. James Yen: Crusader for the Common Man", Sunday Times 
(the magazine of The Manila Times), 18 June 1972, reprinted in Kiang, Dr. Y.C. James 
Y en..., pg. 167.
8 Goturi N. Reddi, "Gandhi and Yen: Guiding Principles of the Indian Rural 
Reconstruction Movement", Rural Reconstruction Review, IERR, Vol. V. 1983, pg. 28.
9 Y.C. James Yen, "International Institute of Rural Reconstruction and Philippine Rural 
Reconstruction Movement" in Harry Bayard Price (Ed.), Rural Reconstruction and
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however, was that the Philippines, like pre-revolutionary China, was racked by rural 
insurgency and that US support for the counterinsurgency campaign of the Quirino 
government increased the likelihood of securing official US funding.
Amid inauspicious beginnings, PRRM’s incorporation papers were signed on 17 July 
1952 by a cross-section of Manila’s political, philanthropic and business elite.10 Its first base 
was a single table in the office of Benitez and Co. in downtown Manila (moving soon after 
to free accommodation in the Social Welfare Administration) and during 1952, it raised only 
P13,700 pesos, mostly from its original incorporators and trustees.11 Because of weak 
finances, PRRM was unable to maximise the interest aroused by Yen’s speaking tour, and 
could only recruit 200 students to train as Rural Reconstruction Workers (RRWs). During the 
first six months training course, 127 quit, and of those who finished, only 24 agreed to work 
for the first year without pay.12
With the inauguration of President Ramon Magsaysay in January 1954 however, 
PRRM’s fortunes changed. Echoing Yen’s work in Ting Hsien, PRRM chose Nueva Ecija 
and the neighbouring province of Rizal as a "social laboratory" in which to develop Yen’s 
four-fold programme, the former, according to PRRM, because it was "the most communist-
Development: A Manual for Field Workers, Fredrick A. Praeger Inc., New York, 1967, 
pg. 20. -
10 The incorporators were: Cecilio Putong (Education Secretary); Juan Salcedo Jr. (Health 
Secretary); Senator Estaban Abada; Congressman Eulogio Rodriguez Jr.; Roland Rene 
(Philippine Director of the US Foreign Operations Administration); Jose Cojuangco; Conrado 
Benitez; Albino Sycip; Oscar Arellano (President, Philippine Jaycees); and Jose S. Camus 
(Agriculture and Natural Resources Under-Secretary) (PRRM In Its Silver Year, Philippine 
Rural Reconstruction Movement, Nieves, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, 1977, pg. 6).
11 Ibid. The P13,700 included 6 donations of P I,000 each from: Araneta Gregorio Inc.; 
China Banking Corporation; Vicente Go Chien; Philippine Bank of Communications; 
Philippine Manufacturing Company; Yutivo Sons Hardware.
12 The PRRM Story 1952-1965, Philippines Rural Reconstruction Movement, Nieves 
San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, 1965.
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infested [province] in the country”.13 PRRM had close ties to the new administration. Its 
main political strategist, Sen. Tomas Cabili, was a key Magsaysay supporter and Manuel 
Manahan, who had been impressed by Yen’s speaking tour, served initially as Chairman of 
Magsaysay’s pet project, the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee (PCAC).
Magsaysay was initially sceptical of PRRM, viewing it as a threat to his planned 
Community Development Planning Council (CPDC)14 and he had previously chided Yen 
that educated youths would never work without pay in rural barrios.15 On 5 April 1954 
however, Magsaysay attended PRRM’s first RRW "graduation” ceremony at Guimba, Nueva 
Ecija. Impressed with Yen’s work, Magsaysay invited PRRM to develop the pivotal San Luis 
Katubusan (Redemption) project.16 In Executive Order 36 of 1954, Magsaysay created the 
San Luis Project Committee, naming PRRM’s Executive Director, Ric Labez, as Chairman.
The San Luis project originated in a letter to PCAC Chairman Manahan from Huk 
leader Luis Taruc soon after Magsaysay’s inauguration, probing Magsaysay’s intentions.17 
Mandated by Magsaysay and accompanied by cub reporter Benigno Aquino Jr., Manahan met 
with Taruc, initiating negotiations leading to Taruc’s controversial "surrender" on 17 May 
1954.18 San Luis, Pampanga, nestled on the slopes of Mt. Arayat, and centred on Luis 
Taruc’s home barrio, Santa Monica, lay deserted following military counterinsurgency
13 Ibid. In contrast, The Philippine Herald of 2 September 1952 lauded PRRM for its 
apolitical origins and objectives: "[PRRM is]...not part or projection of the United States 
MSA [Mutual Security Agency] efforts in the Philippines, a particular class of citizens or any 
religious group...The PRRM has excellent motives...with distinguished citizens for its 
organizers and incorporators who have no political motives".
14 Jose V. Abueva, Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography, Solidaridad Publishing 
House, Manila, 1971, pg. 362.
15 Manahan, "Dr. James Yen: Crusader...", pg. 170.
16 The PRRM Story 1952-1965.
17 Manahan, " Dr. James Yen: Crusader...", pg 172.
18 Aquino’s account of Taruc’s surrender differs from Manahan’s on several points. See 
Nick Joaquin, The Aquinos of Tarlac: An Essay On History As Three Generations,
Cachos Hermanos Inc., Manila, 1988, pp. 238-247.
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operations. After the army had supervised the reoccupation of San Luis, 8 PRRM RRWs 
reactivated the San Luis FACOMA (Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association), provided 
loans to 300 farmers, distributed seeds and seedlings and established plant nurseries.19 In 
June 1955, the project was pronounced a glorious success by the national media.20 
Established primarily to demonstrate Magsaysay’s bona fldes to Taruc, the project played an 
important, if symbolic role, in ending the Huk insurgency.21 According to Manahan, PRRM 
played a key role:
President Magsaysay’s program of tenancy, coupled with Dr. Yen’s rural 
reconstruction, worked so effectively that within 7 months [of Magsaysay’s 
inauguration], Luis Taruc was convinced of the President’s sincere desire to 
help the masses and... came down from his lair in Mt. Arayat.22
Within PRRM however, the close identification with San Luis led to tension. Ric Labez
differed with Yen over the latter’s emphasis on politically sensitive barrios or those favoured
by Magsaysay,23 and two years later, PRRM withdrew from the project.24
Despite San Luis however, PRRM’s future was far from secure. In 1953, PRRM
generated income of P64,385 but was still dependent on a small circle of elite benefactors.
After Magsaysay succeeded Quirino as President in 1954, PRRM sought official funding from
Philippine and American sources. Cabili and Yen encouraged the establishment of a joint
Philippine-American Presidential Action Committee on Rural Reconstruction, securing
19 PRRM In Its Silver Year,pg. 15.
20 Glowing tributes from The Evening News, The Manila Bulletin and The Manila 
Times, all of 13 June 1955, are cited in The PRRM Story 1952-1965.
21 See also Horacio Morales, "The Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement: A Case 
in Reviving and Transforming a Non-Government Development Organisation" in Cesar Cala 
and Jo Dongail (Eds.), A Call For People’s Development: Selected Speeches from 1986- 
1989 by Horacio "Boy" Morales Jr., National Council of Churches in the Philippines, 
Quezon City, 1990, pg. 144.
22 Manahan, "Dr. James Yen: Crusader...", pg. 173.
23 Horacio Morales, interview, Manila, 2 August 1993, recalling discussions with Labez 
before the latter’s death.
24 The PRRM Story 1952-1965.
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Magsaysay’s endorsement. In an amended plan, Abueva notes, the US House of 
Representatives called for the establishment of a Joint Commission on Rural Development 
(JCRD), but the plan fell through.25 With the decline in insurgency, donations from 
landlords and businessmen collapsed and PRRM’s income fell cumulatively to P45,713 in 
1954, P44,770 in 1955 and P32,170 in 1956.
Despite financial uncertainty, the 1950s were successful years for PRRM. Under the 
direction of Sen. Tomas Cabili, Congress approved Republic Act 1245 on lO June 1955. 
Known popularly as the Barrio Council Law, it provided for the direct election of barrio 
council leaders. Councillors for health, education and livelihood were also included, 
mirroring other planks in the PRRM programme.26 The law was expanded in 1958 in 
Republic Act 2370, the Barrio Charter Law, steered through Congress by newly elected 
Senator, Manuel Manahan. Again modelled on PRRM’s self-government programme, the Act 
gave barrios similar powers to municipal corporations including the right to raise taxes, 
borrow money, initiate public works and organise agricultural, industrial or commercial 
cooperatives.27 In another endorsement of PRRM’s programme, a new government agency, 
the Presidential Assistant on Community Development (PACD, later renamed the Presidential 
Arm on Community Development) was established in succession to the ill-fated CDPC. 
Despite Magsaysay’s antipathy to training barrio workers along PRRM lines, the PACD
25 Abueva, Ramon M agsaysay..., pp. 362-363. According to Abueva, Magsaysay 
opposed the planned inclusion of two American commissioners in the JCRD while US 
officials in Manila opposed the JCRD because it would divert funding from established 
channels.
26 Juan Flavier, Doctor To The Barrios, New Day Publishers, Manila, 1970, pg. 182. 
The law echoed Chiang Kai-shek’s decision in 1939 to adopt the MEM’s Ting Hsien model 
of village government in all hsien (counties) (See Buck, Tell The People.., Pg- 79).
27 PRRM In Its Silver Year, pg. 9. In 1960, President Carlos Garcia presented a 
"Presidential Award of Merit" to PRRM for its "silent but glorious revolution". The citation 
noted that PRRM’s work in Nueva Ecija, Rizal and Pampanga had led to the enactment of 
RA1245, amended in RA2370 (The PRRM Story 1952-1965).
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adopted the PRRM model and in April 1956, 220 community development trainees, 50 
agriculturists and 67 home demonstrators embarked on PACD’s first training course.28
Local government legislation proved a major fillip to PRRM’s activities. With the help 
of teams of 8 to 10 RRWs in each test barrio, residents were mobilized through Rural 
Reconstruction Mens Associations (RRMAs) that implemented agricultural and livelihood 
projects, Rural Reconstruction Womens Associations (RRWAs) that managed health 
programmes, and Rural Reconstruction Youth Associations (RRYAs) that promoted education 
and citizenship programs.29 Residents organised barrio farmers seminars and workshops; 
extension farms and plant nurseries; co-operative credit societies; barrio clinics; literacy 
classes and barrio schools and overall policy-making was coordinated by Barrio Councils 
funded by PRRM in its pilot barrios. By 1960, PRRM was active in about 100 barrios, 
mostly in Central Luzon30 and RRMA, RRWA and RRYA federations had a combined 
membership of roughly 18,000.31
Yet despite this putative success, problems were already apparent, according to 
Villanueva. First, despite PRRM’s commitment to Yen’s "Release, Not Relief' philosophy, 
barrio sponsorship, PRRM’s main fundraising device, promoted dependency in assisted 
barrios. Second, PRRM’s programme was excessively project-oriented, with tangible projects 
falsely equated with success. Third, projects aimed to secure individual or family benefit, 
weakening attempts to forge collective identities and widen the interests of barrio residents.
28 Abueva, Ramon Magsaysay..., pg. 369. Senator Emmanuel Palaez, a confidant of 
Yen’s and PRRM supporter, played a key role in evincing Magsaysay’s change of mind. 
Palaez also played a key role in the passage of the 1958 Barrio Charter Law.
29 Morales, "The Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement...", pg. 145.
30 Buenaventura M. Villanueva, The Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, 
Community Development Research Council Special Studies Series No. 9, University of the 
Philippines, Quezon City, 1961, pg. 118.
31 Mayfield, Go To The People..., pg. 35.
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Fourth, expenditure on salaries, transport and supplies led to high administrative costs (an 
estimated 20% of total operations), undermining project viability. Fifth, because of a rigid 
and uniform programme that ignored local contexts, beneficiaries often failed to empathise 
with PRRM projects.32
These specific problems were closely related to political characteristics of PRRM’s
modus operandi. First, although RRWs represented the views of RRMA, RRWA and RRYA
members within PRRM, policy-making was extraordinarily elitist. Financially, the IMEM
helped PRRM significantly, donating one US dollar for every peso raised in the late 1950s,
and providing the bulk of the funding for PRRMs National Training Institute and new
*
headquarters, opened in Nueva Ecija in 1957. Similarly, the International Institute for Rural 
Reconstruction (IIRR), established in Cavite in 1960 to launch Rural Reconstruction 
Movements throughout the developing world, provided funding in the late 1960s along with 
the Asia Foundation, CARE, MISEREOR and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Nevertheless, 
funding remained dependent on a small cross-section of the country’s banking, industrial, 
commercial and landowning elite, both Filipino and foreign. In turn, membership of the 
Board of Trustees was determined by financial contributions rather than professional expertise 
in community development. Table 5 for instance shows that between 1968 and 1970, trustees 
generated over 10% of PRRM’s Total income, with one trustee alone (Jose Ma. Soriano) 
generating over 3%.33
32 See Villanueva, The Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, pp. 125 & 91; 
118; 124; 127 & Appendix C; and 126.
33 PRRM income for the three years 1968-1970 is not available. Using income for the 
year to 31 December 1971 of P934,800 however, calculations assume total income of P2.7m 
for the three-year period, ie. P346,771 = 12.8% of P2.7m.
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Figure 5
List of Cash Contributions From January 1, 1968 to November 30, 1970 (Pesos).
1. Board of Trustees
A. Dean Conrado Benitez
Supreme Council of Free Masonry of 
the Republic of the Philippines 
Faculty Club of the Philippine 
Womens University
B. Hon. Gregorio M. Feliciano
Dept, of Social Welfare 1100
C. Mr. Antonio F. Gonzalez
FGU Insurance Company 2700
Insular Life Insurance Company 5300 8000
2 0 0 0  
1 2 0  2 1 2 0
D. Mr. Derek Holdsworth
Philippine Refining Company
40
E. Mr. Lucio Mazzei
Shell Co. of the Philippines
F. Mr. Aurelio Montinola
Amon Trading Corporation 
Republic Cement Company 
Personal
14510
5000
8740
17000
52000
28250
G. Mr. W. G. Petty
Procter and Gamble PMC 1 0 0 0 0
H. Mr. George W. Potts
Bataan Refining Corporation ' 
Esso Philippines Inc.
I. Mr. Ramon V. del Rosario
Bacnotan Cement Industries 
Filoil Refinery Corporation 
Filoil Marketing- Corporation
7600
4000
15200
11400
5000
11600
31600
J. Don Jose Ma. Soriano
Atlas Consolidated Mining Corp. 
Atlas Fertilizer Corporation 
Bislig Bay Lumber Company 
Paper Industries Corporation of 
the Philippines
Phelps Dodge Copper Products of
the Philippines
Rheem of the Philippines Inc.
7600
2540
51350
35000
2530
2530 101550
K. Don Albino Sycip
China Banking Corporation 30350
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L. Mr. Leonides Virata
Phil-Am Life Insurance Company 
Personal
450
100 5 5 0
M. Mr. J.J. Wolahan
Caltex Philippines 52541
Total P346771
Other Big Donors:
Corso, New Zealand
Central Bank of the Philippines
Office of the President of the Philippines
51473
25000
1 0 0 0 0 0
Total 176473
Source: PRRM archives.
Trustees and others often used PRRM in pursuit of private interests. In Toledo, Cebu, for 
instance, the Soriano-owned Atlas Consolidated Mining Co. contracted PRRM to supervise 
the construction of 3,000 homes for employees. PRRM also supervised a housing project for 
another Soriano-owned company, the Bislig Bay Lumber Co. in Baler, Quezon.34 More 
infamously, Benigno Aquino brought PRRM into Hacienda Luisita soon after it was 
purchased by his inlaws, the Cojuangcos, To quell unrest generated by Huks.35 Reinforcing 
its elite character, PRRM maintained close ties with government, through its Council of 
Governors36 a close working relationship with the Social Welfare Administration and 
informal contacts through its well-connected trustees. Former Commerce and Industry 
Secretary Comelio Balmaceda, PRRM President 1957-1962, became Chairman of the
34 Minutes of the PRRM Joint Board and Finance Committee Meeting, 15 July 1966.
35 By Aquino’s own admission, PRRM’s work on Hacienda Luisita was a "palliative". 
See Joaquin, The Aquinos of Tarlac..., pg. 275.
36 In 1965, for instance, the Council of Governors’ 39 members included the Vice- 
President, 6 cabinet members, 14 Senators, 7 members of the House of Representatives and 
3 provincial governors (The PRRM Story 1952-1965).
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National Economic Coordination Office in the Macapagal administration while his successor, 
Dr. Amando Dalisay, previously Executive Director of the. National Economic Council 
became Agriculture and Natural Resources Under-Secretary. Dalisay’s successor as PRRM 
President, Gregorio Feliciano, joined the Marcos government as Social Welfare Administrator 
in 1967.37
A second major characteristic of PRRM’s political orientation was a close 
identification with government, especially counter-insurgency, policy. PRRM collaborated 
with the AFP in civic action activities in the early 1960s, and began training US Peace Corps 
volunteers in 1960. In 1964, it began training AFP civic action teams at Fort Magsaysay in 
Nueva Ecija and Camp Aquino in Tariac,38 and, from 1965^ at its Nueva Ecija 
headquarters.39 Courses continued throughout the late 1960s.40 PRRM also trained AFP 
personnel attached to the Philippine Civil Action Group (PHILCAG) (the Philippine mission 
to Vietnam), including future President Capt. Fidel Ramos in 1966 and future Defence 
Secretary Capt. Renato de Villa in 1967,41 often using Vietnamese trainers trained by the 
IIRR. Officials also helped the Marcos government in developing counter-insurgency strategy. 
IIRR President (and former PRRM Acting President) Dr. Juan Flavier, a future cabinet 
minister under Ramos, was appointed as a consultant on government operations in Central
37 To reform government, you had to work with it: "Unless you enter the tiger’s den, you 
cannot get the cubs", Yen quoted a Chinese saying and MEM officials worked in provincial 
government including Yen, as an assistant to Hunan’s Governor and Dr. C.C. Chen who 
became Szechuan’s Commissioner of Public Health (See Buck, Tell the People..., pp. 63, 
77, & 79-80).
38 PRRM In Its Silver Year, pg. 48.
39 The PRRM Story 1952-1965.
40 PRRM archives, though incomplete, contain files on 5 courses of one to three months 
held between 1965 and 1969.
41 Ramos was a frequent visitor to PRRM’s Nueva Ecija’s headquarters in the late 1960s 
and 1970s where his mother-in-law, Josefa Jara Martinez, served as PRRM’s training 
manager.
1 9 7
Luzon in 196642 while PRRM Chairman Manuel Manahan, author of the 1967 Manahan 
Report on the "invisible government" of Central Luzon (in reality nothing more than remnant 
Huks) was appointed by Marcos as Chairman of the Central Luzon Study Commission in 
1969.43
A third characteristic was PRRM’s disavowal of structural reform, including land 
reform. In 1970, Manahan was appointed Chair of the Advisory Council for the Marcos 
government’s land reform programme and held discussions with USAID about possible 
PRRM participation in the land reform programme in Nueva Ecija. PRRM trustees however 
felt involvement would sidetrack the organisation from its original objectives.44 PRRM’s 
programme in the 1960s and 70s was based on "a very simple formula": "first, selecting good 
leaders in the barrio; second, training these good leaders in managerial skills within their 
capabilities; third, supervision of their co-operative enterprises; and fourth, ’pump-priming’ 
credit unions on a selective basis to finance the small versions of consumer cooperatives, the 
Buyers Clubs".45 The formula posed little threat to the elite interests supporting PRRM. 
"The main causes of rural poverty are limited acreage and antiquated methods of plant and
42 Minutes of the PRRM Joint Board and Finance Committee Meeting, 15 July 1966.
43 See Eduardo Lachica, Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt, Solidaridad 
Publishing House, Manila, 1971, pg. 251.
44 Minutes of PRRM Board of Trustees Meeting, 24 September 1970.
45 PRRM And Its Story, Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, Nieves, San 
Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, 1969, pg. 4. PRRM commissioned a young agriculturalist, Dr. 
Orlando Sacay, to develop a pre-cooperative organisation (cooperatives, by law, required 
minimum capitalization of P5,000, beyond the resources of most barrios) and by 1970, 
PRRM had established Buyers Clubs in 67 barrios in 9 provinces. In 1972, Sacay became 
Under-Secretary for Co-operatives in the newly-established Department of Local Government 
and Community Development. Using the Buyers Clubs model developed with PRRM, Sacay 
devised the Samahang Nayon (SN, Pre-Cooperative Association) programme, which allowed 
SNs to develop into fully-fledged co-operatives (PRRM In Its Silver Year, pp. 43-44, and 
Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement 1970-1971, Philippine Rural Reconstruction 
Movement, Nieves, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, 1971, pg. 13).
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animal production”, argued PRRM46, suggesting that increased productivity rather than
improved tenancy conditions, the main demand of the Huks, was the key to rural stability.
PRRM was teaching peasants to make do with the little they had.
At a time of declining agricultural wages47 and political instability in rural areas,
PRRM was poorly equipped to mediate tensions caused by the introduction of more capitalist-
based relations of production and more militant peasant demands. PRRM’s work in its Nueva
Ecija "social laboratory",48 and the local government legislation it helped introduce between
1955 and 1963 had little impact on provincial politics where Governor Eduardo Joson was
reelected in 1963, 1967 and 1971, each time with a comfortable majority. "Over the years",
*
Wolters notes,
Governor Joson built a network of followers and political leaders (lider) down 
to the [barrio] level- These retainers assisted in disbursing patronage and 
favours to constituents and in winning votes during elections. Joson earned the 
gratitude of many people in the [barrios] with his programme of free 
medicines and hospitalization to indigents. One of Joson’s other programmes 
promoted education for barangay children, providing them with loans for 
schools in Manila that are paid after graduation. In addition, the governor 
offered free room, tuition and medical insurance to nearly 700 students 
throughout the province studying in colleges in Cabanatuan City.49
Most of these programmes were paid for by local government expenditure facilitated by the
Barrio Council and Barrio Charter laws. Before their passage, barrio lieutenants were
46 The PRRM Story 1952-1965. -
47 Agricultural wages in the Philippines fell sharply between 1962 and 1974, from an 
average P41 per day to P23 (1986 prices) (James K. Boyce, The Political Economy of 
Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, Ateneo de Manila University Press, 
Quezon City, 1993, pg. 25).
48 In 1969, PRRM was active in 47 barrios, and in 18 of 31 municipalities, in Nueva 
Ecija, the "hotbed of Huk dissidence". Nationwide, it worked in 124 barrios in 24 provinces 
(PRRM And Its Story, pg. 1).
49 Willem Wolters, "New Beginnings or Return to the Past in Nueva Ecija Politics", in 
Benedict Kerkvliet and Resil Mojares (Eds.), From Marcos To Aquino: Local Perspectives 
on Political Transition in the Philippines, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1991, 
pg. 209.
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appointed and served mainly to help reelect town mayors who in turn helped Governors or
local Congressmen on whom they were dependent for election funding. The laws failed to
change that situation: Barrio officials were elected but were now dependent on local mayors,
and in turn on Governors. PRRM had in fact indirectly helped to strengthen traditional
politics in Nueva Ecija and other provinces throughout the country.50 PRRM according to
Wolters, "was a typical Community Development Organisation". In the barrio of Larcon,
Bongabon municipality, where Wolters conducted research in the early 1970s, PRRM
established a credit union and a cooperative store in 1966, both of which were 
failures. PRRM officials were hardly taken seriously in the village. They 
worked via one of the local landlord families and some of the farming families 
in the village...PRRM did not criticize the landlords, did not promote land 
reform (before 1972), did not address the existing social inequality, did not 
provide credit. They only...[planted] some trees, [mid taught] bookkeeping, 
village beautification, [and] raking the village gravel paths. Only a few people 
attended the meetings that PRRM workers occasionally held.. .Its impact on the 
village was negligible.51
By 1970, the missionary zeal that had animated PRRM in the 1950s had largely 
evaporated. The PACD, with 2,000 staff operating in more than 10,000 barrios52 had 
eclipsed PRRM while the launch of Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) dealt 
another heavy blow. James Yen, the main intellectual force, had largely withdrawn from 
PRRM, tensions existed between PRRM and IIRR,53 short-term barrio sponsorships affected 
project continuity, specialist RRWs were unable to implement PRRM’s broader programme 
and even after 18 years PRRM regarded its programme as "technically.. .still in an early stage
50 In contrast to China where Yen used traditional respect for education and tu-shu 
(reading books) to secure the empathy of peasants and boost MEM authority vis-a-vis local 
elites, PRRM was unable to turn the conservatism of its approach to positive effect.
51 Willem Wolters, private correspondence with author.
52 1972 figures. Manahan, "Dr. James Yen: Crusader...", pg. 173.
53 Many PRRM Trustees felt the symbiotic "two lungs, one body" IIRR-PRRM 
relationship undermined their own powers and were unhappy when Yen hired, without 
consulting the PRRM board, a small group of staff in 1967 to interchange between PRRM 
and IIRR (Minutes of the Board of Trustees meeting, 25 August 1967).
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of evolution".54 Disaffected, most of PRRM’s corporate supporters deserted to PBSP or 
diverted a large portion of their funding, including the Soriano group of companies, Ramon 
del Rosario’s Bacnotan Cement Industries, Shell Oil, La Tondena Distillers, MERALCO and 
Benguet Corporation.
The declaration of martial law in September 1972 represented another significant 
blow. Funding problems caused by defections to PBSP necessitated a retrenchment but by 
February 1974, PRRM had concluded that "our government under the new society has 
adopted and is implementing the objectives of our own four-fold program in its nationwide 
rural development programs. Because of this massive government support, the role of the 
private sector has diminished considerably".55 As a result, PRRM’s regular staffing was 
reduced from 116 to 75, operations were retrenched and redirected, and key projects 
cancelled or transferred to PBSP. Despite the retrenchment however, PRRM expanded co­
operation with the Marcos regime. Throughout the martial law years (1972-1981), PRRM 
trained AFP civic action teams working in strategic areas, including Muslim Mindanao56 and 
collaborated with government ministries including Agriculture (MA), Social Services and
54 On the last three problems, see Gregorio M. Feliciano, "PRRM Organisation, Planning 
and Administration" in Bayard-Price (Ed.), Rural Reconstruction..., pp. 38-41. Much 
later, an internal document noted PRRM’s heyday from 1952 to the mid-1960s; "The 
spiralling descent...during the next 15 years really began with the sudden removal of the 
senior staff, financial subsidy cut-off, Dr. Yen gave up his moral control and the big people 
suddenly lost interest" (Presidents Report, 25 July 1984).
55 "Summary Report on Latest PRRM Activities and Operations", n.d. [circa February 
1974], PRRM archives.
56 PRRM’s archives (though not complete) contain files on 15 training courses held 
between 1972 and 1981, involving 697 AFP personnel. Another document records that 37 
Civilian Home Defence Force (CHDF) personnel were trained in "community-type projects" 
("Report on Activities undertaken July-August 1981", n.d.). In a letter to AFP Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Home Defence Brig. Gen. Guillermo Pecache, dated 2 April 1974, PRRM 
Chairman Manuel Manahan writes "Please let me know in advance when AFP men will leave 
for Jolo so that we can alert our man to leave with them", suggesting that PRRM staff 
accompanied AFP teams.
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Development (MSSD) and Human Settlements.57 Although largely abandoned by its 
corporate funders, PRRM attracted international support during the 1970s and by 1979 had 
148 staff and assets of over P7m.58 By then however the four-fold programme, especially 
the commitment to self-government, was effectively abandoned and PRRM had become a 
virtual project sub-contractor for international funders and government ministries.
In 1975, PRRM became involved in a controversial deal, illustrating the way 
Philippine NGOs are often used as fronts. The Laurel-Langley Agreement of 1954 provided 
American investors with parity rights in the Philippines until 1974. With its expiration, 
American-registered companies could no longer own Philippine land. Wrigley Philippines 
Inc., subsidiary of the American bubble-gum manufacturer, donated a 2.5 hectare site worth 
P3m to P8m. The site housed Wrigley Philippines’ headquarters in Mandalauyong, a prime 
commercial municipality in Metro Manila. In return, PRRM leased the land to Wrigleys for 
25 years, after which full ownership would revert to PRRM. Wrigley’s Managing Director 
Luis Garcia sat on the PRRM board, protecting the company’s interests, and Wrigley’s paid
57 PRRM worked with the MA on the 1977-1982 Cooperatives Development Program for 
Cagayan Valley (CDPCV), its biggest government project since San Luis (PRRM In Its 
Silver Year, pg. 10), with the MSSD on the Self-Employment Assistance Project for Rural 
Women in Nueva Ecija ("Report for Year Sept. ’80 to Sept. ’81", n.d.) and with the 
Ministry of Human Settlements in establishing the Pamantasan ng Bagong Lipuncm ((PBL) 
New Society University, later the University of Life, a pet project of Imelda Marcos) 
("Memorandum of Understanding between [PRRM] and [PBL]", n.d. [circa 1981]). 
Interestingly, Imelda’s key project, the Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran, (KKK, Movement 
for Livelihood and Progress) (see chapter 2), was eerily similar to PRRM’s programme in 
the 1950s and ’60s, even deploying RRW-like cadres. KKK ostensibly aimed to transform 
barrios (renamed barangays) into self-reliant, productive, communities through Samahang 
Kabuhayan (Progress Associations), federated at the municipal and provincial level. There 
is no record of PRRM involvement in KKK’s establishment, although PRRM collaborated 
with KKK, eg. a PRRM official serving as CDPCV project director served as the concurrent 
KKK co-ordinator in the MA.
58 "Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: A Draft Report on the PRRM Seminar-Workshop 
May 31-June 1 1979", September 1979. Funders included USAID, the US Peace Corps, Asia 
Foundation, the Canadian government, the International Development Research Council, as 
well as the IIRR.
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rent to PRRM of P50,000 per annum. The IIRR, with registered headquarters in New York, 
similarly transferred title to its 125-acre training centre in Silang, Cavite, to PRRM, paying 
rent of P625 per month on a 25 year lease, renewable for another 25. In 1983 however, 
desperate to sell the Wrigley’s title to ease PRRM’s financial crisis, PRRM President Enrique 
Victoriano railed against the deal. By 1983, Victoriano estimated, the Wrigley’s site was 
worth P50m-P80m, yet Wrigley’s paid only P5,500 a month in rent. "For such a pittance", 
Victoriano argued,
Wrigleys has been allowed to continue operating in the Philippines. It imports 
raw materials, probably at inflated prices, from the mother company. It is 
supposedly involved in ’exports’ to Asian countries but profits are probably 
salted away in the mother company. They claim to have been sustaining heavy 
loses during the past few years. If this is so, how is it that they continue here?
They, in effect, are exploiting relatively cheap labor and more to our interest, 
they are exploiting the use of a prime piece of real estate.59
The lease stood however, and PRRM was unable to sell the land.
PRRM had endured numerous bouts of financial uncertainty and had come close to
folding in 1973. In 1982-84 however, PRRM faced its gravest crisis yet. Between 1966 and
1979, PRRM received the proceeds of one weekly Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw per
year. Providing over 20% of total income, the allocation was cancelled in 1979 and PRRM
received its last payment in April 1981. Manuel Manahan appealed the decision directly to
Ferdinand Marcos: "PRRM has worked in  unity and self-reliance with your administration
since your first assumption to the Presidency and has continued to do so in the interests of
the Filipino people", Manahan wrote in a letter to Marcos dated 2 July 1981. The appeal
proved unsuccessful however, and soon after USAID withdrew its accreditation, plunging
PRRM into financial crisis. By 1982, PRRM had debts of P100,000, the staff retirement
fund, worth P67,000 in 1979, was exhausted; staff had either resigned or transferred; and
59 Letter to PRRM Chairman Manuel Manahan, 28 November 1983.
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those who remained were demoralized. "There were cliques, deep rivalry and hatreds, 
vandalism and pilferage of properties and facilities", a PRRM assessment later noted. Income 
generating projects were badly managed and needed subsidies to survive. "Above all", the 
report noted, "the reputation of PRRM was gone".60
A critical internal evaluation noted other causes for PRRM’s demise. First, fund­
raising efforts coordinated by PRRM President Enrique Victoriano were disastrous: "Funding 
institutions seem to have word of PRRM’s inability to carry out programs", the evaluation 
noted.61 Second, staff reductions necessitated by financial constraints lead to acrimony. 
Many of those released were "tainted with graft and corruption", demoralising the remaining 
staff.62 Third, Victoriano became embroiled in a conflict of interest that damaged PRRM. 
Simultaneously the head of another NGO, Agricultural Managers and Services Foundation 
(AMSEF), Victoriano committed PRRM to joint projects with AMSEF, many of which 
proved unsuccessful. Fourth, PRRM’s request to have its Philippine Charity Sweepstakes 
allocation restored opened enquiries into its relationship with the ERR. "The Presidential 
Management Staff...was...frantically looking for scapegoats for government losses at 
elections" and several American-based organisations were under investigation, adversely 
affecting, the evaluation suggested, PRRM’s request. PRRM stumbled through 1983 on small 
contracts from overseas funders. Itsiast government contract, Tvith the Ministry of Health and 
worth PI.4m, expired in March 1984.63 PRRM "literally ran out of funds in January 1984", 
and with only 4 RRWs in its staff, virtually ceased to exist as an NGO.64 Its administrative
60 President’s Report, 25 July 1984.
61 "An Evaluation of PRRM’s Status and Activities in 1984", note prepared by Ernesto 
Mondonedo, 21 December 1984. Victoriano resigned in September 1984.
62 Ibid.
63 Minutes of the Board of Trustees Meeting, 25 July 1984.
64 Ibid, and "An Evaluation of...".
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structures preserved by the IIRR, PRRM lay moribund until a dramatic revival in 1986.
3. PRRM 1986-1993.
In late 1984, a committee composed of PRRM Chairman Manuel Manahan, IIRR 
President Dr. Juan Flavier and Flavier’s assistant Conrado Navarro launched a search for a 
new PRRM President. After PhilDHRRA Chairman Dr. Antonio Ledesma turned it down,65 
Navarro offered the post to Horacio "Boy" Morales during a visit to Fort Bonifacio in Manila 
where Morales was detained as a political prisoner. If he accepted the post, Navarro told him, 
PRRM would work to secure his release. Morales accepted, but remained in prison. Finally 
released on 2 March 1986, he received a visit from a committee representative within days, 
and two weeks later, accepted the position on a two-year trial.66_
A former chairman of the Partido Makabansa (Nationalist Party) at the University of 
the Philippines, Morales became a Senior Economist with the Presidential Economics Staff 
before he helped to establish the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) in the early 
1970s.67 As DAP Executive Vice President, and at the age of 34, Morales was named one 
of Ten Outstanding Young Men (TOYM)68 in 1977. Scheduled to receive the award from 
President Marcos on 26 December, Morales sent word to the ceremony that he had defected
65 President’s Report, 25 July 1984. Ledesma joined the PRRM board however.
66 Horacio Morales, interview, Manila, 2 August 1993. In what Morales himself describes 
as a "package deal", he also assumed responsibility for the equally moribund Co-operatives 
Foundation of the Philippines Inc. (CFPI).
67 A dynamic civic activist, Morales also helped establish the Fund for Assistance to 
Private Education (FAPE), the Responsible Parenthood Council (RPC) and the Federation 
of Electric Cooperatives of the Philippines (FECOP), serving in senior positions with each.
68 Annual awards sponsored by the Ramon Magsaysay Foundation. Still in existence, the 
TOYM awards are now sponsored by the Gerry Roxas Foundation.
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to the underground National Democratic Front (NDF).69
Serving initially as the NDF’s official spokesperson,70 Morales became Convenor of 
the NDF Preparatory Commission in 1981,71 and worked extensively with farmers in Nueva 
Ecija, studying vegetable farming and the feasibility of cooperatives, cooperative banks and 
other farmer organisations for the NDF. On 21 April 1982 however, Morales was arrested, 
and severely tortured.72 Three months later, he was charged with rebellion, vilified by the 
Marcos-controlled press as a leading communist cadre, and became a minor celebrity when 
the Supreme Court ordered an unprecedented investigation of his detention and torture.
One of Morales first initiatives in reviving PRRM was the introduction of new staff. 
Four ex-DAP staff were recruited to senior, and young former NDF/CPP activists to junior, 
positions. The most radical appointment however was that of Isagani Serrano, Morales’s 
senior in the underground movement, who became Deputy President and PRRM’s main 
theoretician.73 Serrano worked with the Philippine Ecumenical Committee for Community
69 A statement noted: "Many of my colleagues and I sought to undertake reforms within 
the government, such as in education, agrarian relations, rural industrialization, cooperatives 
and programs to broaden the people’s participation in the management of their affairs. All 
our well-meaning efforts were in vain" (quoted in "Horacio ’Boy’ Morales of the Philippines: 
The Man and his Cause", Friends of Boy Morales, Quezon City, April 1983).
70 Morales acted as spokesperson for the NDF in a British television documentary 
broadcast in July 1981 ("To Sing Our Own Song", British Broadcasting Corporation, London, 
1981, broadcast as part of the Third Eye series).
71 Anonymous interviews. _
72 A talented technocrat admired by Marcos, Morales worked with Dr. Orlando Sacay in 
designing the Samahang Nayon programme and served as Executive Director of the 
Presidential Task Force on Human Settlements which preceded the Ministry of Human 
Settlements. In addition to his personal betrayal of Marcos, Morales was also tortured because 
of the British television documentary "To Sing Our Own Song". Widely praised in-media 
reviews (See The Times, 19 July 1981, Daily Mirror, 19 July 1981 and The Daily 
Telegraph, 20 July) the documentary led to international condemnation of the Marcos 
administration provoking intense embarrassment in Malacanang.
73 Serrano first met Morales at a secret CPP camp in Nueva Ecija during two months of 
intensive meetings that followed Morales’ defection. Serrano was tasked to smuggle Morales 
from Manila to the camp in the Sierra Madre mountains but was unable to penetrate a 
security cordon around Manila. Morales was forced to remain in Manila for a week before
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Organisation (PECCO) before being arrested in 1973. Released in 1976, he resumed his work
with PECCO as a researcher and assistant training director for Metro Manila. Underground
however, Serrano served as a senior cadre of the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP).74 In 1978, he became a member of the Politburo, the CPP Central Committee, and
in 1980 at the eigth party plenum was elected to the CPP’s National Executive Committee.75
Arrested again in 1982, Serrano remained in prison until 1986.
With other prominent activists, Morales launched Volunteers for Popular Democracy
(VPD) in late 1986 to test the extent of the February "revolution", and a think-tank, the
Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD).76 In 1987, the CPP sanctioned the activities of the
*
"pop dem" jictivists to avoid losing "fall-outs" following the mass-release of political 
prisoners in March 1986.77 As a result, Morales was able to participate in the CPP-approved 
Partido ng Bay an (PnB, Peoples Party) slate that ran in the 1987 Congressional elections. 
Morales ran for the Senate with six”other prominent activists but fared poorly, exposing the 
need for a sound institutional base from which to build popular democracy as an alternative 
progressive project. As a result, PRRM became the pivotal institution within the popular
being taken finally to Nueva Ecija by other CPP cadre (Isagani Serrano, interview, 23 
November 1993).
74 Where his job as head of the CPP Peasant Section conflicted with his role as a 
community organiser. Serrano for instance, helpecTwrite "Community Organisation: Reform 
or Revolution (A Critique of the CO Approach)", CPP Peasant Section, January 1978, which 
condemned jCommunity Organising (see chapter 4), a fact which he acknowledges with 
embarrassment (Serrano interview).
75 Anonymous interviews.
76 Popular democracy, the "political project of the left and the middle [during] the 
transition" called for: "new structures of direct democracy, like people’s councils, and new 
modes of political intervention like recall, initiative and referendum"; and a "pluralist and 
multi-party political order", characterized by the "skilful exercise of coalition politics" (Edicio 
le la Torre, "The Politics of Popular Democracy" in Two Essays on Popular Democracy, 
Institute for Popular Democracy, Quezon City, 1986, pg. 9).
77 Anonymous interviews.
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democratic camp within two years,78 and Morales stayed on indefinitely as PRRM President.
How did PRRM, a conservative NGO with close ties to the Marcos regime and long
controlled by elite interests, come to be led by a former NDF Convenor and a former CPP
Executive Committee member? The appointment of Morales underlined traditional features
of Philippine politics but it also illustrated significant changes hastened by the collapse of the
Marcos regime. Traditionally, Philippine politicians and leaders have been judged on their
personal strengths and relationships rather than their ideological positions. Politicians rarely
committed themselves to detailed policy positions. When they did, they were usually dictated
by pragmatic considerations and usually proved ephemeral and pliable. A politician’s
*
ideological position was therefore seen as secondary and ideological lapses were thus quickly 
forgotten. In the case of PRRM, many of the board members already knew Morales 
personally as a dynamic civic activist and government technocrat and his association with the 
NDF was easily forgiven.79 Second, as a traditional NGO, PRRM had been historically 
dependent on the personal dynamism of key leaders such as Y.C. James Yen and Conrado 
Benitez, and Morales was seen as a traditional leader who could enforce tight personal 
control. _
Equally, however, key board members recognised that PRRM’s financial demise was 
triggered in large part by the emergence of a new generation of rural development NGOs.
78 Speaking in 1993, Cala argues that PRRM provided institutional stability, both 
organisationally and financially, to the popular democratic camp, eg. through staff 
interchanges between PRRM and other "popular democrat" institutions such as IPD and 
CFPI. IPD knows, Cala argued, that if it folds,it can blend into PRRM, giving it the security 
to be creative and to take risks (Cala interview).
79 Before martial law for instance and during his time with the Presidential Economics 
Staff, Morales had worked closely with Senator Helena Benitez, a PRRM board member. 
After hearing of Morales’s nomination in 1986, Benitez explains, "I thought, ’Oh, Boy _was 
trying to run away from a personal problem, so he went to the mountains’... and then I said 
I had no objections..." (Helena Benitez, interview, Nieves, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, 24 
July 1994). Benitez, daughter of Dean Conrado Benitez, became PRRM Chairperson in 1990.
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Most had developed with significant, especially European, donor support; espoused structural 
change including redistributive agrarian reform; and worked closely with grass-roots Peoples 
Organisations. Following an international campaign in support of his Supreme Court case 
however, Morales was well known to European funding agencies, while his NDF work had 
brought him into close contact with grassroots POs. Financial considerations were preeminent 
given the depth of PRRM’s financial crisis and because USAID and Asia Foundation, 
traditional PRRM supporters, had been eclipsed as leading funders of Philippine NGOs. 
Morales was therefore well equipped to lead PRRM back into the rural development 
mainstream. Second, PRRM strategy was traditionally based on close collaboration with 
government agencies. The old PRRM was closely identified with the Marcos regime, was 
widely discredited and had significantly less links to the new regime than other prominent 
NGOs, notably PBSP. Morales, however, had close personal ties to the new administration 
through a group of ex-DAP officials popularly known as the "Morales Boys".80 Third, after 
February 1986, arriviste political forces interacted with the old in a heady but uncertain 
political cocktail and the traditionally-prized ability of leaders to forge wide-ranging personal 
ties was at a premium. In Morales, the PRRM board found a dynamic and assiduous 
networker with ties to key actors crucial to the organisation’s revival. Morales’ reputation as 
a civic activist and technocrat made him acceptable to the philanthropists and businessmen 
of the PRRM board, his imprisonment made him well known in foreign donor circles, and 
his DAP connection provided a network of contacts in government. In addition, past activities
80 The most prominent were Jesus P. de Jesus, Secretary for Public Works and Highways 
from January 1991 (serving in both the Aquino and Ramos administrations), and Carlos 
Fernandez, Under-Secretary (under Aquino) and Secretary (under Ramos) for Agriculture. 
According to Morales "there [was] a dozen, maybe more, who were associated with me in 
the DAP who we tried to mobilise during the Aquino [administration]" (interview, 2 August 
1993).
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in the NDF not only provided contacts in the mainstream NGO/PO community, the centre-of 
gravity of which had moved significantly since the early* 1970s, but his ties to the 
underground were important if PRRM was to work in parts of the country effectively 
controlled by the CPP.
Morales’ appointment brought quick returns. With support from IIRR and European 
funding agencies, PRRM embarked on a multi-project socio-economic programme in Negros 
based on the P27.23m Negros Food Aid Program (FAP), launched in OctobeF1986 with the 
help of local POs and funded by the German Freedom From Hunger Campaign.81 In May 
1987, NOVIB, the Netherlands Organisation for International Development Cooperation, 
arranged for Morales and Serrano to visit partner NGOs in India and Bangladesh to study the 
feasibility of an integrated rural development programme. As a result, NOVIB agreed to fund 
the 3-year P25m Rural Development and Democratization Program (RDDP), consolidating 
PRRM’s revival. Incorporating the ideas of Morales and Serrano and crystallised by their 
experience in India and Bangladesh, the RDDP was launched in January 1988. Designed to 
balance a commitment to empowerment and to socio-economic work, the RDDP entailed four 
main components: organising and consciousness-raising; livelihood; savings and credit; and 
village primary health care.
In addition to securing new funding, Morales also embarked on a broader programme 
of institutional development. First, chapters were established to encourage national 
membership, to develop an institutional base for VPD and to help establish branch offices to 
implement projects: Nueva Ecija, Manila, and Bataan in 1987; Ifugao in 1988; and North
81 An intensive ten-month programme, the FAP helped 2,500 households among an 
estimated 250,000 to 300,000 sugar workers displaced by Negros’s sugar crisis, located in 
20 of the 26 municipalities of Negros Occidental (Ramon Faustino Sales, PRRM Deputy 
Vice-President and Field Operations Manager, interview, Manila, 3 August 1993).
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Cotabato in 1989. Second, a National Assembly was held in February 1988 at which a new 
Board of Trustees was elected, removing many of the old elite guard, yet retaining the 
traditional mix of government officials, educationalists, and businessmen.82 Third, Morales 
launched a programme of decentralization, giving full corporate powers to chapters and 
allowing them to secure separate registration with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.83
The rapid pace of development inevitably provoked tensions. To set up its Negros 
programme, PRRM negotiated with the CPP regional leadership84 and worked with POs 
tagged by the military as pro-NDF,85 provoking allegations of communist sympathies. 
PRRM became embroiled in brief national controversy in May 1988 when Defence Under­
secretary Fortunato Abat accused Morales of raising funds abroad for the CPP, only to 
withdraw the allegations in a letter to Morales three days later.86 Negros Occidental 
Governor Daniel "Bitay" Lacson also accused PRRM of communist allegiances, while PRRM 
board members and programmes suffered military harassment.87 PRRM also became
82 Among thoseremoved from the board were Raul Concepcion, President of Concepcion 
Industries, Andres Siochi, and Antonio Ledesma. Those elected or reelected included Vicente 
Jayme, Finance Secretary in the Aquino government and a friend of Morales; Luis Garcia, 
President of Wrigley Philippines, Juan Flavier, President of IIRR, and Sixto K. Roxas.
83 A decision approved at the Board of Trustees meeting of 25 January 1989.
84 "Senior figures" in PRRM reputedly negotiated directly with CPP Visayas Commission 
head Arturo Tabara to secure CPP support for the Negros programme (anonymous 
interviews).
85 Some board members, notably Antonio Ledesma, were concerned about the National 
Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) being the main project partner in the Negros Food Aid 
Project (Minutes of the Board of Trustees Meeting, 15 September 1987). f
86 "Morales not raising CPP funds: Abat", The Manila Chronicle, 4 July 1988. -
87 The AFP confiscated PRRM food supplied in Sorsogon and branded PRRM’s Rural 
Development and Democratization Programme in Ifugao as an NDF front, while military 
operatives in Nueva Ecija publicized their inquiries into PRRM’s management (Minutes of 
the PRRM Board of Trustees Meeting, 25 January 1989). The minutes note that PRRM had 
complained to the AFP about the harassment and that Morales was scheduled to meet the 
Chief of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) to discuss the matter. Minutes 
of the PRRM Board of Trustees Meeting of 17 August 1988 record that board member Dr.
2 1 1
embroiled in organisational tensions. By January 1989, implementation of the RDDP was 
three months behind schedule, and only 70% of budgeted expenditure was committed. 1988, 
Morales admitted, "was a period of trying to expand very fast into so many areas, trying to 
get new projects, new programmes and new funding [and] at the same time trying to build 
...staff capability".88 Other problems were experienced in dealing with project partners, 
local POs who expected to be involved in project design,89 and disputes frequently 
developed with local NGOs over "turf", poaching of staff, ideology, and personality 
issues.90 Another problem caught PRRM by surprise. PRRM’s choice of regions for the 
RDDP91 presumed an existing level of organisation, ie a relatively dense network of POs 
and NGOs with which PRRM could collaborate. Yet even in provinces like Bataan with a 
strong history of activation and mobilization, PRRM found pockets where local communities 
were unorganised, forcing it to engage in direct organising from 1989.92 Despite the 
problems however, the RDDP was a general success and in 1991, PRRM launched a new 10- 
year programme, the Sustainable Rural District Development Programme (SRDDP), again 
with NOVIB funding.
4. PRRM and Philippine Politics: Philosophy and Implementation.
Edgardo Agno, President of Central Luzon State University, was warned by the military to 
"keep [his] distance" from PRRM.
88 Quoted in the Minutes of the Board of Trustees Meeting, 25 January 1989.
89 Implementation of PRRMs Food and Nutrition Programme in Negros, for instance, had 
to be delayed to take account of objections from partner POs, and the project redesigned 
(ibid).
90 For instance, North Cotabato, where PRRM enjoyed poor working relationships with 
the main provincial development NGOs, BATUNA and the ANT Foundation, until 1991 
(interviews with two former North Cotabato branch managers: Marivic Raquiza, 10 October 
1993, and Rose Nierras, 18 October 1993).
91 Ifugao, Nueva Ecija, Bataan, Eastern Samar and North Cotabato.
92 Serrano interview.
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A number of factors shape the political philosophy of prominent Philippine NGOs. 
First, long-standing NGOs are influenced by their historical mission and their traditions. Even 
in the case of PRRM, effectively relaunched in 1986, senior managers were obliged to 
formulate a strategy that echoed the organisation’s traditional mission and retained the 
confidence of traditional supporters.
Second, in the Philippines especially, traditional deference to leaders (mga lider) and 
the traditional dominance of individuals over institutional or bureaucratic decision-making 
processes, gives prominent figures significant influence over NGO strategy. In the case of 
PRRM, two particularly influential leaders, Horacio Morales, the hands on manager, and 
Isagani Serrano, the_theoretician, played a significant role in shaping PRRM’s new political 
trajectory.
Third, political philosophy is  influenced by the constellation of political forces 
represented in the NGO’s decision-making structures and, specifically, the need to reconcile 
competing institutional interests. In PRRM, philanthropic, business, and governmental 
interests dominated the board, and sought continuity in PRRM’s programmes, especially 
smooth working relations with government agencies. The staff included ex-DAP officials who 
supported close ties with government and former NDF and CPP activists who sought close 
links with militant NGOs and POs and a critical stance towards the Aquino administration. 
Different donors meanwhile adopted different positions. Most European funders sought close 
links between PRRM and NGOs/POs that had actively opposed the Marcos regime and 
remained mistrustful of the new regime while multilateral and American funders sought 
smooth ties with government and a focus on the socio-economic and technical aspects of 
development programmes. Fourth, the particular institutional structures by which NGOs could 
participate in politics exerted an influence of their own. Electoral politics and local
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government in particular exerted a significant influence over the evolution of PRRM political 
philosophy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In 1986, according to Morales, PRRM had minimal resources, had no membership 
base, had "strayed from the mainstream of the Philippine agrarian movement and ...lagged 
far behind other non-governmental organisations in supporting the cause of the peasant 
struggle". A central reason, he acknowledged, was the "failure to address the structural 
causes of underdevelopment".93 After six months of consultations with other NGOs, 
government officials, and peasant leaders in 1986, a PRRM "task force" defined a "new 
philosophical orientation for the organisation", embodied in the new slogan "rural 
development through people’s empowerment".94 Adhering closely to the organisations 
historical mission, PRRM retained the Yen four-fold approach (education to combat illiteracy, 
livelihood to combat poverty, health to combat disease and_civic government to combat 
inertia). Radicalizing the approach however and making it more relevant in the political 
ferment of the early Aquino years, PRRM put civic government at the centre.
PRRM philosophy traditionally espoused barrio-level structures that encouraged citizen 
involvement in small-scale local development programmes and the new programme promoted: 
sectoral organisations of poor peasants, landless workers, rural women, youth and other 
marginalized sectors of rural society; cooperatives for socio-economic activities; and 
community organizations that could evolve into "people’s councils".95 PRRM however also 
espoused "popular democracy", a radical agenda that represented a significant departure from 
PRRM’s traditional vision, especially in terms of its scale: an activist government; a vibrant 
network of POs; thorough-going agrarian reform; a nationalist industrialization strategy; and
93 Morales, "The Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement...", pg. 153.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid, pg. 154.
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diversified international relations.96 The basic philosophy embodied in the SRDDP entailed
a new four-fold approach: (1) empowerment (mobilizing people through rural institutions);
(2) local economic development including alternative finance and marketing schemes; (3)
protecting, restoring and upgrading the environment through schemes already under way
(such as Bataan and Ifugao); (4) advocacy, development cooperation and collaboration with
govemment_and multilateral agencies combined with criticism when required.97
In the new international language of NGO action, PRRM packaged its new programme
of interventions as a "fourth generation strategy" (FGS), a term coined by Isagani Serrano
in 1989.98 "The basic characteristic of a [FGS]", Serrano explains
is comprehensive systems change... [TJhere are different levels or arenas of 
struggle. At the lower level, you can see very simple reforms, civic responses 
to certain social problems... relief, responding to a basic humanitarian need, 
responding to people suffering as a result of a natural disaster.. .so long as this 
is linked to broader goals that have transformative elements in them, then I 
consider them part of a bigger transformative project.. .Now, as to what is the 
trajectory and who are the carriers, I consider mass movements still as a key 
and not just simple NGOs.99
As the core programme o f PRRM, the SRDDP represents Serrano’s FGS in its clearest form.
"Beyond mere criticism of [government] policy", PRRM argue,
NGOs and POs are...pro-actively building and demonstrating the viability of 
an alternative model of development [to]... address the continuing poverty and 
environmental crisis with a view towards eventually pushing the alternative to
96 See Horacio Morales, "The Political Economy of Popular Democracy" in Two Essays 
on Popular Democracy, pp. 16-25.
97 Horacio Morales, Presidents address, PRRM 41st Anniversary Celebrations, Nieves, 
San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, 23 July 1994.
98 Isagani Serrano, "Developing a Fourth Generation Strategy", paper presented at the 
31st International Training Conference, International Institute for Rural Reconstruction, 11 
October 1989, reprinted in Isagani Serrano,_On Civil Society, Monograph Series, Philippine 
Rural Reconstruction Movement, Quezon City, 1993, pp. 13-20. Korten credits Serrano with 
coining the term (Korten, Getting to the 21st Century..., pg. 123).
99 Serrano interview.
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the mainstream.100
A key component in this strategy, the SRDDP is based on the idea of Sustainable Rural
Districts (SRDs), localities of roughly 50,000 households "woven around a variety of
ecosystems, production processing and marketing linkages"101. Within a maximum range
of 4 to 8 municipalities, the population of an SRD (200,000 to 300,000) represents a
minimum "critical mass" needed to transform local economics and politics, and demonstrate
the viability of the SRDDP as an alternative development strategy.102 Launched in five
provinces by 1993 (Ifugao; Nueva Ecija; Bataan; Camarines Sur and North Cotabato) and
covering 273 barrios in 38 municipalities, the SRDDP is based on five specific strategies: (1)
*
Organising peoples institutions from the village to the district level; (2) Conscientization and 
education; (3) mobilization; (4) leadership formation; and (5) Skills development and 
technology.103 These however fall into two broader strategies. The first, Integrated Area 
Development, promotes self-govemancethrough rural institutions; sustainable local economic 
development; food security and basic social services delivery. Using the SRDDP as a 
springboard however, the second, policy advocacy, promotes the incorporation of PRRM 
philosophy into government policy, i.e., the "mainstreaming" of its development 
alternative.104 Integrated Area Development clearly falls within Korten’s definition of a
100 "The Way To Power: Sustainable Rural District Development Framework", Philippine 
Rural Reconstruction Movement, Quezon City, May 1993, pg. 6
101 Morales “"Scaling Up NGO Impact...", pg. 6. The Philippines, according to PRRM, 
has four ecosystems: 1. Upland forests; 2. mid-level foothills; 3. interior lowlands; 4. coastal 
plains. An SRD straddles at least 2 ecosystems ("Sustainable Rural District Development 
Programme: Development In the Hands of The People", Philippine Rural Reconstruction 
Movement, Quezon City, 1992, pg. 2).
102 "Sustainable Rural District Development Programme..." pp. 3-4.
103 Ibid, pp. 5 and "Optimizing Gains, Enhancing Approaches: 1992 Annual Report", 
Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, Quezon City, June 1993, pg. 6.
104 Ibid.
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third generation strategy105, although as Serrano notes above, is nevertheless an important 
component of an evolving FGS. The policy advocacy function however reveals the most 
innovative and important aspects of the FGS and shows PRRM fulfilling many of the 
traditional roles of interest groups in liberal democracies.
5. Coalition Building.
The collapse of the Marcos regime in February 1986 triggered a heady expansion in 
political mobilization and issue-based social movements proliferated. NGOs such as PRRM 
played a significant role in their establishment and NGO participation represented a significant 
institutional characteristic of these movements and influenced their political agendas. Inter- 
NGO coalitions also proliferated, facilitating greater cooperation and coordination among 
NGOs and increasing their political power and influence. PRRM played an important role 
in broad issue-based coalitions in the late 1980s and early ’90s. In May 1987, it helped 
launch the Congress for a Peoples Agrarian Reform (CPAR), brokering the institutional and 
ideological rivalries need to create the necessary unity,106 and in particular, securing the 
support of foreign funders and the NDF/CPP.107 In March 1988, "PRRM practically set 
up" the Freedom From Debt Coalition (FDC);108 for the first 6 months, three PRRM staff
105 According to Korten, "Third generation strategies focus on creating a policy and 
institutional setting that facilitates...sustainable and inclusive local development action" 
(Korten, Getting To The 21st Century..., pg. 121).
106 Cesar "Cha" Cala, Executive Director, Institute for Popular Democracy, interview, 
Manila, 30 October 1993.
107 Morales toured European funding agencies in 1988 to secure financial support for 
CPAR, accompanied by Rep. Bonifacio Gillego, Oscar Castillo of PAKISAMA and Ed 
Mariano of KMP. Serrano was reputedly instrumental in securing national democrat support 
when CPAR almost collapsed during the Agrarian Reform Express of 1987 (anonymous 
interviews). Serrano himself plays down his role. The CPP/NDF played an active role from 
the outset in establishing CPAR, he says, and didn’t need much convincing to stay (Serrano 
interview).
108 Lisa Dacanay, PRRM Deputy Vice President, interview, Manila, 25 October 1993.
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worked full-time in the FDC office and PRRM covered the bulk of FDC’s costs in its first 
year.109 By 1988 in a dynamic and almost aggressive approach to coalition-building, it had 
also become active in the NGO Coalition for Cooperatives Development, the Council for 
Peoples Development, the Forum on NGO Ethics and the Philippine Council for Rural 
Savings and Finance.
PRRM was also active in local-level coalitions. In North Cotabato for instance, it 
participated in the Koalisyong Kuryente ng Kotabato (KKK, Cotabato Electricity Coalition) 
which protested against electricity price increases (providing the secretarial support) and 
PAGMAKA (Paghiusa Mag-uuma sa Kotabato, the Alliance of Cotabato Farmers) which 
protested against government rice policy. It also participates in Task Force Apo Sandawa 
(TFAS, named after Sandawa, God of Mt. Apo), an NGO-PO-COG coalition formed to 
oppose plans by the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to build a geothermal 
electricity plant on tribal ancestral land in the Mt. Apo national park, and NGO Forum, a 
local NGO coalition.
National-level or tertiary NGO/PO coalitions are viewed by many Filipino NGO 
activists as positive alternatives to large, bureaucratized, NGOs (see for instance Karina 
Constantino-David in Chapter 4) yet by 1989, PRRM had effectively withdrawn from CPAR. 
Within CPAR, Serrano explains, PRRM had advocated
— flexible multilateral setups; primaries, federations, networks [plus] a 
multiplicity of bilateral arrangements, especially project based...We need to 
expand as much as we can and the less that we limit the initiative with 
bureaucratic structures, the better for all of us. Then, we can draw the net at 
certain points when we need to respond to common issues, where we need to 
put up common fronts, especially in terms of advocacy work or facing up to 
country programs.110
109 Rose Nierras, PRRM Deputy Vice President, interview, Manila, 18 October 1993.
110 Serrano interview.
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Operationally however, Serrano concedes, the strategy is very difficult to implement and
CPAR began to "calcify". By 1989, according to another PRRM official, "CPAR had become
a monster as the secretariat began to represent CPAR itself instead of leading the member
organisations in representing CPAR".111 By 1990, it had also effectively withdrawn from
FDC.112 In 1993, CPAR collapsed but PRRM played a key role in establishing a successor,
the Philippine Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Development (PhilCARRD) along with
Kaisahan, PEACE, the Centre for Community Services (CCS) and the Centre for Reform,
Education and Training (CARET), uniting the main centre-left political formations (Pandayan
through CCS, BISIG through CARET, and the Popular Democrats through PRRM itself).
Despite PhilCARRD however, Serrano’s approach to CPAR reveals important
dilemmas in PRRM’s coalition-building strategy. First, Serrano, the epitome in many respects
of the quixotic political theorists who wield such influence over Philippine NGO strategy,
professes to be "somewhere in the mix of eco-socialism and eco-anarchism": "I’m basically
an anarchist at heart...I think anarchism will be an antidote to a political project that is
leading towards the capture of state power".113 Yet, PRRM, by its size, is in many respects
the antithesis of the "flexible, multilateral arrangements" which he advocates. PRRM’s rapid
growth, Morales argues, has been deliberate:
Operational expansion is seen as a need to enable us to run a model of 
development that would make an impact on a nationwide scale. And especially 
in a politically volatile environment like the Philippines, a big NGO stands a 
better chance of survival than smaller ones. Moreover, PRRM’s strategies 
require an emphasis on operational expansion to be able to demonstrate the 
workability of a sustainable area development model on the ground as well as
111 Lisa Dacanay, interview, 25 October 1993.
112 According to Nierras, PRRM withdrew from FDC because "it realised it had been 
devoting insufficient time to actual project work which should have been its focus" (Nierras 
interview, 18 October 1993).
113 Serrano interview.
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undertake the necessary policy advocacy at the national and global level.114
Rapid growth however has led to tension with other NGOs and POs. As one internal 
document notes,
There’s a negative side to PRRM’s visibility, size, and operational reach. At 
the very least, PRRM appears very threatening to many groups. Fair or not, 
it has been the object of jealousies and sometimes hatred. The External 
Relations Office has yet to find an effective way of dealing with this 
situation.115
Second, in a polity where political parties organise and mobilize predominantly around 
patronage concerns, PRRM plays an important political role in mobilising constituencies 
through broad coalitions that unite NGOs, POs and the main political formations/cause- 
oriented groups around specific political issues. PRRM’s focus however has been undermined 
by the strategy of using coalitions as the primary means by which it engages in campaign and 
advocacy work because campaigns have been too broadly-based to achieve tangible policy 
impact. At any one time, PRRM participates in a vast array of national-level coalitions (17 
according to its 1992 brochure), placing great strain on staff resources. By contrast, it has 
no Congressional lobbyists or Press Officers to lead a more focused campaign. Similarly, 
within FDC, PRRM sought to build the coalition’s membership to enable it to reduce its 
involvement but without promoting an effective division of labour among members. Local 
level coalitions are equally problematic. In North Cotabato for instance, the NGO Forum, 
established in 1992, is loose and uncoordinated, meets irregularly and, in the absence of a 
clear programme or strategy, is largely reactive.
Third, PRRM’s strategy reveals the complexity of coalition politics since 1986.
114 Morales, "Scaling Up NGO Impact... ", pg. 7.
115 Minutes of the PRRM Board of Trustees meeting 17 February 1993.
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PRRM refused to join CODE-NGO when it was launched in 1990 and withdrew from the 
Council for Peoples Development (CPD) when it became a founding network of CODE- 
NGO. According to IPD’s Clark Soriano, PRRM left because its area-centred focus clashed 
with CPD’s national orientation.116 Soriano’s explanation, however, highlights more 
sophisticated institutional and ideological rivalries since PRRM retained a significant national 
orientation. Before 1986, NGO commitment to "high politics", unified and systematic 
opposition to the Marcos regime, mitigated ideological and professional cleavages. With the 
collapse of the Marcos regime however came a new emphasis on "low politics", 
organisational expansion, programme development and issue-based campaigning. Ideological 
and professional differences proliferated: PRRM and CODE-NGO shared a commitment to 
agrarian reform or indigenous rights but differed, for instance, on relationships with funders, 
especially USAID. PRRM also saw CODE-NGO as an attempt to build an institutional power 
base capable of rivalling the national democrats and nascent popular democrats.
Ideological and professional rivalries however were also a mask for more profound 
personal rivalries. Like Philippine politics generally, the Philippine NGO world is 
characterized by leaders and figureheads, mga lider or mga panginoon ng NGO (NGO bosses 
or lords, from the Tagalog for landlord, panginoon ng lupa)117 and NGO leaders are 
frequently prone to the traditional politicians trait of nagbibida (acting the hero).118 NGO 
sources testify to an unofficial rivalry between three main NGO leaders; Horacio "Boy" 
Morales of PRRM, Karina Constantino-David of CODE-NGO and Maximo "Junie" Kalaw 
of the Haribon Foundation. As Maximo Kalaw, for instance, consolidated his stewardship
116 Clark Soriano, Institute for Popular Democracy, interview, Manila, 13 July 1993.
117 Joel Rocamora, Board member, Institute for Popular Democracy, interview, Manila,
5 May 1993.
118 A term used by one NGO leader to describe NGO leaders who feel circumscribed by 
the authority of others (anonymous interview).
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over Green Forum, the main environmental NGO coalition, so PRRM gradually withdrew, 
underlining deep personalist motivations behind its coalition policies.
Underlining the complex mix of institutional, ideological and personalist tensions that 
animate NGO coalition politics, PRRM was nominated by the Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources (DENR) in 1992 as the local NGO partner in the P500m second stage 
of the World Bank-funded Integrated Protected Areas System (IPAS). Others objected 
however, notably Green Forum and Maximo Kalaw. In mid-1993, new Environment 
Secretary Angel Alcala, Kalaw’s associate on the Haribon board, wrote to the World Bank 
to insist that the funds be coursed through a consortium of Philippine NGOs in which Kalaw 
would play a leading role119 and by the end of 1993, PRRM’s participation was in doubt. 
According to Constantino-David, CODE-NGO and Green Forum objected because PRRM 
was given a subordinate role to the World Wide-Fund for Nature (WWF), the World Bank’s 
lead partners in the IP AS project, "consigning Philippine NGOs to the role of subsidiaries to 
international NGOs".120 CODE-NGO and Green Forum however had collaborated in 
establishing the USAID-funded Foundation for the Philippine Environment (FPE) where 
WWF acted as USAID’s lead partner,121 suggesting a_more profound rivalry over access 
to funding.
Fourth, PRRM’s strategy of organising a "critical mass" in operational areas in 
support of the SRDDP strategy brought it into sharp conflict with the CPP-NDF, national- 
level NGOs, and local NGOs/POs. Following its withdrawal from CPD, PRRM established 
Convergence for Community Centred Area Development (CONVERGENCE) in February
119 Yasmin Arquiza, "Funding agencies shape RP agenda", Philippine Daily Inquirer, 
2 November 1993.
120 Karina Constantino David, interview, Manila, 9 July 1993.
121 According to Constantino-David, the WWF merely managed the debt transaction in 
the FPE project but would manage project implementation in the proposed IPAS 2 (ibid).
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1991 and by 1993 had 17 NGO members committed to integrated area development.122
According to CONVERGENCE, the coalition differs from, others where members are
committed to sectoral organising.123 "When you try to fit national problems to local
problems", Soriano argues,
the effect is to try to enforce change from the outside. But the area-centred 
approach tries to move away from that by forging local positions on local 
issues, eg. using the Local Government Code (LGC) to weaken traditional 
politics, using integrated social forestry projects to undermine illegal logging, 
using credit programmes to undermine usury and using the LGC and peace 
zones to undermine militarization.124
The strategy however exacerbated conflict between PRRM & CONVERGENCE and the CPP
& NDF. According to former NDF official spokesman Satur Ocampo,
The major part of the movement is critical of PRRMs programs that tend to 
compete at least, or to deflect the energies and sentiments of people in the 
rural areas from the revolutionary movement. But to the extent of introducing 
modem techniques of agriculture or political organising, the NDF indirectly 
supports the movement and generally helps in arousing and organising the 
people in the countryside... Another aspect of the criticism of the PRRM is 
that it becomes some sort of magnet in attracting former leaders of the 
movement who have been imprisoned and who have been released. Instead of 
going back to the mainstream underground, they are being absorbed or go to 
the PRRM.125
The weakening of the CPP and the breakdown in the traditional relationship between the CPP 
and sympathetic NGOs undermined the force of this condemnation. Nevertheless, the CPP’s
122 Amee Coronel, Deputy Executive Director, CONVERGENCE, interview, Manila, 16 
August 1991.
123 Ibid. With sectoral organising, according to isagani Serrano "You may be able to lift 
the situation of the poorest of the poor but that doesn’t change the whole set-up...social 
transformation must really be cross-sectoral. It [takes] a lot of actors to change the order of 
things, even in a locality". Underlining the political sensitivity of this approach, Serrano 
acknowledges that it leaves PRRM and CONVERGENCE open to charges of "reformism" 
(Serrano interview).
124 Clark Soriano, Institute for Popular Democracy, interview, Manila, 13 July 1993.
125 Satur Ocampo, interview, 19 November 1993. With the emergence of the July 1992 
CPP document, "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles..." (see Chapter 4), Ocampo noted, "the line 
of division became much more pronounced".
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critical stance had enormous implications for PRRM and CONVERGENCE operations. Even 
in North Cotabato, where the establishment of PRRM’s branch resulted from an invitation 
from regional CPP leaders when PRRM was searching for a Mindanao base,126 ideological 
tension with local NGOs was a significant problem, exacerbated by the CPP’s internal 
"Reaffirm” V "Reject" debate. "Both camps are dealing with PRRM and applying pressure" 
PRRM’s Lisa Dacanay noted in October 1993, "PRRM has to deal with the fact that branch 
managers have sympathies with both camps and may take sides, [though] none have so 
far".127
Growing tension with local NGOs and POs also undermines the potential for broad
*
coalitions critical to fourth generation strategies. In establishing branches in the late 1980s, 
PRRM provoked resentment by encroaching on territory,128 paying relatively high salaries 
and poaching staff from other NGOs and POs. Philippine NGOs and POs, according to Cala, 
thrive on their capacity to represent issues129 and many feared losing their mandate in a 
"politics of representation" battle that PRRM’s arrival heralded. Within CONVERGENCE, 
Cala notes, the programmes of member NGOs were not sufficiently developed to facilitate 
"interfaces" with others. Individual NGOs suspected that their own "recipes" would be 
poached and in the climate of the CPP internal debate, political trust was undermined.130 
PRRM has also been affected by a general tension as POs seek increasingly to access
126 anonymous interviews.
127 Dacanay, interview, 25 October 1993.
128 In 1989 for instance, when PRRM established a branch in North Cotabato, it upset an 
effective modus vivendi between BATUNA and the ANI Foundation whereby Cotabato’s main 
highway roughly delineated their respective territories. Both organisations feared PRRM’s 
greater financial resources would entice local POs away from the smaller NGOs and 
differences with PRRM were only resolved in 1991, partly PRRM concedes because it didn’t 
"have in place the systems to ensure dialogue" (Raquiza interview).
129 Cala interview.
130 Ibid.
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government and foreign funding directly, bypassing intermediate NGOs. PRRM, for instance, 
worked closely with the Bataan chapter of the National Council for Aquatic Resources 
(NACFAR) in implementing the DA’s Fisheries Sector Programme (FSP). As a result, 
NACFAR-Bataan felt sufficiently confident in 1992 to apply directly (and in competition with 
PRRM) to the Presidential Management Staff for funding to implement a food-for-work 
scheme for fishermen displaced by "Red Tide", widespread pollution-induced algae that 
damaged fisheries along Bataan’s shores. The PMS turned down the NACFAR-Bataan 
application and renewed its contract with PRRM. According to Lisa Dacanay, PRRM is 
sympathetic to attempts by POs such as NACFAR-Bataan to access funding directly and feels 
many NGOs wrongly view their intermediate roles in permanent terms.131 By competing 
prematurely for funding however, Dacanay warns, POs risk cooptation since even big NGOs 
find it difficult to deal with funders.
6. Volunteer Mobilization.
Soon after relaunching PRRM in 1986, Morales launched a programme of chapter 
building to provide PRRM with a membership base and by 1992 PRRM had chapters in 
Ifugao, San Jose City (Nueva Ecija), Bataan, Cavite, Camarines Sur, Iloilo, North Cotabato, 
Ilocos Sur, Baguio-Benguet, La Union and Metro Manila (Manila, Pasig, and Quezon 
City).132 At PRRM’s 41st anniversary celebrations in Nueva Ecija in July 1993, the first 
chapter gathering, 74 delegates representing 16 chapters heard Morales describe them as "the 
base of PRRM...the centre of power and empowerment".133 Staff and rural reconstruction
131 Dacanay interview, 25 October 1993.
132 Minutes of the PRRM Executive Committee Meeting, 30 April 1992. PRRM is 
reluctant to provide a figure for total individual members although anonymous sources put 
it at roughly 300 to 500.
133 President’s Address, 23 July 1993.
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workers from the ’50s and ’60s, many of whom had joined the new chapters, revelled in 
PRRM’s rebirth and applauded loudly, underlining the significant blend of continuity and 
change with which he had infused the organisation.
The chapters play a critical role in PRRM strategy. First, they are critical to the 
SRDDP strategy of developing a "critical mass" capable of transforming power relations in 
targeted areas. Second, PRRM chapters represent a vital institutional base for the Movement 
for Popular Democracy (MPD)(which replaced VPD after the 1987 Congressional elections) 
and in many parts of the country MPD has yet to expand beyond the PRRM chapter base. 
Third, almost 90% of PRRM’s income in 1992 came from foreign funders, 63% of total 
income from NOVIB alone134 and, in anticipation of a drop in foreign funds, chapters are 
expected to reduce dependence in future years.
In building chapters, PRRM has concentrated on attracting middle-class professionals. 
In North Cotabato for instance, PRRM has roughly 25 active and 25 dormant members, 
mostly drawn from middle-class professions, who became involved through acquaintances, 
relatives, or through participation in PRRM-organised training sessions.135 Many of the 
members are local government officials and PRRM staff perceive a change in outlook through 
their involvement in the chapter. The chapter, for instance, is currently collaborating with the 
Tourism Council of Cotabato to implement an alternative tourism plan in Magpet municipality 
and raised P25,000 for the project in October 1993.136 For an organisation that has only 
become a membership-based NGO recently, this new outlook is seen internally as a
134 Figures supplied by Cecilia Perez, Accountant, Financial Services Office, PRRM, 18 
October 1993.
135 Rizalino Barandino and Alexander Lopez, PRRM North Cotabato branch, interview, 
Kidapawan, 6 November 1993.
136 Ibid.
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significant achievement and has led other local NGOs to consider membership bases.137
Building the chapter structures has entailed a balancing of conflicting interests however 
that few NGOs would contemplate. Chapter members formerly active in cause-oriented 
groups are largely unaware of PRRM support for the Marcos regime or its record of 
involvement in counter-insurgency activities.138 Similarly, elite philantrophists within 
PRRM’s Board of Trustees, and chapter members who respect them, are largely unaware of 
the implications of PRRM’s espousal of the popular democratic cause. At PRRM’s 41st 
anniversary celebrations, Chairperson Helena Benitez argued that PRRM’s basic philosophy 
entailed "building democracy from the bottom up", echoing traditional PRRM philosophy that 
eschewed confrontation with elite power structures. According to Morales however, PRRM 
not only builds democracy from the bottom but also exploits fissures in the cohesion of 
traditional elitist decision-making structures, especially by winning over officials working in 
local or national government.139 To many members however these differences are barely 
perceptible, and PRRM managers are reluctant to clarify the resultant ambiguity.
7. Electoral Participation.
PRRM played little part in the 1987 Congressional elections (apart from Morales’ 
participation in Partido ng Bayan’s Senatorial slate) or the 1988 local elections. By 1992 
however, when the climate for NGO participation in elections had changed, PRRM’s branch 
and chapter structure and its close identification with the Movement for Popular Democracy 
enabled it to play an active role. MPD was limited organisationally by 1992, with
137 Ibid.
138 Anonymous conversations with delegates to the 41st anniversary celebrations. 
Inevitably, perhaps, Morales, "The Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement....”, offers 
a highly sanitised account of the organisation’s history.
139 Morales interview, 23 November 1993.
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membership effectively combined to NGOs within the popular democratic "cluster" (including 
PRRM, IPD, CFPI, Popular Education for Peoples Enlightenment (PEPE, a network) and 
the Centre for Urban Community Development (CUCD)140 but in the few areas where it 
was strong, notably Bataan and North Cotabato, MPD achieved notable successes. In Bataan,
2 MPD candidates were elected as town mayors (in Orani and Morong) and MPD contributed 
to the reelection of Congressman Felicito Payumo on the Liberal Party slate. In North 
Cotabato, MPD contributed to the reelection of Congressman Gregorio Andolana on the 
Lakas-NUCD slate. Nationally, MPD claims to have had 22 of its own or its supported 
candidates elected including Naga City where an MPD candidate became mayor,141 
insignificant in light of 17,000 positions available in the_campaign, yet indicative of growing 
NGO involvement in election campaigns.
Bataan was PRRM’s main success. PRRM did not participate directly in the election 
campaign but many staff (including the branch manager) took leave of absence to work with — 
MPD and Kabalikatan (Partnership or Shoulder-to-shoulder, a PO electoral coalition formed 
by Balikatan, the local MPD chapter).142 MPD participated in Akbayan, the national level 
NGO-PO-COG coalition but the election campaign in Bataan was fought primarily on local 
issues. Philippine election campaigns at the local level are invariably fought around local 
issues and local alliances. Given the difficulty of relating Akbayan’s national platform to local 
concerns, Kabalikatan therefore mobilized NGO and POs around local issues.143 
Kabalikatan also played an innovative role in mobilising volunteers to monitor election count 
centres. IPD’s Soriano explains:
140 Dacanay interview 29 April 1993.
141 Soriano interview.
142 Dacanay interview 29 April 1993.
143 Ibid. Kabalikatan however also promoted national slates, for instance, the presidential 
and vice-presidential campaigns of Salonga and Pimentel.
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In 1987, Partido ng Bayan spent 80% of its election funds on the campaign.
Only 20% was retained for monitoring vote counting. The PnB poll-watchers 
were all hungry because they had no food allowance and there was no 
provision for feeding or for rotating poll-watchers....You can have 20,000 
votes and your opponent can have only 2,000. All he has to do is knock one 
of your "0"s and add one to his own figure.144
PnB suffered badly in 1987 as a result, but MPD believes that its volunteer mobilization
programme reduced fraud in Bataan in 1992. On its own however, this was insufficient to
counter the mechanics of traditional electoral patronage. Soriano continues:
Traditional politicians [running for Congress] only spend about 50% of their 
election expenses on the campaign itself. In an average province, about 30,000 
votes are needed from about 200 precincts, about 150 votes per precinct. The 
traditional politician has a representative in each precinct responsible for 
identifying those voters and distributing to them P200 pesos each, about 
P30,000 per precinct or P6m in total. The politician doesn’t have to buy every 
vote, maybe 20,000, which brings the cost down to P4m. What we needed 
was a precinct-based approach. What we had to do was have a few people in 
every precinct and on every day in the week or two leading up to the election 
campaign for each to persuade one or two voters to support a particular 
candidate. This for us was very work intensive whereas for the traditional 
politician its cost intensive.145
In North Cotabato, where MPDVbase was effectively the PRRM branch and chapter, a 
different strategy was adopted. In 1987, human rights lawyer Gregorio Andolana was elected 
as the Representative for Cotabato’s District 2, one of two PnB Congressmen elected. Two 
other activists from the Marcos-era "parliament of the streets", Rosario Diaz and Jose 
Tuburan, were elected as Governor and Vice-Governor in the 1988 local elections, running 
with PDP-Laban. In 1992, NGOs and POs aimed primarily to have all three reelected, 
effectively to preserve the status quo. Yet the task was far from simple. By 1992, Andolana 
had switched from PnB to the LDP (supporting Mitra in the Presidential campaign) while 
Diaz and Tuburan had moved to Lakas-NUCD. Diaz and Tuburan had also fallen out with
144 Soriano interview.
145 Ibid.
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Andolana.146 NGOs and POs had also supported rival candidates in the 1988 local elections, 
allowing a "trapo" to win office as Mayor of Kidapawan, the provincial capital.147 In 1992, 
NGOs had not only to unite among themselves but also had to broker a reconciliation between 
Andolana, Diaz and Tuburan so they could support and promote a united ticket. All three 
were reelected.
As in Bataan, PRRM could not participate directly in the electoral campaign. 
Concentrating on the 8 municipalities in its Sustainable Rural District however, PRRM helped 
to select "progressive" candidates and trained partner PO volunteers to conduct voter 
education campaigns. Partner POs also helped other provincial NGOs and POs to prepare a 
"Peoples-Development Agenda" and promoted it as part of the voter education campaign.148 
PRRM estimates that in alliance with partner POs, its voter education campaign reached 
10,000 voters (of North Cotabato’s 750,000 population).149 To limit electoral fraud, PRRM 
also targeted school teachers (who would count the votes) and canvassers independently of 
local progressive candidates. When word filtered through of traditional politicians dispensing 
electoral handouts in particular areas, PRRM sent voter education teams and passed word to 
offices of"progressive" candidates. Candidates’ own campaign teams then descended on the 
areas.150
Experience in 1992, (and in 1988 to a lesser extent), according to Serrano, led MPD 
and PRRM to a four-fold electoral strategy: 1. transform POs into electoral coalitions such 
as Kabalikatan; 2. buildalliances with local liberals, such as Diaz and Tuburan in North 
Cotabato; 3. master the technology of election campaigns; 4. appreciate the specific local
146 Nierras interview 18 October 1993.
147 Barandino interview, 6 November 1993.
148 Ibid.
149 Nierras interview, 18 October 1993.
150 Ibid.
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electoral context. "When the game is football, you don’t play by basketball rules", Soriano 
mused. Traditional left strategy of armed struggle and united* front militancy, PRRM and 
MPD had decided, were inappropriate tactics for the demands of electoral struggle.
S. Participation in Local Government Structures.
Although not mentioned in the SRDDP Guide151 as a tactic by which PRRM engages 
in advocacy, participation in local government structures has become an important component 
in PRRM’s political strategy. PRRM participated in Regional Development Councils (RDCs) 
established by the National Economic and Development Authority in 1988 and PRRM staff 
assisted in the preparation of the final draft of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC).152 
PRRM became involved in the Central Luzon RDC almost by accident. Charged with 
organising elections for the 10 NGO seats on the RDC, NEDA had no mailing list or other 
means of contacting NGOs in the provinces of Central Luzon and PRRM heard of the 
elections informally through a NEDA contact. On election day, PRRM coordinated with other 
progressive NGOs and POs and as a result, PRRM, along with 6 other progressive NGOs and 
POs (including local chapters of the Kilusang Magbububkid ng Pilipinas (KMP, Philippine 
Peasants Union) and the Citizens Disaster and Rehabilitation Centre (CDRC)) was 
elected.153 When elections were held in 1992, however, for the Provincial Development 
Council of Bataan established under the 1991 LGC, PRRM heard of the election at a late 
stage. As a result, it was unable to coordinate election strategy with other progressive NGOs 
and was defeated after tying for the last seat.154
151 "Sustainable Rural District Development Programme: Development in the hands..."
152 Morales interview, 23 November 1993.
153 Dacanay interview, 29 April 1993.
154 Dacanay interview, 25 October 1993.
231
In North Cotabato, PRRM joined the Provincial Peace Secretariat convened by the 
National Unification Commission (NUC) after the election of President Ramos in June 1992. 
PRRM also participates in the Peace and Order Council administered by the provincial 
Governor in cooperation with the Department of Interior and Local Government. In 
September 1993 it participated along with 80 other NGOs and POs (including an estimated 
20 to 25 from the "progressive" and "cause-oriented" sector) in elections for 10 seats on the 
North Cotabato Provincial Development Council. In contrast to "traditional" NGOs such as 
the Cotabato Chamber of Commerce, PRRM coordinated strategy with other NGOs and won 
a seat, along with one other "progressive" NGO.155 In addition, it participates in Municipal 
Development Councils (MDCs) in 6 of the 8 municipalities in its North Cotabato SRD, as 
well as 3 municipal health boards.156
PRRM’s experiences in local government raise mixed emotions among staff. Bataan 
Branch Manager Lisa Dacanay represents PRRM and the environmental NGO sector on the 
Central Luzon RDC where she also heads the RDC sub-committee on coastal resources. 
NGOs, she argues, face a losing battle, swamped by the bureaucracy of elaborate consultation 
processes yet frustrated by the dominance of patronage concerns and the difficulty NGOs face 
in upholding elementary procedures. On 14 October 1993 for instance, the RDC voted 22-2 
in favour of the controversial Masinloc coal-powered electricity generating-station in 
Zambales which PRRM has long opposed. RDC procedures required a quorum of 50% of the 
85 members (ie 43 votes) but PRRM’s objections were swept aside by the RDC Chairman, 
the concurrent Governor of Zambales and one of the projects staunchest backers. Yet 
participation has also brought tangible gains. In 1993, when the Bataan branch encountered
155 Raquiza interview.
156 Barandino interview.
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difficulties in negotiating with the Asian Development Bank and Department of Agriculture 
(DA) over changes to the Fisheries Sector Programme157, PRRM turned to the RDC. After 
lobbying, the Coastal Resources Sub-committee, followed by the Committee on Economic 
Development and finally the Executive Committee of the RDC, passed resolutions calling for 
modifications, forcing the DA to establish a technical committee with PRRM 
representation.158
Experience in North Cotabato has been equally mixed. According to Raquiza, NGOs 
are marginalized from discussions on development projects which are effectively confined to 
the relevant local offices of government departments.159 On the MDCs for Arakan and 
Antipas however, PRRM is actively involved in municipal development planning, ensuring 
that partner POs can participate in Barangay Development Councils. PRRM partner POs are 
represented on 12 Barangay Development Councils in the North Cotabato SRD and feedback 
on their experiences to date, PRRM says, has been largely positive. By late 1993, elections 
for NGO places on the provincial sanggunian (assemblies) had yet to take place but NGOs 
had already held discussions on common candidates.160
9. Relations with Government.
"A key component of the SRDDP strategy involves PRRM "work[ing] for a 
government that is accountable, responsive, and democratic"161 and since 1986, PRRM has 
become enmeshed in a complex web of relationships with the Philippine state. Soonafter his
157 PRRM believed the programme was marred by disjointed planning and was ineffective 
in winning fishermen away from unsustainable fishing methods.
158 Dacanay interview, 25 October 1993..
159 Raquiza interview.
160 Barandino interview.
161 "Sustainable Rural District Development Program: Development in the hands...", pg.
42.
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release in March 1986, Horacio Morales was offered the post of Under-Secretary for 
Economic Planning with the National Economic and Development Authority, but rejected it 
"because at that time we were still not sure that the Aquino government was really committed 
to a change of the system...from elite democracy to popular democracy".162 Two months 
later however, Morales became a Consultant to the Presidential Committee on Government 
Reorganisation on a three month contract, tasked with making recommendations on the future 
of the Ministry of Human Settlements. "Shortly after I finished my work" Morales adds, 
"there was [a] red scare.. .people looking for [those] in the government who had connections
to the movement in the past and a lot of high ranking officials under the Aquino government
. * 
were removed". Throughout the remainder of the 1980s, PRRM remained effectively
marginalized from the Aquino government. PRRM, Morales argues, "had to switch to a more
critical stance when the scope for reform started to narrow down".163
Scope for reform however broadened dramatically following the election of Fidel 
Ramos in June 1992, especially when Ramos appointed former PRRM President Dr. Juan 
Flavier as Secretary for Health.164 Flavier took charge of the Department of Health (DoH) 
at a critical stage in its history, charged with implementing the DoH’s decentralization 
strategy under the terms of the 1991 Local Government Code.165 With no experience of 
running a government department and faced with opposition from DoH mandarins opposed 
to decentralization, Flavier convened a group of 5 advisers including Horacio Morales which 
met daily for the first few weeks of Flavier’s stewardship, then weekly. Flavier incurred
162 Morales interview, 2 August 1993.
163 Morales, "Scaling Up NGO Impact...", pg. 7.
164 Ramos was unable to reappoint outgoing Health Secretary Alan Bengzon because of 
a prohibition on appointing defeated Congressional candidates within one year of elections. 
Bengzon came 25th in the race for the Senate’s 24 seats.
165 Bengzon and his 2 departmental Under-Secretaries had bitterly opposed 
decentralization and DoH staff were seething with resentment at the government’s plans.
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significant opposition internally to his "kitchen cabinet" and to formalise his position, Morales 
became the head of the DoH’s Task Force Devolution and a consultant to the DoH on an 
annual salary of P I .166 Under the DoH’s decentralization plan, 45,000 of its 75,000 staff 
would transfer to local government units, responsibility for 80% of bedspace would be 
devolved and the DoH would lose responsibility for half its budget of PlOb; Morales’ TFD 
was given 4 months to plan decentralization strategy.167 Morales drafted PRRM Deputy 
Vice President Rose Nierras to help and although the TFD completed its work in December 
1992, both Nierras and Morales retain close links with Flavier and the DoH.
PRRM’s association with Flavier and the DoH raises interesting questions about the
*
relationship between NGOs and the Philippine state. IPD’s Cala argues that the Philippine 
state is effectively a series of patronage networks and thrives on transactional relationships. 
NGOs therefore run the risk, Gala adds, of spinning an alternative patronage web.168 
According to Morales, mutual trust is essential in developing relationships between NGOs and 
government ministries. If a minister is closely associated with a particular NGO, then trust 
is well established and underpins the relationship.169 According to Nierras however, DoH 
relationships with NGOs differ significantly from those between NGOs and the Department 
of Agrarian Reform (DAR), where NGOs in CONVERGENCE feel disadvantaged by the 
DAR’s close links with PBSP and PhilDHRRA. Under Flavier according to Nierras, 10 
former NGO leaders have been brought into the DOH at grades of Service Director or higher, 
from a politically diverse range of NGOs including the Medical Action Group (MAG), 
Kapwa Ko Mahal Ko (I Love My Neighbour) and the United Nations Children’s Emergency
166 Nierras interview, 8 October 1993.
167 Ibid.
168 Cala interview.
169 Morales interview, 23 November 1993.
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Fund-Philippines (UNICEF-Philippines). The success of the Task Force Devolution was 
partly credited to Flavier’s participatory management style, according to Nierras, and led to 
the establishment of Joint Task Forces linking DoH and NGO/PO personnel to oversee DoH 
programmes such as the Community-Based Maternal and Child Health Care Programme and 
the Community-Based Health Financing Scheme. The DoH has also subcontracted a number 
of activities to NGOs including the preparation of ODA loan proposals. Overall, however 
PRRM does not receive special treatment from Flavier and the DoH and financially has only 
benefitted marginally from its partnership with the DoH.170
PRRM also works closely with other government departments including the
*
Department of Agriculture where PRRM-is a lead partner in the Asian Development Bank- 
funded Fisheries Sector Programme and the Department of Energy, with whom PRRM in 
alliance with other NGOs involved in Task Force Energy, is helping to prepare a Common 
Framework for Alternative Energy Development. Apart from the DoH, its closest relationship 
is with the DAR, especially at the local level. In North Cotabato for instance, PRRM is 
helping to establish an Agrarian Reform Community (ARC) in the three barangays of 
Makilala, one of the municipalities in PRRM ’s North Cotabato_SRD and in 1993 helped 
establish a rubber co-operative processing plant producing slippers and other products. PRRM 
is also helping the DAR to identify land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Programme in Kidapawan, Makilala, Mlang and Matalam where many of the beneficiaries 
are PRRM partner PO members.171 In Nueva Vizcaya; PRRM mobilized local POs to 
construct a road linking a remote barangay to the provincial highway under contract to the
170 PRRM has received no DoH funding directly although it has received funds for and 
on behalf of the DoH. USAID provided a grant to aid the work of the TFD, paid through the 
UP Economics Foundation to enable PRRM and the TFD to function without continual 
recourse to DoH funding (which could have enabled DoH staff to delay decentralization).
171 Barandino interview, 6 November 1993.
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Presidential Management Staff and it has also worked with Presidential Adviser on Rural
Development Daniel Lacson in preparing provincial development plans.172
Despite the collaboration with government departments however, PRRM has staunchly
criticized both the Aquino and Ramos administrations. PRRM has attacked the Ramos
government’s 1993-1998 Medium Term Philippine Development Plan for "its export-oriented
and foreign investment-led growth strategy" which it argues will lead to further depletion of
the nation’s natural capital.173 Yet it also supports aspects of Ramos’s drive for Newly
Industrializing Country (NIC) status, especially asset reform measures and the development
of a more "activist/interventionist" government.174 The approach reveals an ambiguous view
*
of the state. On the one hand, Serrano argues, PRRM seeks "a strong state and a strong civil
society", yet on the other it seeks to overcome civic inertia by reducing
"citizens...dependence on state mediation”.175 "Philosophically", Serrano writes,
NGOs envision an anarchist society: no government to lord it over the citizen, 
only an endless array of voluntary organisations transacting among themselves, 
and no politicians or politicians, ...only citizen diplomats. NGOs aim to 
disempower government step by step until it disappears.176
Most Philippine NGOs, Cala argues, aspire to being microcosm states177 and PRRM is in _
many respects a perfect example. Morales forinstance writes of co-operatives, economic
organisations and community organisations federated into local People’s Councils "which run
parallel to, but interfac[e], with government"178 and PRRM programmes include disaster
172 Nierras interview, 8 October. PRRM prepared a provincial development plan for 
Cotabato.
173 "The Way of Power...", pp. 2-3.
174 Ibid, pg. 4.
175 Serrano, On Civil Society, pp. 46 & 56.
176 Ibid, pg. 31
177 Cala interview.
178 Morales, "Scaling Up NGO Impact...", pg. 6.
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relief, reforestation, livelihood projects, primary health care, credit schemes and education, 
supported by policy research and planning, mirroring the broad range of social services 
provided by the state.
10. Networking.
One of the most distinctive features of PRRM, setting it apart from most other 
Philippine NGOs, is its assiduous cultivation of contacts. In building its socio-economic 
programme since its relaunch in 1986, PRRM has established relationships with a vast array 
of foreign and Philippine funders179 and critics both within and outside the organisation 
suggest that PRRM is heavily influenced by donor interests.180 Virtually all Philippine 
NGOs try to forge relationships with national and local politicians and according to Rep. 
Bonifacio Gillego, most members o f the House of Representatives tap NGO leaders as 
advisers and consultants.181 Horacio Morales acted as adviser to Rep. Jose Yap when Yap 
participated in Aquino government peace initiatives and was appointed by President Ramos 
to the 1992-93 National Unification Commission.182 Explaining the relationship, Morales
179 Minutes of the Executive Committee meeting of 19 November 1990 for instance list 
29 agencies funding existing PRRM projects or considering funding applications.
180 According to minutes of the Board of Trustees meeting of 15 September 1987, Dr. 
Antonio Ledesma "inquired whether the [programmes] operate because of the dictates of 
funding agencies or because of a philosophy emanating from policy studies". More recently, 
PRRM has been criticized for working on Camiguin Island, Mindanao. Anonymous critics 
say the island is relatively prosperous, lies outside SRDDP operational areas, and that PRRM 
was motivated primarily by Spanish funding. PRRM concedes that the project resulted from 
an approach from Spanish NGOs and the Spanish Embassy but argues that local tourism and 
attendant prostitution necessitated a family planning and responsible parenthood project and 
that PRRM wanted to develop a sustainable development model appropriate to small islands 
(Nierras interview, 18 October 1993).
181 Rep. Bonifacio Gillego, interview, Manila, 28 April 1993.
182 Consolidating PRRM’s influence in the peace process, former Board members Howard 
Dee and Vincente Jayme were named respectively in July and August 1993 as Chief 
Negotiator with the NDF-CPP-NPA and member of the National Amnesty Commission.
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notes that "Congressman Yap is from my province [Tarlac] and related to my cousin".183
In many cases, PRRM has risked controversy to develop networks and personal 
relationships. In early 1993 for instance, Morales was instrumental in launching "Warriors 
for Peace", a group of former leaders of the CPP-NPA and RAM (Rebolusyonaryong 
Atyansang Makabayan, the Revolutionary Nationalist Alliance, formerly the Reform the 
Armed Forces Movement), including former NPA Chief Romulo Kintanar, and former army 
Colonel and RAM leader Gregorio Honasan. With high-profile media appearances and 
basketball matches in remote barrios, "Warriors for Peace" undermined the bitter legacy of 
the Marcos dictatorship and provided momentum to peace negotiations between the
a
government and CPP-NDF, yet Morales was widely criticized in national democratic circles.
Contacts are also cultivated assiduously at the local level. In 1991 for instance, PRRM 
invited Sen. Joseph Estrada to meet with partner POs in Ifugao and later negotiated a Plm 
contribution from Estrada’s Countryside Development Fund.184 In North Cotabato, PRRM 
maintains close personal ties with the Governor and Vice Governor, sustained through 
frequent social meetings, and the relationship helps PRRM to get privileged access to farm 
equipment, food subsidies or commodity loans from local government agencies.185 The 
relationship was built on personal ties, and enables PRRM to play the pivotal role of conduit 
between other NGOs and the Governor.186
Close personalist ties are a double-edged sword however and provoke criticism from
183 Morales interview, 23 November 1993.
184 Ramon Sales, interview, London, 12 August 1994.
185 Barandino interview.
186 Rose Nierras served as North Cotabato Branch Manager from January 1991 to July 
1992 during which time she maintained close ties with Governor Diaz, cemented by an inter- 
family friendship. During Nierras’s tenure, Diaz visited the PRRM office "practically every 
day" and Nierras frequently wrote speeches and policy papers for her (Nierras interview, 18 
October 1993).
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NGOs opposed to patronage-based politics. PRRM was widely criticized by other members 
of Task Force Apo Sandawa (TFAS) following a meeting between TFAS and President 
Ramos in Kidapawan on 23 January 1993, held to discuss TFAS objections to the proposed 
Mt. Apo geothermal electricity generating plant. Governor Diaz and PRRM liaised between 
TFAS and the Presidential Adviser for Mindanao to arrange the meeting. TFAS members 
however wanted to bring media representatives into the meeting and hold a rally and "voice 
barrage" outside, and accused PRRM of being "used" by the Governor when the demands 
were rejected.187 PRRM’s popular democratic philosophy of "wanting to accommodate 
everybody", one PRRM worker claims, inevitably leaves it open to attack.188
11. Conclusion.
For all the problems that have marred its history, PRRM is one of the Philippines’ 
most successful NGOs. In the 1950s and 1960s, it established a remarkable reputation for 
institutional innovation: launching community development as a key weapon of government 
counterinsurgency policy; providing the model for the Presidential Arm on Community 
Development, three separate pieces of local government legislation, and later the Samahang 
Nayon programme; triggering the proliferation of Rural Reconstruction Movements 
throughout the developing world (Colombia, Ghana, Guatemala,-India and Thailand). Like 
other civic organisations before it, PRRM also played an important role in mobilizing 
Protestant civic leaders.189 Like its predecessor, the Chinese Mass Education Movement,
187 Barandino interview.
188 Ibid.
189 Rafael Salas (who later served as United Nations Under-Secretary) visiting PRRM in 
1968 described it as "very successful in evolving techniques for motivating farmers in rice 
production.. .despite the fact that [it] is an organisation largely run by Protestants in a country 
which is 80% Catholic" (Rafael Salas, More Grains: Participatory Management in the 
Philippine Rice Self-Sufficiency Program 1967-1969, Simul Press, Tokyo, 1985, pg. 79).
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PRRM’s success was primarily in the political realm, undermining Sanyal’s assertions in the 
introduction. More ambiguously perhaps, PRRM was significantly influenced by philanthropic 
and business elite interests and their support underpinned PRRM’s impact on public policy 
reform. Equally however, elite influence was a restraining factor and contributed to PRRM’s 
decline in the early 1970s and again in the early 80s.
Successful NGOs, as PRRM illustrates, are remarkably vulnerable to the machinations
of states. PRRM growth in the 1950s was facilitated by the overhaul of legislation governing
civic organisations in 1952 and collaboration with government agencies in counter-insurgency
operations. Once the counter-insurgency threat had passed however, PRRM was marginalized
*
by the PACD as President Magsaysay and his successors expanded the administrative 
machinery of the Philippine state. Similarly, Ferdinand Marcos used PRRM initially but 
marginalized the organisation when it threatened his interests, leading to its virtual collapse 
in 1984.
By 1993, PRRM had reclimbed to great heights. It had become one of the largest 
NGOs in the country, second only to PBSP, one of the few NGOs with nation-wide reach, 
and one of the most controversial. Critics argued that PRRM was project- and donor- 
driven;190 excessively technocratic;191 largely unsuccessful at community organising;192
These included Dr. Y.C. James Yen; Cornelia Balmaceda, the only Protestant to serve in the 
Quirino cabinet; Dr. Albino Sycip, until 1987, PRRM’s key financial adviser; Dr. Juan 
Flavier, PRRM and later IIRR President; and Trustees Derek Holdsworth, George Potts and 
J.J. Wolahan (Benitez interview). ~
190 In the late 1980s, according to one source, "Boy [Morales] ^ would come back from 
Europe and tell staff that this or that funding agency was interested in funding a particular 
type of project and tell them to have a funding proposal ready to send off in 48 hours... .staff 
felt this was the way policy was being made". Speaking in mid-1993, the source claimed that 
the problem had lessened in the previous two years (anonymous interview).
191 According to one source, for instance, PRRM tends to overelaborate and 
overconceptualize its plans without waiting for actual experience to contribute (anonymous 
interview).
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and insensitive to gender issues.193 Others however pointed to major achievements.
According to Cala, PRRM successfully altered power relations in Bataan and North Cotabato:
In Bataan, the budget of the PRRM branch is bigger than the budget of the 
town of Orani.... politicians in Bataan are wary of PRRM and see it as a 
patronage machine that they can’t match.194
"Before", Cala adds, "the NGO was in the margin of the inventories of political forces in the
mainstream", but under Serrano and Morales, PRRM was successfully positioned as "a key
participant political force".
As with PRRM in the 1950s, achievements in the late 1980s and early 1990s have
been predominantly in the political realm. Political factors, especially the character and
* — 
quality of relationships with related actors (state agencies, insurgent groups, members, other
NGOs/POs, and funders), invariably dictate the fortunes of PRRM’s socio-economic -
development programmes. Marivic Raquiza, PRRM’s North Cotabato Branch manager from
July 1992 to November 1993, when asked to analyze her work, concluded that she spent
more time as a political manager, i.e., establishing and maintaining relationships with other
NGOs/POs and government agencies, than she did as an economic manager, i.e ., supervising
PRRM’s socio-economic programmes.195 PRRM is itself a political manager. Rather-than
concrete socio-economic achievements, its main success in the period since 1986 has been to
link a complex range of actors during the important post-authoritarian transition. Unlike the
192 PRRM, again according to anonymous sources, has sought advice from other ex- -  
national democrat NGO leaders about reinvigorating its organising efforts, admitting that they = 
have not met with the expected success.
193 According to one former PRRM worker, sexual harassment of women staff has been 
a problem and on one occasion female staff erected placards in PRRM’s head office to 
complain. Members also complain of PRRM’s attitude to Women in Development, a problem 
acknowledged by Morales in his address at PRRM’s 41st anniversary celebrations in Nueva 
Ecija, 23 July 1993.
194 Cala interview.
195 Raquiza interview.
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old PRRM however, the rejuvenated organisation balanced elite influence with institutional 
linkages to government agencies, political parties and NGOs & POs, underlining the 
importance of two key factors in Sanyal’s analysis. PRRM, Soriano argues, "is enmeshed in 
strategic alliances, many that the military support, transforming power relationships rather 
than just challenging for state power".196
PRRM’s rejuvenation raises an interesting question however. Having rediscovered 
success, would its clothes be stolen once again by a Philippine state anxious to develop a 
"critical mass" of its own? In some respects, the threat has diminished. Since 1986, 
Philippine Presidents have sought to curb rather than expand the power of the bureaucracy, 
through privatization, decentralization and sub-contracting. NGOs, POs and the private sector 
are now enmeshed In a complex web of relationships and a significant political upheaval 
would be needed to cause them to unravel. On the other hand however, government agencies 
remain weak at community-organising ancbdependent on NGOs in implementing strategic 
programmes that confront entrenched elite interests, such as redistributive land reform or 
reforestation. In "Philippines 2000", the government is committed to an ambitious programme 
of economic development and frustration at slippage in the attainment of targets, especially 
in programmes involving NGOs, could lead to tension with NGOs and attempts to displace 
them by expanding government agencies.
PRRM is more vulnerable in the electoral and local government arenas. Political 
parties and traditional politicians do not see NGOs as a fundamental threat as of yet, in large 
part because their impact in electoral campaigns has been marginal to date. Results in the 
1992 elections however suggested that their impact is growing quickly. As the PACD 
followed PRRM success in community organisation and mobilization, so its success in
196 Soriano interview.
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educating and mobilizing voters and in monitoring election count centres will force political 
parties to establish local organisational bases. Equally, as NGOs and POs consolidate their 
participation in local government structures, so traditional political forces will become 
increasingly concerned. Gerry Bulatao’s comments in Chapter 4 suggest that NGOs and POs 
themselves favour a more explicitly party-political project in future election campaigns. 
Should a political party with a significant local organisational base materialise, however, it 
would further underline the role of PRRM, and other NGOs, as important triggers of political 
change within and beyond the Philippine state.
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CHAPTER SIX: Task Force Detainees of the Philippines.
1. Introduction.
Human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have a long record of activity 
in the promotion and protection of international human rights standards. They were 
instrumental in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948,1 and became 
important actors in the "international human rights regime" that evolved during the 1980s, 
giving rise to a substantial body of literature.2 Studies of the intranational roles of human 
rights NGOs in the developing world are rarer however, and exist mainly in report or 
monograph form.3 Yet, intranationally, as the following case-study illustrates, human rights 
NGOs have not only contributed to the protection and promotion of human rights standards, 
but have also eroded the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, mobilized specific constituencies 
in support of opposition campaigns and shaped political discourse in post-authoritarian 
polities.
Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP) was founded in 1974 by the
1 David Weissbrodt, "The Contribution of International Non-Governmental Organisations 
to the Protection of Human Rights", in Theodore Meron (Ed.), Human Rights in 
International Law: Legal and Policy Issues, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, pp. 429-430.
2 See, for instance, N.G. Onuf and Spike Peterson, "Human rights from an international 
regimes perspective", Journal oLInternational Affairs, Vol. 37, 19S4; Jack Donnelly, 
"International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis", International Organisation, Vol. 40, 
No. 3, 1986; and Conway Henderson, "Human rights and regimes: A bibliographic essay", 
Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 10, 1988; For country-specific accounts, see for instance 
Alison Brysk, "From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and 
Human Rights in Argentina", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 26 No. 3, 1993 or G. 
Sidney Silliman, "Transnational Relations and Human Rights in the Philippines", Pilipinas, 
No. 16, Spring, 1991.
3 See for instance, Cynthia Brown, The Vicaria de la Solidaridad in Chile, Americas 
Watch, New York, 1987; or Daniel Lev, "Legal Aid in Indonesia", Working Paper No. 44, 
Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Clayton, 1987, a study of the 
Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Institute).
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Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP), during a decade in
which human rights NGOs "emerged as a notable international political force".4 TFDP was
one of the most militant NGOs of the Marcos era and its hitherto undocumented history
represents an important contribution to the history and political science of the Marcos
dictatorship. In 1993, it was the largest human rights NGO both in the Philippines and in the
developing_world as a whole.5 The third largest NGO in the Philippines (behind Philippines
Business for Social Progress (PBSP) and the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement
(PRRM)), TFDP had 288 staff and 82 offices in 69 of the Philippines’ 72 provinces.
In important respects, TFDP differs from standard conceptions of a human rights
*
NGO. Wiseberg, for instance, defines a human rights NGO as
...a private association which devotes significant resources to the promotion 
and protection of human rights, which is independent of both governmental 
and political groups that seek direct political power and which does not itself 
seek such power.6
Far from being independent of political groups that seek direct political power however,
TFDP has a long history- of support for the National Democratic Front (NDF), the united
front of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), and despite changes to its mandate
following the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship, remains an integral part of a larger social
movement. In contrast to Wiseberg, TFDP Chairperson Sr. Mariani Dimaranan argues that
human rights NGOs are inherently political:
Campaigning against.. .violations of human rights is a subversive activity. It 
cannot therefore be effectively undertaken either by voluntary organisations 
which seek to make themselves acceptable to all governments by insisting they 
are impartial or apolitical or by United Nations Commissions which depend
4 Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993, pg. 113.
5 Following the closure of the Vicaria de la Solidaridad in November 1992.
6 Laurie S. Wiseberg, "Protecting Human Rights Activists and NGOs: What Can Be 
Done?", Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 13, 1991, pg. 529.
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on the cooperation of the government concerned.7 
This perspective was shaped by TFDP’s experience of government repression during the 
Marcos dictatorship, and its support for the programme of the National Democratic Front. 
After 1986 however, TFDP became involved in wide-ranging relationships with government 
agencies as its legitimacy and influence was gradually acknowledged by the Aquino and 
Ramos governments. TFDP therefore represents a significant case-study of the antagonism 
between NGOs and the state during the Marcos dictatorship, the tentative rapprdachment of 
the years 1986-1990 and the significant improvement in relationships that has developed since 
then. Equally however, TFDP illustrates important features of NGO politics beyond the state. 
TFDP relations with the Catholic Church and European donors point to the role of particular 
institutional forces in influencing the programmes and mandates of Philippine NGOs. More 
importantly however, TFDP points to the changing relationships between the underground 
left mid formerly supportive NGOs, as the former fragments and the latter consolidate their 
influence in Philippine politics. TFDP thus illustrates important changes in Philippine politics 
and the important role played by Philippine NGOs.
2. TFDP, 1974-1986.
The establishment and consolidation of successful NGOs in the developing world is 
crucially dependenton forceful personalities. This applies especially to leading human rights 
NGOs, many of which emerged under conditions of severe repression in the 1970s. Personal 
dynamism and authority in themselves, however, were inadequate and institutional support
7 Sr. Mariani Dimaranan, "The International Human Rights Network: The Role and 
Function of International Human Rights Organisations", in Reynaldo Ty (Ed.), Truth and 
Freedom: Understanding and Teaching Human Rights, Task Force Detainees of the 
Philippines, Quezon City, 1990, pg. 59.
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was essential in providing human rights NGOs with the legitimacy to confront authoritarian 
regimes and the moral authority to escape outright censure. The establishment and 
consolidation of TFDP is attributable in large part to the work of Sr. Mariani Dimaranan, its 
Chairperson since 1975. More importantly however, a tripartite alliance between important 
segments of the Catholic Church, underground activists of the NDF and foreign funders led 
by Nederlandse Organisatie Voor Internationale Ontwikkeflngssamenwerk (NOVIB, the 
Netherlands Organisation for International Development) led to TFDP’s emergence as the 
most influential human rights NGO in the Philippines.
The Catholic Church was the most important catalyst in the establishment of TFDP.
*
Within weeks of the declaration of martial law on 21 March 1972, 30,000 people were 
imprisoned, mostly in Manila, and over subsequent months an estimated 20,000 political 
prisoners were detained at Camp Crame, headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary.8 
Catholic clergy numbered among those arrested and four foreign missionaries were told to 
leave the country in 1972.9 In response, the AMRSP, with the support of the Catholic 
Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) organised a nationwide survey of conditions 
under martial law. In a report issued on 26 November 1973 to coincide with the launch of 
the Church-Military Liaison Committee (CMLC),10 the AMRSP argued that
8 Jose Diokno, "Martial Law in the Philippines", lecture delivered at Amnesty 
International’s International Council meeting, Cambridge, 21 September 1978, reprinted in 
Priscila S. Manalang (Ed.), A Nation For Our Children: Selected Writings of Jose W. 
Diokno, Claretian Publications, Quezon City, 1987, pg. 33; and Dolores Stephens Feria, 
Project Sea Hawk: The Barbed Wire Journal, Paper Tigers and Circle Publications, 
Manila, 1993, pg. 117.
9 Political Detainees in the Philippines, Association of Major Religious Superiors in 
the Philippines, Manila, n.d. [circa 1977], pg. 62, originally published as Signs of the 
Times-Documentation, Task Force Data Gathering, Association of Major Religious 
Superiors in the Philippines, 31 March 1976.
10 Established to reduce church-military tensions after raids on church establishments in 
mid-1973.
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There are no accurate estimates on the number of political prisoners, but aill 
regions report that there are some. They are generally accused of subversion.
There are frequent reports of physical torture from all regions of the country.
The families and relatives of prisoners are kept under surveillance. Extortion 
money is asked of prisoners for their release in a number of regions.11
The survey’s conclusions, especially the need for "safeguards in matters of arrest, detention
and trial",12 became the focal point of the AMRSP’s annual convention in January 1974.
Many religious superiors doubted the CMLC’s ability to halt the torture of political detainees
and during the convention, the AMRSP launched two "task forces" concerned specifically
with human rights: Task Forces Detainees, to support the estimated 10,000 political detainees
still imprisoned in December 1973,13 and Task Force Data Gathering (TFDG), to monitor
*
prison conditions and document cases of abuse.
Members of Christians for National Liberation (CNL), the largest constituent 
organisation in the underground National Democratic Front (NDF) played a significant role 
in the birth of TFDP, especially in the 1973 AMRSP survey. In late 1973, both the NDF and 
CNL were largely amorphous.14 Prominent members, including Luis Jalandoni,15 had fled 
Manila; those remaining were unable to maintain regular contact with comrades because of 
intense military surveillance; and most members were preoccupied with the anti-Marcos
11 "The Philippines: The Role of the Church under Martial Law- National Survey by the 
Major Religious Superiors", IDOC Bulletin, Nos. 15-16, January-February 1974 pg. 9 quoted 
in Robert L. Youngblood, Marcos Against The Church: Economic Development and 
Political Repression in the Philippines, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990, pp. 158- 
159.
12 IDOC Bulletin, ibid, pg. 13 cited in Youngblood, ibid, pg. 159.
13 Diokno, "Martial Law...", pg. 33.
14 Although CNL held a convention in July 1972, before the declaration of martial law, 
it was unable to hold another until 1981.
15 A former priest and reputedly one of the first chairmen of the NDF Preparatory 
Commission, Jalandoni was arrested and imprisoned in the late 1970s. Released in 1986, he 
moved to Utrecht in the Netherlands where he became head of the NDF International Office.
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constitution campaign.16 Individual members however played an important role, including 
CNL founder Fr. Edicio de la Torre, Fr. Carlos "Calloy7 Tayag,17 and Fr. Gerardo 
Bulatao.18
The first head of TFDP was an American Jesuit, Fr. Mel Brady. In early 1975 
however, Brady resigned due to overwork,19 and in April, Sr. Mariani Dimaranan, one of 
the core group behind the 1973 AMRSP survey, was elected Chairperson in succession.20 
Bom in Occidental Mindoro, Dimaranan studied at Manila’s De La Salle University before 
moving to Holy Spirit College. With other nuns, she visited prominent Huk leaders in the 
Muntinlupa State Penitentiary in Manila including Luis Tame and Alfredo Saulo. In the late 
1960s, Dimaranan was assigned to St. Joseph’s College in Manila where she became head 
of the Social Science Department and joined her own students in anti-Marcos and anti-US 
demonstrations. Using overseas church contacts, Dimaranan developed a-"solidarity network" 
and, accused of being a member of CNL, was arrested on 20 October 1973.21 Released on 
6 December 1973, Dimaranan joined TFDP as secretary and adviser to Fr. Mel Brady.
From tiny beginnings, TFDP grew quickly under Dimaranan’s dynamic stewardship
16 Anonymous interviews. In early 1974, many NDF members were involved in the 
campaign against a new constitution ratified by hastily-convened "Citizens Assemblies" in 
January 1973 and amended in a July 1973 referendum.
17 Tayag, who "disappeared" in August 1976, played a central role in launching CNL 
in 1972, after converting de la Torre to the national democratic cause (anonymous interview).
18 Anonymous interviews. Bulatao became Assistant Secretary General of the Association 
of Men Major Religious Superiors in May 1974. J
19 A canon law Instructor at Our Lady of the Angel seminary in Novaliches, Metro 
Manila, while part-time head of TFDP, Brady spent much of 1974 in prolonged and 
ultimately fruitless negotiations with the military on behalf of the Major Religious Superiors. 
Aware of the need for a full-time TFDP Chairperson, Brady resigned to focus on teaching 
commitments.
20 Sr. Mariani Dimaranan, Chairperson, TFDP, interview, Manila, 21 July 1993.
21 Brenda Gonzalez, "Sister Mariani and the Struggle for Human Rights", Midweek, 30 
April 1986, pg. 27. "I didn’t use the term ’solidarity network’ then, but I maintained a type 
of network...outside the country", Dimaranan confirmed in 1993 (Dimaranan interview).
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and by 1979 had helped 1,300 families and over 3,000 detainees in 60 prison camps.22 In 
late 1974, TFDP had almost 200 volunteer nuns, and every Saturday an average of 25 would 
visit Manila’s detainees.23 By 1975 however, obstacles were increasingly raised against 
TFDP, especially through security alerts declared before scheduled visits. Unable to reach 
prisoners, volunteer nuns gradually left TFDP.24 To professionalise the organisation and 
replace lost volunteer nuns, Dimaranan recruited ex-detainees as volunteers and paid staff.25 
The same year, in response to letters and requests from the provinces, Dimaranan travelled 
to Cebu and Mindanao (including Zamboanga, Cotabato, Davao, and Cagayan de Oro) to set 
up regional offices.26 Bishop Antonio Nepomuceno provided an office in Cotabato and the 
Redemptorist Fathers provided one in Cebu. ImDavao, Dimaranan established ties with the 
local, Maryknoll-run, Citizens Council for Justice and Peace (CCJP) leading to the 
establishment of another TFDP office.27 As a result, by late 1975, TFDP had a handful of 
offices scattered throughout Mindanao and the Visayas. —
Through Dimaranan, TFDP also established a pivotal relationship with the Free Legal 
Assistance Group (FLAG) and its founder, Jose "Pepe" Diokno. Former Justice Secretary, 
Senator, and prominent Marcos critic, Diokno_was arrested in the opening days of martial 
law. Released on 11 September 1974, he founded FLAG with four other lawyers in October 
1974 to provide legal support to detainees and by 1982, FLAG had almost 100 lawyers
22 Letter from Sr. Mariani Dimaranan to NOVIB, 11 January 1979.
23 Political Detainees in the Philippines, Association of Major Religious Superiors in the 
Philippines, Manila, n.d. [circa 1977], pg. 67. 1
24 Ibid.
25 Dimaranan interview, 21 July 1993..
26 Ibid.
27 Under plans prepared by the Catholic Church’s National Secretariat for Social Action 
(NASSA), diocesan CCJP’s would fill local CMLC panels. Local CMLCs however were only 
established in a small number of dioceses and Davao (along with Cebu) was one of the few 
places where a CCJP was actually established. (Youngblood, Marcos Against the 
Church..., pg. 84; Political Detainees..., pg. 66)
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nationwide.28 TFDP and FLAG intentionally complemented each other. While imprisoned, 
Diokno was kept informed of the AMRSP survey and the establishment of TFDP and TFDG 
and was visited frequently by TFDP volunteer nuns to whom he explained his plans for a 
lawyers organisation. Throughout the 1970s, TFDP aided FLAG financially and in the late 
1970s, introduced FLAG to NOVIB, as the two organisations became, according to 
Dimaranan, "brother and sister".29
By 1979, TFDP had 42 offices in Mindanao (administered under the umbrella of the 
Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Conference30) and the Visayas,31 47 staff and 200 volunteers.32 
In its early years, TFDP focused on the needs of detainees and their families, but from the 
late 1970s sought, firstly, "To support and strengthen the organisation of detainees, families 
and support groups towards national liberation" and secondly, "to promote the development 
of mass movements of concern against violations of human rights and expose and oppose 
escalating militarization".33 In the five years since its birth, TFDP’s political philosophy had 
evolved considerably. Many staff and volunteers were CNL members, providing the CPP 
with significant, albeit far from dominant, influence. "In the beginning", de la Torre noted
28 Maria Socorro Diokno, Secretary General, FLAG, interview, 29 March 1993; "History 
of the Free Legal Assistance Group", FLAG, n.d. [circa 1992], pg. 1.
29 Dimaranan, interview, 21 July 1993;
30 Until 1979 when it established its own organisational structures separate from the 
AMRSP and MSPC, TFDP relied on the MSPC to house its Mindanao Regional Office in 
Davao, to provide political direction, and to mobilise church support. In parts of Mindanao 
(especially Muslim areas) where TFDP had no offices, it relied on MSPC members based in 
diocesan social action centres to highlight abuses by contacting bishops and mobilising church 
support groups.
31 32 units, 6 sub-regional offices, and 4 regional offices. The National Centre in Manila 
looked after Luzon (Minutes of the Second National Administrative Board Meeting, 13-15 
December 1979).
32 Of the 47 staff, 17 were full-time and 30 part-time. (General letter from NOVIB to 
other European funders on behalf of TFDP, n.d. [circa April/May 1979].
33 "Proceedings of the Second National Convention of TFDP, 8-11 August 1979", pg.
9.
252
in 1979, "TFDP was perfectly open, no secrets. But people’s struggle got more sophisticated.
[As] the military...got more sophisticated...we also became more sophisticated".34
From the late 1970s, when an estimated 2% to 3% of clergy supported the NDF,35
TFDP philosophy firmly espoused the national democratic cause. "Experience under martial
law", TFDP argued in 1979, "has shown conclusively that individual efforts to solve [the]
problems...of political detainees are not enough. Individual efforts...to defend the rights of
political detainees, to promote their welfare and secure releases must be combined with
group action".36 TFDP’s fourth national convention was held under the rubric "TFDP, One
with the People’s Struggle Towards Total Social Transformation", NDF-speak for the
*
revolutionary overthrow of the Marcos regime. Amid rising radicalism at the local level and
a reaffirmation of the CPP’s Marxist-Leninist-Mao Tse Tung Thought principles under
Rodolfo Salas’s chairmanship however, TFDP’s National Centre grappled to defend its
organisational autonomy. "TFDP",Dimaranan lectured the Convention,
is an independent organisation. It must remain independent if it is to perform 
its functions effectively.... TFDP workers ...should not take [directives] from 
any other group or organisation.37
The CPP was not the only threat to TFDP autonomy, however; by the early 1980s, foreign
funders were exerting significant influence over organisational structures, programme focus
and financial management. In its early years, TFDP relied on volunteer labour with few
fulltime staff and its main source of financial support was a P10,000 grant in 1975 from the
34 Edicio de la Torre, "Keynote Address" in "Proceedings of the Fourth National Annual 
Convention of TFDP, 19-23 October 1981", Appendix D, pg. 2.
35 David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, 1988, pg. 279.
36 Emphasis from the original ("Proceedings of the TFDP Second National 
Convention...", pg. 13).
37 Sr. Mariani Dimaranan, "TFDP National Organisational Situationer" in 
"Proceedings...Fourth National Annual Convention", Appendix I, pg. 4. In her address, 
Dimaranan listed measures workers should adopt to protect TFDP’s integrity.
253
Women Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines.38 In 1976 however, NOVIB approved 
a grant to TFDP, establishing a long relationship that aided TFDP’s development. With extra 
European funding secured with the help of NOVIB, TFDP had income of P3.7m in 1981, 
70% up on 1980.39 As a result, European agencies formed a consortium to coordinate 
funding to TFDP in 1980, consolidating their already-significant influence.
Within the AMRSP, increased CPP influence in TFDP, and its militant opposition to 
the Marcos regime, estranged conservative superiors. By 1981, TFDP dwarfed the AMRSP 
in size, and though still formally a "working arm" of the AMRSP, now had its own 
organisational structures, weakening AMRSP oversight. Within the AMRSP, bitter debate 
waged about TFDP’s status, and throughout 198L, the AMRSP held inconclusive discussions 
with TFDP and other task forces. For TFDP, working arm status represented a vital "moral 
umbrella" and before the AMRSP convention in August, staff launched an intensive lobby 
of AMRSP members to protect its link.40 The AMRSP Convention decided to retain-its 
relationship with TFDP and other working arms but the issue plagued AMRSP conventions 
for years to come.
In 1975, TFDP was tiny, "a small group of...[women religious] answering the needs 
of political detainees and their relatives...[visiting] camps, [preparing] documentation, 
organising detainees’ relatives to [campaign for] releases, [producing] publication^] and
38 Dimaranan interview, 21 July 1993. r
39 Letter from Sjef Theunis to Sr. Mariani Dimaranan, 20 July 1981; "NOVIB’s 
Comments on the Task Force Detainees 1983-1984 Programme" n.d. [circa 1982]. Sensitive 
to the political implications, the Dutch Foreign Ministry expressed concern in 1979 at NOVIB 
being TFDP’s main European funder (Letter from Sjef Theunis to Sr. Mariani Dimaranan, 
8 February 1979) (Oxfam, Christian Aid and CAFOD however provided small amounts). 
NOVIB lobbied European funding agencies to broaden TFDP’s funding base and by 1981, 
Oxfam, Christian Aid, and the Swiss Lenten Campaign were important funders.
40 Minutes of the National Administrative Board Meeting, 9-11 March 1981.
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educational] [material], [even] babysitting detainees’ children".41 The work however was 
split between two organisations; TFDP, based in the Religious of the Virgin Mary compound 
in Cubao with volunteers drawn mainly from the women religious, and TFDG, from an office 
in Sta. Ana with mainly male volunteers. On 6 September 1974, TFDG launched its first 
publication, Various Reports, publicising cases of harassment of church figures and the torture 
and killing of political detainees.42 Surreptitiously circulated among Catholic and Protestant 
clergy, Various Reports resulted in pressure from the Catholic Bishops Conference of the 
Philippines on Marcos through the Church-Military Liaison Committee, forcing a categorical 
assurance from Marcos that, "No one, but no one, has been tortured".43 Following a 
warning from the Chairman of the Philippine Council for Print Media (PCPM) to cease 
publication,44 the name was changed, first to ICHTHYS (from the Greek "fish") and then 
to Signs o f the Times f 5 but the changes failed to save TFDG.
In September 1976, Amnesty International (AI) issued a damning report^ claiming 
70% of political detainees it interviewed had been tortured. Under international pressure, the 
Philippine government responded in October 1976, querying AI’s Philippine contacts and
41 Sr. Mariani Dimaranan, "Welcome Address", in "Reaffirming Our Commitment to the 
Promotion and Defense of Human Rights: Proceedings of the 10th National Convention of 
TFDP", Iloilo, 2-5 June 1993, Appendix A. Among the relatives seeking TFDP’s help was 
Corazon Aquino whose husband Benigno mounted a hunger strike in April and May 1974 (Sr. 
Mariani Dimaranan, interview, 19 November 1993; Political Detainees..., pp. 80-81).
42 The arrest of Fr. Edward Gerlock, a social action director in Davao del Norte in 
October 1973 and the death in custody of church lay worker Santiago Arce in September 
1974 were among the first cases documented by VR (Political Detainees..., pp. 72-74). Early 
issues of VR were written by two human rights lawyers who achieved prominence during the 
Marcos dictatorship, Romeo Capulong and Raul Roco. After the fall of Marcos, Capulong 
became Counsel to the NDF while Roco was elected to the Senate in 1987 and 1992.
43 In a nationwide radio and television address, 1 December 1974 (Political Detainees 
in the Philippines, Book 3, TFDP and AMRSP, Manila, n.d. [1978], pg. 2.).
44 Under the terms of Presidential Decree 576, publications had to be licensed by the 
PCPM. See Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church..., pg. 119.
45 De la Torre interview.
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condemning "groups that would subvert and overthrow the Philippine government".46 More 
dangerous to the government than TFDP because of its documentation work, TFDG’s fate 
was sealed. On 5 December 1976, in a coordinated clampdown on the AMRSP, TFDG’s 
office was raided and Signs o f the Times was closed. As members of the Association of Men 
Major Religious Superiors (AMMRS) were arrested, others including TFDG publications 
manager Gerardo Bulatao went underground. In disarray, TFDG was subsumed within TFDP.
TFDP’s support services to detainees and their families provided a natural constituency
from which to organise Peoples Organisations (POs) and mobilize their members in support
of human rights and other anti-government campaigns. Launched in 1974, TFDP’s Self-
*
Reliant Projects (SRP) programme provided loans of P500 to P2000 to families whose main 
wage earner was” imprisoned, before being replaced in 1977 by Family Self Reliance 
Programmes (FSRP).47 Rehabilitation projects were also launched in Metro Manila prison 
camps with help from the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP), enabling 
detainees to produce painted T-shirts, pendants carved from cow bones, woven baskets and 
printed cards. As socio-economic programmes, SRPs and FSRPs were largely unsuccessful. 
Loans went unpaid and TFDP became embroiled in intermittent disputes with foreign funders 
about financial reporting. Their main success, Dimaranan argued, was to help families "gain 
the courage to face the military" and in 1978, TFDP launched Kapisanan para sa 
Pagpapalaya at Amnestiya ng mga Detenidong Pulitikal (KAPATID, Association for the 
Release and Amnesty of Political Detainees) with volunteers mobilized through the FSRP.48
From 1976, TFDP helped to pioneer one of the most successful tactics of the left in
46 Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic o f the Philippines, 
22 November-5 December 1975, Second Edition, Amnesty International, London, 1977, 
pg. 69.
47 Dimaranan letter, 11 January 1979.
48 Ibid.
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harassing the Marcos regime. On 5 January, Fr. Ed de la Torre and 17 other detainees went
on hunger strike seeking house arrest status for two female detainees. Although not the first,
the 76-day hunger strike was the most successful to date, promoting unity among detainees
and undermining government denials about prison conditions. While TFDG spread word
through Signs o f the Times and refuted stories in the Marcos-controlled press, TFDP
publicized the strike internationally and mobilized detainees’ families in support.49 Following
negotiations at the Church-Military Liaison Committee meeting of 19 March 1976, the strike
was called off and on 26 March, the two detainees were released under house arrest. Success
however rippled beyond the immediate releases. According to Youngblood, the hunger strike
*
"established that torture was indeed inflicted on some detainees, [and as a result] reports of 
punishment of abusive officers began to appear more frequently".50 The strike represented 
the climax to a wave of 15 hunger strikes between 1973 and 1976 and further waves followed 
in 1978 (7 hunger strikes), and between September 1980 and February 1981. From 1981, 
hunger strikes, invariably successful in bringing releases or improved conditions, became a 
standard response to sudden spates of arrests.51
With the lifting of martial law on 17 January 1981, the character of human rights 
abuses, and consequently of TFDP strategy, changed dramatically. From 1972 to 1981, 
political arrests, torture, and deaths in detention represented TFDP’s primary concern.52
49 Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church..., pg. 161; Dimaranan interview, 21 July 
1993. r
50 Youngblood, ibid, pg. 164.
51 Pumipiglas: Political Detention and Military Atrocities in the Philippines 1981- 
1982, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, Quezon City, 1986, pg. 166.
52 Between September 1972 and January 1981, almost 70,000 people were arrested and 
detained. By the end of 1981, 947 political detainees remained in prison (Pumipiglas..., pg. 
19). With the end of martial law, military trials of detainees resumed and civil courts began 
to recommend bail for newly-arrested detainees ("Proceeding...Fourth National Annual 
Convention...", pg. 5)
257
From 1981 however, "salvagings" (extra-judicial killings, from the Tagalog salbahe, meaning 
nasty or bad), disappearances, massacres, bombings, "hamletting" (forcible relocation) and 
militarization became increasingly important concerns as battle between the Marcos 
dictatorship and the armed left intensified, and government policy towards TFDP hardened. 
TFDP’s new strategy was reflected in its documentation. Its Political Detainees book series, 
published between 1976 and 1978 in the name of the AMRSP, concentrated meticulously on 
documenting arrests and ill-treatment and growing church concern.53 Reflecting its more 
militant approach, Pumipiglas (Struggle or Struggling), a new series of books launched in
1981, documented abuses against peasants, workers and indigenous groups and the resultant 
"people’s resistance", accompanied by a wide-ranging political and economic critique of the 
martial law regime.54 In response, TFDP, along with KAPATID and a church solidarity 
organisation, the Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), was branded a 
"communist front" by the Department of National Defense in July 1981,55 and in September
1982, TFDP’s Sub-Regional Office in Iloilo was raided.56
Scope for political campaigning however was still determined by the exigencies of the 
organisation’s other functions. In the early 1980s, campaigning (Indirect Service) was only 
one of five programmes and the others (Detainee Service, Family Service, Documentation 
and Publication and Administration) frequently operated under considerable pressure. In a 
wave of arrests between September and November 1982, 1,836 people were detained. 
Prisoners, both political and criminal, received inadequate food rations (equivalent to P6 a
53 Political Detainees...; Political Detainees in the Philippines, Book 2, Association 
of Major Religious Superiors, Manila, 1977; Political Detainees...Book 3.
54 Pumipiglas: Political Detention and Military Atrocities in the Philippines, Task 
Force Detainees of the Philippines, Quezon City, 1981.
55 In a front-page story carried by The Sunday Express, 2 August 1981.
56 As part of a general clamp-down on church institutions suspected of anti-government 
activity in late 1982 (See Youngblood, Marcos Against the Church..., pg. 122).
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day in 1983), forcing families to supply food or money to relatives in detention.57 TFDP’s 
DSP and FSP were swamped with requests for help and, as a result, TFDP launched a Food 
Assistance Programme in 1983 with help from European funders.
In 1983, the murder of Benigno Aquino transformed the Philippine political landscape,
creating new opportunities for popular alliances. Human rights issues climbed the agendas of
the Catholic church and moderate opposition in response to rising human rights violations (see
Table 10) and human rights advocates were suddenly to the fore. Jose Diokno and Lorenzo
Tanada, former nationalist Senators and founding lawyers of FLAG, spearheaded Justice for
Aquino, Justice for All, (JAJA), a coalition uniting the moderate and radical opposition.
*
Tanada also chaired the Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD) 
in which, like JAJA, moderate opposition leaders bowed to the organisational skills of the 
national democrats. With its "prestige, network of contacts and organisational resources", 
TFDP played a major role in launching the NAJFD and its regional chapters in Northern 
Luzon, Central Luzon, Bicol, Southern Tagalog, Negros, Panay, Cebu, Leyte, Samar and 
Mindanao (Davao, Cagayan de Oro, Cotabato, Ozamis and Butuan).58 TFDP was also active 
in the JAJA political prisoners committee and maintained close ties with UNIDO (United 
Nationalist Democratic Organisation) and PDP-Laban (Partido Demokratikong ng Pilipinas 
(Philippine Democratic Party)-Lakas ngBayan (Strength of the Nation)), the main opposition 
parties.59 As a result, TFDP ensured that political prisoners and militarization remained 
prominent in their respective platforms and maintained the momentum of an issue around 
which opposition parties could unite.
57 "Food Assistance Project Proposal, 1983-1984", n.d.
58 Oscar Francisco, "Assessment of the Indirect Services Program of the Task Force
Detainees of the Philippines for NOVIB", April 1984, pg. 15.
59 Ibid, pg. 16.
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TFDP was already an active member of the Philippine Coalition for Human Rights
(PhCHR),60 formed in 1980 by lawyers from FLAG and MABINI (Movement of Attorneys
for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism Inc.61). PhCHR was envisaged as a leading
coalition of human rights advocates but failed to take off. On 20 April 1983 however, the
Supreme Court supported the continued detention of prisoners held under Presidential
Commitment Orders (PCOs), effectively legalising warrantless arrests.62 On 5 May, PhCHR
held a special forum, under the banner "Scrap the PCO and replace [sic] the writ [of Habeas
Corpus]", attended by 80 Manila-based human rights and other organisations, including
TFDP and KAPATID, launching the Movement to Abolish the PCO (MAPCO). TFDP was
*
a member of the organising committee and played a prominent role in_subsequent 
activities.63
Throughout the 1970s, Jose Diokno notes, TFDP "helped...awaken public opinion in 
the United States to the iniquity and injustice, the hardship and degradation that support by 
their government help[ed] the martial law regime perpetrate on the Filipino people". US- 
Philippine relations, Diokno argued, provided TFDP with "an unexpected weapon".64 
During the early 1980s, TFDP developed the role further through personal visits by 
Dimaranan and other staff, its regular magazine Quarterly Report, and later, Philippine
60 PhCHR, rather than PCHR as its full name was abbreviated, is used here to distinguish 
it from the Presidential Committee on Human Rights established in 1986.
61 MABINI, composed mainly of FLAG lawyers, was established in part because Jose 
Diokno was reluctant to allow FLAG to become engaged in overt campaigning. The 
organisation was named after Apolinario Mabini, a prominent leader of the 1898 revolution.
62 PCO’s dated formally to the enactment of Letter of Instruction 1125-A in May 1981. 
LOI 1125-A had since been amended by L O I1211, abolishing the requirement for a warrant 
of arrest.
63 "TFDP Semi-Annual Report (January-June 1983)". MAPCO also campaigned against 
Presidential Decree 1834 which converted national security crimes into capital offenses and 
PD1835 which codified anti-subversion laws and imposed capital punishment for subversion.
64 Diokno, "Martial Law...", pg. 36.
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Human Rights Updctte, and assistance to visiting American fact-finding missions (including 
the International Association of Democratic Lawyers in 1984 and the Lawyers Committee for 
Human Rights in 1983 and 1985).65 Enhancing its credibility, TFDP statistics were used by 
the State Department in annual human rights reports to Congress after 1983.66
The atmosphere of terror under which TFDP laboured, combined with its attachment 
to the national democratic cause, led to profound, often disturbing, dilemmas, as an 
organisation devoted to protecting human rights sought to rationalise, if not legitimise, a 
systematic slaughter of underground and NGO/PO activists. In late 1985, the CPP killed over
200 cadres, 130 in Mindanao alone, suspected of being "Deep Penetration Agents" (DPAs)
* — 
(government spies).67 TFDP helped to exhume bodies, collated information about missing
activists and helped their families, and some TFDP workers suffered directly as spouses and
relatives were killed.68 Questions were also raised, however, about TFDP’s role leading up
to, and during, the purges.69 According to the CPP, the purges began in late 1985 when
"leading cadre... became convinced that large numbers of enemy deep penetration agents had
infiltrated the party over a long period of time through white area organisations".70 TFDP
was one of the first organisations to raise the alarm. In 1979, after an inspection visit by
65 See Silliman, "Transnational Relations...", pp. 66-69, and Youngblood, Marcos 
Against the Church..., pg. 167. ^
66 Richard D. Fisher Jr., "Debate Over a Philippine Rights Group", Asian Wall Street 
Journal, 10 April 1989.
67 "Divided They May Fall", The Economist (London), 24 May 1986; "Reaffirm Our 
Basic Principles and Rectify Errors", Central Committee of the Communist Party of fee 
Philippines, July 1992, pp. 31-33. Former Mindanao Commission members Ricardo Reyes 
and Benjamin de Vera and former NPA Chief of Staff Romulo Kintanar were widely blamed 
for orchestrating the purge.
68 The Manila Times, 13 May 1986; anonymous interview.
69 See for instance "Purifying the Party: The aims, objectives and methods of the 
Communist Party of the Philippines", The Pacific Newsletter, (Newsletter of the Pacific 
Division of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade), Edition 492, n.d. [circa 1992].
70 "Reaffirm Our...", pg. 32.
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Dimaranan, TFDP closed its Ozamis City unit and dismissed three staff amid fears of DPA 
infiltration.71 Six months later, the unit was reopened with one worker.72 Throughout the 
early 1980’s, TFDP units endured intimidation from criminal gangs, fanatical religious cults 
and the private armies of landlords, especially in Mindanao, leading to a "low profile 
posture" in parts of the country for much of 1983. Writing to NOVIB in July 1983, 
Dimaranan noted
I don’t know what [will] happen to our Mindanao Regional Office in Davao 
[or] other TFDP offices. Military raids are very much in the air now.. .Though 
these things might be inevitable sooner or later, we try to keep on working 
quietly without inviting their attention.73
Two years later, in 1985, two TFDP staff were killed in separate circumstances; Jesus
"Zaldy" Maglantay, 24, killed in Kalibo, Panay on 2 August by soldiers of the 313th PC
Company after they arrested him at his, boarding house, and Eufrocino Inamarga shot dead
by a Civilian Home Defence Force (CHDF) member.74 Another TFDP worker, Albert
"Abet" Enriquez, "disappeared" after being kidnapped on 29 August and reportedly detained
in Lucena City’s Camp Nakar.75 Fears about the organisation’s security, in particular, the
threat of DPA infiltration, increased from late 1985. In 1986, TFDP documented a massacre
in Mindanao of 50 activists suspected of military links, by the NPA. "In 1985", TFDP
reported at the same time however, "the New People’s Army discovered ...DPAs... within
their ranks. These [DPAs had] infiltrated the ranks of the insurgents so skilfully that it took
71 Dimaranan reputedly found staff openly fraternizing with armed NPA guerillas 
(anonymous interviews). According to another source, staff resigned because they were 
closely associated with suspected DPAs, affecting the unit’s credibility. Infiltration of the unit 
itself, the source claims, was never confirmed.
72 TFDP file "Administration 1979".
73 Letter from Sr. Mariani Dimaranan to Peter de Haan, 21 July 1983.
74 TFDP feature in Malaya, 10 December 1986.
75 See The Philippine Tribune, 3 May 1986. The suspected killers later fled to Canada. 
Attempts by Philippine authorities to have them extradited to stand trial proved unsuccessful.
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until 1985 for the NPA to discover the 10-year old scheme...the NPA is now in the process 
of purging [them]".76 Even as late as April 1986, when the deaths were beginning to ebb, 
TFDP reported "an increase in the number of "Zombies" (DPAs) in Iligan City, Agusan, 
Butuan and part of Surigao".77
Difficulties arising from the atmosphere of repression under which TFDP laboured 
were exacerbated by organisational tensions. TFDP’s Indirect Service Programme (ISP) had 
grown substantially during the 1980s: TFDP was active in alliance work, support group 
building and action committees (including "Free...Committees" for Jose Maria Sison, Fidel 
Agcaoili, Satur Ocampo, Edicio de la Torre and Horacio Morales). The ISP also organised 
forums and symposia; assisted and sustained sectoral organisations (POs) that it had helped 
establish (especially KAPATID, Samahah ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensiyon at para 
sa Amnestiya, [SELDA, Association of-Ex-Detainees against Detention and for Amnesty, 
established in 1985], and Mothers and Relatives Against-  Tyranny and Repression 
[MARTYR]); organised Fact Finding Missions; maintained international solidarity campaigns; 
and organised prison visits for middle-class organisations.78 Other programmes, especially 
documentation, had suffered however79 and the ISP was effectively operating autonomously 
from core programmes such as detainee and family support.80
76 Philippine Human Rights Update (PHRU), Vol. 2 No. 2, October-November 1986, 
pp. 8-9. The article was written in the early months of 1986.
77 Minutes of the National Board Meeting of 6 April 1986.
78 Francisco, "Assessment of ...Indirect Service...", pp. 5-13.
79 According to a NOVIB report, information was often irretrievable and TFDP’s concept 
of documentation (effectively "everything to do with paper") too broad (See Thoolen, "Report 
on.. .(TFDP)", pg 8). Interviewed on 21 July 1993, Dimaranan acknowledged problems with 
TFDP documentation before 1986, including faulty tabulations and double counting (eg. 
detainees listed under their own, plus their "underground", name).
80 Francisco, "Assessment of...Indirect Service...", pg. 22.
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3. TFDP, 1986-1993.
TFDP was caught unawares by the events of February 1986. First, like other
organisations in the national democratic camp, TFDP supported the boycott of the 7 February
Presidential election called by the CPP-NDF in the expectation that electoral fraud would
enable Marcos to retain the presidency. Consequently, during the "People Power" revolt of
22-25 February when church leaders camped on EDS A (Epifanio De los Santos Avenue),
TFDP Chairperson Sr. Mariani Dimaranan was in Europe, mobilising support for a projected
new cycle of confrontation with the Marcos regime. Second, an American magazine article
in December 1985 accused TFDP of being "openly pro-communist".81 Serialised in the
*
Philippine Daily Inquirer, the article claimed that TFDP "inflated the extent of political 
violence for which the government is responsible" and "conscious[ly]...suppress[ed]" details 
of cases it documented "for political reasons".82 TFDP spent late December and January 
contacting Philippine and foreign supporters to counteract the article, diverting attention from 
broader events.83 Third, TFDP was caught by the rapid pace of events after 25 February. 
On 1 March, CPP founding Chairman Jose Maria Sison and other prominent detainees were 
released. Within days, 218 political prisoners were released nationwide,84 overwhelming 
TFDP’s Direct Service Programme with requests to arrange accommodation for released 
detainees, medical and psychiatric treatment for those who had been tortured, organise press 
conferences, and to help families to contact released relatives.
Along with these immediate problems however, Aquino’s assumption of the
81 Ross Munro, "The New Khmer Rouge", Commentary, December 1985, pg. 22.
82 Ibid, pg. 23.
83 "Task Force Detainees of the Philippines on Ross H. Munro Article", TFDP statement, 
28 January 1986; Fidel Agcaoili, letter to the editor, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21 
December 1985.
84 Gonzalez, "Sister Mariani...", pg. 28.
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presidency presented TFDP with a number of dilemmas. First, human rights had been a key
plank in Aquino’s election manifesto and in response, hundreds of local and regional human
rights organisation were established nationwide following the collapse of the Marcos regime.
TFDP therefore risked marginalization and the fragmentation of the national democratic-
aligned human rights movement that it had built. Second, TFDP had to refine its mandate.
TFDP openly supported the NDF from the late 1970s until 1986, but the new regime
conditions created pressure on TFDP to distance itself from the NDF and redefine its role as
a human rights organisation. Third, with a government committed to the establishment of new
institutions and mechanisms to protect human rights, TFDP would now have to engage the
*
state in direct relationships, in contrast to the militant opposition to the state that had 
previously defined its stance.
In 1986, TFDP’s National Assembly approved a written constitution, by-laws and a 
statement of principles; TFDP registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission; and 
an external auditor was appointed for the first time. TFDP’s National Board also established 
a Task Force Regionalisation to strip out an entire tier of bureaucracy; created new 
departments to handle finance, planning, monitoring and evaluation, and human resource 
development; and agreed new decision-making procedures. In May 1987, underpressure from 
funding consortium members, two consultants were appointed to"sit in on National Board" 
meetings and in August 1987, an Advisory Board was established, composed of Horacio 
Morales, Ed Garcia and Bishop Julio Labayen. Membership of TFDP’s National 
Administrative Board and its successor, the National Board, were traditionally confined to 
staff, a function of the traditional sensitivity of TFDP’s work and political empathies, but the 
1987 changes introduced significant new thinking and pressures.
In 1992, however, the most significant change occurred, when Sr. Mariani
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Dimaranan, TFDP’s unrivalled head since 1975, was replaced as head of TFDP. Sr. Cres
Lucero, former head of Education Forum, another AMRSP‘task force, assumed the new
office of Executive Director. Dimaranan remained as Chairperson but de facto  power now
lay with Lucero. Illustrating the complex institutional forces and alliances which underpin
large NGOs such as TFDP, the transition was initiated by an unlikely alliance between the
CPP and foreign funders, brokered by Advisory Board Chairman Horacio Morales.85 The
CPP-NDF remained an important influence in TFDP after 1986, and became restive with
Dimaranan’s increasingly outspoken and truculent style.86 European funders were also
frustrated by Dimaranan’s personal grip over TFDP, and an almost dictatorial management
*
style that stymied organisational and strategic change.87 Implementation of the 
regionalisation policy depended on a similar alliance, as senior CPP-NDF leaders, concerned 
to curb the activities of renegades in Mindanao,88 sided with European donors who sought 
increased efficiency.
Under Lucero’s stewardship, the institution-building thrust was consolidated. 
Regionalisation was completed, replacing the former regional and sub-regional tiers with 13 
new regional offices. Programme implementation was improved with the appointment of a 
Deputy Executive Director with responsibility for Operations. Decision-making and
85 Anonymous sources confirm that Morales’ authority played a key role in persuading 
Dimaranan to step aside.
86 According to former CPP Executive Committee member Isagani Serrano, Dimaranan 
epitomised a strain of thought among the religious with which the CPP frequently found it 
difficult to cope, undermining progress towards a more formal united front. "Because of the 
hegemony of the movement and the type of prestige its leadership has developed, even 
independent people..believe in what...the leadership are saying. That goes as well for Sr. 
Mariani, but then she resist[s] also... [and] does what she wants to do... .1 guess her adamancy 
grew because times changed also" (Isagani Serrano, interview, 23 November 1993).
87 Anonymous interviews.
88 CPP/NDF leaders also promoted regionalisation in other organisations in which it was 
influential, notably KMP, to control Mindanao members (anonymous interview).
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accountability were improved with the creation of a Board of Trustees (BoT) and a separate
National Management Committee (NAMANCOM).89 TFDP’s finances were also
restructured. Administration expenses (planning, monitoring & evaluation, finance, human
resource development) as a percentage of overall expenditure fell from almost 40% in 1991
to 29% in 1992 and the percentage of total funding (including counterpart funding such as
services and materials) raised within the Philippines rose from 9% in 1990 to 21% in
1 9 9 2  90 According to staff, the changes brought significant benefits; better communication
between units and the national centre; improved liaison with local government units,91 (see
below); more manageable workloads for regional directors; and improved overall
*
QOmanagement.
Institution-building proved controversial however and pitted political forces in a battle 
for influence in TFDP. One of the main battle grounds was regionalisation, pitting the 
National Centre against more radical staff, especially in Mindanao. Mindanao, previously 
administered by a regional office in Davao City, was divided into three regions, each with 
a Regional Director answerable to Manila. Mindanao staff claimed the reforms undermined 
TFDP’s ability to mount Mindanao-wide campaigns, and to liaise with other mass 
organisations with island-wide structures and curbed the significant autonomy which the 
Mindanao region previously enjoyed.93 In response, the National Centre established an Inter-
89 See " [TFDP] Advisory Team Interim Report", February 1992, pp. 7-9.
90 Sr. Cres Lucero, "Presentation of Three-Year Strategic Assessment 1990-93" in 
"Proceedings... 10th National Convention", Appendix E.
91 The new region structure closely parallels local government regions.
92 Victoria Torre-Campo, Unit Supervisor, TFDP Bacolod, interview, Bacolod, 2 
November 1993; Danilo Caspe, Regional Director-Southern Mindanao, TFDP, interview, 
Davao City,4 November 1993.
93 Traditionally, CPP influence within TFDP was at its greatest in Mindanao. 
Regionalisation thus sparked an important political struggle within TFDP (anonymous 
interviews).
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Regional Coordinating Committee (IRCC) in Mindanao,94 but Mindanao staff were unhappy 
that the IRCC had no budget or decision-making powers.95
Relations between the National Centre (NC) and regions is an enduring source of
tension within TFDP, especially over finance. Regional offices or units have approached
foreign funders in the past without informing the NC.96 Other units failed to submit regular
financial reports and in 1990, a "No report, no subsidy" policy was introduced to improve
financial control.97 TFDP is unusual among Philippine NGOs in the degree of authority the
NC exerts over regional offices, a crucial mechanism by which political empathy for the
national democratic cause is subordinated to institutional prerogatives. To maintain control
*
and monitor programme implementation, senior staff visit regional offices and units regularly.
Socio-economic programmes have been another source of controversy. TFDP is 
unusual among Philippine NGOs in its commitment to focus and, in contrast to PRRM, has 
resisted broadening programme range. Income-generating projects (IGPs), for instance, 
boosted beneficiaries’ morale and served as a valuable springboard for organising. Senior 
TFDP staff felt however that IGPs also engendered dependency and were undermined by poor 
staff skills and inadequate capital.98 By 1988/89, TFDP had more than 100 IGPs-Operating 
nationwide but in October 1989, the National Board ended IGPs as a major programme 
thrust.99 Similarly, in 1989, TFDP closed Tulong-Laya, its rehabilitation centre for released
94 Lucero acknowledges that the reduced ability to mount Mindanao-wide campaigns was 
the main disadvantage of the regionalisation process (interview, 18 October 1993).
95 Caspe interview.
96 Minutes of National Board meeting, 24-28 July 1989.
97 Minutes of the expanded National Board meeting, 22-26 January 1990; 
"Proceedings... 10th Convention", pg. 7.
98 "TFDP-Luzon Progress Report January-June 1987".
99 The board decided to end central funding to IGPs, to transfer large projects to co­
operatives and to fund existing IGPs from project repayments only ("Semi-Annual Report, 
luly-December 1989", pg. 8); Minutes of National Board meeting 25-28 July 1988.
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detainees, and transferred its functions to other organisations including KAPATID, the 
AMRSP Sanctuary Desk and the Medical Action Group (MAG).100
Despite this determination to concentrate on its core tasks of documentation and 
campaigning however, TFDP has been forced to maintain ancillary schemes, illustrating the 
enormous pressures on NGOs to complement inadequate state services. With funding from 
the European Community worth PlOm in 1993-94, TFDP supplemented the food allowances 
political prisoners receive from prison authorities (P8.50 a day or P250 a month) with an 
additional P250 per prisoner per month, and arranged lawyers for political prisoners unable 
to secure a Public Attorneys Office (PAO) lawyer.101
TFDP grew significantly during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Income doubled 
between 1990 and 1993,102 although staff size remained constant.103 By the end of 1992,
100 "Semi-Annual Report, July-December 1989", pg. 9.
101 NOVIB ended Food Aid support to TFDP in mid-1993, causing tension. TFDP 
maintained the allowances however, placing considerable pressure on its other programmes. 
EC aid funds legal assistance and a campaign to improve prison conditions (Sr. Cres Lucero, 
interview, 18 October 1993). Since 1989, when human rights lawyers were killed in 
unprecedented numbers (see Chapter 3), TFDP has found it increasingly difficult to secure 
lawyers for political prisoners. Of 37 political prisoners in Bacolod Provincial Jail in 
November 1993 for instance, only 14 had a PAOJawyer (8 had FLAG lawyers while 15 had 
other human rights lawyers). Where judges are unable to arrange a PAO lawyer, TFDP can 
sometimes arrange one. Those with PAO lawyers however resent them because of their 
reluctance to visit the prison or keep them informed of the progress of their case. Inevitably, 
supplementary food aid leads criminal prisoners to seek political status. In Bacolod Provincial 
Jail, TFDP withdrew entitlements from 2 prisoners who claimed their offenses were 
politically-motivated following representations from other political prisoners. Political 
prisoners, some seriously injured, also rely almost exclusively on TFDP and KAPATID for 
medical care. One prisoner for instance was returned to prison prematurely and without 
antibiotics after a leg amputation. By 2 November he had been without antibiotics for a 
month, had an infected wound and was in considerable pain. TFDP and KAPATID however 
could not obtain medicine without a prescription or permission to have the prisoner seen by 
a doctor (Group interview with 21 political prisoners in Bacolod Provincial Jail, 2 November 
1993. Hereafter, BPJ interviews).
102 "Proceedings... 10th National Convention", Graph 1.
103 TFDP had 277 staff in 1987, 285 in 1989 and 288 at the end of 1992 (Oscar Francisco 
and Jose Zalaquett, "Evaluation of Task Force Detainees of the Philippines", TFDP/NOVIB, 
October 1987, pg. 21; Minutes of the National Board meeting, 26-28 April 1989; "TFDP
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TFDP had 82 offices nationwide with units in 69 of the country’s 72 provinces (including 5 
units in predominantly Muslim areas),104 giving it the most extensive nationwide network 
of any Philippine NGO. Institution-building played a major role in attracting the necessary 
donor confidence, but as the following sections trace, refinements in its philosophy and its 
programme of political action, led to growing influence and legitimacy.
4. TFDP and Philippine Politics: Philosophy and Implementation.
TFDP philosophy, enshrined in its January 1986 constitution, commits it to (1) the
inviolable dignity of the human person and the inalienable right to life, freedom and
*
development; (2) "the Gospel’s preferential option for the poor, deprived and oppressed"; (3) 
"active, critical and creative participation in the historical process of social transformation"; 
and (4) adherence to-intemational human rights and humanitarian law.105 As with PRRM, 
the evolution of that philosophy during the late 1980s and early 1990s was influenced by its 
traditional mission, the role of authoritative leaders (notably Srs. Dimaranan and Lucero) and 
the need to reconcile institutional interests represented in its decision-making processes. 
TFDP^s philosophy however legitimizes an extensive programme of political action in pursuit
End-of-Year Report, July-December 1992, pg. 24).
104 Sr. Cres Lucero, "Prospects for Peace and Human Rights in the Philippines", talk 
given at the Philippine Resource Centre, London, 22 February 1993, (author’s own notes). 
The 5 units are located in Isulan, Iligan City, Zamboanga City, Cotabato City and Marawi 
City. TFDP operations in Muslim areas have traditionally depended on a number of factors, 
including: (1) relations between the CPP and Moro National Liberation Force (MNLF); (2) 
relations between Muslim and Christian religious leaders; (3) relations between TFDP and 
Muslim NGOs, notably the Manila-based Moro Human Rights Centre (MHRC); and (4) 
human rights abuse patterns in Muslim areas. TFDP first established units in Muslim 
Mindanao in 1979 (in Iligan, Cotabato and Zamboanga cities) and in 1993, the National 
Convention approved the establishment of a Regional Office (Central Mindanao) responsible 
for Muslim areas (including Sultan Kudarat, Zamboanga City, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, 
Marawi, Lanao provinces and Cotabato City) (See "Proceedings... 10th National Convention", 
pp. 35-37 and Appendix H).
105 TFDP Constitution, Part II, "Guiding Principles", in "[TFDP] Membership Manual".
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of goals that exceed a strict concern with human rights, accentuating the dilemmas.
In the first year of the Aquino administration, TFDP came under enormous pressure 
from foreign funders, Philippine and international human rights organisations, and former 
human rights lawyers in the Aquino government to confine its mandate to human rights 
concerns and to demonstrate political impartiality by documenting NPA abuses. In October 
1987, NOVIB criticized TFDP for demanding the unconditional release of political prisoners 
where proper treatment and fair trials were more appropriate demands, and for indiscriminate 
condemnation of military operations permitted under international humanitarian law (eg. 
civilian evacuations and displacements).106 In particular however, the report called for "a 
human rights movement or organisation that is clearly separate and distinct in objective and 
mandate from political parties or broader political movements".107
At the National Board meeting of 26-28 August 1987, TFDP approved a defiant 
statement in response, published as an advertisement in the national daily Malaya in October 
1987. TFDP rejected pressure to document rebel abuses,108 and defended its "preferential 
option for the poor".109 The NOVIB report however made clear that TFDP was expected 
to initiate a thorough review of its mandate and programmes and TFDP’s May 1988 National 
Convention agreed significant changes. "[WJorking for human rights and not political actions 
is TFDP’s contribution to the attainment of a [just] society", the Convention decided.110 
Resolutions calling for evacuations, displacements etc. to be documented with reference to
106 Francisco and Zalaquett, "Evaluation of [TFDP]", pp. 16-18.
107 Ibid, pg. 34.
108 Rebel offenses, TFDP argued, were already punishable under criminal and national 
security legislation, reducing the issue to one of enforcement. TFDP also pointed out that it 
did not document deaths or injuries among NPA guerillas in legitimate encounters with the 
AFP.
109 "So You May Know", reproduced in "[TFDP] Membership Manual", pp. 25-29.
110 "Developments in TFDP Work Pertinent to the Recommendations From The 
Francisco-Zalaquett Evaluation", n.d. [late 1988].
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international humanitarian law, and mandating changes to TFDP’s Human Rights Lexicon, 
were also approved.111 Behind the scenes, however, TFDP resented the pressure, and the 
changes, in many respects, represented a damage limitation exercise designed to maintain  
TFDP’s strategic orientation.112
In 1989 however, TFDP came under greater pressure to clarify its mandate. On 25 
June, the NPA killed 37 people in Digos, Davao del Sur. TFDP participated in a fact-finding 
mission with the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP), to which the dead were 
all attached. On 28 June, UCCP blamed the massacre on the NPA,113 while the NPA 
claimed self-defence.114 With links to both the UCCP and NDF, TFDP dwelled on its 
response and was denounced by the press. On 4 July, TFDP’s National Centre finally 
responded, condemning the "senseless killings". "It should be emphasised", the statement 
qualified, "that TFDP is against all acts of violence against unarmed civilians...committed 
by agents of the state or rebels".115 Deepening the crisis, TFDP’s Mindanao regional office 
issued a statement two days later attributing the deaths to a firelight between Bogobo-Itoman 
cultists and the NPA,116 a defiant last gesture before regionalisation.
In 1986, when Marcos loyalists were arrested and detained on political grounds, 
TFDP resolved to document cases, but not to campaign for their release. "It must be made 
clear" an internal TFDP document noted, "that TFDP has a historical bias which affects our
111 Ibid. The new lexicon was published in the March-April and April-May 1988 issues 
of Philippine Human Rights Update, both published after the Convention.
112 According to Dimaranan, for instance, the creation of a Board of Trustees, enabled
TFDP to circumvent many of the report’s recommendations (Dimaranan interview, 19
November 1993).
113 UCCP Press Statement, 28 June 1989. The statement pointed out that of the 37 killed, 
23 were female and 21 under the age of 19.
114 NDF statement dated simply "June 1989".
115 TFDP National Centre Press Release, 4 July 1989.
116 TFDP-Mindanao Press Statement, 6 July 1989.
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treatment of the "loyalists"".117 In 1988, TFDP noted that it was open to using international
humanitarian law "to reflect the reality of armed conflict", but argued that such a policy
risked promoting belligerency status for the NPA under international law, and jeopardized
the safety of workers obliged to enter rebel-held or contested areas.118 Individual units
were given the discretion to document humanitarian law abuses but documentation was not
systemized at the national level,119 a compromise that contained pressures in particular
regions. The Digos Massacre however, along with Operation Missing Link, (another bout of
purges within the CPP in Mindanao and Southern Tagalog), crystallized TFDP’s adherence
to international humanitarian law. As with the recovery of "DPA" bodies in 1986, TFDP
*
participated in fact-finding missions and the exhumation of shallow graves, and helped to 
rehabilitate CPP torture victims, deeply affecting many staff.120 Although theoretically 
committed to international humanitarian law since 1987, TFDP now documented and 
condemned NPA atrocities with greater determination,121 echoing policy within the NDF 
itself.122
As the principal NGO in the national democratic camp, TFDP comes under significant 
pressure to maintain its militancy. In 1988, for instance, human rights NGOs and POs in 
Cagayan Valley (notably the local branch of the Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace 
(EMJP)) attacked TFDP and differences were only resolved at a specially-convened "Unity
117 Minutes of National Board meeting, 20-22 May 1986.
118 Minutes of TFDP Consortium meeting, The Hague, 7 December 1988.
119 Minutes of National Board meeting, 26-28 October 1988.
120 Victims, according to Sr. Lucero, included NGO workers and some of her own former 
students from St. Joseph’s College, Manila (Lucero interview, 13 August 1993).
121 Notably, an encounter with NPA guerillas in Surigao del Sur on 15 February 1992 in 
which 38 government soldiers died. "[W]ounded soldiers", said TFDP, quoting survivors, 
were "systematically executed", "focus[ing] attention anew on whether the NDF itself was 
faithfully adhering to internationally accepted norms" (Pumipiglas 3 ... ,  pg. 64).
122 On the NDF’s acknowledgement of abuses by the NPA and CPP, see interview with 
Satur Ocampo in Pumipiglas 3 ..., pp. 162-164.
273
Congress".123 By 1993, the CPP’s "Reaffirm" V "Reject" debate had exacerbated the
pressure but TFDP’s size and influence gave it a significant capacity to survive as it evolved
from an organisation narrowly concerned with defending NDF/CPP activists and NPA
guerrillas to a human rights organisation with a less partisan mandate. According to Satur
Ocampo, a staunch defender of TFDP interests in underground circles,
With the development of broader concepts of human rights, [TFDP] is 
expanding its activities and concerns beyond political detainees or those in the 
revolutionary movement. It [will] be a test for the NDF to withstand the 
intrusion of the political effects of the on-going debate within the movement 
such as the pressures on some TFDP units against extending services to groups 
or peoples identified with other parties and TFDP must maintain its 
independent role. As far as defending human rights and extending support to 
the needy is concerned, it should^not be affected by political positions.124
Ocampo’s position suggests that TFDP, ironically, is dependent on support from influential
NDF members to maintain its integrity as a human rights organisation.
As human rights violations committed against individuals fell in the 1990s (See Table
10), TFDP’s 10th National Convention in 1993 approved a new mission statement that eroded
its commitment to social transformation.125 TFDP agreed to focus increasingly on
economic, political, and cultural rights, embracing special interests including women,
indigenous groups, and children.126 The decision formalised initiatives already underway,
123 Dimaranan interview, 19 November 1993. According to the minutes of the National 
Board meeting of 25-28 July 1988, POs expected TFDP to function as a cause-oriented group 
such as BAY AN, a problem also experienced in Visayas, though preempted there.
124 Satur Ocampo, interview, 19 November 1993.
125 "As a service organisation", the new mission statement read, "TFDP shall work to 
protect the rights and promote the legitimate interests of political prisoners and other victims 
of human rights violations, and create and enhance among people awareness of their rights 
and knowledge of basic human rights concepts and principles" ("Proceedings... 10th National 
Convention", Appendix F).
126 Ibid; Lucero interview 13 August 1993. On the growing nexus between development 
and human rights espoused by national democratic NGOs, see Human Rights Forum, Vol. 
3 No. 1, 1993.
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including collaboration with environmental NGOs on ecology issues,127 and heralded further 
conflict with the CPP.
5. Coalition-Building.
Coalition-building (or alliance work, the term preferred by TFDP) is one of the most 
important mechanisms by which TFDP intervenes in politics. TFDP is a member of the 
Multi-Sectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA), the National Peace Conference, and the National 
Coordinating Council on Local Government (NCC-LG) and a number of regional coalitions.
Unlike PRRM however, TFDP concentrates on one, the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights
* — 
Advocates (PAHRA, from the Tagalog,para  (stop)), a coalition of predominantly national
democratic human rights NGOs.
The collapse of the Marcos regime created a dramatic new "democratic space" for
human rights NGOs and POs: freedom to organise, liaise openly with other organisations at
the local or national level, and actively mobilize new constituencies. In May 1986, human
rights NGOs and POs, mostly national democrat-aligned and led by TFDP, held a national
congress in Manila. To consolidate the human rights movement, a new coalition, PAHRA, _
was launched, and Sr. Mariani Dimaranan became PAHRA’s first Chairperson.128 With 100
NGO/PO members by 1993,129 PAHRA became the most important human rights coalition
127 In 1991, for instance, TFDP and HARIBON workers were arrested in Palawan during 
a petition campaign ("TFDP Mid-Year Report January-June 1991"; Lucero interview, 18 
October 1993). On the growing human rights-ecology nexus, see Max de Mesa, "A 
Philippine Endeavour: Building the People’s Aegis Against the Twin Assaults on Human 
Rights and the Environment", Human Rights Forum, Vol. 2 No. 2, 1992.
128 Pumipiglas 3 ...,p g . 75.
129 For a full list of PAHRA members, see Gerard Clarke, "Human Rights Non- 
Governmental Organisations in the Philippines: A Case-study of Task Force Detainees of the 
Philippines", in Sidney G. Silliman and Lela Gamer Noble (Eds.), Non-Governmental 
Organisations in the Philippines: Civil Society and the State, University of Hawaii Press, 
Honolulu, forthcoming.
275
in the Philippines and an important weapon used by the left to berate the Aquino government, 
co-ordinating issue-specific campaigns,130 organising pickets and demonstrations,131 
petitioning United Nations organs,132 and, from 1989, lobbying the Senate and House.133 
In addition however, PAHRA became a significant critic of the CPP and the NPA and 
highlighted growing tension within the human rights movement as the CPP, and supportive 
NGOs/POs, split between those committed and opposed to the CPP’s orthodox Marxist- 
Leninist- Mao Tse Tung Thought philosophy.
In contrast to coalitions such as CPAR and FDC which achieved quick success, but 
then fragmented, PAHRA experienced a difficult birth. Between 1987 and 1989, when 
fighting between the AFP and NPA was at its most intense, moderates shunned PAHRA, and 
its national democrat orientation, combined “with Aquino’s ostensible liberalism, made 
organising difficult.134 Internally, PAHRA was destabilised by the CPP’s "Operation 
Missing Link". PAHRA staff member Pearl Abaya was abducted outside TFDP’s National 
Centre in November 1988 by the CPP. Amid intensive inquiries in underground circles by 
PAHRA officials, Abaya was released after six months.135 By then however, relations
130 For instance, the 1986 "Exodus" and "Piso Para sa mga Bata ng Cagayan" (a Peso for 
the Children of Cagayan) campaigns directed against government counter-insurgency 
operations in Cagayan.
131 In 1988, for instance, PAHRA organised a "trial" of Manila Police Chief Brig. Gen. 
Alfredo Lim and Lt. Col. Romeo Maganto, commander of Manila’s Western Police district 
Station No. 1 (Tondo) on charges of multiple murder. The 5-person jury composed of Rep. 
Nikki Coseteng, a Quezon City councillor and representatives of PAHRA, MAG and EMJP 
found both guilty in a ringing condemnation of the Commission on Human Rights’ failure to 
act on cases filed by human rights NGOs (See The Manila Chronicle, 25 June 1988).
132 For instance, in February 1988, PAHRA petitioned the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights to conduct an inquiry into the human rights situation in the Philippines 
(Malaya, 20 February 1988).
133 See further below.
134 Pumipiglas 3 ..., pp. 78.
135 According to anonymous sources, Abaya’s release followed direct representations by 
PAHRA to exiled CPP leader Jose Maria Sison in December 1988.
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between PAHRA and the revolutionary movement were tense, exacerbated as others released 
directed TFDP and the military to shallow graves in Southern Tagalog.136 From 1990 
however, as the Aquino government increasingly acknowledged the legitimacy of PAHRA 
and TFDP grievances, its steadfastness won it increased credibility with Congress, the 
judiciary and the media.137 By 1993, co-ordination among members through PAHRA 
committees (including campaigns and research & documentation) had improved 
significantly,138 and campaign launches regularly attracted ambassadors and embassy 
officials, bishops, political representatives, and the national media.139
One of the distinctive features of PAHRA was its vocal support for the national 
democratic cause. According to Lucero, its national democrat identity and its role as a 
"political centre" in projecting humamights as a central issue filled a political vacuum and 
hence proved a significant source of strength. During the early 1990s, it’s effectiveness 
stemmed largely from the specialist skills of individual members and a resultant division of 
labour. TFDP was responsible for documentation, EMJP for militarization and internal 
refugees, MAG for medical support to fact-finding missions and to former political detainees, 
and KAPATID, SELDA, FIND and MARTYR for organising specific constituencies. This 
division, Dimaranan argued, made TFDP work focused and systematic, and less vulnerable
136 Anonymous interviews. PAHRA called for a presidential inquiry after 30 bodies were 
discovered in 13 shallow graves in Laguna and Quezon (of an estimated 270 missing, 
according to relatives) in May 1989 (See The Manila Chronicle, 17 May 1989). The purges 
in Southern Tagalog were reputedly masterminded by NPA commanders Gregorio Rosal and 
Leopoldo Mabilangan (See The ManBa Chronicle, 27 May 1989).
137 Former Supreme Court Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento became PAHRA Co-Chairman 
in 1991.
138 Lucero interview, 18 October 1993.
139 The launch of PAHRA’s anti-vigilante campaign, "CAFGUs Against Human Rights", 
on 2 April 1993 for instance was attended by the Belgian ambassador, British and Australian 
embassy officials, 1 bishop, and representatives of 3 Congressmen. The launch was also 
promoted through a front page article, "CAFGUs persist in abuses", in the Philippine Daily 
Inquirer, 2 April 1993.
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to repression by the government or censure by the Catholic hierarchy or foreign funders, in 
contrast to the Vicaria de la Solidaridad in Chile, which closed after losing church 
support.140
Outside Manila, PAHRA was less effective. PAHRA regional and provincial affiliates 
in which TFDP was prominent, such as the Human Rights Alliance of Negros (HRAN), the 
Davao Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (DAHRA) and the Cotabato Alliance of Human 
Rights Advocates (CAHRA), were only sustained for short periods.141 Federations such as 
EMJP, SELDA, MARTYR, and KAPATID lacked the extensive national networks to provide 
TFDP with local coalition partners, while others, notably EMJP, faced funding difficulties 
in the 1990s as the number of individual human rights violations fell (see Table 10). Where 
they did have chapters, however, partner POs resented TFDP prominence and salary 
differentials between TFDP and other human rights workers.142 Similarly, TFDP and 
partner POs mounted effective short-term coalitions in response to specific issues, for 
instance, on behalf of internal refugees following the displacement of 35,000 people in 
Negros Occidental in April 1989,143 yet found it difficult to launch pro-active and sustained
140 Dimaranan, interview, 21 July 1993. The Vicaria documented human rights abuses, 
provided lawyers, and managed socio-economic projects. Its closure dealt a significant blow 
to the human rights movement in Chile, a lesson, Dimaranan argues, that TFDP is 
determined to avoid.
141 HRAN for instance was established by TFDP and the Bacolod Social Action 
Secretariat (SAC) in 1988 but lost momentum in 1990 when SAC staff were retrenched 
following the appointment of a conservative Bishop (Jagurin interview; Torre Campo 
interview). Both DAHRA and CAHRA collapsed in 1987-88 although a Southern Mindanao 
Alliance of Human Rights Advocates was launched in August 1993 (Caspe interview).
142 ypDp salaries outside Manila though moderate compared to PRRM or PBSP are still 
twice the level of KAPATID’s (anonymous interview). The problem is a long-standing one. 
Minutes of TFDP’s National Board meeting of 26-29 August 1979 record complaints from 
partner human rights POs about TFDP staff wearing stylish clothes and eating in restaurants.
143 Pumipiglas 3 ..., pg. 33. As well as publicizing the issue nationally, HRAN’s 
campaign led to the establishment of the Federation of Internal Refugees (FIRE) and the 
Koalisyonpara sa Paghidaet (Coalition for Peace), in Negros, an island where alliance work 
has been traditionally hazardous (Torre-Campo interview).
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coalitions.
With the onset of the CPP "Reaffirm" V "Reject" debate (see chapter 4), TFDP 
coalition-building became more difficult. As of 1993, TFDP’s centralised structure ensured 
sufficient autonomy from the NDF and CPP to preserve its institutional integrity, unlike 
sectoral organisations such as Kilusang May Uno (KMU, May First Movement) or Kilusang 
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP, Philippine Peasants Movements) which split into rival 
camps.144 As federations, however, in which regional affiliates had greater autonomy, 
coalition partners such as KAPATID and EMJP were more vulnerable, threatening PAHRA, 
and by implication, TFDP. Equally, pressure from the local branches of organisations such 
as KAPATID or EMJP threatened to engulf TFDP units and regional offices. In late 1993, 
TFDP workers reported sensitivity about cases they took on, pressure on individuals to take 
sides, and the need for frequent unit and regional office meetings to contain the pressure.145
h r  1994 however, the CPP internal split finally engulfed PAHRA. Following five 
months of debate on PAHRA’s draft Philippine Declaration of Human and Peoples Rights, 
28 member organisations led by BAYAN (Bagong Alayansang Makabayan, New Patriotic 
Alliance) walked out from PAHRA’s fifth national Congress on 26 October. BAYAN 
denounced attempts "to transform PAHRA into a politically neutral organisation which reeks 
of collaboration and compromise with the state on the issue of human rights violations" while 
other organisations condemned the PAHRA draft as "too universal to guide human rights 
advocacy in the [Philippines]". KMU, KMP, GABRIELA (the General Assembly Binding 
Women for Reform, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action) and SELDA joined BAYAN 
in leaving PAHRA, while TFDP, MAG, EMJP and the Association of Concerned Teachers
144 In August 1993, according to Lucero, TFDP’s Management Committee decided to 
"assert [TFDP’s] integrity as a legal organisation" (Lucero interview, 18 October 1993).
145 Anonymous interviews.
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(ACT) remained.146 As the human rights situation improved, the partisan character of 
human rights NGO action had weakened, leading to further divergence between human rights 
NGOs and the national democratic movement and further fragmentation of the national human 
rights movement.
6. Volunteer Mobilization.
Volunteer mobilization and membership have long been sensitive within TFDP, and 
amid international appeals for greater NGO accountability,147 illustrate dilemmas Philippine 
NGOs face in developing membership bases. When TFDP membership was introduced in the 
early 1980s, it was confined to staff, roughly 250, to protect both TFDP’s national 
democratic orientation and the national centre’s authority. In 1985 however a NOVIB report 
criticized the narrow membership base and recommended that TFDP develop a local 
membership structure involving other local human rights organisations, thus replacing units 
and their paid staff.148 Article IV of TFDP’s constitution approved by the 1986 National 
Assembly (28 January- 1 February), noted that "TFDP shall have for its membership 
individuals who share the same vision and adhere to its principles" but concrete plans to 
expand membership beyond staff were avoided in accompanying Bye-laws. NOVIB again 
criticized TFDP’s narrow membership base in 1987,149 but Dimaranan opposed 
expansion.150
146 BAYAN Press Statement, 26 October 1994; The Manila Chronicle, 28 October 
1994; Philippine Daily Inquirer, 28 October 1994.
147 See for instance Michael Edwards and David Hulme, "NGOs and Development: 
Performance and Accountability in ’the New World Order’", paper to the International 
Workshop on "NGOs and Development: Performance and Accountability in the New World 
Order", University of Manchester, 27-29 June 1994.
148 Thoolen, "Report Mission...[TFDP]", pp. 4 and 8.
149 Francisco and Zalaquett, "Evaluation of [TFDP]", pp. 46-47.
150 Anonymous interview.
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[With the appointment of a TFDP Advisory Board in 1987, TFDP came under greater
pressure and at the April 1990 National Convention, cautious'membership provisions were
added to TFDP’s bye-laws. Membership was confined to "consistent human rights
advocate[s]", the National Assembly was empowered to limit numbers, and the Membership
Committee to ensure representative nationwide distribution, while individual membership
applications had to be approved by the National Board.151 In July 1991, a TFDP
membership manual was produced, but despite the appointment of outside specialists and
constituency representatives such as Prof. Randy David, Atty. Rene Sarmiento and Nelia
Sancho to TFDP’s new Board of Trustees in 1990, opposition to expanded membership from
*
Dimaranan and others within TFDP delayed implementation.
By early 1992 however, Lucero was in effective command and TFDP made concrete 
plans to recruit outside members. To maintain stability, to prevent TFDP becoming a mass 
organisation (ie. a PO), and to provide support to units, TFDP’s National Management 
Committee (NAMANCOM) proposed that non-staff membership should not exceed the 
number of staff (by now, roughly 300).152 Despite reservations,153 the Board of Trustees 
approved the NAMANCOM plans and set a recruitment target of 100 non-staff members by 
June 1993.154 Although some regions opposed non-staff members,155 the target was 
exceeded and by June 1993, TFDP had 239, "most of whom" were "long-time human rights 
advocates and TFDP allies", giving a total membership of 479 including staff.156
151 TFDP Bye-laws, Article 1, Sections 1-3.
152 Minutes of TFDP Board of Trustees meeting, 2 March 1990.
153 Ibid.
154 Minutes of the Board of Trustees meeting, 6 June 1992.
155 Some felt units could maintain effective relationships with important sectors, notably 
lawyers and religious, without formal membership (See "[TFDP] Advisory Team Interim 
Report", pg. 22).
156 Lucero, in "Proceedings... 10th National Convention", Appendix E, pg. 7.
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TFDP’s July 1991 membership manual establishes an elaborate and stringent 
recruitment procedure. Applications must be accompanied by .a letter of recommendation; 
they must be vetted by local staff, the regional director and National Membership Committee; 
and must be approved by a Board of Trustees majority vote.157 Members can be expelled 
if they "issue derogatory statements" or "participate in smear campaign[s]", protecting TFDP 
from internecine intra-left debate, and must "participate in TFDP activities", excluding 
passive supporters.158 Non-staff members are drawn primarily from the "middle sectors" 
(see Table 9) and have brought TFDP enhanced credibility with government officials and 
local communities, and helped secure TFDP accreditation with local government bodies.159
Table 9
TFDP Non-Staff Membership, June 1993: 
Occupational Profile (%)16°
Lawyers 18 Government officials 3 Accountants 1
Priests 21 Social workers 2 Midwives 1
Nuns 5 Government employees 3 Engineers 1
Pastors 8 Private employees 2 Farmers- 3
Bishops 2 Church lay workers 4 Nurses 1
Electricians 1 Journalists 1 Teachers 9
Businessmen 3 NGO workers 9 Doctors 2
By June 1993, all regions had recruited members. At the unit level however, some staff 
oppose national policy of limiting non-staff members. While some units have recruited no 
members, others have exceeded their quota.161 Units recruit an average three to four 
members, providing little income from membership dues yet maximising-TFDP’s local
157 "[TFDP] Membership Manual", pp. 23.
158 Ibid, pg. 22-23.
159 Lucero interview, 18 October 1993; Lucero in "Proceedings... 10th Convention", 
Appendix E, pg. 7; "End of Year Report July-December 1992", pg. 23.
160 Based on figures in Lucero, "Proceedings...", ibid.
161 Anonymous interviews.
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influence through careful selection. TFDP’s Bacolod unit, for instance, had three members 
in November 1993, a bishop and 2 priests, but was anxious to recruit an academic to promote 
human rights education initiatives in schools and colleges.162 In Davao City, TFDP 
members sit on the Sangguniang Panglungsod (City Council) while another is former 
Governor of Davao del Sur.163 Restricted membership has proved largely successful. 
Members are generally both active and influential in their local communities, yet as long­
standing allies, provide stability at a time of significant pressure on, and institutional change 
in, TFDP. Equally, given TFDP’s commitment to sustaining other human rights POs, 
restricted membership prevents TFDP from poaching potential members from mass 
organisations, such as KAPATID, SELDA or FIND._
7. Electoral Participation.
Since 1986, TFDP has become increasingly active in electoral campaigns, primarily — 
by monitoring human rights violations. TFDP reorganised the Luzon-based human rights 
coalition Tanggol-Karapatan Para Sa Kalayaan (Human Rights For Freedom) to monitor 
violence during the 1987 Congressional elections.164 At a time when TFDP was under 
pressure to refine its political mandate however, staff were warned about partisan behaviour 
during the campaign, and one worker resigned to run as a candidate.165 In 1988, some 
TFDP workers resigned their posts to contest the January local elections under new policy 
that allowed them to resume their positions if defeated. Two TFDP workers died however; 
Roberto Rivares, 22, murdered on 12 February 1992 after running unsuccessfully in Aurora
162 Torre-Campo interview.
163 Caspe interview.
164 "TFDP-Luzon Progress Report, January-June 1987”
165 "TFDP’s response to the Francisco-Zalaquett Evaluation"; Caspe interview.
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under the Partido ng Bay an slate,166 and Robinson Manaya, 47, shot on 5 May after his 
election to Butuan City Council.167 Lawyers closely identified with TFDP also contested 
the elections, but amid the atmosphere of intense intimidation of candidates associated with 
cause-oriented groups, achieved success in Negros only.168
As with other NGOs, 1992 was the first year in which TFDP systematically intervened
in an election campaign. PAHRA drafted a Human Rights Agenda and sought support from
electoral candidates, an initial attempt to establish a "human rights vote". TFDP also
organised regional meetings to question candidates on human rights concerns, chaired by
Board of Trustees member and television chat show host Prof. Randy David, while TFDP
*
appeared in television and radio programmes on the election campaign.169 According to 
Lucero, TFDP sought to educate voters on human rights issues, rather than influence votes, 
a campaign to which the AMRSP lent important support.170 According to TFDP, 72 
separate election-related events were organised by units and regional offices.171 Few regions 
tabulated specific results, but the Cagayan Valley regional office claimed that 10 of 28 
candidates who adopted the Human Rights Agenda were elected to local positions.172 As 
in 1988, staff_were allowed to resign to run, although the Board of Trustees vetoed a
166 Secretary-General of BAYAJSTs Aurora chapter before joining TFDP, Rivares’ death 
was attributed to participation in the election campaign (See The-Manila Chronicle, 13 
February 1988).
167 Manaya was reputedly killed by members of an anti-communist vigilante gang, 
BACODA (Bayanihan Council of Datus) (Malaya, 20 May 1988).
168 Minutes of National Board meeting, 26-28 January 1988.
169 TFDP officials twice appeared on Channel 7’s weekly "Probe Team" ("Mid Year 
Report, January-June 1992", pg. 8).
170 Lucero interview, 18 October 1993. Issues promoted included the release of political 
prisoners, indemnification of victims, disbandment of para-military groups, and abandonment 
of the government’s "total war" policy ("Mid-Year Report...", ibid, pg. 7).
171 Ibid, pg. 6.
172 Ibid, pg. 7.
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NAMANCOM proposal that resignations should be permanent to protect TFDP’s
credibility.173 Four staff resigned to run, including the Northern Mindanao regional
director, but all were defeated and rejoined TFDP.174
Despite TFDP’s national policy of non-partisanship, many regions and units
determined their own positions. In Negros, TFDP refrained from joining the Negros
Movement for People’s Candidates initiated by the Hujpong (United) Nationalist Alliance,
the local BAYAN chapter and confined its activities to voter education.175 In North Cotabato
however, TFDP openly supported Rep. Gregorio Andolana’s successful reelection campaign
by preparing and distributing campaign material, and promoted an NGO/PO "Peoples
*
Agenda", as well as monitoring an election count centre.176 Though ultimately such 
partisanship did little to undermine TFDP credibility (all NGOs and POs in Kidapawan 
participated openly to some extent), it underlined the traditional independence and radicalism 
of TFDP’s Mindanao staff. ~
8. Participation in Local Government Structures.
_In contrast to PRRM, TFDP radically eschewed participation in local government 
structures until the early 1990s. Antipathy to TFDP among local politicians, military officers 
and government officials was intense, and where TFDP did receive invitations, it feared co­
173 Minutes of Board of Trustees meeting, 2 March 1992.
174 Lucero interview, 15 November 1993.
175 Torre-Campo interview.
176 Herminia Palua-Gumanao and Rebecca Mayola-Dano, TFDP-Kidapawan, interview, 
4 November 1993; Joel Virador, Unit Supervisor, TFDP-Kidapawan, interview, 5 November 
1993. The Southern Mindanao Regional Director supported the staff’s actions, though warned 
them "not to be too visible" (Caspe interview).
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optation.177 By 1992 however, TFDP credibility at the local level had increased 
significantly, and the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC) made substantial provisions for 
wide-scale NGO participation in local government structures. In addition however, 
Congressional support existed for a specific human rights dimension to local government 
activities, providing TFDP with a potentially important role.178
_  In 1992, TFDP became involved in a wide range of local government structures,
though policy by late 1993 remained cautious and sceptical. In June 1992, when many TFDP
offices were already accredited by local government units, TFDP allowed staff to become
members of Sangguniang PanglunsodlPanlalawigan (City/Provincial Councils).179 Second,
0
staff were allowed to join National Unification Commission (NUC) local secretariats, but not 
as convenors; "TFDP", the board decided, "should...maintain its critical stance vis-a-vis the 
whole peace process and maximise opportunities brought by the same".180 Third, staff were 
allowed to join Peace and Order Councils (POCs) established by the Department of Interior 
and Local Government.181 In some provinces however, (notably, Leyte), TFDP eschewed 
participation because of staff constraints or local intimidation.182
By the end of 1992, units in at least 4 of TFDP’s 13 regions were participating in
177 In 1988 for instance, TFDP turned down an invitation from Quezon Province’s 
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Provincial Council) to join the Quezon Human Rights .Council 
"to maintain its independence" (Minutes of National Board meeting, 26-28 October 1988).
178 In 1990, the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights, chaired by Wigberto 
Tanada recommended that Provincial and Municipal Boards and City Councils establish 
Human Rights Committees and liaise closely with human rights organisations (Report o f the 
Committee on Justice and Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in the 
Philippines, Senate, Committee Report No. 1025, 6 December 1990, pg. 72).
179 Minutes of the Board of Trustees meeting of 6 June 1992.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
182 With roughly 2-3 staff per province, many units are too busy to attend regular local 
government meetings. In other provinces, Lucero notes, staff lack the confidence and 
competence to face landlords and military officers noted for human rights abuses in local 
government structures (Lucero interview, 18 October 1993).
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LGC structures, NUC local secretariats or POCs, helping to increase TFDP credibility, staff
reported, in those regions.183 According to Lucero however, the bureaucracy of
participation alienated staff (eg. notifications of meetings arriving after the meeting) and
meaningful participation was only possible in the small number of areas (Samar, Davao City
and the Cordilleras) where government officials are supportive towards, or local allies of,
TFDP.184 In Negros, TFDP units do not participate in POCs or LGC structures, because
of the hostile environment towards national democratic NGOs, although the Bacolod unit has
participated in NUC consultations.185 In Southern Mindanao however, conditions are more
favourable. In North Cotabato, TFDP sits on the Provincial Development Council and POC,
0
as well as the Municipal POC for Kidapawan and the Tulunan Local Development Council. 
TFDP also maintains contact with the governor who frequently attends TFDP events.186 In 
the Provincial POC, staff sit opposite two Philippine Army battalion commanders, and the 
Philippine National Police provincial commander. Implacable enemies of TFDP in the past, 
they accepted TFDP, staff claimed, as a legitimate organisation and POC member, an 
important success for TFDP.187
Davao City, the third largest in the Philippines with a population of over 2m, 
represents TFDP influence in local government at its greatest. TFDP sits on the City 
Development Council elected in March 1993, and” its subcommittees on social development 
and education. Staff feel participation is worthwhile, especially in the education subcommittee
183 "End of Year Report... 1992", pg. 26.
184 Lucero interviews, 18 October and 15 November 1993.
185 Torre-Campo interview.
186 Virador interview; Palua-Gumanao and Mayola-Dano interview. Relations with 
Governor Diaz are frequently fractious however. In 1992, TFDP was elected by other NGOs 
to the provincial NUC peace secretariat, but TFDP was passed over by Diaz with whom 
power of appointment ultimately lay (Virador interview).
187 Virador interview.
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where TFDP promotes human rights educational initiatives, but participation is time-
consuming and feasible only because staff from the Davao -unit and regional office can
alternate.188 Support within the City Council and contacts in Davao City’s bureaucracy have
been critical in building TFDP influence. The Chairperson of GABRIELLA-Mindanao and
Secretary-General of KMU-Mindanao were both elected to the City Council as candidates of
Lakas ng Davao and the party, which holds the office of mayor, supports NGO participation
in Council affairs. In addition, many city employees are ex-political detainees, while TFDP
is close to the Provincial Fiscal (a former human rights lawyer), the City Chief of Tourism
(a former TFDP worker), the Mayor’s Chief of Staff (an active member of SELDA) and
0
other senior officials. All represent important contacts to whom TFDP can appeal for 
help.189
9. Relations With Government.
TFDP’s reticence about participation in local government structures was largely 
determined by bitter-sweet experiences during the Aquino years. Within weeks of the collapse 
of the Marcos dictatorship on 25 February 1986, TFDP Chairperson Sr. Mariani Dimaranan 
was appointed to three govemmenfbodies: the Judicial Reorganisation Committee (JRC); the 
Presidential Committee on Political Detainees (PCPD); and the Presidential Committee on 
Human Rights (PCHR).190 With Justice Secretary and former human rights lawyer Silvestre 
Bello chairing the JRC, TFDP actively participated, recommending trusted human rights
188 Caspe interview; Dawal and Belarca interview.
189 Caspe interview.
190 Dimaranan nominated lawyer Johannes Ignacio to represent her on the JRC and the 
PCPD.
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lawyers to judicial positions through regional JRCs in which Sub-Regional Office coordinators 
represented TFDP. "It [can] be safely stated", TFDP concluded in April 1987 after the JRC 
was disbanded, "that some of TFDP’s [recommendees] to the Regional Trial Courts were 
appointed. The [National Centre] got good feedback on this point".191 TFDP participation 
in the PCPD was less effective. The PCPD’s Special Committee for the Immediate Release 
of Political Detainees on which TFDP was represented, was slower than the PCHR at 
effecting the release of political detainees192 and the final report of the full PCPD in 
February 1987 recommended full pardon for 58 detainees, significantly less than TFDP had 
hoped.193
The main structure however through which TFDP probed the government’s 
commitment to human rights was the PCHR. Sr. Mariani Dimaranan became a full member 
while another TFDP senior staff member, Anelyn de Luna, became Head of Records 
reflecting TFDP’s strength in documentation work. As head of the Special Projects 
Department (SPD), Dimaranan was responsible for PCHR field operations, including fact­
finding missions and the establishment of regional PCHR offices. By December 1986, 
Dimaranan had organised six fact-finding missions and the opening of a PCHR regional office 
in Davao City, while 691 cases were filed with the PCHR, mostly by TFDP, FLAG, SELDA 
and FIND.194 By then however, release of the PCHR’s P50m budget was delayed, the SPD 
had only one staff member,195 and Marcos loyalists were calling for Dimaranan’s 
removal.196 By February 1987, when Jose Diokno died of cancer, the PCHR was
191 Letter from Sr. Mariani Dimaranan to Wim Monasso, NOVIB, 6 April 1987.
192 Minutes of the National Board meeting, 6 April 1986.
193 Letter from Johannes Ignacio to Sr. Mariani Dimaranan, 4 February 1987.
194 Human Rights Newsletter, PCHR, Vol. 1 No. 1, 1987; de Lima interview.
195 News Herald, 17 April 1986; "Report of the Presidential Committee on Human 
Rights, January-April 1987", pg. 9.
196 See The Manila Times, 27 June 1986.
2 8 9
emasculated by opposition from Defence Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile and Armed Forces 
Chief of Staff Gen. Fidel Ramos.197 Frustrated, Mariani led»a KAPATID delegation to a 
meeting with Aquino, urging prosecution of military personnel, but Aquino was non­
committal. "Cory didn’t have the political will", Dimaranan concluded, "it was the military 
running the show and not [her].198 On 17-18 February 1987, Dimaranan led a PCHR fact­
finding mission to Lupao, Nueva Ecija, after 17 people were shot dead by the AFP on 10 
February. Supported by the fact-finding mission members (PCHR lawyers, National Bureau 
of Investigation (NBI) officials and Medical Action Group doctors), Dimaranan concluded
that the dead were innocent civilians,199 increasing her disillusionment with the Aquino
*
government.
On 5 May 1987, the PCHR was abolished, and replaced^by a Commission on Human 
Rights (CHR), prescribed in the February 1987 Constitution. Aquino invited Dimaranan to 
join the new Commission but Dimaranan refused.200 The CHR had no proseeutoiy 
powers201 but in a significant break with international law its mandate permitted
197 Ponce-Enrile and Ramos opposed prosecution of military personnel accused of human 
rights abuses under the Marcos regimes and wanted the PCHR to investigate NPA abuses, 
a move opposed by Diokno. _
198 Dimaranan interview, 19 November 1993.
199 Ibid; Human Rights Newsletter.
200 Letter from President Corazon Aquino to Sr. Mariani Dimaranan, 1 July 1987; Letter 
from Dimaranan to Aquino, 9 July 1987. According to her letter, Dimaranan declined 
because of her "not pleasant experiences in the PCHR" and her commitment to NGO work 
(Executive Order 163 noted that CHR members "shall not hold any office nor participate in 
the active management or control of any business", precluding Dimaranan’s continued 
stewardship of TFDP).
201 According to one member, the 1986 Constitutional Commission’s Committee on Social 
Justice and Human Rights feared undermining the prosecutory powers of the Department of 
Justice. Opposition from human rights lawyers to the CHR’s broad mandate (see below) was 
also opposed by conservatives (Rene Sarmiento, interview, 6 August 1993).
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investigations into NPA abuses.202 Uncertain of how the CHR would interpret this mandate, 
and determined to maintain a bridge, TFDP approved de Luna’s continued secondment.203 
Within months however, TFDP was embroiled in conflict with CHR Chairperson Mary 
Concepsion Bautista. Frustrated by the government’s refusal to act on cases filed with the 
PCHR, TFDP ignored CHR appeals for help with documentation. In response, Bautista 
accused TFDP and other human rights NGOs of conducting "a ruthless propaganda cam­
paign" and of "violat[ing] the rights of millions" by refusing to coordinate with the CHR.204
Throughout 1988, tension between TFDP and the CHR deepened, exacerbated by 
international reports which criticized the government’s human rights performance.205 As 
government moderates called on TFDP to back down,206 newspaper columnist Belinda 
Olivares Cunnan warned TFDP that its "undisguised bias for ...leftists", would inevitably 
"isolate [it] from popular support".207 In reality however, the worsening human rights situ­
ation (see Chapter 3), Bautista’s antipathy to human rights NGOs, and it’s own steadfastness, 
won TFDP significant national and international support.208 To quell animosity between the
202 Article 13, Section 18 of the 1987 constitution mandated the CHR to "Investigate, on 
its own or on complaint by any partyrall forms of human rights violations involving civil and 
political rights". The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights binds states 
however and not non-state actors.
203 Anelyn de Luna, Programme Director, Global Advocacy and Networking, TFDP, 
interview, Manila, 28 October 1993. -
204 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 17 December 1987. —
205 Amnesty International, The Philippines: Unlawful Killings...; Lawyers Committee 
for Human Rights, Vigilantes in the Philippines:-A Threat to Democratic Rule, New 
York, 1988; Asian Human Rights Commission, Report of the Asian Human Rights 
Commission Study Mission to the Philippines, January 1988, Hong Kong, 1988.
206 See The Manila Chronicle, 5 July 1988, re. appeal by CHR Commissioner Paulynn 
Sicam to human rights NGOs to rethink their strategy and Malaya, 5 August 1988, re. appeal 
from Justice Secretary Sedffey Ordonez to PAHRA to investigate rebel abuses.
207 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 July 1988.
208 National support came especially from the media. See for instance the editorial in The 
Manila Chronicle of 4 January 1988 which cites TFDP statistics in a condemnation of the 
CHR and the government’s human rights performance. Testifying to TFDP international
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CHR and the human rights NGO community, Aquino met with FIND representatives in 
December 1988 and announced the establishment of a new Presidential Human Rights 
Committee (PHRC).209
According to Aquino, the PHRC was established after "non-governmental 
organisations, many of them critical of my governments efforts in human rights protection 
and promotion...helped government appreciate the gravity of our human rights situation".210 
Headed by the Justice Secretary, and under the control of the Office of the President, the 
PHRC included representatives from the CHR, and the Senate and House human rights 
committees. Two seats were allocated to PAHRA and FLAG as representatives of the human 
rights NGO community, with the PAHRA seat filled by TFDP legal counsel Rene Sarmiento. 
NGOs were perplexed and taken by surprise by the PHRC’s establishment211 but within a 
year established an effective rapport. FIND lobbied Aquino for action on behalf of the 
disappeared in their December 1988 meeting. In response, the PCHR "facilitated searches in 
camps and military stockades and [brought] cases of...disappearances to authorities through 
members of the committee".212 In 1991, when 3 TFDP workers in Bicol were accused of
credibility, Australian Trade and Foreign Minister Gareth Evans met with TFDP officials 
during a visit to Manila in January 1989 (See The Manila Chronicle, 27 January 1989).
209 The Manila Chronicle, 10 December 1988; Administrative Order No. 101,- 13 
December 1988; Malaya, 14 December 1988. Aquino’s announcement followed a July 
meeting with Cardinal Ricardo Vidal and AMRSP officials where the creation of "composite 
investigation panel" to assist the CHR was discussed (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 July 
1988), and a report from the Presidential Task Force on the Improvement o f the 
Administration of Justice which noted human rights NGO antipathy to the CHR (Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, 6 December 1988).
210 Corazon Aquino, "Transparency and Democracy", speech to the United Nations World 
Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 16 June 1993, reproduced in The Manila Bulletin, 
19 June 1993.
211 "I have no idea why it was created. It suddenly appeared...[T]here was no need for 
the PHRC. What the government should have done [was] support the CHR, increase the 
budget and expunge [it’s] weaknesses", Sarmiento noted (Sarmiento interview).
212 "[XFDP] Semi-Annual Report, July-December 1989", pg. 8.
292
being members of a communist front organisation in charges filed by the AFP, the PHRC 
passed a resolution declaring TFDP "a legal and legitimate human rights organisation".213 
In 1992, among other measures, PHRC investigated military counter-insurgency operations 
in Northern Luzon, and in response to TFDP demands, facilitated the release of political 
detainees on humanitarian grounds, reviewed the cases of detainees charged with criminal 
offenses, approved the clustering of political detainees at Manila’s Muntinlupa state peniten­
tiary and established a P20m witness protection programme.214 By facilitating direct 
relationships between human rights NGOs and officials from the AFP, DOJ and NBI, the
PHRC avoided the bureaucracy and inertia of the CHR, leading to speedy investigations,
*
direct hearings with human rights victims, and more vigorous prosecutions.215
Since May 1992, when Fidel Ramos became President, the PHRC has been largely 
inactive. Constructive, albeit still tentative, relations with human rights NGOs have been 
maintained however. In October 1992, the CHR, TFDP, FLAG, PAHRA and FIND 
established a Fact-Finding Committee on Involuntary Missing Persons under DOJ auspices 
to trace 1,128 people who disappeared during the Marcos and Aquino regimes216 and on 
3 December 1992, during a meeting with TFDP and FIND, Ramos announced a P4m 
compensation fund.217 TFDP representatives were unhappy with the meeting,218 but in a
= 213 Minutes of Board of Trustees meeting, 2 July 1991.
-  214 Pumipiglas 3 ..., pp. 90-91 and 131; "[TFDP] Mid-Year Report, January-June 1992", 
P&- 7.
= 215 Pumipiglas 3 ..., pg. 131.
216 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 17 October 1992. FIND later claimed that 821 activists 
disappeared during the Aquino regime, compared to its original estimate of 367, and 752 
under Marcos (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 5 December 1991). The Fact-Finding Committee 
was formally established by Memorandum Order No. 88, 8 February 1993.
217 Amid NGO concern at CHR control, a Memorandum of Agreement dated 14 May 
1993 allocated a share of the fund to FIND (Antonio Villasor, PAHRA, interview, 18 May 
1993). By October 1993, compensation of P10,000 each had been paid to the relatives of 14 
of the disappeared and P100,00 allocated to a relatives’ co-operative fund (Lucero interview, 
18 October 1993).
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speech on 10 December, Ramos acknowledged the legitimacy of human rights NGOs:
Tension...between the government and...human rights tNGOs] is a necessary 
element in the democracy we are trying to build. We in government must learn 
to realise that they are not the enemy...I [want] to see both government and 
NGOs...work closely together...[with] more openness between us [and] more 
empathy with one another’s situation.219
Tension and co-operation remain defining characteristics of TFDP-goverament relationships.
By late 1993, TFDP continued to negotiate the release of political detainees with the
Department of Justice Task Force on Human Rights, worked with the Department o f Social
Welfare and Development to aid child victims of internal conflict and implemented an
elaborate human rights education programme in association with the Department of
*
Education, Culture and Sport. In contrast to PRRM, relationships between TFDP and state 
agencies are underpinned by institutional rather than personalist ties and have led to "more 
respect and deference to TFDP workers".220 Significant tension remained however, 
highlighted by the death of TFDP worker Chris Batan in February 1993.221
In 1993, political prisoners became a central political issue amid attempts by the 
Ramos government to initiate peace talks with the CPP-NDF-NPA. In June, TFDP attacked 
Ramos for continued arrests, the slow release of political prisoners and use of criminal
218 Sarmiento interview; Lucero interview, 13 August 1993; Both felt the meeting, 
covered by the media at Malacanang’s request, was manipulated by Ramos to portray NGO 
support for his administration.
219 "Ramos Delivers Speech Marking Human Rights Day", Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (East Asia), Washington, 10 December 1991, pg. 1.
220 Lucero interview, 18 October 1993.
221 Batan, 26, was shot dead by CAFGU personnel in Mountain Province on 23 February. 
Although active in other organisations, his TFDP work was, according to Amnesty 
International, "the immediate motive for the killing" (Amnesty International, Urgent Action, 
UA 49/93, 26 February 1993), leading to further acrimony about the continued existence of 
CAFGUs (See CAFGUs Against Human Rights, Philippine Alliance of Human Rights 
Advocates, Quezon City, 1993.)
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charges against political detainees.222 Ramos asked the CHR to clarify TFDP’s claims223 
but on 20 June his Press Secretary cited CHR assertion’s that "there have been no new cases 
of political detention since July 1992 or the assumption into office of Mr. Ramos".224 
Detainees cited by TFDP, the statement continued, were guilty of common crimes and could 
apply for early release under the amnesty guidelines of the Inter-Agency Task Force on 
Political Prisoners. Days later, the CHR repudiated the Malacanang statement and confirmed 
the TFDP statistics as correct.225 On 29 June, Defence Undersecretary Fernando Campos 
entered the fray, refuting TFDP’s allegations.226 Challenged by Justice Secretary Franklin 
Drilon to support its claims, TFDP held a press conference in Muntinlupa state penitentiary, 
naming 151 convicted political prisoners and presenting details of 356 political detainees held 
in 77 detention centres nation-wide.227 In the final shot of the immediate furore, TFDP
222 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 14 June 1993. TFDP claimed that 10 political detainees 
in Manila alone had been arrested since Ramos became president, one of whom died in 
detention, and that 377 political prisoners remained in detention. Of 222 releases since July 
1992, TFDP continued, only 72 resulted from executive action, undermining the peace 
process. TFDP also denounced as "propaganda" the repeal of the anti-subversion law, 
Republic Act 1700, legalising the CPP, since political prisoners were now charged under 
criminal legislation. A few days later, TFDP claimed 131 political detainees in total had been 
arrested after June 1992 (and another 506 released) (Philippine Daily Inquirer, 23 June 
1993).
223 The Manila Bulletin, 16 June 1993.
224 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 21 June 1993.
225 Letter to the Editor from CHR Commissioner Paulynn Sicam, in The Manila 
Chronicle, 22 June 1993. Sicam noted however that the exact status of the detainees had yet 
to be resolved. CHR Chairman Sedffey Ordonez however refuted Sicam’s statement and 
TFDP’s claims after returning from overseas and said no political detainees currently held 
had been arrested since July 1992. Also refuting TFDP’s claims, the NBI Assistant Director 
claimed there were no political prisoners at all in detention (The Manila Bulletin, 3 July 
1993).
226 Letter to the Editor, The Manila Chronicle, 29 June 1993. Campos’s letter followed 
columnist Ricardo Malay’s assertion in The Manila Chronicle, 16 June 1993 that "All the 
president’s confidence building moves will amount to nought if the charges of TFDP are 
proven true".
227 TFDP press conference kit, 2 July 1993; The Manila Chronicle, 3 July 1993. 
TFDP’s assertions were supported by PAHRA and FLAG.
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claimed the last word in unprecedented dispute with the President, his Press Secretary, CHR, 
NBI, and the Departments of Justice and National Defence.228 The exchange testified to 
TFDP’s ability, unrivalled among Philippine NGOs, to confront the government broadside 
and emerge with its credibility enhanced.
10. Networking.
TFDP credibility with government, despite enormous hostility from sections of the 
media, military, Congress, and the Christian Churches, depends in part on a network of 
contacts within each. Media liaison, through regular press conferences, press statements, and 
media events, represented a breakthrough in 1992 and 1993, and by June 1993r TFDP had 
over 500 media contacts nationwide.229 Local-level media liaison is also highly successful. 
In Negros, TFDP and KAPATID ties to the COBRA-ANS agency facilitate coverage of 
human rights concerns in Bacolod newspapers230 while TFDP campaigns in Davao are 
regularly featured in the city’s biggest selling daily, the Mindanao Daily Mirror,231 In North 
Cotabato, the Kidapawan unit supervisor helps run a weekly public affairs programme, Radio 
Forum, on the church-run radio station DXND (Notre Dame) while the provincial newspaper, 
Mindanao Express, carries all the unit’s press releases.232
Within the Catholic Church, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines is
228 In "updated figures" released some weeks later, Justice Secretary Drilon claimed 
Ramos had approved the release of 149 detainees since July 1992, in addition to 248 released 
on repeal of RA1700. Drilon however did not refute TFDP’s claims of 356 political prisoners 
still in detention (Letter to the Editor, The Manila Chronicle, 27 July 1993).
229 Lucero, "...Strategic Assessment (1990-93)", pg. 9.
230 Jagurin interview.
231 Caspe interview.
232 Virador interview.
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critical of TFDP’s militancy233 yet TFDP also commands support from a handful of 
Bishops, including Antonio Fortich, TFDP Co-Chairperson, and Antonio Nepomuceno (both 
retired but still influential), and Julio Labayen. Support from leading members of the 
AMRSP, maintained through regular liaison and lobbying, has also protected TFDP’s 
working arm status, despite a 1987-1989 crisis in TFDP-AMRSP relations. Locally, many 
units remain housed on church property and leading congregations, such as the Columbans 
and Redemptorists, provide vital support, but church support varies widely. In North 
Cotabato, long-standing support from local Bishops (Bishop Escaler, his successor in 1984,
Bishop Orlando Quevido, and from 1991, Bishop Juan De Dios Pueblos) facilitates
* — 
cooperation with the diocesan Justice and Peace programme, the Social Action Centre and
the Prisoners Apostolate.234 In Southern Mindanao however, relations with the Church
deteriorated after Davao’s Bishop Alu, appointed in 1989, branded TFDP a communist front
and by 1993, all the region’s units were located in commercial property.235
In 1988, Sr. Mariani Dimaranan was summoned to appear before the House of 
Representatives Special Committee on Crime, Fraud and Corruption and a special hearing on 
proposed "legislation in connection with the alleged communist infiltration of Task Force _ 
Detainees of the Philippines".236 To defeat such initiatives, TFDP relies on cross-party 
support from Congressmen/women including Wigberto Tanada (LP-PDP-LABAN), Raul
233 In a 1989 press statement signed by Bishop Leonardo Legaspi for instance, the CBCP 
condemned "political groups" that "positively gloat over massacres or cases of torture", 
avoiding references to TFDP by name ("The Manipulative Use of Human Rights Violations", 
11 July 1989)
234 Palua-Gumanao and Mayola-Dano interview.
235 Caspe interview.
236 Letter from Committee Chairman Hermogenes Concepcion Jr, to Sr. Mariani 
Dimaranan, 10 February 1988, summoning Dimaranan to appear at 10am on 17 February 
1988. Concepsion summoned Dimaranan again in a letter dated 29 February 1988 but in a 
reply on 8 March, TFDP Deputy Chairperson Evelyn Serrano explained that Dimaranan 
would be out of Manila.
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Roco (LDP), and Nikki Coseteng (NPC) in the Senate and Bonifacio Gillego, Gregorio
Andolana and Exequiel Javier (all Lakas-NUCD) in the House. Gillego, for instance,
introduced a resolution in 1992 commending TFDP and other members of PAHRA for their
"achievements, commitment and selfless dedication".237 Many of TFDP’s Congressional
allies sit on the House or Senate Human Rights Committees (chaired by Gillego and Tanada
respectively in 1993) helping TFDP to push its campaigns, and TFDP attributed legislative
successes in 1992, including the repeal of RA1700 and amendments to PD1866 (covering
illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion) to support mobilized in
Congress.238 Equally importantly however, Congressional support helps protect TFDP
*
workers, and pressures the government to respect its legitimacy.239
TFDP also relies on an elaborate network of local contacts to keep it informed of 
human rights abuses, especially in remote areas such as Muslim Mindanao, or inaccessible 
military camps. Local contacts, TFDP claims, are "vital in every unit for data-gathering- a 
concerned citizen, a relative of a victim, a former victim helped by TFDP or anyone else 
who sympathises with the cause of human rights".240 The network was expanded under 
Lucero’s mstitution-buildingjhrust and by 1993, TFDP had over 2,200 individual contacts 
nationwide.241 TFDP’s human rights education programme has been a critical factor in
237 House Resolution 399. Though approved by the House Committee on Human Rights, 
the Resolution was smothered by the Committee on Rules, preventing a vote in the House as 
a whole (Gillego interview). J
238 Lucero, "Prospects for Peace and Human Rights...".
239 The Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights held a special hearing on 8 
December 1988 to investigate the detention and torture of TFDP worker Susan Aniban in 
Baguio, 28-30 November 1988 and a military raid of a TFDP staff conference in Ilocos Sir 
on 11 November 1988. Its 1990 report called for NGO participation in the search for the 
disappeared and "strengthened dialogue" between the military and human rights NGOs 
("Human Rights ...in the Philippines", pg. 73).
240 " J F D P -L u zo n  Progress Report, January-June 1987".
241 Lucero, "....Strategic Assessment 1990-93", pg. 9.
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recruitment, especially among military and local government officials.242
Like other national democratic organisations, TFDP has long facilitated "exposure"
visits by foreign groups and individuals243 but with the establishment of a Global Advocacy
and Networking Programme in 1990, international networking has become an important
focus. In 1991, TFDP established the Philippine International Center for Human Rights in
Brussels to liaise with European funders and solidarity groups and to lobby European
Community institutions244 and also helped establish the Asia Forum for Human Rights and
Development (FORUM-ASIA) to project its campaigns internationally. By hosting the World
Symposium of Human Rights and Development245 and the International Symposium On
*
Indigenous Peopled Rights and Development246 in 1992, TFDP established a reputation as 
one of the most influential indigenous human rights organisations in the developing world.
11. Conclusion -
As TFDP illustrates, the influence of human rights NGOs in the developing world 
extends far beyond the "international human rights regime". TFDP illustrates that many 
human rights NGOs have deep roots in ^ivil society, with ties to political parties, the 
religious, insurgent groups, the media, and other NGOs/POs, and have consequently become
242 Minutes of the Board of Trustees meeting of 22 March 1991 note examples of a 
Provincial Commander in Calbayog who informed TFDP of a new detainee after attending 
a TFDP seminar, and "a resolution passed enjoining all the municipal mayors to attend a 
human rights course after a Provincial Board member and four mayors in Surigao del Sir 
finished one [of TFDP’s] courses".
243 From January to June 1989 for instance, TFDP "facilitated exposures for about 95 
foreign groups or individuals", most of whom went to Negros ("TFDP Semi-Annual Report 
1989").
244 PICHR closed temporarily in 1992 however due to funding constraints.
245 Organised jointly with FLAG, OMCT and SOS-Torture.
246 Organised jointly with four other Philippine NGOs ("Proceedings... 10th National 
Convention", pg. 8).
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important actors in the national politics of numerous countries. The case-study suggests that
TFDP has influenced Philippine politics in three main respects.‘First, it underlines the impact
of human rights NGOs on the Philippine state. More than any other single NGO, TFDP
undermined the Marcos dictatorship: by crystallizing church concern for human rights;
articulating a central cause around which the fragmented opposition could unite after 1983,
and around which_ moderate opposition groups could support the NDF; mobilising
international opposition to the Marcos regime; and building a nationwide human rights
movement through new organisations such as KAPATID and SELDA. The Philippines lacks
a strong judicial tradition, and as former Supreme Court Justice Abraham Sarmiento notes,
*
the pressure politics of TFDP and other human rights NGOs proved more effective at 
protecting human rights under the Marcos regime than the subordinated judiciary.247 
Influence established during the Marcos dictatorship has been consolidated under the Aquino 
and Ramos governments. In alliance with PAHRA and FLAG, TFDP played or plays a 
central role in government structures designed to protect and promote human rights, 
establishing human rights as a key issue-area in which NGOs have achieved significant 
influence over government policy. In so doing, TFDP has played a central role in establishing 
the legitimacy of militant campaigning on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. 
Similarly, although the Aquino government was undermined by its poor human rights record 
domestically and abroad, and the attacks of human rights organisations, it desperately 
attempted to consolidate its democratic legitimacy and improve its international image by 
seeking NGO co-operation. In the period from 1989 in particular, partnership with human
247 Abraham Sarmiento, "Philippine Experience in Enforcing a Bill of Rights: Political 
Realities and Judicial Perspectives", Human Rights Forum, Vol. 11 No. 1, 1992, pg. 33.
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rights NGOs helped to shore-up the government’s rapidly eroding legitimacy.248
Second, TFDP illustrates an important nexus between the underground left and a large
section of the NGO community, labelled as "national democrat". TFDP remains an emphatic
supporter of the traditional national democratic cause.249 The nationwide human rights
movement it built from the 1970s, crystallized in the formation of PAHRA in 1986,
represented a tangible expression of the united front that the CPP and NDF could never
build, and illustrated important tensions in united front politics. In 1993, TFDP remained
committed to the national democratic quest for a structural transformation of Philippine
society, but as a broad vision rather than a concrete goal. Its size and influence however
0
provide it with significant leverage in challenging the CPP, especially under its dynamic and 
outspoken Chairperson, Sr. Mariani Dimaranan. The TFDP also illustrates the role of church 
NGOs as a base from which to challenge the Catholic hierarchy. An official organ of the 
Catholic Church,250 TFDP pioneered the Church’s "preferential option for the poor" and 
remains a significant critic of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines.
Third, and in contrast to Wiseberg’s position in the introduction, TFDP illustrates the 
inherently political character of Philippine human rights NGOs. High levels and systematic 
patterns of human rights abuse under the Marcos and Aquino governments polarized national 
political debate. Given the weaknesses of Philippine political parties in articulating, ancT 
mobilising on the basis of, ideologically consistent platforms on issues such as human rights,
248 See Silvestre H. Bello, "Justice and Human Rights" in Corazon C. Aquino et al, The 
Aquino Administration: Record and Legacy (1986-1992), University of the Philippines 
Press, Quezon City, 1992, which trumpets cooperation between human rights NGOs and the 
government.
249 Executive Director Sr. Cres Lucero argues that "You cannot disassociate the TFDP 
mandate from the overall people’s movement [and] people’s struggle, which is essentially 
democratic, national democratic" (Lucero interview, 18 October 1993).
250 As a working arm of the AMRSP.
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NGOs such as TFDP were forced to engage in partisan politics, either individually or in 
issue-based coalitions. Unless the human rights situation ‘improves to the extent that 
conflicting perceptions cease to be a significant political cleavage, or political parties improve 
their ability to represent and articulate issues, by expanding membership and strengthening 
their ideological platforms, the work of TFDP and other Philippine human rights NGOs will 
retain its partisan character.
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Table 10
1. Human Rights Violations Under Marcos, 1977-1986
Year Arrests Salvagings Disappearances
1977 1,351 51 17
1978 1,620 86 10
1979 1,961 196 48
1980 962 218 19
1981 1,377 321 53
1982 1,911 210 42
1983 2,088 368 145
1984 4,1-68 538 158
1985 5,967 429 189
1986 (Jan-Feb) 478 74 28
Total 21,883 2,491 709
Monthly Average 198.94 22.65 6.45
2. Human Rights Violations Under Aquino, 1986-1992
Year Arrests Salvagings Disappearances
1986 (Mar-Dee) 1,234 123 62
1987 8,367 267 52
1988 2,882 249 141
1989 2,312 179 83
1990 3,953 149 60
1991 1,106 49 28
1992 (Jan-June) 468 40 15
Total 20,322 1,056 451
Monthly Average 267.39 13.89 5.80
3. Human Rights Violations Under Ramos, 1992-1994
Year Arrests Salvagings Disappearances
7.1992-6.1993 976 64 14
7.1993-6.1994 683 40 4
Total 1,695 104 18
Monthly Average 69.15 4.33 0.75
Sources: 1. G. Sidney SiUiman, ’Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy”, in James F. Eder and Robert L. Youngblood (Eds.), 
Patterns of Power and Politics in the Philippines: Implications for Development, Program for Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State 
University, Tempe, 1994, pp. 107. 2. Silliman, ibid, pg. 114 except for Jan-June 1992 figures which come from Pumipiglas 3: Torment 
and Struggle After Marcos, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, Quezon City 1993, pg. 167. 3. Yet A Stream of Human Suffering: 
A Human Rights Report on the Second Year o f the Ramos Government, Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates, Manila, 
October 1994, pp. 7-8.
CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusion.
1. The "Grand Modem Fact" of Philippine Politics.
In 1828, the young Whig historian Thomas Macaulay noticed a fundamental 
realignment in British politics. Edmund Burke’s three "estates", the monarchy, parliament, 
and the established church, had to contend with another, Macaulay argued, for "The gallery 
in which the reporters sit has become a fourth estate of the realm".1 With this argument, his 
biographer noted, "Macaulay penetrated beneath the formal structure of politics to put his
finger on [a] great new force", a nascent national media.2 Macaulay was supported by his
✓
sometimes critic Thomas Carlyle who argued in 1848 that "the existence of an Unfettered 
Press" represented a "grand modem fact": "Is not The Times newspaper an open Forum, 
open as never Forum was before...One grand branch of the parliaments trade is obviously 
dead forever".3
This dissertation analyses a "grand modem fact" of Philippine politics, the emergence 
of a community of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) andpeoples organisations (POs) 
as an important-political force, reflecting the emergence of a "sixth estate" in the politics of 
developed and developing countries alike.4 Illustrating the significance of the global 
"associational revolution", the "striking upsurge in organised voluntary activity and the
1 John Clive, Thomas Babbington Macaulay: The Shaping of an Historian, Seeker 
& Warburg, London, 1973, pg. 124.
2 Ibid, pg. 125.
3 Thomas Carlyle, Pamphlet on "Parliaments", in M.K. Goldberg & J.P. Seigel (Eds.), 
Carlyle’s Latter-Day Pamphlets, Canadian Federation of the Humanities, 1983, pp. 277- 
278.
4 Trade unions representing the fifth. See Robert Taylor, The Fifth Estate: Britain’s 
Trade Unions in the Modem World, revised edition, Pan Books, London, 1980.
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creation of private, non-profit or non-governmental organisations",5 the Philippine NGO/PO 
sector grew by 148% between January 1984 and June 1993, compared to 65% growth in the 
private sector over the same period.6
Philippine NGOs and POs have yet to establish an important role in the economy, in 
contrast to the voluntary sectors in developed states. In the United Kingdom, for instance, 
the total income of 171,434 registered charities accounted for 3.4% of Gross Domestic 
Product in 1990 while the sector employed 482,000 people, or 2.2% of the total labour 
force.7 In the Philippines, no government agency complies statistics on the economic role 
of NGOs. An estimate, however, would put NGO/PO income as a share of GNP at less than 
1.5% and total employment at less than 200,000, or less than 1 % of the total labour force.8
As such, the main significance of the growth of the Philippine NGO/PO community^ 
is political. As the dissertation argues, the proliferation, growth, regional distribution and 
organisational character of NGOs, as well as the tasks they carry out have all been 
determined by essentially political factors. Philippine NGOs and the POs with which they
5 Lester M. Salamon, "The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73 No. 
4, July/August 1994, pg. 109.
6 Measured by the increase in the number of registrations with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). The number of for-profit corporations (stock entities) 
registered with the SEC grew from 128,100 in January 1984 to 212,270 in June 1993 while 
the number o f NGOs and POs (equivalent to 75% of registered non-stock entities) (see 
chapter 3) grew from 23,800 to 58,200 (Monthly Paid-Up Equity Investment Report 
series, Securities and Exchange Commission, Manila).
7 Charity Trends 1992, Charities Aid Foundation, Tonbridge, Kent, 1992, pp. 6 & 9. 
The UK has another 170,000 unregistered voluntary organisations (David Brindle, "Power 
to the People", The Guardian, 21 September 1994), bringing the voluntary sectors share of 
GDP closer to 5 %.
8 Assuming that: A. the $102m (equivalent to 0.22% of GNP) channelled to Philippine 
NGOs and POs from abroad (see chapter 4) is quadrupled by (1) Philippine government 
funding to NGOs; (2) multilateral funding to the Philippine government channelled to NGOs; 
(3) funding raised by NGOs and POs within the Philippines; and B. the 58,000 NGOs and 
POs registered in June 1993 employed an average of 4 staff. 1991 labour force= 23m (See 
Human Development Report 1993, United Nations Development Programme and Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1993, pp. 168 & 180).
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work closely are significant mainly for their broad organisational reach and their ability to 
represent ideologically-coherent interests, making them a significant actor in Philippine 
politics.
In absolute terms, the Philippines has the third largest NGO/PO community in the 
developing world behind Brazil and India. In per capita terms however, the Philippines has 
by far the largest, and represents a remarkable case-study of the politicaHactors promoting 
the proliferation of NGOs in the developing world. Philippine NGOs, through their 
antecedents, civic and political organisations, date to the late nineteenth century and despite 
political upheavals and regime changes since then, the Philippine voluntary sector has 
developed steadily, evolving through the four generations conceived by David Korten (see 
Chapter 2). In the Philippines, American colonial policy encouraged the early development 
of civic associations, providing an impetus to the proliferation of NGOs in the 1950s and 
again from the late 1970s. In Indonesia, by contrast, a bitter independence struggle waged 
by a cohesive and militarily-efficient nationalist movement led to the emergence of a powerful 
state in the post-war period with a significant ability to control civil society and thus limit the 
proliferation of NGOs. In Malaysia, the colonial legacy of a federal bureaucratic machine 
similarly led to the emergence of a strong state, while ethnic tensions led to restrictions on 
political organisations including NGOs. In Thailand, the historical power of the Thai 
bureaucracy and the central role of the military in post-war politics led to a similar dichotomy 
between a strong state counterpoised against a retarded civil society.
Contrasts between the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand illustrate the 
importance of religion in sustaining a culture in which NGOs can proliferate. First, in the 
Philippines, the Catholic Church has long opposed the state, thus promoting a political culture
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that tolerated and encouraged political organisation independent of the state.9 Second, as a 
result of American colonial rule (1898-1947), Protestant Churches became active in the 
Philippines and many voluntary organisations were established by Protestant civic activists’ 
Third, as a result of schisms in the Catholic Church, centred on the Vatican II reforms and 
the development of liberation theology in the 1960s, NGOs assumed importance as 
institutional vehicles used to advance opposing philosophies.
In Indonesia, Islam has played a significant role in encouraging the proliferation of
voluntary organisations by providing a moral umbrella that voluntary organisations can use
to challenge the state’s effective monopoly over interpretations of Pancasila. At the same
*
time, however, State monopolisation of interpretations of Islam, has forced voluntary 
organisations to eschew the term "Non-Governmental Organisation" because of its 
oppositional connotations (see chapter 1) stemming the proliferation of explicitly "non­
governmental" organisations. Similarly, in Thailand, Buddhist mutual aid organisations such 
as the Chung-hua, Lung-hua and the Yi-ho (founded in 1930, 1932 and 1935 respectively), 
and Christian organisations such as the Young Mens Christian Association (1937) and the 
Church of Christ Foundation (1943), antecedents of modern Thai NGOs, were established 
in the early decades of the twentieth century. After World War II however, state-directed 
Buddhism, mobilized to counter the threat of communism, was used to curb the continued 
proliferation of civic organisations. Non-Buddhist organisations were tightly controlled while
9 In 1583, under pressure from the Church, Philip II of Spain abolished encomienda (the 
ceding of rights over land and people), to conquistadores (adventurers) in the Philippines. As 
a result, Spaniards, except friars and tax collectors, were barred from native villages, 
enabling the main religious orders to acquire substantial tracts of land. Thus, from the late 
16th century, the Catholic Church had economic interests distinct from the state which it then 
protected assiduously.
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the Thera Association monitored Buddhist institutions.10
Equally however, the Philippines points to factors that have promoted the proliferation
of NGOs throughout South-East Asia. As argued in Chapter 2, the Marcos dictatorship (1972-
1986) played a decisive role in stimulating the proliferation of NGOs, and shaping the
political character of the NGO community. NGOs funded by international, largely European,
donors became an important base for activists committed to opposing the dictatorship and
working with socio-economic groups adversely affected by its economic policies. In the late
1970s, the Philippine government was forced to involve NGOs in the implementation of
development programmes, pressured by bilateral and multilateral donors, economic crises in
0
the wake of the 1974 and 1979 oil slumps, and weaknesses in state programmes designed to
organise and mobilize local communities. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, NGOs
proliferated in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia as varying degrees of authoritarian rule and
economic growth triggered complex processes of social change that pressured governments
to loosen political controls and allow NGOs to proliferate.
Considerable support exists within the NGO literature for the view that NGOs
strengthen democratization, although little concrete evidence has been advanced. Edwards and
Hulme, for instance, point out that:
...donor support for NGOs is predicated at least as much on their supposed 
role in democratizing the political process as on their role in the provision of 
— welfare services [yet] rarely in the literature is it made clear exactly how 
NGOs and GROs [Grassroots Organisations, or POs] (and especially the 
former) are supposed to contribute to "democratization" and the formal
10 See Amara Pongsapich and Nitaya Kataleeradabhan, Philanthropy, NGO Activities 
and Corporate Funding in Thailand, Chulalongkom University Social Research Institute, 
Bangkok, 1994 pp. 19-25;Maniemai Tongswate and Walter Tips, Coordination Between 
Governmental and Non-Governmental Organisations in Thailand’s Rural Development,
Research Monograph No. 5, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, 1985, pg. 39.
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political process.11
This dissertation however points to 5 basic means by which NGOs and POs have aided the 
process of democratization or democratic consolidation in the Philippines, echoing 
developments in Chile traced by Hojman (See Chapter 1). First, through participation in 
issue-based social movements, NGOs played a significant role in the two and a half years of 
unrest from August 1983 that led to the "People Power" revolt of February 1986, a tangible 
expression of what was otherwise a largely ephemeral phenomenon. NGOs participated in , 
while NGO leaders helped to broker, issue-based or cause-oriented coalitions that united 
moderates and radicals, traditional political parties and cause-oriented groups and Manila- 
based and regional campaigns, and provided leaders and secretarial support to sustain them. 
As a result, their role in national life was enshrined in the 1987 constitution. Second, in a 
polity where cabinet ministers with autonomy from entrenched socio-economic elites help to 
insulate the government from significant pressures, NGOs have represented an important 
source of political leaders for cabinet and other government positions since 1986, and 
personnel from the NGO/PO community have been recruited to the upper tiers of the 
bureaucracy. Third, government departments have devolved or subcontracted key tasks to 
NGOs and POs including programme design, implementation and appraisal, and by 1990, 
every government department had an NGO liaison desk. NGOs have thus helped the 
government to concentrate its limited resources and capability more effectively. Fourth, 
NGOs and POs now participate actively in election campaigns, especially at the municipal 
and provincial level, and the 1991 Local Government Code provides for NGO/PO
11 Michael Edwards and David Hulme, "NGOs and Development: Performance and 
Accountability in "the New World Order"", paper to the International Workshop on "NGOs 
and Development: Performance and Accountability in the New World Order", University of 
Manchester, 27-29 June 1994, pg. 4.
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representation in most local elected bodies. As a result, NGOs have helped to undermine 
electoral violence and to strengthen the legitimacy and efficacy of local elective bodies. Fifth, 
NGOs play an important role in contemporary social movements that push issue-based 
political agendas in a polity dominated by patronage-based political debate. In a polity where 
political parties have weak membership bases and only attempt to mobilise at election-time, 
NGOs therefore fill an important institutional vacuum and, through their links to membership- 
based POs, link large sections of the population to the formal processes of electoral 
democracy.
A number of factors account for the growing political prominence of Philippine NGOs
0
and POs. First, the restoration of democratic rights in 1986, including the right to organise, 
to free assembly, to participate in elections and to a free press, created a "democratic space" 
in which NGOs and POs could proliferate. Second, official development assistance (ODA) 
flows to the Philippines increased dramatically after 1986 as donors rushed to prop up the 
Aquino government. Illustrating increasing concerns with governance and participation, 
bilateral and multilateral ODA donors insisted on NGO participation in socio-economic 
programmes while World Bank and IntemationalMonetary Fund structural adjustment loans 
required cutbacks in government spending, forcing government departments to seek NGO 
partners. Third, the Aquino government needed NGO support in 1989 to consolidate its 
position vis-a-vis the armed forces and a Congress dominated by socio-economic, 
predominantly agrarian, elites. Ultimately, the government failed to secure wide-ranging 
NGO support but the Ramos administration is committed to securing NGO participation in 
a "social coalition" that underpins "Philippines 2000", the government’s push for Newly 
Industrializing Country (NIC) status by 2000.
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2. Philippine NGOs and Political Science.
Chapter 1 noted that political scientists have been slow to recognise the emergence of
NGOs as important political actors in the developing world. Subsequent chapters underlined
the political nature of NGO action, reinforcing the point that political scientists are well
placed to bring separate literatures on NGO action and on social movements together and to
make refinements. The dissertation highlights problems with the NGO and social movements
literature alike in interpreting patterns of NGO organisation and activity.
One problem with the NGO literature, attributable in large part to its neoliberal and
neopluralist foundation, is the assumption that NGOs have wide political latitude in
0
determining policy and strategy. Liberai-pluralist literature on interest groups sees them as
relatively autonomous with scope for manoeuvre determined mainly by the inclinations of
members. Clarke, for instance, transfers these assumptions to the NGO literature:
Because NGOs do not have to be answerable either to parliament, to 
electorates or to any constituency other than their funders, it is easy to start 
such an organisation in most countries...Provided they remain within the law 
of the land and can continue raising the money they need, they can chart their 
own course. This allows NGOs the space to innovate, to alter course, to grow 
or die as they see fit. There are rules about what you cannot do, but thereafter 
tremendous freedom.12 -
This dissertation argues however that NGOs face a complex political environment that, at 
best, exerts a significant influence over strategy and, at worst, restricts the range of available 
options. In polities such as the Philippines, characterized by intense social polarization, scope 
for manoeuvre is even further restricted. Chapter 3 noted that NGO relationships with the 
state are undermined by the enduring legacy of the Marcos regime, the continuing threat of 
cooptation, the difficulty of interpreting executive-level policy (when the government is
12 John Clark, Democratizing Development: The Role o f Voluntary Organisations,
Earthscan Publications, London, 1991, pg. 8. (emphasis from the original).
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composed of competing interests and when individual departments exhibit conflicting attitudes
towards NGOs) and the danger of becoming enmeshed in patrimonial politics. Chapter 4
analysed institutional forces stimulating the proliferation of NGOs (elite philanthropists, the
Church, overseas donors and the underground left) and argued that each exerts significant
influence over NGO strategy. In PRRM for instance, strategy must not only reconcile the
sometimes conflicting interests and perspectives of overseas donors and elite philanthropists,
but must also avoid estranging other NGOs/POs and the underground left. The chapter also
analyzed a range of mechanisms through which Philippine NGOs engage in politics (1.
coalition-building and participation in contemporary social movements; 2. volunteer
0
mobilization; 3. electoral intervention; 4. participation in local government structures; 5. 
relationships with state agencies; and 6. networking) and how NGO perspectives on each are 
influenced by competing institutional interests, an issue tackled in greater detail in the case- 
studiesrin the case of TFDP, not only do foreign donors, the Catholic Church and the 
underground left exert an influence that constrains TFDP strategy, but in particular cases (eg. 
the replacement of Sr. Mariani Dimaranan as effective head and the implementation of the 
sub-regionalisation policy), a coalition between normally antagonistic interests (European 
donors and the underground left) was required to undertake major initiatives.
Second, the NGO literature is primarily concerned with the socio-economic roles of 
NGOs and underplays^ the explicitly political dimension of their activities. In most cases, 
authors concede that NGO organising and mobilising functions and the relationships with 
grassroots POs that result, draw NGOs into political activity, but most argue that NGOs play 
a subordinate role to other institutions. Clayton, for instance, summing up a wide-ranging 
workshop discussion on the subject, .argues that "NGOs have a role in supporting local 
organisations that are working to establish democracy at a grassroots level, rather than
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supporting directly formal political parties".13 In the Philippines however, NGOs not only 
support political projects and political parties but in many cases play a critical and central role 
in mobilising broad issue-based social movements and providing political parties and 
individual candidates with organisational support during elections. The results of 1992 
elections convinced Philippine NGO leaders and academics of the continuing role of NGO 
coalitions in electoral campaigns (see Chapter 4). Equally, leaders argued that increasing 
integration into the campaigns of political parties is essential if the "progressive" political 
projects articulated by NGOs are to achieve greater success.
A third problem is the assertion that NGOs are unaccountable and internally
*
undemocratic. Palmer and Rossiter for instance argue that NGOs "have no legitimacy, 
authority, or sovereignty and crucially are self-selected and thus not accountable".14 In the 
Philippines however, the weak process of institutionalization, which sustains a weak party- 
political system and trade union movement, has strengthened the legitimacy and credibility 
of NGOs in the eyes of the national media, government agencies, and sections of Congress. 
Equally, since the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship, many of the Philippines’ larger NGOs, 
including TFDP and PRRM, have enhanced their accountability and transparency by 
reorganising internally and developing or expanding membership bases. Pressure from donors 
played a significant role but the rhetoric of "People Power" which dominated political 
discourse in the early years of the Aquino government was equally important. The fate of 
President Aquino and reformers in her administration besieged by the military, conservative
13 Andrew Clayton, "Introduction", in Andrew Clayton (Ed.), Governance, Democracy 
and Conditionality: What Role for NGOs?, INTRAC, Oxford, 1994, pg. 1.
14 R. Palmer and J. Rossiter, "Northern NGOs in Southern Africa: Some Heretical 
Thoughts", paper presented to the Conference on Critical Choices for the NGO Community: 
African Development in the 1990s, University of Edinburgh, 1990, cited in Michael Edwards 
and David Hulme (Eds.), Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a Changing 
World, Earthscan, London, 1992, pg. 17.
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technocrats and local elites underlined the need for NGOs to institutionalize and consolidate 
their power as a political force.
In a recent paper, Edwards and Hulme argue that NGO accountability is complex, 
abstract, and poorly analyzed in the NGO literature.15 Case-studies of PRRM and TFDP 
underline this point, since the ramifications of membership go beyond immediate questions 
of accountability or transparency. In PRRM, membership increases the accountability of the 
board but also enhances PRRM’s local influence and supports a broader political project. In 
TFDP, membership is directed to similar objectives yet it also threatens to undermine TFDP’s 
political focus, curb its autonomy from the NDF, engulf it in intranecine intra-left debate and 
erode the membership of partner human rights POs. Appeals ff om Edwards and Hulme for 
openness and accountability therefore underestimate the competing political pressures NGOs 
face in a relatively fractious political culture, such as the Philippines’, where the absence of 
strong mediating institutions promotes a polarisation of political debate. In the absence of 
consensus, NGOs are inevitably forced into partisan positions that undermine openness and 
.transparency, although as TFDP suggests, the consolidation of democratic reforms in the 
Philippines since 1986 is promoting greater accountability among formerly militant NGOs.-
A fourth problem concerns the institutional and individual character of NGOs, and the 
trend in the NGO literature to emphasise the latter. Farrington and Bebbington argue that 
"The strategies that [NGOs] pursue and the ways in which they position themselves-in civil 
society and in relationship to the state are an effect (not always linear) of a complex of 
individual strategies". Ultimately, they suggest, "institutional reproduction is a net effect of
15 Edwards and Hulme, "NGOs and Development...", pg. 18.
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individual actions".16 In highlighting the crucial role of dynamic and forceful individuals in 
launching and sustaining prominent NGOs and the importance of personal ties in developing 
state-NGO relationships, the dissertation supports this view. NGOs however are more than 
the sum of the individuals who work with them and, like other institutions, develop a 
momentum of their own. In the Philippines, for instance, NGOs provided a vital institutional 
platform from which disillusioned former NDF activists could develop a power-base 
independent of, and in opposition to, the CPP, increasing their autonomy and strength as 
individuals.
Developing their argument further, Farrington and Bebbington argue that "Decision-
*
makers in NGOs...have room for manoeuvre..[their] choices are not entirely free but nor, 
so our analysis has gone, are they entirely determined".17 Here again the NGO literature 
underestimates the importance of institutional concerns and tensions in influencing NGO 
strategy and restrictions on individual autonomy of action within NGOs. The case-study of 
TFDP, for instance, illustrates competing ideological and institutional pressures on senior 
managers. From above, foreign donors, the government, the Church and political parties in 
Congress urge moderation while below, pro-CPP human rights POs and cause-oriented groups 
pressure TFDP to maintain its militancy. One important consequence, as pointed out in 
Chapter 4, is that Philippine NGO coalitions and broad social movements, riddled with 
personal, professional, ideological and regional tensions, tend to be reactive and short-lived.
The dissertation illustrates that the social movements literature is equally problematic 
when applied to the Philippines. First, echoing a similar flaw in the NGO literature, the
16 John Farrington and Anthony Bebbington (Eds.), Reluctant Partners: Non- 
Governmental Organisations, The State and Sustainable Agricultural Development,
Routledge, London, 1993, pg. 56.
17 Ibid, pg. 57.
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social movements literature underestimates the impact of prevailing political culture on
NGOs. Lehmann for instance concedes that NGOs and social movements risk being sucked
into clientelistic politics and correctly differentiates this risk from the separate threat of
cooptation, yet he also argues that they undermine patron-clientelism by avoiding it as a
means of organisation.18 This dissertation, however, illustrates the significant role of patron-
clientelism in NGO organising activities. Fragmentation within the Philippine NGO
community and tension within NGO coalitions is to a significant extent underpinned by
personal cleavages and many NGOs entail a small, subordinate staff ranged around a single,
dominant, individual. Equally, relationships between NGOs and state agencies are
*
characterised by significant patron-client ties, with government ministers appointed from the 
NGO community showing clear favouritism towards their respective organisations.
Second, illustrating the neo-marxist basis of the social movements literature, some 
authors argue that institutionalization undermines the political efficacy of social movements, 
and by implication, NGOs. In contrast to the concern with "scaling-up" in the NGO 
literature, Gunder-Frank and Fuentes argue that "...institutionalization weakens social 
movements... [T]hey require flexible, adaptive and autonomous nonauthoritarian organisation 
to direct social power in pursuit of social goods which can be pursued only through random 
spontaneity".19 PRRM experience’s supports this point. Early success, built on the 
dynamism and zeal of its volunteer Rural Reconstruction Workers dissipated in the late 1960s 
and 1970s as the organisation became increasingly bureaucratic. In the period since 1986
18 David Lehmann, Democracy and Development in Latin America: Economics, 
Politics and Religion in the Postwar Period, Polity Press, London, 1990, pg. 174.
19 Andre Gunder-Frank and Marta Fuentes, "Civil Democracy: Social Movements in 
Recent World History" in Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder-Frank and 
Immanuel Wallerstein (Eds.), Transforming the Revolution: Social Movements and the 
World System, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1990, pg. 176.
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however, PRRM’s bureaucratic character has proved a significant ingredient in its success.
Similarly, TFDP’s dynamism and stature increased as it evolved from an essentially volunteer
organisation in the mid 1970s to a professional NGO with centralised management structures.
This dissertation also suggests that NGOs characterised by a strong process of institutional
development play a critical role in sustaining social movements in polities characterised by
a weak process of institutionalization within civil society. Again highlighting the importance
of institutional pressures on NGOs, TFDP has played aT crucial role in sustaining the
Philippine human rights movement, despite lacking full autonomy from the CPP, a party
noted for its centralizing and authoritarian instincts.
*
A third problem, again echoing the neo-marxist underpinnings of much of the social 
movements literature, is the suggestion that social movements develop spontaneously.20 The 
reactive and transitory nature of Philippine social movements such as the Freedom From Debt 
Coalition (FDC) or the Congress for a Peoples Agrarian Reform (CPAR) underpins this 
point. Philippine social movements however are also underpinned by a complex coalition of 
NGOs, POs, cause-oriented groups and political parties, and NGOs play an important 
institutional role in launching and sustaining them, undermining arguments about their 
spontaneous character.
Fourth, some social movements theorists argue that new or contemporary social 
movements depoliticize previously activated popular sectors.21 In an important respect, this
20 See for instance Ponna Wignaraja, "Rethinking Development and Democracy", in 
Ponna Wignaraja (Ed.), New Social Movements in the South: Empowering the People, 
Zed Books, London, 1993, pp. 19 & 28.
21 See, for instance, Samir Amin, "Social Movements in the Periphery", in ibid, pg. 76. 
Amin argues that "some" of the "new" social movements "are deadends,., symptoms of the 
crisis, not solutions to it, and exclusively products of disillusionment. They will eventually 
lose steam as they reveal their powerlessness in the face of the real challenge" (pg. 87). Amin 
however fails to identify these movements, or criteria which others might use to identify 
them.
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argument is problematic when applied the Philippines. During the Marcos regime, Dohner 
and Haggard note, the urban "popular sector" and the labour movement remained weak and 
unable to defend themselves against the onslaught of structural adjustment policies while 
under Aquino, labour’s power remained "quite limited".22 Within this context, NGOs have 
played a crucial role in sustaining urban social movements and articulating the mobilising 
discourse of "new politics". The case of the Philippines, however, also suggests that NGOs 
and the contemporary social movements in which they participate do deactivate previously 
activated popular sectors (see further below).
*
3. NGOs, the State and Civil Society in the Philippines.
The proliferation of NGOs and POs and their increasing role in political life has led 
to wide-ranging speculation among Philippine politicians, activists and commentators from 
both left and right. In 1972, Edicio de la Torre founded the underground Christians for 
National Liberation (CNL), the largest constituent organisation in the National Democratic 
Front (NDF). Released from prison in 1986, de la Torre foreswore armed struggle and the 
democratic centralism of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) to focus on building 
NGOs and POs. De larTorre helped establish the Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD), and 
later established the Education for Life Foundation (ELF). By 1993, he viewed NGOs and 
POs as critical new institutions in advancing the interests of millions traditionally estranged 
from political power and economic opportunity: "the [govemment]-NGO-PO trinity", de la
22 Robert Dohner and Stephen Haggard, The Political Feasibility of Adjustment in the 
Philippines, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Development Centre, Paris, 1994, pp. 11 and 22.
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Torre wrote, "structures our dreams of empowerment".23
De la Torre’s optimism echoes a vibrant discourse* about the possibilities and
limitations of NGO action among activists based in NGOs, POs and "cause-oriented groups".
Mainstream political actors however have become increasingly aware of the discourse, its
implications and the need to control it. In a speech in Guam in 1993 for instance, Senate
President Edgardo Angara, a prominent leader, at that time, of the opposition which Ramos’s
"strategic alliance" is designed to circumvent,24 argued that "the transformation of NGOs
into a potent political force underscores the purposeful and strong national effort to turn the
Philippines into Asia’s next economic dragon.. .NGOs [have become] a formidable movement
*
for people empowerment, helping the government strengthen grass-roots linkages so vital to 
faster and more equitable growth and development".25 The apparent consensus between the 
moderate left and right, between politicians and social activists traditionally opposed to each 
other, indicates a slow drift to the centre in Philippine politics, a post-authoritarian process 
of normalisation. Equally however, it raises fundamental questions about the nature of NGO 
action and its impact on Philippine politics, the state and civil society. Does a vibrant NGO 
community strengthen civil society? Can it transform relations-between the state and civil 
society? Can it help to empower the millions traditionally marginalized from political 
participation?
4. NGOs and Civil Society in the Philippines. J
In a seminal work of political science theory, Samuel Huntington argued in 1968 that
23 Edicio de la Torre, "Foreword" in Eric Guiterrez, Ties That Bind: A Guide To The 
Family, Business And Other Interests in the Ninth Congress, Philippine Center for 
Investigative Journalism, Manila 1994, pg. ii.
24 Angara later joined the reconstituted, pro-Ramos, Lakas-Laban coalition.
25 "Angara cites rise of NGOs...", The Manila Bulletin, 13 June 1993.
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"praetorianism", political disorder that inevitably and necessarily led to military intervention
and authoritarian rule, resulted in developing polities when political institutionalization failed
to aggregate ever-increasing rates of political participation stimulated by economic growth and
social change.26 To resolve the conundrum, Huntington recommended restricting political
participation to a level that did not overburden existing institutions, allowing participation to
expand only as institutionalization gathered momentum. Widely dismissed for its authoritarian
bent and thinly-disguised preoccupation with American national security concerns, Huntington
nevertheless highlighted a critical problem in developing countries: political
institutionalization inevitably fails to keep pace with the exponential growth in political
*
demands from previous marginalised social strata, triggered by rapid economic growth and/or 
social change. The Philippines epitomizes the dilemma. The collapse of the Marcos regime 
in February 1986 led to an outpouring of political demands suppressed by almost 14 years 
of authoritarian rule. Political institutions had also been repressed however and could not 
recover at a rate sufficient to aggregate competing political demands. The result was growing 
polarization and the renewal of fighting between the armed forces and the New Peoples Army 
in  February 1987.
But how do NGOs help to resolve the Huntington conundrum? Huntington himself 
foresaw no role for them,27 yet in arguing that political modernization involves the ' 
rationalization of authority, the differentiation of sffuctures and the expansion of political - 
participation28^  he provides a clue, for NGOs have strengthened each of these processes in
26 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, 
Yale, 1968.
27 Huntington felt that the political stalemate between state and an agrarian- or rural based
civil society could only be broken through four mechanisms: a nationalist movement; a 
competitive party system; a military coup; and revolution (ibid, pg. 75).
28 Ibid, pg. 93.
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the Philippines. NGOs have contributed a rationalization of authority in a number of ways.
First, they have promoted issue-based political debate in a polity dominated by patronage-
based political debate and filled a crucial gap left by political parties. In the Philippines, the
weak membership base and formal local networks of political parties (with the possible
exception of the Communist Party of the Philippines) allows NGOs and POs to organise and
mobilise in a relative institutional vacuum. Because of their professional staff (often
prominent activists), well-developed administrative systems, regular funding, and research,
documentation and publication programmes, NGOs provide leaders and secretarial support
needed to launch issue-specific political campaigns. As a result, NGOs and NGO leaders play
<0
an important brokering role in broad social movement-based coalitions such as the Philippine 
Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA), the Congress for a Peoples Agrarian Reform 
(CPAR) and the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) that have helped to undermine 
patronage-based debate. Second, NGOs promote legal forms of political struggle. In the 
Philippines in particular, they absorbed both the rank-and-file and the senior cadre of the 
Communist Party, especially following the releases of 1986, and exerted a moderating 
influence on the CPP (eg. TFDP) or undermined it through breakaways (eg. the popular 
democrats in PRRM). As both case-studies illustrate, NGOs provide critics of the CPP with 
an institutional base from which to challenge its quest for hegemony over the left-wing 
oppositionTThird, because NGOs use their direct programme experience as a platform from 
which to project political campaigns, NGO advocacy tends to be less rhetorical, more 
focused, well-argued and better documented than the campaigns of cause-oriented groups, 
again exerting a moderating influence on broad social movements.
NGOs have also contributed to a differentiation of structures. NGOs complement and 
supplement the institutions which have traditionally fostered political debate in the
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Philippines, including trade unions, peasant associations, political parties and the Churches.
As the cases of PRRM and TFDP illustrate, leading Philippine NGOs have overcome
significant pressures in maintaining or expanding their autonomy from other actors including
government, the underground left, the Catholic Church and business interests. Although the
NGO community as a whole is highly fragmented, Philippine NGOs unite around particular
ideological positions, (eg. national democrat, popular democrat, socialist, social democratic
etc.) providing ideologically-coherent choices to partner POs. NGOs have also developed
targeted programmes, often in alliance with other institutions, leading to the specialization
of function inherent to a differentiation of structures.
*
The expansion of political participation represents the main political achievement of 
Philippines NGOs. Traditional mass-membership institutions such as political parties, trade 
unions and peasant associations lack the effective ability to mobilise and aggregate political 
demands. The party political system remains debilitated by weak membership bases, weak 
internal party discipline, and weak ideological cohesion. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino 
(Fight for Philippine Democracy), ostensibly the largest political party in Congress, but in 
reality a disparate coalition of personalist cliques, has a national membership of little more 
than 1,500.29 Even the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the only mass- 
membership political party in the Philippines and legalised in 1993, had only 3,000 members 
in the late 1980s.30 Thus, on its own the Philippine party system cannot facilitate political 
participation to the extent that it anchors effective functioning democratic institutions. Trade 
unions are equally problematic. In 1991 for instance, registered trade unions had a total
29 "Laban Overhaul Readied", The Manila Times, 21 November 1994.
30 "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors", Central Committee, Communist 
Party of the Philippines, July 1992, pg. 33.
322
membership of 3,114,000, equivalent to only 13% of the total labour force,31 and the
particular character of Philippine industry, with little heavy manufacturing or geographically-
concentrated industrial activity (with the exception of Manila), undermines the power of trade
unions in expanding participation. Statistics on the number and membership of peasant
associations is difficult to secure since many do not register with government (although the
2,916 registered rural cooperatives directly employ 17,496 workers32). As with trade unions
however , particular obstacles exist to using them to expand political participation. While
relatively spontaneous and short-lived political campaigns often develop in response to
specific agrarian crises, few peasant associations can financially support the mass leaders and
*
administrative capacity needed to become durable and proactive political actors. In addition, 
while trade unions are limited to workers and peasant associations to particular types of 
farmers, NGOs make wide-ranging appeals to a variety of identities and in response to 
disparate concerns. NGOs therefore represent a vital supplement to trade unions and peasant — 
associations in expanding political participation.
Underlining this argument, Robin Broad reported in 1993 that NGOs and POs had an 
organised constituency of 5m to 6m, or almost 10% of the population.33 Broad offers no
31 1991 Philippine Development Report, National Economic and Development 
Authority, Manila, June 1992, pg. 217. Thompson notes that in 1985, trade unions claimed 
a labour force unionisation rate of 20% but that a mere 262,000 workers (2.6% of the labour 
force) were covered by collective bargaining agreements. He claims that trade union 
membership is closer to the latter than to the former figure (Mark Thompson, "The Labor 
Movement Opposition to the Marcos Regime", in Proceedings of the Thirteenth 
International Symposium on Asian Studies 1991, Asian Research Service, Hong Kong, 
pg. 418).
32 Fernando T. Aldaba, "The Role of Philippine NGOs in Social Transformation: The 
Need for an Assessment", paper prepared for the Caucus of Development NGO Networks 
(CODE-NGO), October 1992, pg. 7, citing statistics produced by the Cooperatives 
Development Authority.
33 Robin Broad with John Cavanagh, Plundering Paradise: The Struggle for the 
Environment in the Philippines, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1993, pg. 135.
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details of her calculations but almost certainly they include the membership of trade unions,
peasant associations, rural cooperatives, and Basic Christian Cdmmunities.34 Broad’s estimate
exaggerates the organised constituency of NGOs and POs but it points to two important
characteristics of the NGO/PO community; first, that a disparate range of institutions such
as trade unions, peasant associations and cooperatives are now viewed generically in the
Philippines as "peoples’ organisations" in keeping with_a significant new popular discourse;
and second, that NGOs play an important intermediary role in coalescing these institutions
in issue-based contemporary social movements. NGOs have a significant ability to liaise
between a disparate range of institutions including Peoples Organisations (trade unions,
*
peasant associations, rural co-operatives and issue-specific "cause-oriented groups"), the 
Churches, business concerns,- political parties, and government departments. This 
"intermediary" or "meso" position makes NGOs a distinctive and additional "layer" of civil 
society, between local mass-memberships institutions such as peasant associations, rural 
cooperatives, credit unions, and Basic Christian Communities on the one hand and national 
institutions such as political parties, the national media and government on the other. In this 
sense, NGOs hav£ contributed to a strengthening of civil society.
A number of factors however suggest that NGOs simultaneously weaken civil society 
or replicate existing weaknesses. First, the proliferation of NGOs since the mid-1980s 
resulted in significant part from the weakening of other political forces, especially the armed 
and underground left. The case-study of PRRM for instance illustrates that NGOs often 
mobilise sectors already organised and politically active, by competing with other well- 
established NGOs and luring away POs, often from the clutches of the CPP. The CPP itself
34 Elsewhere, Broad notes that the figure includes lm trade union members and lm 
members of peasant associations (Robin Broad, "The Poor and the Environment: Friends or 
Foes?", World Development, Vol. 22 No. 6, 1994).
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estimates that membership shrank by 300% by the late 1980s (due to strategic blunders and 
the government counterinsurgency operations35) and its mass base shrank to a similar extent 
amid intense organising by NGOs.36 According to Boudreau, other socialist parties were also 
affected by a general pattern of demobilization during the Aquino years.37 This dissertation 
suggests that the proliferation of NGOs and POs changed the character of popular political 
participation after 1986. By concentrating on the upward linkages that NGOs form, especially 
with government actors, the dissertation offers little evidence on the character of downward 
relationships (between NGOs and beneficiaries).38 Thus, while the TFDP case-study
illustrated the organisation of victims of human rights and their relatives as participant
*
political forces (through POs such as FIND, KAPATID and SELDA) It did not make clear 
whether such activity increased participation or simply attracted support away from other 
organisations or institutions. Despite this lacunae however, the dissertation suggests that NGO 
proliferation intensified competition among intermediary institutions for the support of POs 
and mass memberships. In the Philippine context, historically, such competition weakens civil 
society by fragmenting mass movements and making them vulnerable to cooptation by the
35 "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles...", pg. 33. — .
36 Bello, for instance, estimates that the CPP’s mass base contracted by 40% between the 
late 1980s and 1992 (Walden Bello, "The Crisis of the Philippine Progressive Movement: A 
Preliminary Investigation", Debate, No. 4, September 1992, pg. 45.-
37 Vincent Boudreau, "At the Margins of the Movement: Grassroots Associations in the 
Philippine Socialist Network"7Ph.D. thesis, Department of Government, Cornell University, 
1993, pg. 20.
38 Although the research does provide tentative support for Gregorio-Medal’s conclusion 
that Philippine NGO employees are largely middle-class and university-educated and that 
Philippine NGOs are consequently middle-class oriented (Angelita Gregorio-Medal, 
"Development Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the Democratization of 
Philippine Society", Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, 
Germany, 1992, Chapter 5, especially pg. 140). Chapter 5 illustrated resentment on the part 
of local NGOs and POs at the higher salaries paid by PRRM and consequent poaching of 
staff, while Chapter 6 illustrated similar resentment from local human rights POs at the 
salaries paid to TFDP workers and their resultant life styles, including eating in restaurants 
and wearing fashionable clothes.
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Another problem is that it is difficult to compare the incremental policy changes wrought by 
NGO action and the social polarisation and consequent structural change wrought by more 
militant political action, and hence that NGOs increased the efficacy of political participation. 
If NGOs do not improve the efficacy of political participation, they can hardly be said to 
have strengthened civil society.
A second major problem is the distinctive regulatory environment found in the
Philippines. As Chapter 3 noted, the weak regulatory framework enforced at the national
level, and a resultant environment which gave considerable scope to local officials to shape
the political character of the NGO community, allowed a penetration of the NGO community
  *
by social forces opposed to structural change. As a result, the NGO community became an 
arena within which batdes from society at large were internalised, and multiplied, Gramscian 
"trenches” or "permanent fortifications" in a "war of position" waged between dominant and 
subordinate classes.39 This complicates the government’s attempt to seek a strategic 
partnership with NGOs since a large section of the NGO community is used to defend the 
patronage-based character of the political system, and the particular interests of entrenched 
socio-economic elites. In the sense that Philippine politics has for hundreds of years been 
characterized by a weak state in perennial conflict with strong, disparate, social forces, NGOs 
simply replicate existing tensions within civil society and between society and the state.
A third problem is that NGOs, like other political institutions, are an integral part of 
society, and reflect its dominant values and ethos. While NGOs have a certain capacity to
39 According to Gramsci, "The massive structures of the modem democracies, both as 
State organisations and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of 
politics as it were the ’trenches’ and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of 
position: they render merely ’partial’ the element of movement which before used to be ’the 
whole’ of the war, etc." (Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (Eds.), Selections From 
The Prison Notebooks Of Antonio Gramsci, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971, pg. 
243.
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alter political culture, eg. animating issue-based political debate in a polity dominated by 
patronage-based debate, the logical consequence is that they remain open to influence from 
other institutions. As Chapters 4 to 6 illustrated, Philippine NGOs are characterised by 
regional, ideological, professional and personality cleavages, undermining their ability to 
strengthen civil society. Yet in a polarised political culture like the Philippines’, institutions 
that aggregate competing political demands take on a strategic character and NGOs have made 
significant progress in reducing tension within the NGO community and between NGOs and 
the state through coalition initiatives such as the Caucus of Development NGO Networks 
(CODE-NGO), illustrating a political maturity that distinguishes them from political parties,
y  —
trade unions and peasant associations. _
5. NGOs and the Philippine State.
The work of Anek Laothamatas and Andrew MacIntyre on business associations in 
Thailand and Indonesia respectively marks a new and influential vein in the study of South- 
East Asian politics.40 Despite the prevalence of authoritarian patterns of rule in the region in 
recent decades, fissures in state cohesion, triggered by complex processes of economic and 
social change, are being increasingly exploited, giving rise to a new degree of autonomy to 
important political actors and social forces. In turn, this new autonomy is changing the nature 
both of state-society relations and of "development" in South-East Asia. In its analysis of the 
NGO community and its impact on, and beyond, the Philippine state, this research aims to- 
reinforce this new vein in the study of South-East Asian politics.
40 Anek Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy of 
Thailand, Westview Press, Boulder, 1992; Andrew MacIntyre, Business and Politics in 
Indonesia, Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen and Unwin, 
Sydney, 1990.
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The Philippine state is simultaneously both strong and weak. It has sufficient strength 
to extract rents through the selective application of government regulations, to support the 
economic interests of its key supporters, and to permeate civil society (through government- 
influenced trade unions, NGOs etc.). Similarly, it controls a military and para-military 
apparatus that successfully represses threats to the status quo. On the other hand however, the 
state is unable to isolate its administrative machinery from the pervasive influence of powerful 
social forces and is unable to implement reform-oriented programmes or attract broadly-based 
institutional support.41
Chapters 2-3 and 5-6 illustrate significant ways in which NGOs help to strengthen the 
state. Through participation, they help to build pockets of efficiency within government 
agencies, provide strategic partners for reform-oriented ministries, fill voids in the 
government’s social service delivery role, and help the executive to circumvent Congress to 
forge direct ties with the population. Similarly, through protest, NGOs strengthen the state: 
by aggregating and moderating political demands and by providing channels distinct from 
Congress through which disputes can be negotiated and dissipated. "[FJreedom of association 
in political matters", Alexis de Tocqueville argued in 1840, "is not so dangerous to public 
tranquillity as is supposed; and.. .possibly after having agitated society for some time, it may 
strengthen the State in the end".42
Claims that state-NGO links are critical or central to government attempts to increase 
its capacity and autonomy need careful qualification however. President Ramos has publicly 
committed his government to attracting wide-ranging NGO/PO participation in a "strategic
41 Migdal refers to this as "the duality of state strength" (Joel S. Migdal, Strong States 
and Weak Societies: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988, pg. 8.
42 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume II, (translated by Henry 
Reeve), P.F. Collier & Son, New York, 1900, pg. 126.
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alliance" that engenders social cohesion and underpins economic growth. Political scientists
face an interesting challenge in conceptualizing such an alliance. Montgomery uses the
concept of "bureaucratic populism" to describe growing state overtures to NGOs in different
parts of the developing world.43 Historically however, populism has been the more general
correlate of corporatism, a specific institutional arrangement linking government, business and
organised labour in tripartite power-sharing structures. In the Philippines, the Ramos
government is committed to developing relationships with business, organised labour, and
NGOs/POs, in that order of priority, and state-NGO relationships are therefore essentially
neo-corporatist. The strategy has clear historical roots. In the 1950s, as argued in Chapters
*
2 and 5, President Ramon Magsaysay used NGOs such as PRRM to undermine the Huk 
insurgency and to expand his autonomy from Congress. Simultaneously, Magsaysay continued 
to enforce-the demobilization of militant labour achieved in the early 1950s through the 
suspension of the writ of habeas- corpus,44 and the 1953 Industrial Peace Act. The Act 
instituted collective-bargaining with the newly-established and government controlled 
Philippines Trade Union Congress and allowed the Magsaysay government to promote US- 
style economic trade unionism and to suppress its political equivalent. Ramos government 
strategy is remarkably similar. During the Aquino years, the militant trade union movement 
Kilusang Mayo Uno (May First Movement) was weakened by the murder of its leaders and 
the repression of its grassroots constituent members. During the early years of the Ramos 
administration, the internal CPP "Reaffirm" V "Reject" debate in 1992-93 led to a split and
43 J.D. Montgomery, Bureaucrats and People: Grassroots Participation in Third 
World Development, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1988.
44 Suspension of the writ of habeas corpus between 1950 and 1952, the resultant arrest 
of labour leaders, and the murder of labour leaders by privately-armed anti-communist 
vigilante gangs led to collapse of urban trade union organisations such as the Manila-based 
Congress of Labour Organisations and the Cebu-based Federacion Obrero de Filipinos 
(Federation of Filipino Workers).
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KMU fragmented, its threat to the government radically diminished.45 At the same time, the 
government has maintained loose collective bargaining mechanisms through the Labour 
Advisory and Consultative Council (LACC) with the support of the moderate Trade Union 
Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), which have proved successful in controlling militant 
labour activity. Similarly, Ramos has made significant overtures to the Chinese-Filipino 
business community (previously estranged by Aquino government links to the Filipino 
businessmen of European origin but consolidating their position as the dynamo of the private 
sector), to attract their support in circumventing Congress, and hence increase productive 
investment.
* _
The government’s commitment to collaboration with NGOs is, in part, tactical. Much 
of the collaboration in the post-1986 period is attributable to the Philippines’ traditional 
Presidential system of government revived in the 1987 constitution which institutionalizes an 
adversarial relationship between the President and Congress and forces the President to seek 
cabinet members outside the House and Senate. Both Presidents Aquino and Ramos turned 
to NGO leaders for cabinet appointees who in turn recruited NGO workers into the 
bureaucracy and involved NGOs in departmental planning and programme implementation. 
As of 1993, however, the Ramos government is exploring the possibility of abolishing the 
Presidential system and replacing it with a parliamentary system of government. If successful, 
the plan would deny NGOs access to cabinet positions, undermine collaboration with 
government departments and force government and opposition political parties alike to 
challenge NGOs in organising and mobilising specific local interests.
45 Member organisations opposed to KMU’s support for the orthodox Marxist-Leninist- 
Mao Tse Tung Thought philosophy of the CPP, left to form Bukluran ng Manggagawang 
Filipino (BMP, Alliance of Filipino Workers)(BMP was previously the main left-wing labour 
movement before being banned in 1980) in 1993, seriously eroding KMU’s ranks.
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The significant influence NGOs have acquired over government policy in areas such 
as agricultural, fisheries and forestry development, land reform, health, environmental 
protection, and human rights highlights the general lack of autonomy the Philippine state 
enjoys from societal interests and its inability to enforce existing laws and regulations. A 
strengthening of government autonomy from elite societal interests, and its ability to 
implement the reform-oriented social change needed to consolidate progress in these specific 
areas, will inevitably necessitate a firmer stance towards the "popular sector". This will 
inevitably curb the political power of NGOs through the enforcement of existing regulations 
and the introduction of new ones.
*
Nevertheless, despite progress made since 1987, institutional paralysis (notably the 
gridlock between the Senate and executive and the sluggish performance of government 
ministries) continues to undermine the post-authoritarian process of democratic consolidation. 
Within this context, the proliferation of NGOs since 1986 and their increasing participation 
in politics ensures their continuing political importance. A number of factors suggest the 
number of NGOs in 1993 will continue to increase. In many parts of the country, NGO 
numbers are insufficient to fill available places on local government bodies or to meet the 
demand for NGO partners for "pork barrel" programmes such as the Countryside 
Development Fund. Competing political forces will inevitably respond by establishing new 
organisations. As implementation of the 1991 Local Government Code continues, government 
resources dispersed at the local level will increase dramatically, while Congressional pork- 
barrel funding to NGOs through the CDF and similar programmes designed to counteract the 
patronage power of central government will also increase.46 These developments suggest that
46 In 1994, Congress reportedly secured P9.5b (roughly US$340m) in "congressional 
initiative funds" from the government in return for approving a value-added tax bill (See 
Rigoberto Tiglao, "Paralysed by Politics", Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 May 1994,
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NGOs will become increasingly important as weapons in conflicts between the government 
and entrenched socio-economic elites, forcing progressive NGOs, including those ostensibly 
concerned with socio-economic development, to maintain their involvement in political 
processes. At the same time, the current fragmentation of the Communist Party of the 
Philippines and its mass base, echoing the fragmentation of Huk organisations in the 1950s 
and ’60s, may well lead to a process of demobilization and falling political participation. 
NGOs and the POs with which they work closely will therefore face the challenge of 
sustaining existing levels of organisation and mobilisation among affected communities. 
Almost certainly, the continuing weak process of institutionalization in the Philippines will 
prevent NGOs from focusing on the socio-economic roles envisaged by the "third sector" 
advocates. Political scientists will therefore continue to find important clues to the evolving 
character of Philippine politics in the praxis of Philippine NGOs and further justification for 
attempts to explore the general political science of NGO organisation and activity. —
pg. 23). Almost certainly, the total value of CDF funding, a high, albeit unknown, amount 
of which is channelled through NGOs, will increase significantly.
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